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The public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements require the optimization of risk allocation between 
the public and private sectors in order to achieve the best net present value (NPV). Many researchers 
mentioned that the risk events of a PPP infrastructure projects are interdependent over project life cycle. 
Sterman (1992) stated that a large-scale construction project that is complex and has highly dynamic 
and interdependent risks and uncertainties over long-term project life cycle. Williams (2002) also 
mentioned that the risk usually interact each other with nonlinear relationships over time in a complex 
project. Dey and Ogunlana (2004) contended that there is a need to analyze risk interactions of 
complex infrastructure projects such as build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects over their long-term 
project life. In modern approaches to PPP project risk management, experts assume risk factors are 
independent and ignore the risk interaction effects over project life cycle, so the project risks cannot be 
effectively managed and controlled. The researcher proposed a modelling approach that used a risk 
network model applying System Dynamics (SD) techniques to estimate risk interaction effects on 
project NPV over time. The researcher used another SD model built on the risk network model to 
estimate the beneficial effects of bidding proposals on project NPV over time and to see how 
efficiently the risk effects can be reduced and the NPV performance can be improved. Then, the 
researcher applied appropriate stochastic analyses including mean-variance, mean semi-variance, 
stochastic dominance and expected-loss ratio to compare range values of NPV among different bidding 
proposals. A capable PPP concessionaire with the best project NPV performance can hence be selected. 
An industry case was applied to demonstrate SD decision models. The SD decision models have been 
validated through the behaviour reproduction test and multivariate sensitivity analysis. This proved that 
the proposed approach is robust and applicable to address real world problems to evaluate the long-
term performance of a PPP project concessionaire. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Background 
Officials in control of public works utilities such as electricity, water, sanitation, 
telecommunications and transportation infrastructure projects play a critical role in developing direct 
and indirect links to living standards and economic growth. According to the World Bank’s global 
statistics (Table 1), Fay and Yaps (2003) reported that an estimated USD $370 billion per annum are 
needed in new investment for infrastructure projects from 2005 to 2010. This totals nearly 1% of the 
worldwide gross domestic product (GDP). Another USD $480 billion or 1.2% of global GDP is needed 
by officials for maintaining such projects. Thus, the total resources needed to maintain projects are 
approximately 2.1% of GDP, excluding any expenditures on rehabilitations or upgrades. However, in 
most countries, inefficiencies and losses are largely relative to the infrastructure investment.  For 
example, the World Bank (1994) reported that until the 1990s, most developing countries relied on 
public sector monopolies to finance and operate their infrastructures. This reliance by officials on 
monopolies yielded disappointing results. Technical inefficiencies in power, water, roads, and railway 
systems have caused losses of approximately USD $55 billion a year in the early 1990s which is 
equivalent to 1% of the combined GDP of all developing countries. This figure represents a quarter of 
the annual infrastructure investment and twice the annual development financing for an infrastructure. 
With public provision, infrastructure services are often priced incorrectly to meet short-term political 
goals, thus leading to additional losses of USD $123 billion annually (World Bank, 2002). In addition, 
“public financing of infrastructure also represents a large fiscal burden on governments, consuming 
resources that might otherwise be available to meet other social needs. (Gray, 2001)”  
Beginning in the late 1980s, officials in many countries turned to the private sector for both 
the management of existing infrastructure enterprise operations and for the financing of new 
infrastructure assets. Engaging the private sector officials in this capacity was expected to provide a 
number of benefits to all parties involved. These benefits included cost savings, risk mitigation, service 
and revenue improvement, as well as employment opportunities, and economic growth enhancement   2
(Work Bank, 1999b). This approach was called public-private partnership (PPP or P3). Kernagham 
(1993) defined PPP as “a cooperative venture between the public and private sectors, built on the 
expertise of each partner, that best meets clearly defined public needs through the appropriate 
allocation of resources, risks and rewards.”. From 1990 to 2000, private financial participation in 
existing enterprises dominated investment trends, and accounted for USD$682 billion of investments 
(World Bank, 2002).  
 
Table 1 The Expected Annual Investment Needs for Year 2005-2010 (Fay & 
Yepes, 2003)1 
 
  New Maintenance  Total 
  US$Mn %GDP US$Mn %GDP  US$Mn %GDP
By income group          
Low Income  49,988  3.18%  58,619 3.73%  108,607  6.92% 
Middle Income  183,151  2.64%  173,035 2.50% 356,187 5.14% 
High income  135,956  0.42%  247,970 0.76% 383,926 1.18% 
Developing countries by region          
East Asia & Pacific  99,906  3.67% 78,986  2.90% 178,892 6.57% 
South Asia  28,069  3.06%  35,033 3.82%  63,101 6.87% 
Europe & Central Asia  39,069  2.76% 58,849  4.16% 97,918  6.92% 
Middle East & N. Africa  14,884  2.37% 13,264  2.11% 28,148  4.48% 
Sub-Saharan Africa  13,268  2.84% 12,644  2.71% 25,912  5.55% 
Latin America & Caribb.  37,944  1.62% 32,878  1.40% 70,822  3.02% 
All developing countries  233,139 2.74% 231,654 2.73% 464,793 5.47% 
World  369,095 0.90% 479,624 1.17% 848,719 2.07% 
          
 
Dey and Ogunlana (2004) stated one of the most popular PPP delivery options is build-
operate-transfer (BOT). The BOT was defined as a government contractor with a private-sector partner 
(the concessionaire), constructing an infrastructure facility and giving the private partner the right to 
operate within a certain concession period. At the end of the concession period, the private partner 
transfers ownership of the facility to the government (UN/ECE, 2000). Due to the following essential   3
characteristics, there would be highly complex uncertainties throughout the project’s duration 
(Ababutain, 2001; Dalmon, 2001; Esty, 2003; Kumaraswamy & Morris, 2002; Lang, 1998; Miller & 
Lessard, 2001 UN/ECE, 2002; Zhang et al., 2002): 
•  Project Long-term life. A BOT mega project is a long-term project with a specified concession 
period, usually 25 to 40 years or more. The longer the development time, the higher the likelihood 
that the project will be affected by surfacing events. 
•  Heterogeneous supply chain and risk. The supply chain of a BOT infrastructure project consists 
of work packages from various industries. For example, there are work packages from civil-work 
engineering, station construction, track systems, depots construction, electricity & machine core 
systems and operation & maintenance services involved in the Taiwan high speed rail system 
project. The manpower, materials and equipment are integrated with a corporate target to reduce 
system-integration risks and ensure efficiency. The heterogeneous risks during the design, 
construction and operation stages include finance, economy, technology, origination, contract 
management, politics, statutory regulation, environment, and so on. 
•  Private financing. In a BOT project, the concession contractor is responsible for securing long-
term funding sources that usually last up to 20 years in order to ensure ongoing development and 
operation of the project. 
•  Risk sharing/allocation. The project risks are shared between public and private sectors through 
contracts and agreements. The concession contractor (project concessionaire) is the core of BOT 
project structure (Figure 1). Parties such as government authority (project owner), stakeholders 
(investor), subcontractors, and suppliers link to the concession contractor through the 
corresponding agreements/contracts. Furthermore, each party is dependent on the performance of 
all parties to the project collectively, not only its interlocking counterpart. 
•  SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle). The BOT concession contractor must provide an excellent SPV 
which is the mechanism in which diverse functions of finance, design, construction and operation 
are integrated, and a cooperative relationship is formed (Figure 1.1). In a traditional non PPP 
project, these functions are fragmented, and relationships among multiple participants are often 
confrontational. 
   4
1.2 Research Issues 
Value for money (VFM) is a core objective for individuals involved in PPP projects (Allan, 
2001; HM Treasury/UK, 2006; Whitfield, 2006). VFM is the optimum combination of whole project 
life costs and benefits under consideration to meet user requirement; not simply the lowest costs or 
cheapest prices (Allan; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; HM Treasury, 2004a). A major purpose of the PPP 
arrangement is the transfer and allocation of risks to the party who is the most capable of efficiently 
managing these risks. The purpose of the PPP is to optimize risk allocation between public and private 
sectors for achieving the best project VFM (Allan; Davies, 2006; Grimsey & Lewis; HM Treasury, 
2004b; United Nations, 2002). In many previous studies, researchers revealed that a critical component 
to the success of a PPP project was the selection of a private-sector partner who could provide the best 
overall arrangement throughout the PPP development process (Aziz, 2007; Chan et al., 2001; Zhang, 
2005a). Researchers found that another important step toward success was the selection of a 
concessionaire who offered the best value monetarily yet who had the capability to deliver the required 
services (Zhang, 2004b, 2004a, 2005; Norment, 2007). However, the researcher found that the major 








Figure 1 The Typical Structure of BOT Projects Modified from (Dalmon, 2001; 
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•  They miss a link between risk analysis and contractor selection. 
The prevailing contractor/bidding proposal selection process for PPP projects is usually 
divided at the point of the risk management. The features of a BOT project show that the 
concessionaire undertakes more commitments and assumes more risks than a mere contractor in a 
traditional procurement project (Zhang, 2005a). “The complexity of the BOT arrangement leads to 
increased levels of risk exposure for all parties, and gives rise to the need for a new perspective in risk 
analysis. The future development of this scheme is largely dependent on the risk management system. 
Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate a concessionaire’s competence by integrating risk analysis into 
the selection process(Dey & Ogunlana, 2004).”  
•  They are unable to deal with semi-structured or unstructured real-world problems. 
The problems which officials of large infrastructures need to address in project development 
and assignment include finance, technology, economy, contract management, organization, politics, 
regulation, and so on. These problems are viewed as both heterogeneous and structured, as well as 
unstructured. In current studies, researchers are incapable of evaluating risks or simply ignore the 
unstructured and qualitative risk issues. For example, Liou and Huang (2008), in their use of the 
automated contractual-negotiation model, ignored the impact of non-financial risk factors on NPV. 
Deng (2004) did not investigate the impact of non-financial risk factors in the decision support system 
and the expert system for PPP project funding and cash flow management. Mackie et al. (2003) have 
criticized current approaches incorporating cost-benefit analysis (CBA) with claims that it is difficult to 
quantify non-monetary terms. 
•  They do not address interdependently dynamic and non-linear risk interactions. 
In reality, the risks of a mega PPP project are interdependent through nonlinear relationships 
over the long-term life cycle of the project (Sterman, 1992). However, in current practices, researchers 
assume that risk factors are independent. For example, the Washington State Department of Transport’s 
CEVP (Cost Estimate Validation Process) approach (Reilly, et. Al, 2004), in the officials of the United 
Kingdom government in the VFM Assessment Guidance’ and ‘Quantitative Assessment User Guide 
(HM Treasury, 2004b; HM Treasury, 2004a) and the Australian government officials in the Public 
Sector Comparator-Technical Note (Partnerships Victoria, 2003) affirm these theories. Moreover, 
officials using the current approaches incorporate these approaches with multi-criteria decision making 
(MCDM) and make the assumption that the decision criteria are independent each other (ODPM, 2004;   6
Triantaphyllou, 2000; Xu & Yang, 2001). “Ignoring or underestimating correlations between variables 
will tend to understate outcome variance(Balcombe & Smith, 1999)” ; using such correlations may 
eventually lead to wrong judgments on the overall project risk estimates for bidding proposal selection. 
•  They ignore the uncertainty of outcomes. 
Officials using the current practices of bid comparison ignore the dispersion of outcomes, 
instead depending on deterministic outcomes only. Minor changes in underlying assumptions will 
cause the model to yield completely different results (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002, 2005; Ye & Tiong, 
2000). It is necessary to move from single value estimates to range values estimates for PPP 
infrastructure projects (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Reilly, 2005; Reilly & Brown, 2004).  
•  They lack the global review of project life cycle. 
Multifaceted risks of cost, scheduling, quality, and the like develop over the life cycle of the 
project, and many of the current concessionaire-selection methods lack the inclusive scope which these 
complexities demand. For example, in some evaluations officials focus on the construction stage only, 
excluding the project design and the operation phase. This method would not yield cumulatively 
accurate data over the lifetime performance of the project (Scottish Government, 2005).  
 
1.3 Research Objective 
The objective of the thesis research is to develop a theoretical approach that is able to solve 
the common issues of the current PPP project concessionaire selection methods. The developed 
theoretical approach can build a decision support model that is specific to a particular PPP project for 
the public sector to choose a concessionaire which is capable of creating value for money.  
 
1.4 Research Structure 
The research structure is outlined below: 
• Chapter 1 Introduction: In this chapter, the researcher introduced background information including 
the need for PPP project and contractor/bidding proposal selection, common selection issues, the 
research objective, and the research structure outline. 
• Chapter 2 Literature Review: In this chapter, the researcher reviewed and discussed the 
characteristics of a PPP project and the PPP project contractor/bid selection.   7
• Chapter 3 Research Methodology: In this chapter, the researcher stated and identified the research 
questions, strategies and proposed methods.  
• Chapter 4 Risk Factors and Causal Loop Diagrams: In this chapter, the researcher summarized the 
possible PPP project risks and their interdependencies with the causal loop diagrams (CLD). 
• Chapter 5 Risks of Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR) project: In this chapter, the researcher 
described the risk scenarios of the THSR project.  
• Chapter 6 Risk Network Modelling: In this chapter, the researcher applied the System Dynamics 
technique to model risk effects, interactions, and feedback effects over project life. 
• Chapter 7 Bidding Proposal Modelling: In this chapter, the researcher applied the System Dynamics 
technique to model risk reduction and feedback effects of bidding proposals over project life. . 
• Chapter 8 Model Validation: In this chapter, the researcher reviewed the simulation results and 
applied tests to measure model performance.  
• Chapter 9: Conclusions: Finally, in this chapter, the researcher summarized the research findings 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction to Public-Private Partnerships 
The term, public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s) has been used since the 1990s (Davies & 
Eustice, 2005). According to the UK Government officials, (HM Treasury, 2000, 2003b; House of 
Commons Library/UK, 2001), the term PPP is used to describe three types of scenarios: 
1.  The selling of government assets and services into wider markets; 
2.  The PPP procurement arrangements (including concessions); 
3.  The introduction of private sector ownership into state-owned businesses. 
However, there is no single definition or model for a public-private partnership (Abadie & Howcroft, 
2004; Davies & Eustice, 2005). “If a narrow definition is taken, this can result in legislation which only 
applies to a narrow range of project types or structures, which may be of limited practical value. 
(Abadie & Howcroft)” Some widely used descriptions are: 
•  “The PPPs constitute an approach to introducing private management into public service by means 
of a long-term contractual bond between an operator and a public authority. Fundamentally, it 
secures all or part of the public service, so delegated by private funding and calls upon private 
sector know-how (United Nations, 2002).”  
•  “The term public-private partnership (PPP) is not defined at Community level. In general, the term 
refers to forms of cooperation between public authorities and the world of business which aim to 
ensure the funding, construction, renovation, management or maintenance of an infrastructure or 
the provision of a service (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister/UK, 2002).” 
•  “Public-private partnerships bring public and private sectors together in long term partnership for 
mutual benefit. The PPP label covers a wide range of different types of partnership including the 
Private Finance Initiative, the introduction of private sector ownership into state-owned businesses 
and selling Government services into wider markets and other partnership arrangements where 
private sector expertise and finance are used to exploit the commercial potential of Government 
assets (HM Treasury, 2000).”   9
•  “A public-private partnership is a contractual agreement between a public agency (federal, state or 
local) and a private sector entity. Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each sector 
(public and private) are shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public. 
In addition to the sharing of resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards potential in the 
delivery of the service and/or facility (The National Council/USA, 2006).” 
•  “A cooperative venture between the public and private sectors, built on the expertise of each 
partner, that best meets clearly defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, 
risks and rewards (Canadian Council, 2006).” 
•  “Instead of the public sector procuring a capital asset by paying for it in full up front, the effect of 
a typical PPP structure is usually to create a single, standalone business, financed and operated by 
the private sector. The purpose is to create the asset and then deliver a service to the community, in 
return for payment commensurate with the service levels provided over the life of the asset. 
(Australian Council, 2004).” 
•  “It means a commercial transaction between an Institution and a private Party in terms of which 
the Private Party – (a) performs an Institutional function on behalf of the Institution; and/or (b) 
acquires the use of state property for its own commercial purposes; and (c) assumes substantial 
financial, technical and operational risk in connection with the performance of the institutional 
function and/or use of state property; and (d) receives a benefit for performing the Institutional 
function or from utilizing the state property, either by way of (i) consideration to be paid by the 
Institution which derives from a revenue fund or, where the Institution is a national government 
business enterprise, from the revenues of such Institution; or (ii) charges or fees to be collected by 
the Private Party from users or customers of a service provided to them; or (iii) a combination of 
such consideration and such charges or fees (National Treasury/South Africa, 2004).” 
 
Public-private partnerships may undertake one or more combination of the following 
functions: design (D); build (B); finance (F); operate (O); maintain (M);own (O); transfer (T); lease (L); 
develop (D); buy (B), or refurbish (R) (World Bank, 2006). According to officials of the US 
Department of Transportation’s Public Works Financing Projects (PWF), the major options for PPP 
procurement in transport projects worldwide are O&M (operations and maintenance contracts), DB 
(design, build), LDO (lease, Develop, operate), DBOM (design, build, operate, maintain), BOT (build,   10
operate, transfer), DBFO (design, build, finance, operate), and BOO (build, own, operate) (AECOM 
Consult, 2005). The PPP functions as a bridge between traditional public procurement and full 
privatization. The risk allocation and responsibilities between public and private partners is shown in 
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Risk Allocation of the PPP Delivery Options
 
Figure 2.1.1 Risk Allocation for the PPP Delivery Options, modified from (HDR, 
2005; The Canada Government, 2003)2 
 
Table 2.1.1 Risk Responsibilities of the PPP Delivery Options2 
PPP 
Options  Design Construction  Financing Ownership Operations Maintenance Marketing




DB  Private  Private  Public Public Public  Public  Public 
LDO  Private Private Private then 
Public 
Private or 




DBOM  Private Private  Public  Public Private  Private  Private or 
Public 
BOT  Private Private  Public 
/Private 
Private then 
Public  Private Private Private 
DBFO  Private Private  Private  Private then 
Public  Private Private Private 
BOO  Private Private  Private  Private  Private Private Private 
 
In addition to data shown in Figure 2.1.2 (Pakkala, 2002), the researcher found that a selection 
matrix diagram that used function synergy and financing scope may be a useful tool in choosing PPP 
delivery options. The function synergy that includes segmented options and integrated options is 
located on one axis. The researcher assumed the synergies may be found among four main function 
domains of design, construction, operations and finance. As shown in Figure 2.1.3 (Dinesen & 
Thompson, 2003), there may be four functionality synergies involved which include buildability,   11
reliability, operability and full-risk transfer. By using the design-build (DB) project life cycle in which 
officials focus on integrating design and construction phases, officials may find this to be only choice 
for buildability. Alternatively, the build-operate-transfer (BOT) project life cycle which spans the 
entire life of a project to integrate design, construction and operation, may be the choice by officials for 
operability. Regarding finance, by using the BOT method, officials utilize public funding (internal 
funding) and private funding (external funding) which are located on the other axis. It is simple to 
determine which delivery options are integrated and which require private financing mechanisms. For 
example, if the goal is an integrated process with private financing, due to limited government 
allocations, then the client would consider the following delivery methods: 
•  Build-operate-transfer (BOT)  
•  Design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) 
If the goal is a traditional and segmented delivery method, then the client would employ one of the 
following delivery methods: 
•  Design-build (DB) 













Figure 2.1.2 PPP Delivery System Choice(Pakkala, 2002)3 
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Figure 2.1.3 Synergies in An Accommodation Project: (a)between Design and 
Construction;(b) between Building Process and Operations Phase; (c)between 




2.2 Value for Money 
Value for money (VFM) is defined as the optimal combination of whole life costs and benefits 
(quality or fitness for purpose) for the project (Allan, 2001; HM Treasury, 2004c) to meet user 
requirements. VFM does not simply mean the lowest costs or lowest price (HM Treasury, 2004c; 
United Nations, 2002). Researchers in current literature commonly describe the VFM as a core 
objective of PPP (Allan, 2001; Dinesen & Thompson, 2003; HM Treasury, 2003b; Infrastructure 
Australia, 2008a; United Nation, 2002). Allan stated that the PPP projects demonstrate the VFM 
concept from the perspective of the taxpayer as the client. The United Kingdom government officials 
stated that, “the Government only uses PPP where it can be shown to deliver value for money and does 
not come at the expense of employees’ terms and conditions” (HM Treasury/UK, 2006a) 
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Figure 2.2.1 Value for Money (VFM) Demonstration(Skanska, 2004)5 
 
 
The VFM is indicated by the comparison of the project net present value (NPV) with both the 
PPP procurement options and the traditional public procurement options (Allan, 2001; Shaoul, 2002, 
2005). The latter is called the public-sector comparator (PSC) which means that the net present value is 
based on the in-house skills, capability and public funding of public sector (Davies & Eustice, 2005). 
For example, in the PSC option, officials may allow for a design and build contract to construct an 
asset, and then procure annual operating and maintenance contracts for the ongoing maintenance of that 
asset (HM Treasury, 2004b). The PSC is a benchmark for quantitative analysis in VFM comparisons 
between PPP and traditional procurement (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005), particularly in the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Regan, 2005). In the Figure 2.2.1, the 
NPV has three cost components which consist of whole life costs, finance costs, and risk costs retained 
by public sector (Skanska, 2004). The NPV difference between the PSC and PPP options is considered 
the VFM. Allan (2001) stated there are two critical questions to be asked when determining PPP 
superiority over traditional models. First, does the project possess a positive NPV long-term? Secondly, 
is the NPV of PPP better than that of PSC? If so, the use of the PPP option then demonstrates superior 
VFM and the decision by officials is warranted. In other words, officials have indicated that the 
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costs of PPP procurement at a recognizable level. If PPP does not demonstrate superior VFM, then 
officials should use traditional procurement. 
 
2.3 Debates on the Effectiveness of PPP 
The pros and cons of PPP/PFI for public service delivery have been discussed. The PPP/PFI is 
generally favored within the current public sectors, in part because many of the PPP/PFI contracts take 
debt off the government’s balance sheet (Gosling, 2008). Moreover, a majority of public projects by 
PPP/PFI schemes could deliver better public services over the traditional procurement. For example, 
the UK Government’s report in year 2003, officials claimed that 88% of PFI schemes are delivered on 
time (HM Treasury, 2003), whereas 70% of non-PFI projects are delivered late and 73% are over 
budget. In another updated report in 2006 researchers investigated 500 projects including refurbished 
assets and transport assets that have entered the operational phase, and revealed that 79% of projects 
reported user satisfaction, 89% of projects reported that services closely followed contracts, and 96% 
of projects reported successful performance overall (HM Treasury/UK, 2006b; Partnerships UK, 2006). 
However, the experts of nonofficial organizations do not agree with the public sector officials’ 
viewpoints. For instance, the UNISON’s report in 2008 (Gosling, 2008) strictly criticized that the PPP 
has been marked by two significant failings, the creation of both huge profits and commercial failures 
for private sector contractors. No matter which one, the public sectors and taxpayers have been cheated.  
Can the PPP approach really deliver VFM? The PPP approach is designed to produce value 
for money through four mechanisms: risk sharing, private finance, output specification 
(OS)/performance based payment (PBP), and special purpose vehicle (SPV). In the following sections 
the researcher introduces PPP mechanisms and examines the effectiveness of the PPP approach from 
the perspectives of PPP mechanisms. 
 
2.3.1 Risk Sharing and Arguments  
“Risk is central to PPPs and relates to nearly all aspects of the design, delivery, operation and 
efficient delivery of economic and social infrastructure services” (Regan, 2005). The PPP procurement 
process generally means that private sector officials presumably have a better capacity to manage   15
project risks than the public sector officials in designing, constructing, operating, and maintaining its 
infrastructure (Davies & Eustice, 2005). Since risk is a real project cost, a structured PPP approach for 
risk and partnership management is likely to result in greater economic efficiency relative to the 
alternative in which risk is frequently ignored as an inevitable cost element (Allan, 2001). This is why 
the PPP arrangement for risk transfer is important in infrastructure development. 
The best VFM is the optimal combination of the whole life costs and benefits of the projects. 
To achieve this, it is essential not to maximize risk transfer on a whole life basis, but rather to optimize 
risk allocation (APCC, 2002; CEPA, 2005; Maguire & Malinovitch, 2004). To manage risk in this 
manner involves formal identification, quantification, allocation, and mitigation of the risks associated 
with a particular PPP project (Allan, 2001). The allocation of responsibilities in PPP projects varies 
depending on the nature and objectives of the project. Once risks are identified and quantified, they are 
allocated to the partner with the most competence to manage those risks through a long-term contract 
design (Allan; Davies & Eustice, 2005; United Nations, 2002). 
However, it is questionable if the PPP approach can really deliver VFM through appropriate 
risk transfer and allocation in some typical cases. For example, the private finance under PFI/PPP 
arrangement is usually high gearing. Especially in the UK, approximately 80% to 90% of financing for 
a DBFO project comes from debt providers (Yescombe, 2006). The debt finance is used against 
repayment including interest rate reflecting real risk costs, so it is not able to absorb unlimited risks 
(Davies & Eustice, 2005; Esty, 2003a). Also, the private project contractor usually conducts a series of 
fixed price subcontracts with certain limitations in terms of risk transfer and liquidated damages 
payable by sub-contractors on default for the concession contract (Davies, 2006; The Smith Institute, 
2005). This makes it more difficult for the private project contractor to absorb the real risk costs. Under 
certain adverse events such as force majeure and national economic impacts on a project, the private 
project contractor might run into financial difficulties and fail to deliver services adequately (Flyvbjerg 
et al., 2003; Miller & Lessard, 2000). Davies (2006), Lonsdale (2005) and Gosling (2008) pointed out 
that in the event the project team fails to deliver the services to the standard specified and the private 
project contractor has failed to remedy this deficiency, the public sector should step in to take over the 
incomplete or underperforming project to ensure the delivery of services for public interests. In other 
words, when particular risks are transferred, it does not mean that risk transfer is absolute. Especially in 
the event of extreme project failure, the incomplete or underperforming assets could revert to the   16
government. “Public authorities must not only be prepared to negotiate risk sharing, but also be ready 
to retain some risks and share excessive risks” (United Nations, 2002). To date, the Taiwan High Speed 
Rail (THSR) project is such a case. The global financial crisis that emerged since the end of 2008 made 
it a large revenue loss after a large decline in ridership demand. This risk event has made it difficult for 
the private project contractor (THSRC) to sustain operations. “Given its financial losses, the Minister 
of Transportation and Communications (the public authority of THSR) might consider training drivers 
themselves, which could prepare you to take over the operation” (Shan, 2009). It means that the risks 
could transfer back to the public sector in order to account for the termination liabilities at taxpayer’s 
cost to take the project ownership back (Golsing, 2008). 
Davies and Eustice (2005) pointed out a typical case in which the risks might not be easy to 
transfer is when the asset life cycle is beyond the scope of the PPP/PFI project life cycle. The private 
PPP project provider cannot take the whole life cycle risk costs for the entire assets in such a 
circumstance. Such examples are that the public sector might engage a private PPP project provider to 
construct and maintain an office building, but the IT services are separately provided by an IT vendor 
(the third party); a private PPP project provider might be engaged to upgrade the existing rail line to a 
far wider network, but it doesn’t share risks for the existing rail line (PAC, 2005a). In such a 
circumstance, the procedures should be put in place to govern the interactions between the various 
providers (e.g., how the PPP project provider should respond to service failures). There should be a 
clear distinction between the risk responsibilities of the PPP project provider and third parties. Deloitte 
(2006) advocated a solution that the public sector authority might consider whether the scope of the 
PFI/PPP project could be widened to cover the whole life cycle services of both the existing projects 
and the expanding projects, so that the whole assets can be operated as an integrated whole. Then the 
whole life cycle risk costs can be transferred to a PPP project contractor for the best management. 
The balance sheet treatment of PPP transactions is also an argument about risk allocation. The 
PPP/PFI arrangement transfers most of the project risks from the public sector to the private sector, so 
there may be an opportunity for a large number of PPPs to be off balance sheets for the public sector 
authority. This means that the assets of the project and related liabilities do not appear on the public 
sector’s balance sheet nor score against the overall national debt of the country (Allan, 2001; Davies & 
Eustice, 2005; House of Commons Library/UK, 2001; Spackman, 2002; UNISON, 2001). As 
addressed, many PPP infrastructure projects involve the upgrade and refurbishment of existing assets   17
as well as the development of new facilities integrated within the existing assets as a whole. In this 
circumstance, the risks share of the private sector may not be sufficiently large enough to cover the 
entire assets. That is to say, the public sector officials still carry risk liabilities. Removing those 
obligations from the public sector’s balance sheet entirely would arguably understate the public 
sector’s likely future payments (Gosling, 2008; Maguire & Malinovitch, 2004; Spackman, 2002). The 
PPP/PFI projects are often designed for the private sector to receive payment from the public sector 
again the project output services which may be the majority of return on the private finance, both debt 
and equity, raised for project investment. Thus, in most circumstances, the public sector is going to pay 
out all or the vast majority of future project service payments. As a result, the off-balance sheet 
treatment would understate public sector’s likely future payment and produce a significant cost to 
taxpayers (Gosling, 2008; Maguire & Malinovitch, 2004; Spackman, 2002). 
Based on the lessons learned from the literature review concerning the risk sharing of PPP 
projects, it is known that the private sector is unable to absorb unlimited risks and that the risk transfer 
is not absolute when particular risks are transferred to the private sector. Eventually, the risk could 
transfer back to the public sector at a cost to the taxpayers and the project ownership would revert back 
to the public sector if the risks have made it difficult for the private sector to sustain project services. 
This is the case with the Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR) project. 
Based on the literature review, the researcher advocated that before awarding a PPP contract to 
a private sector bidder, the public sector officials need to look into the potential risks that could 
influence the PPP project performance. The risk factors were organized in Table 4.1.3. Then, the risk 
effects were modeled and a model simulation was performed to see the worse case scenario and best 
case scenario of project net present value (NPV) over time (see chapter 6). In particular, the worse case 
scenario simulation provide the public sector with the information about the possibility of project 
failure to help the public sector reduce the chance of taking risks back after awarding a PPP contract. A 
simulation case for Taiwan High Speed Rail project is shown in Figure 8.8.1, in Section 8.8. 
 
2.3.2 Private Finance and Arguments 
Under the PPP arrangement, the private sector officials can help provide new sources of 
investment, in particular through project financing at the private sector’s risk (Prowle, 2006). The   18
involvement of private finance is an important factor in the success of PPP/PFI, based on the fact that 
the public sector seeks to receive the best VFM by securing the benefits of private finance for PPP/PFI 
projects (HM Treasury, 2003a). In addition to spreading risk, the major benefit of private finance is to 
maintain a variety of sources of funding for PPP/PFI projects in securing VFM through competitive 
tension (Yescombe, 2006). A private sector party generally raises project funds both in equity and debt 
finance for PPP (Esty, 2003b). The PPP concessionaire is usually owned by one or more equity 
investors. Some of these shareholders may be the contractors in the consortium, who are performing 
construction, design or facilities management work on the project. Another source of capital is debt 
finance in the form of bank loans or bonds raised to pay for construction and operation of the project 
(Esty, 2003b). When the lenders consider financing a project, they exercise extensive due diligence 
which is aided by independent advisors in technical, insurance, legal and financial aspects of the PPP 
deal. Third-party due diligence is also a key benefit to ensure that a PPP project is feasible to secure 
VFM (Yescombe, 2006).  
Davies and Eustice (2005) pointed out that the private sector’s cost of finance including equity 
finance can reflect the specific risks of the project, on the grounds that the latter is being required to 
absorb many of the project’s risks. In contrast, the public sector’s cost of finance is the overall rate at 
which that authority can borrow funds (i.e., debt only, not equity), and therefore does not reflect the 
risks of the project. To the extent that those risks occur, there is no equity to absorb those risks, rather 
the public sector has to find further funds or take on further borrowings to finance completion of that 
project. However, the private finance for PPP/PFI projects is usually high-gearing finance so that more 
than 70% of total project finance is debt finance (Esty, 2003). In the United Kingdom, the debt finance 
is estimated to be 80% to 90% of total project finance (Spackman, 2002; Yescombe, 2006). Can the 
high-gearing private finance absorb the long-term PPP/PFI project risks? The opposing arguments 
querying the private finance only offer VFM in PPP/PFI procurement in circumstances where the 
benefits it brings outweighs any cost that are involved. Allan (2001), CEPA (2005), Davies and Eustice 
(2005), Regan (2005) and Gosling (2008) have revealed that the true cost of finance for the PPP/PFI 
deal is higher than that for traditional public procurement. As for the private finance, an insurance 
company will require the payment of a premium related to the actuarial value of the risk assumed, or a 
bank or other financial institution will adjust the interest rate charged to reflect the financing risk 
(Allan, 2001). The private sector’s weighted cost of finance, both debt and equity together, is typically   19
between 1% and 3% higher than the public sector’s cost of debt on a nonrisk-adjusted basis (Davies & 
Eustice, 2005). On the other hand, it can be argued that the public sector authority’s cost of debt 
finance is the appropriate rate, because that authority undertakes a portfolio of projects and therefore 
the borrowing rate should reflect the lower risk of this portfolio, not the risks of a particular project 
(Allan, 2001; Davies & Eustice, 2005). Obviously, private finance costs will be higher than public 
finance costs, so the key question is whether the private sector’s cost efficient management will 
outweigh that incremental cost. The public sector also needs to consider how much higher private 
finance costs can be. If too large a premium or too high an interest rate is put on project risks, VFM 
will be significantly eroded (Allan, 2001; CEPA, 2005; Davies & Eustice, 2005; Regan, 2005).  
The Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR) project is a representative case to this debate. With 
high-gearing finance (70% of total financing is debt finance), the high interest rate for debt is creating 
the fact that the operating revenues cannot cover the large debt invested during the construction stage. 
Moreover, the global financial crisis that emerged at the end 2008 produced a large revenue loss in the 
project particularly after a large decrease in ridership demand occurred. The total deficit expanded to 
NT$67.5 billion at the end of 2008, accounting for almost 65% of NT$105.3 billion in corporate capital 
(Shan, 2009). Both risk events have made it difficult for the THSRC private project contractor to 
sustain operations. This is a result of the fact that the transport projects need sufficient income (revenue) 
during the operation stage to outweigh high outcome (private finance for the cost of constructing 
infrastructure) that occurred during construction stage to create VFM. When the demand for the 
services generated by the transport projects is less than projected, the resulting lower revenue would 
lead to financial difficulties so that the private project contractor’s capability in cost efficient 
management will be eroded. VFM will then be significantly eroded. 
Based on the lessons learned from the literature review concerning the private finance of PPP 
projects, it is known that the private finance costs could possibly exceed the public finance costs. 
Whether a PPP project is able to create VFM will depend on if the private sector’s cost efficient 
management will outweigh that incremental cost. 
Based on the research, the researcher advocates that the PPP project NPV should be modeled 
over time to see whether the private sector’s cost efficient management which was shown in the 
bidding proposal will outweigh the private finance costs. The project NPV was molded in the Section 
6.1.7. This includes project finance model for equity and debt finance (see Section 6.1.2) and the   20
relevant cost and revenue models (see Section 6.1). For example, based on the simulation results for 
Taiwan High Speed Rail case shown in Figure 8.8.1, the Section 8.8, the researcher supported the fact 
that the VFM is significantly eroded when the operating revenues cannot cover the large project 
finance costs spent during the construction stage.  
 
2.3.3 OS/ PBP and Arguments 
The output specification (OS) is the document in which the public sector officials delineate in 
output terms, what they need from the long-term services and any associated facilities (4Ps, 2005). 
Output specification is the tool used by the public sector officials to define the required private sector 
services and outputs for PPP projects. A well-drafted output specification is essential for the successful 
delivery of long-term services. 
Private sector innovation is especially critical for PPP projects in which the private provider is 
expected to generate better management than the public sector in-house services (Davies & Eustice, 
2005). Thus, the output specification is vital for the public sector to maintain VFM while encouraging 
the private sector to create innovation for the PPP deals. Public service requirements are normally 
framed as an output specification with a broadly defined objective that allows the private sector to 
produce innovative and cost-effective solutions, as compared to the technical and narrow specifications 
included in many traditional agreements (Allan, 2001; Davies & Eustice, 2005; UN/ECE, 2000). 
“Output specification defines what the required services are, but they do not specify how they should 
be delivered” (Cuttaree, 2008). For example, define the service requirement of a rail transportation 
project in terms of routing, capacity and operational quality instead of how it is to be achieved. 
The essence of the PPP arrangement is the procurement of services. The robustness of 
performance based payment (PBP) system is an important source of assurance to government officials 
that the private party is meeting the obligations to deliver services (Infrastructure Australia, 2008b).The 
PBP mechanism is fundamental to the PFI/PPP contract, as it puts into financial effect the allocation of 
risk and responsibility between the public parties and the private parties. The PBP mechanism should 
include appropriate incentives for the private sector to deliver the service in a manner that gives best 
value, and promotes partnership working (4Ps, 2005).   21
The PBP mechanism is present to ensure that the public sector officials’ objectives for the 
project are being delivered; it should be linked to the outcomes and outputs for the project that are set 
forth in the output specification. Payments vary depending on whether the services have met the 
performance outcome mandated in the output specifications. The key to a successful PBP mechanism is 
the relationship and interdependency between the output specification and the PBP mechanism. 
Therefore, it is important that these are developed in conjunction with one another (4Ps, 2005). The 
output specification should clearly and comprehensively indicate what is required as well as the 
standards that are to be achieved in order to reduce the uncertainty faced by both the public sector and 
the private sector providers. It is also vital that communication between the public and the private 
parties clarify how performance against output specification is measured and monitored (UN/ECE, 
2000; Aziz, 2007).  
However, “Does the public sector have sufficient capacity and skills to adopt the PPP 
approach?” is an extensively debated issue (Regan, 2005). It is argued that the major purpose to adopt 
PPP deal is that the public sector officials want to obtain benefits from the off-balance sheet treatment 
rather than if it has sufficient capacity and experience to adopt it (Gosling, 2008). The public sector 
officials should be capable of structuring the desired service output specifications that are clearly stated 
and measurable so that the private sector parties can have a clear understanding how to achieve the 
government officials’ policies and objectives. In addition, the public sector should be capable of 
measuring and monitoring the performance of the private sector to ensure the service requirements are 
met (European Commission, 2003; Regan, 2005).  
An essential concern with long-term PPP contracts is the level of flexibility in changing output 
specification. The project services will inevitably change during a long-term PPP contract. Especially 
for a transportation project, it has a long-term life that involves difficulties in reflecting trends in 
regional economic development and growth. Therefore, the frequent change in output specification to 
meet economic trends might be desirable for a public authority (Thomson et al., 2005). On the other 
hand, to achieve VFM and certain level of cost benefits, a rigid output specification is usually set by 
public sector officials for the life of a PPP project. Service requirements should be very specific in 
terms of service standards and performance requirements to ensure that the contract documentation is 
clear, and not prone to different interpretations (4Ps, 2005). The PPP long-term contracts are therefore 
inflexible due to the difficulties of changing requirements (CEPA, 2005; Davies & Eustice, 2005;   22
Deloitte, 2006; European Commission, 2003; Thomson et al., 2005; Yescombe, 2006). Furthermore, all 
relevant parties must agree to any changes to the contracts and these changes may involve a 
considerable increase of costs to the public sector. As a result, the level of frequent change in a long-
term output specification that is desirable for a public authority is relatively limited (4Ps, 2005; Davies 
& Eustice, 2005; Deloitte, 2006). The level of flexibility possible in changing output specifications will 
influence the PPP project performance which was addressed as risk factor “inflexible contract 
arrangements” (see Table 4.1.3) and was discussed in Appendix V29 and Appendix VI29. 
Another key concern relative to output specification and PBP mechanism is that the public 
sector may lose management control for PPP projects. The PFI/PPP management approaches are 
designed for the private sector officials to have increased power of the management control of outputs 
than the public sector so that they are shielded from regular political and administrative interference 
which is one of the common causes of cost overruns and delays (Davies, 2006). Although the public 
sector officials may still intervene through contract change mechanisms, all relevant parties must agree 
any changes to the contract (4Ps, 2005; Davies & Eustice, 2005; Deloitte, 2006). All of these imply that 
the public sector’s ability for day-to-day control over the management of public sector services is 
limited. This is against the proponents’ points of view that a superior position of government to plan 
and coordinate infrastructure supply in the broader interests of both community and economy is 
necessary (Regan, 2005).  
The level of flexibility possible in changing output specifications will influence the PPP project 
performance which was addressed as risk factor “inflexible contract arrangements” (see Table 4.1.3) 
and was discussed in Appendix V29 and Appendix VI29. Based on the lessons learned from the 
literature review concerning OS and PBP of PPP projects, the output specification is vital to 
maintaining VFM while encouraging the private sector to create innovation for the PPP deals. The 
public sector officials should be capable of structuring the desired service output specifications, and 
measuring and monitoring the performance of the private sector to ensure service requirements are met. 
In the research, the researcher assumed that the public sector had sufficient capability and skills to 
formulate the service specifications and measure and monitor PPP project performance. Under this 
condition, a methodology was developed to select a PPP contractor who can produce the best VFM 
among the bidders (the private sectors).   23
As for performance based payment, it is developed in conjunction with the output specification 
to ensure the performance outcome can meet output specification. Payments varied depending on 
whether the services performed met the performance outcome mandated in the output specifications. In 
the research, the transportation project was used as a case study to develop a PPP contractor selection 
methodology. The revenues of a transportation project are generated from end users, instead of the 
public sector. Therefore, there was no payment mechanism for a transportation project in the research, 
but revenue and penalties mechanism against project performance outcome were discussed in the 
Section 6.1.3, 6.2.3, and Appendixes V3 and V32. The lack of a payment mechanism is identified as 
one of the limitations of the study, yet presents an opportunity for future research. 
 
2.3.4 Special Purpose Vehicle and Arguments 
The private partner (concessionaire) is usually a consortium formed by multiple companies. 
This type of consortium provides an excellent special purpose vehicle (SPV) which incorporates 
finance, design, construction and operation in a cooperative relationship. In many traditional project 
models, these functions are fragmented and often result in tension among participants (Zhang, 2004b). 
Usually, the SPV is a joint venture between an experienced construction contractor and a facilities 
management or service operations company experts capable of running and maintaining the asset. 
Other contractors required for delivery of outputs specified in the contract also join the SPV. A key 
function in structuring SPV for PPP arrangement is obtaining private financing for ongoing operations 
(Zhang, 2004a; Zhang, 2004b; Zhang, 2005). 
However, it is argued, “Does sufficient private sector expertise exist to warrant the PPP 
approach?” (Davies & Eustice, 2005). Under PPP arrangement, a SPV should have the capabilities to 
add value to the delivery of public services. Hence, PPP should only be applied to projects where the 
private sector has the competencies to meet the service standards required by the public sector. In 
addition, there should also be multiple potential private providers who can offer different proposals and 
ideas that will increase and promote continual improvement in the delivery of public services. So the 
fundamental questions concerning the private sector’s competence for PFI/PPP arrangement are as 
follows:    24
1. Is it possible for the private sector to deliver services better and more efficiently than the 
public sector? The private sector contractor should have proven additional management 
skills to realize service improvements and efficiency gains. 
2. Are there sufficiently numbers of potential private sector bidders that allow for an effective 
competition? 
3. Are the private sectors bidders experienced in pricing life cycle costs? 
4. Are the private sectors contractors able to managing and absorbing the particular risks of 
projects? (Davies & Eustice, 2005; Zhang, 2004a; Zhang, 2004b): 
Furthermore, Gosling (2008) criticized the concept that by contracting with the public sector 
contractors through SPVs, contractors are able to turn ignore a difficult or unprofitable contract, 
possibly without incurring financial penalties. Because the SPV is likely to own no assets of its own, 
contract failure may not lead to the enforcement of any penalties agreed as part of the contract. 
Gosling (2008) further criticized the concept that stand-alone companies have no financial 
liability falling on the companies if the SPV collapses which is beyond the value of their shareholding 
and any guarantees which they might have provided. Shareholders usually each own less than 50% of 
the SPV and so have no need to show its assets and liabilities on their own balance sheets. By using a 
name which is unconnected to that of the shareholders, any of the shareholders in the SPV would not 
be affected in the event of commercial failure on the part of the SPV.  
As stated in Section 2.4.2, THSRC (the SPV of Taiwan High Speed Rail) is struggling to stay 
viable amid mounting losses due to the current global financial crisis and the high interest rate for debt. 
The SPV was NT70.2 billion in debt as of the end of June 2009, compared with a capitalization of 
NT105.3 billion (Tan, 2009). The SPV was seeking NT80 billion (2.5 billion USD) from creditor banks 
to keep it afloat, but creditors were reluctant to approve new loans because the shareholders in the SPV 
refused to increase equity finance for SPV’s heavy losses. This would signal the failure of Taiwan's 
biggest build-operate-transfer (BOT) project, under which the contracting firm agreed to build the rail 
line and run it for 35 years before transferring ownership to the government (Chen, 2009a). The THSR 
services have great economic benefits since the train links the capital Taipei and southern Kaohsiung 
city. The transportation service will allow people to move out of cramped urban areas, integrating the 
island’s core western corridor into a modern megalopolis. According to the THSR contract, the 
government officials now must take over the entire project, assuming full financial responsibility if the   25
THSRC fails either during construction or at any time during the following two decades of operations 
before the scheduled transfer. The opposition-dominated members of the legislature indicated a desire 
to eliminate the public responsibility in June 2001, but it the agreement was already finalized (Chen, 
2009b). The SPV has become responsible for debt now, and its consortium members (shareholders) 
have refused to take any further financial risks (increase equity finance). It is very controversial that the 
government officials are going to take over the SPV, but taxpayers will continue to fund the THSR 
project regardless. A PPP model- BOT clearly has not worked in this vital case (Huang, 2009).  
Based on the lessons learned from the literature review concerning the SPV of PPP projects, it 
is arguable whether the private sector contractor is able to deliver services better and more efficiently 
than the public sector resources. In the research, it was assumed that there are at least three private 
sector bidders to assure effective competition (see the Section 3.3). Under this assumption, the 
researcher advocated a methodology that compared PPP project NPV of the private sector contractors 
(3 bidding proposals) with that of public sector (a base case) to determine whether the private sector 
contractors could create VFM (i.e., the bidding proposals can produce better project NPV than the base 
case) [see chapter 7]. In addition, as addressed in the Section 2.3.1, the potential risk effects were 
modeled to show the worst case scenario and best case scenario of the project NPV of the bidding 
proposals over time. Using this model tested whether the private sectors contractors were able to 
manage and absorb the particular risks of projects. For example, the risk effects concerning a SPV’s 
debt and equity finance were modeled to see how the changes of debt-equity ratio would influence 
project NPV.   
As addressed in the Section 2.3, an effective PPP approach is evidenced when whole life 
benefits of the project outweigh the risk costs through VFM assessment. Therefore, in addition to 
examining the effectiveness of PPP approach from the perspectives of PPP mechanisms, the research 
further discusses the debates on VFM assessment methods such as the PSC approaches from the 
technical perspective in Section 2.4. 
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2.4 Issues of VFM-based Bids Evaluation 
There are many objectives in applying risk assessment to the PPP bid evaluation process. 
Cooper et al. (2005) indicated: 
1.  To provide an initial indication of where the major risks might arise in the project, prior to 
receipt or detailed examination of tender responses, based on a set of creditable 
assumptions about how project might be conducted; 
2.  To develop a risk baseline against which individual tender response can be compared; 
3.  To assist the project team to focus on potential risk areas in their evaluations of offers; 
4.  To provide a risk profile for each tender offer submitted, developed on a consistent and 
justifiable basis; and 
5.  To provide a documented audit trail of the project team’s assumptions about potential risk 
areas and their reasons for adjusting their assessments in the light of individual tender 
responses. 
Given the United Kingdom officials’ extensive study and use of PPP procurement (Allen, 2001), the 
researcher focused on the UK-style PSC approach for bid evaluation, which undertakes whole life-
cycle risk costs with risk and uncertainty analysis for PSC-PPP VFM tests.  
 
2.4.1 Critics on VFM Assessment Approaches 
The general critics on the risk analysis approaches and tools state the following issues relative 
to the VFM assessment approach: 
 
•  CBA vs. CEA? 
Cost benefit analysis (CBA) is an important tool for socio-economic assessment. Traditionally, 
proponents of this tool have focused on economic efficiency, particularly by providing policy makers 
with an indication of net benefits associated with a government project or policy. Economic efficiency 
is a measure of net contribution of an activity or project to overall social welfare (Huang, 2001). As for 
PPP procurement, objective is to assess whether a given project or bid proposal is value for money 
(Stahr, 2006). Applying the whole-life cycle costing with the discounted cash-flow analysis and  risk 
analysis to calculate PSC for NPV is the major tasks of CBA. However, in CBA parties relies on the   27
ability to measure costs and benefits in monetary terms which creates problems for projects in which 
the majority of benefits cannot be readily monetized (Huang; Mackie, Nellthorpe & Laird, 2003). 
By using the CBA approach, officials attempt to quantify benefits and costs in money terms to 
a large extent, whereas the cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) approach is a cost-minimization 
technique (Watson, 2005). The CEA approach is a useful tool officials use for project screening or 
ranking which often incorporates multi-criteria decision making (MCDA) to weigh multiple outcomes 
in obtaining a single composite measure. However, when officials use this tool they rely on a 
subjective decision which is not inherently superior to CBA. Furthermore, this method has a 
shortcoming in that it is unlikely to produce consistent comparisons from project to project by different 
groups or experts (Lebo & Schelling, 2001). The CEA approach is widely used by officials to appraise 
investments in the social sector, such as health and education projects, and has rarely been used in the 
transport sector. This is due to the hypothesis that transport investments are generally economic in 
nature and should therefore be economically measured (Mackie et al., 2003).  
 
•  Is NPV a reliable measure criterion for bid evaluation? 
In using CBA as the economic appraisal method for the PPP infrastructure projects, the 
measure criteria often includes the net present value (NPV), the internal rate of return (IRR), benefit-
cost ratios (BC), and the payback period. Decisions made during the payback period do not factor the 
time value of money, whereas others incorporate the time value of money, using discounted cash flow 
methodology (Ye & Tiong, 2000).  
The NPV is the present value of all benefits for each period within the project life 
appropriately discounted, minus the present value of all costs discounted at the same rate for the same 
period (Park & Sharp-Bette, 1990). Throughout bids comparison, officials use the NPV to provide the 
best criteria for decision making without the extreme care inherent in (Watson, 2005). 
A BC ratio is that of present value of benefits to the present value of costs. The rule here is to 
reject any bid with a BC ratio of less than 1, and rank bids in order of their BC ratio (Park & Sharp-
Bette, 1990). A shortcoming of a BC ratio is the possibility of its artificial changes in the accounting 
for benefits and costs. A positive benefit is equivalent to a negative cost, and vice visa. Adding to the 
costs is equal to subtracting from the benefits, and vice visa. Either choice is correct. However, the BC   28
ratio would be increased or decreased artificially, depending on this arbitrary accounting decision 
(Watson, 2005).  
The payback period is defined as the time it takes for the cumulative present value of benefits 
to equal that of cumulative present value of costs. In general, shorter payback periods are better. This 
can, however, be misleading in that it ignores everything that happens after the payback point. It is 
quite possible for a project to have a shorter payback period but lower NPV, and vice visa. As shown in 
Figure 2.4.1(Watson, 2005), Bid A has a quicker payback, but Bid B reaches a higher NPV. 
 
Example 2.4.1  
 
 Benefits  Costs  Benefit-cost  ratio 
Bid A  $180  $100  180/100 = 1.8 
Bid B  $190  $100  170/150 = 1.9 
Artificial change for 
Bid A  $130  $50  130/50 = 2.6 
 
Note: before artificial change, the BC ratio for Bid A = 1.8, which is lower than that for Bid B = 1.9. 
By netting $50 out of the benefits for Bid A rather than listing it as a cost. Then the BC ratio for Bid A 
will change to be 2.6, which get larger than Bid B. 
 
Even though the CBA incorporated with NPV is preferred for public sector to evaluate the 
large-scale infrastructure projects, there are some studies (Zhang, 2004b, 2004a; Zhang et al., 2002) 
which have shown that the NPV measure only emphasizes financial appraisal and ignores analysis on 
such multiple-criteria as techniques, management, legislation, environment, and the like. Grimsey and 
Lewis (2005) stated that financial evaluations with discounted cash flow analysis related to cost 
estimates are incomplete bases to draw conclusions about the viability of PPP, and more emphasis 
needs to be given to non-financial elements in long-term evaluation. Grimsey and Lewis proposed 
applying a CEA with MCDA to incorporate qualitative and non-monetary data for bid comparisons. As 
discussed, the CEA with MCDA would produce subjective and inconsistent decision, which is not 
preferred to CBA with NPV. By employing the CBA with NPV for a transport project’s bids evaluation, 
officials have found the challenge is to convert all qualitative and non-monetary effects other than 
financial effects into monetary terms and carry out a risk analysis for the qualitative risk impact and 
uncertainty over the project life cycle. This is because officials will combine overall effects of both 
monetary and non-monetary factors for the project’s NPV. However, approaches such as group expert 
judgment and statistic techniques can help to quantify subjective and qualitative data and covert non-  29
monetary terms to monetary terms in an objective and systematic manner. This is discussed in Chapter 













Figure 2.4.1 Payback Period Compared for Two Bids (Watson, 2005)6 
 
 
The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is defined as the interest rate that makes the NPV of a cash 
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Where  
NPV: net present value; 
IRR: the internal rate of return; 
Fn: the net cash flow at the nth year; 
L: project life.  
 
It is often used in practice and knowing a return is intuitively appealing. It is a simple way to 
communicate the value of a project to someone who doesn’t know all the estimation details. However, 
IRR is unreliable in the following situations (Hartman, 2007; Park and Sharp-Bette, 1990; Park, 1997; 
Peterson and Fabozzi, 2002; Ross, et al., 2008; Yaffey, 1992):  
1.  Non-conventional cash flows: cash flow signs change more than once; 
2.  Mutually exclusive projects: If the acceptance of any one precludes the acceptance of any of the   30
others. 
 
Conventionally a project is ideally assumed to have an initial outflow (initial negative 
investment) in the beginning but have subsequent inflows (return) in the later stages. If only one cash 
flow sign changes this means the IRR generates a unique result (Figure 2.4.2). But in the real world, the 
cash flows may change sign more than once. In a complex project like PPP infrastructure project this is 
such a case. When for the IRR is solved for, the root of the above equation NPV (IRR) = 0 is solved and 
when the x-axis is crossed more than once, there will be more than one return that solves the equation. 
This means that there are multiple solutions to IRR. If multiple IRRs are calculated, none are then 
reliable. Figure 2.4.3 shows the nonconventional cash flows and indicates there is no single IRR or 
there are multiple IRRs in the various timing. Since multiple solutions that are each valid and 
IRR≠IRR1+IRR2+..IRRn , the IRR for multiple projects comparison (the selection of bidding proposals 
is in such a case) makes no sense (No any IRR can be suitably picked in consistently comparison of 
multiple projects).   
 
 
Figure 2.4.2 A Conventional Project Cash Flow Has An Unique IRR7 
 
 
IRR is unreliable in comparison of mutually-exclusive projects. Table 2.4.2 is an example with 
mutually-exclusive projects. Intuitively, the project would be chosen with the higher IRR and the 
higher NPV. But as for this example, there is a conflict between IRR with NPV. Note that although the 
Project B (the small budget project: -$400) has the greater IRR (22.17%), the Project A (the large 
budget project: -$500) has a greater NPV ($64.05). Choosing the alternative with the highest IRR 
(Project B has higher IRR) does not maximize shareholder wealth (Project B has lower NPV: $60.74). 





(Project A has higher NPV). This example indicates that the IRR is difficult to use in selecting the 
optimal scale of investment, but NPV can directly measure the increase in value of a project to the firm.  
 
 




Table 2.4.2 The Cash Flow Example With Two Mutually Exclusive Projects (Ross, et al., 2008) 3 
Period 0  1  2  IRR  NPV 
Project A  -$500  $325  $325  19.43%  $64.05 
Project B  -$400  $325  $200  22.17%  $60.74 
 
The IRR is also unreliable in two situations: multiple solutions to IRR, and mutually exclusive 
projects. In this thesis, the researcher focuses on the selection of bidding proposals for the PPP 
infrastructure projects. The PPP infrastructure projects are generally considered complex projects that 
there are multiple IRRs. The selection of bidding proposals refers to the comparison and selection of 
multiple mutually exclusive projects offered by the bidders. Both are in such a case that the IRR 
decision rule is unreliable. Therefore, this thesis promotes NPV instead of IRR to measure project 
performance for PPP contractor selection. Whenever there is a conflict between NPV and another 
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•  Are risk costs independent? 
Williams (2005) pointed out that overall project complexity can be characterized by structural 
complexity and uncertainty (Figure 2.4.2). The structure complexity is characterized by project size 
and interdependence of elements, and the uncertainty is featured by uncertainty in goals and respective 
methods. Multiplying effects of both structural complexity and uncertainty will consequently lead to 
complexly dynamic behaviour. The major risks inherent in each hierarchical work breakdown structure 
(WBS) of a complex project often cut across activities and work packages, and the uncertainties in the 
WBS items are interdependently compounded. In reality, a mega PPP project has usually a long-term 
life cycle with risk interactions (Miller & Lessard, 2000, 2001). 
Unfortunately, spreadsheets used in current methods for PPP project risk estimates or bids 
evaluation often indicate that risk costs are independent; each cost is analyzed separately. Furthermore, 
risks and uncertainties are not evaluated against WBS so that the risk compounding effects among 
WBS items are ignored. For example, the UK government officials (HM Treasury) currently developed 
a VFM quantitative evaluation spreadsheet called the Spreadsheet, as a standard modelling tool to 
assist procurement authorities undertaking a quantitative analysis to support the VFM decision (HM 
Treasury, 2004c, 2004b), on which the input risk variables of the Spreadsheet are independent. There 
are no breakdown costs for each WBS item. There is also no any assessment of risk costs arising from 
the interacts of WBS items.  
A causal-effect technique to model the risk cost network for inter-relationships of risk events 
may be more efficient than spreadsheets used in the current practices. System Dynamics (SD) is a 
technique which models non-linear behaviour, time-delay effects and causal feedback of risk events for 
a complex project over time (Williams, 2002), which will be further described in Chapter 3: Research 
Methodology.  
 
2.4.2 Critics on Need of the PSC 
The PSC is a benchmark to measure whether bids represent value for money for the public 
sector and whether risk transfer generally improves VFM. However, the opponents of PPP procurement 
have criticized the design of the PSC process indicating that it encourages project managers to use PSC 
to pass PPP project rather than monitor VFM for the taxpayer (Turner, 2002). The major suspicions of   33
the use of PSC for VFM tests are based on the following questions: Is the PSC is costly? and Is the 
























Figure 2.4.2 Dimensions of Project Complexity(Williams, 2002)9 
  
 
•  Is the PSC costly? 
The purpose of PSC is to offer the opportunity for government officials to secure better VFM 
and use greater innovation in the delivery services. Therefore, the PSC must have a defensible estimate 
of what the cost to government would be if the services were provided through a more traditional 
means of procurement (Partnerships Victoria, 2003a). Therefore, the level of analytical detail should be 
sufficient to provide a meaningful comparison between the PSC and bids and the differences between 
them. However, arriving at such realistic estimates can be a costly and complex task, not dissimilar to 
the preparation of business plan (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). 
 
•  Is the PSC so subjective that it can be easily manipulated? 
The PSC calculation is a theoretical one calculation of what the project might cost using the 
public procurement route, with many unknowns attached to the costing due to limited availability of 
the historical data, particularly with respect to the evaluation and treatment for risk likelihood and 
impact. It is therefore argued that the PSC is an entirely hypothetical figure that is used by officials to 
estimate the cost of publicly financed projects to deliver equivalent benefits to the PPP option without   34
any real market test (Shaoul, 2002; Turner, 2002). This is easily swayed by assumption and whatever 
its users require it to show (Blyth, 2002; Shaoul, 2005).  
Many studies have demonstrated that “the lowest-price wins bid” in the traditional public 
procurement, sacrificing the quality of project performance ( Holt, 1998; Holt et al., 1995; Wong, 
Proverbs & Holt, 2002). “The central proposition should always be that PPP should only be pursued 
where it delivers value for money (VFM), where VFM is the optimum combination of whole life cost 
and quality (or fitness for purpose) to meet the user’s requirement, and does not always mean choosing 
the lowest cost bid” (HM Treasury, 2004c). Practical experience in very large infrastructure 
transactions in Australia has shown officials that the cost of private sector service delivery may 
sometimes be even lower than the raw PSC. For completeness and quality assurance, the full PSC 
should always be the quantitative benchmark (Partnerships Victoria, 2001b). As described in the 
current theory of Engineering Economics (Park & Sharp-Bette, 1990), PSC acts as a baseline, base case 
or correct criterion to compare multiple project alternatives and diagnose whether they are VFM. “The 
PSC provides a consistent benchmark and evaluation tool to ensures that all projects are tested in a like 
for like way and are subjected to a broadly similar and systematic test for protecting VFM (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2005).” 
Use of PSC as benchmark by officials saves costs and time in efforts to estimate broader 
social benefits which are the same between PPP and traditional public procurements. Therefore, the 
PSC approach may not be the best first approach, but a cost-effective compromise between a full cost-
benefit analysis of all project options, as in Germany, and simply selecting the best private bid, as in 
France (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005).  
Secondly, objective assessment depends on the data availability and the quality of historical 
records. The history of PPP schemes is still young, and the life cycle of PPP projects is usually more 
than 20 to 30 years in length, so such data has not been accumulated. In addition, the PPP projects are 
usually unique with specific risks (Bloomfield et al., 1998; Dey & Ogunlana, 2004; Gerrard, 2001; Li 
& Zou, 2008). Therefore, some form of subjective assessment is necessary to some extent. Subjective 
judgment is also needed by officials to transform existing information into available forms for a 
specific PPP project (Dey & Ogunlana, 2004). In the event of computing with imperfect information, 
the likelihood and impact of risk can be assessed subjectively, but in a systematic manner, by 
incorporating the approaches such as group expert judgment and statistic techniques. Furthermore,   35
undertaking sensitivity analysis to estimate PSC is a useful way of understanding the impact of changes 
in these variables on the overall project NPV (Guikema & Milke, 2003; Reilly, 2005; Tanczos & Kong, 
2001). These methods will be discussed and illustrated by a case in Chapter 8.  
Some researchers (Demirag, Dubnick, & Khadaroo, 2004; Pollock et al., 2005; Shaoul, 2002; 
Turner, 2002) argued using the PSC for VFM tests to focus on PPP projects in health sector, especially 
in the UK. In the PPP health and school projects in the UK, officials seem to achieve less reasonable 
efficiency gains than those for road and prison projects. Grimsey and Lewis (2005) drew conclusions 
from Allen (2001) for two reasons. First, unlike road projects, the core and ancillary for the PPP health 
projects in the UK remain segmented, perhaps reducing some of the potential for innovation. Second, 
for road projects there is a single government agency handling the contracting however in the health 
industry the private sectors must contact a number of bodies such as National Health Services (NHS) 
trusts and other governing councils. 
However, there is no evidence to conclude the PSC for VFM testing will have bad effects on 
PPP health project performance. Actually, an updated statistics report (HM Treasury/UK, 2006a) by 
UK HM Treasury officials associated with UK Partnerships and 4PS companies has indicated that the 
various types of PPP projects, including health projects, can effectively meet VFM. This also shows 
that PSC is an important tool to ensure VFM, but ongoing improvement for the PSC and VFM tests is 
necessary. 
 
2.4.3 Critics on Choice of the Discount Rate 
The non-systematic risks are associated with only a particular asset, company, or segment of 
the market. They are known as specific risks because they exert an impact on specific components of 
the market. Examples of activities which can introduce specific risks to a particular company include 
the introduction of a new product, changes in management, etc. Since specific risks do not affect the 
entire market, investors that are affected by specific risks can diversify into a range of other activities 
in order to avoid such risks (Akintoye et al., 2001; Partnerships Victoria, 2003b).  
On the other hand, the systematic risks are also known as non-specific risks, and concern 
changes in broad economic conditions that affect a whole market. Examples of market risks include 
changes in consumer spending, level of industrial output, interest rates, exchange rates, energy prices,   36
high-impact weather effects, etc. Market risks affect all equities to some extent and cannot be 
completely avoided. An investor cannot avoid through a diversified portfolio of assets. Therefore, the 
investor will need to seek a premium where they are required to assume systematic risks. This risk 
premium increases the investor’s cost of capital (Akintoye et al., 2001; Partnerships Victoria, 2003b). 
The discount rate reflects the time value of money and the premium that is required by 
investors in the project to compensate them for the systematic risk inherent in the project, thereby 
converting future cash flows into equivalent present cash flows and allowing VFM to be measured 
between options on a consistent basis (NSWG, 2007). 
NPV is often sensitive to the discount rates. Even small changes in application of the discount 
rate will probably change the outcome and the best bid for VFM (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). The first 
argument is based on narrow and fiscal perspectives rather than broad and social perspectives of 
government (Watson, 2005). Some public authorities use their long-term borrowing rate as a proxy for 
the discount rate on the grounds that they will use additional borrowing to fund incremental 
expenditures (Grimsey & Lewis). It is the expected social benefit returns of the project and the risks 
associated with them, rather than the costs of debt for public or private financiers which determine the 
cost of capital (Partnerships Victoria, 2003b).  
Another argument is that government officials should use a single discount rate. If 
government officials applied an average discount rate across all projects, this would benefit risky 
projects by demanding a return lower than their risk warranted, and undercut low risk projects by 
demanding excessive returns from them. Government officials would therefore over-invest in risky 
projects, and under-invest in low risk projects (Broadbent, Gill & Laughlin, 2003; Broadbent & 
Laughlin, 2003; Grout, 2003; Partnerships Victoria, 2003b). The PSC is based on the government 
reference project which assumes that all systematic risks inherent in the project are retained by 
government officials. The discount rate for PSC calculation is generally determined on this basis. In 
contrast, with a PPP delivery mechanism, systematic risks may be transferred to the private sector. 
Therefore, when the project is delivered in conjunction with the private sector party, government cash 
flows are likely to be subject to less systematic risk and uncertainty than the PSC. Broadbent et al. 
(2003) and Grout contended under these circumstances a higher discount rate should be used for the 
PPP than for PSC. Failure to do so will result in the overestimation of PPP NPV relative to PSC.   37
The UK central government officials have applied 3.5% in real terms before tax for social 
time preference rate (STPR) as the overall discount rate for future benefits and costs, as regulated in the 
revised Green Book (HM Treasury, 2003a). “The STPR is defined as the value society attached to 
present, as opposed to future, consumption”(HM Treasury, 2003a). This represents the rate that 
members of society are willing to pay for receiving something now rather than in the future. The 
formula of STPR is as follows: 
STPR (r) = ρ + μg (2.4.1) 
Where   ρ: the pure time preference rate (this is simply society’s utility or preference for 
consumption now rather than in the future); 
μ: the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption; 
g: the annual growth per capita consumption (HM Treasury, 2003a). 
Concerning the second argument, taking a direction different from the UK officials’ approach 
that adopted an overall discount rate, the Victoria/Australia government officials developed a set of 
adjusted discount rates for bid evaluation, based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
(Partnerships Victoria, 2003b). A benefit of the CAPM approach is that that the cost of capital/discount 
rate recognized is specific to each project and is a function of risk for the specific project (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2005). The formula of CAPM is shown (2.4.2) 
Ra = Rf + βa(Rm-Rf) (2.4.2) 
Where: 
o  Ra : the resulting discount rate (project rate), where the cost of capital of (or required 
return on) assets whose risk class is designated by the asset beta or systematic risk; 
o  Rf : the risk-free rate;  
o  Rm: market return; 
o  βa: the asset beta, which reflects the degree to which asset returns (i.e., returns of a 
particular project) are expected to vary with returns of the market as a whole (for 
example, a well-diversified portfolio of assets or projects), otherwise known as the 
systematic risk. It is calculated as below: 
  βa = δam/δm
2 
where: 
βa is the beta for asset ‘a’;   38
δam is the covariance of returns of asset ‘a’ compared to market returns; 
δm
2 is the variance of market returns. 
o  Rm-Rf : the market risk premium (MRP) that an investor would expect to receive 
before investing in an asset exactly correlated with the market (Partnerships Victoria, 
2003b). 
For each project, an asset beta is determined, assuming that government officials are 
undertaking the project directly and retain all of the systematic risks inherent in the project. 
Theoretically, each project has a different level of systematic risk and therefore should have a unique 
asset beta. However, for the majority of projects, the marginal benefits from calculating a unique asset 
beta are outweighed by costs (Partnerships Victoria, 2003b). For this reason, the majority of projects 
have been categorized into three broad risk bands shown as Table 2.4.1 (Partnerships Victoria, 2003b). 
Each risk band has been assigned a beta value, assuming that government adopts all the systematic risk 
inherent in the project’s cash flows. 
Once the asset beta and project rate are developed, they are used to determine discount rates 
for PSC construction and bid evaluation. For the PPP projects which transfer material systematic risk to 
a private party, different discount rates should be used to calculate the PSC and to assess private sector 
bids, based on the level of systematic risks transferred to the private sector. The Australia Victoria 
government officials’ discount rate methodology for PSC and bid evaluation depends on whether the 
government’s net cash flows from the project are positive, that is net cash inflow, or negative, that is, 
net cash outflow (Partnerships Victoria, 2003b): 
•  Projects with net cash inflows: Where the net cash flows to the government are positive, a 
conventional use of CAPM is appropriate, that is, the higher the systematic risk inherent in 
government’s cash flows, the higher the discount rate applied to those specific cash flows. The 
discount rate used to calculate the PSC is based on the assumption that government retains all the 
project’s systematic risks. So, as shown in Figure 2.4.3 (Partnerships Victoria, 2003b), the 
resulting discount rate (Ra) is defined as the project rate. The discount rate used to assess private 
sector bids in such projects is calculated against systematic risks between government and the 
private sector. As government’s cash flows will be subject to less systematic risk than estimated 
for the PSC, the beta calculated for the cash flows bid by the private sector will be less than the 
asset beta. Accordingly, as shown in Figure 2.4.4, the discount rate used by officials to assess the   39
private sector bids will be reduced linearly relative to the project rate, depending on the proportion 
of the systematic risk transferred. 
•  Projects with net cash outflows: When calculating discount rates for net cash outflow projects, a 
more risky net cash outflow would be assigned a higher discount rate, resulting in a lower net 
present cost (NPC). This would make the higher risk project seem preferable to a lower risk 
project. Therefore, in ranking net cash outflow alternatives, the risk-free rate should be used to 
discount government’s PSC cash flows, as shown in Figure 2.4.5 (Partnerships Victoria, 2003b). 
On the other hand, the transfer of more systematic risk to the private sector represents a better 
outcome for government (PSC is better than bids). Therefore, for discounted cash flow analysis, a 
higher beta and a higher discount rate should apply to government’s net cash outflows where the 
greater systematic risk is transferred to the private sector. The higher discount rate results in a 
lower NPC (i.e., a higher NPV) to government. Conversely, lower risk accepted by the private 
sector is a less preferable outcome for government. The lower discount rate leads to a higher NPC 
(i.e., lower NPV) to government. As shown in Figure 2.4.4, the discount rate used to assess the 
private sector bids will be increased linearly from the risk-free rate, depending on the proportion of 
the systematic risk transferred. 
These two approaches used to setting the discount rate between UK and Australia 
governments appear to be different, but the underlying principle is the same for both. The UK officials’ 
STPR model is only for risk-free discount rates, whereas the Australian officials’ CAPM model reflects 
project risk. The choice of discount rate depending on risk allocation of a specific project provides 
professionals with a more systematic way to analyze discounting cash flow, because discount rates are 
generally very sensitive to the outcomes (NPV). 
In practice, accuracy of the discount rate calculation will yield marginal benefits unless the 
cash flows can also be forecast to the same degree of accuracy. For most PPP projects, this will likely 
prove time-consuming, and for minimal gain (Heald, 2003). To minimize the bias on discounting cash 
flow analysis due to the variability of discount rates, a sensitivity analysis should be performed by 
changing discount rate variables for project rate to the risk-free rate for discount cash flow analysis to 
amend bid evaluation. 
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Figure 2.4.3 Discount Rate Calculation: Net Cash Inflows to 
Government(Partnerships Victoria, 2003b)10 
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Figure 2.4.4 Discount Rate Calculation: Net Cash Outflows to Government 
(Partnerships Victoria, 2003b)11 
 
 
2.4.4 Critics on Uncertainty and Optimism Bias 
There are two components of uncertainty included in the risk distribution: the inherent 
uncertainty in the risk variable itself, and the uncertainty arising from the expert’s lack of knowledge of 
the risk variable (Partnerships Victoria, 2003a). This uncertainty is more important than risk, especially 
for risk transfer that is key element in VFM tests for the PPP-PSC bid comparison (Grimsey & Lewis, 
2004, 2005; Shaoul, 2005). “Not only is uncertainty a palpable tension but turbulent events burst out 
and interact.”(Miller & Lessard, 2000) This means the longer the project life cycle, the higher the 
probability that the project will be affected by emergent events. The VFM is projected at the point of 
PSC comparison, and actual outturn costs may differ from those projected by the PSC. When these 
costs fall well below the level of projections, then VFM will not be maintained. Most large-scale PPP 
contracts span 20 to 30 years minimum. Over a long period, the impact of cost projections on the 
public sector could be significant (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). Significant uncertainties of risk impacts 
should be defined (Reilly, 2005). 
Shaoul (2005) stated that the measurement and methodology of risk transfer for PPP-PSC bid 
comparison is problematic because all possible outcomes cannot be predicted and weighted. Grimsey   42
and Lewis (2005) maintained that at a practical level governments officials traditionally do not budget 
well for systematic risks or uncertainty, and consequently PSC calculations only contain project 
specific risks, never accounting for error. The public sector might be able to ignore uncertainty across a 
portfolio but bidders for a PPP project cannot ignore such uncertainties.  
A study conducted by officials of the Washington Department of Transportation (WSDOT) 
found that recognition of a future cost estimate to involve substantial uncertainty was almost never 
realized. This will cause significant cost overrun if the uncertainty is ignored in the cost estimating 
process (Reilly, 2005; Reilly & Brown, 2004; Reilly et al., 2004). There are substantial and costly 
biases in many cases. For example, the Boston, Massachusetts’s artery/tunnel project in the US had 
196% of cost overrun; the Great Belt rail tunnel in Denmark had 110% cost overrun; the Channel 
tunnel in the UK and France had 80% cost overrun; the Oresund link, in Denmark had 70% cost 
overruns (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003b; Flyvbjerg et al., 2004). Among the large-
scale projects, the Apollo Aerospace program in the United Stated was successful in that there was only 
5% cost overrun based on USD $21 billion budgeted. This is because the cost estimates by officials 
were based on the realism of risks, costs, and contingencies. Officials’ original budget estimate 
included $8 billion of contingencies (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a).  
“Optimism bias is the demonstrated systematic tendency for appraisers to be over-optimistic 
about key project parameters, which can arise in relation to capital costs, works duration, operating 
costs, under delivery of benefits, etc.” (HM Treasury, 2003c) Optimism bias is represented as Formula 







× =  (2.4.3) 
Mott MacDonald (2002) indicated that optimism bias is caused by a failure to identify and 
effectively manage project effects of uncertainty. Additionally, optimism bias for a project decreases 
through its project life-cycle. The Torpedo diagram, as shown in Figure 2.4.5 (Partnerships Victoria, 
2003a), indicates these effects of uncertainty. For early estimates, the typical average deviation 
(confidence range) is larger than in definite estimates made when design is complete and the project 
fully defined (Schexnayder, Weber & Fiori, 2003). Because the estimator always lacks complete 
information, estimates always incorporate some uncertainty. Uncertainty is greatest during the early 
project stages (e.g. the preliminary assessment stage in the Torpedo diagram). Ideally, as the project   43
progresses, the strategies for risk mitigation and management would be in place and the potential for 
certain project risk areas is likely to decrease with time. For example, Figure 2.4.5 showed that the 
step-down between the PSC and the PV contract (the PPP contract of Victoria/Australia government) 
represented the VFM outcome (the confidence range of outcome was narrowed) through bids 
competition and negotiation, although there is some uncertainty associated with the retained risks. Final 
outturn cost would be unknown until the contract is awarded. It is therefore important to recognize that 
probabilities and uncertainties in cost prediction vary during the project procurement process and so do 
the measures of likely cost outcome and variability (Schexnayder et al., 2003).  
“The information to estimate the expected values of costs, revenues, and effects, and the most 
likely development, including the associated variances is required to give decision makers a more 
realistic view of the likely outcome of projects, instead of the incomplete and misleading view on 
which decisions are often based today” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a). To minimize inherent optimism bias, 
making empirically based adjustments to the estimates of a project’s costs, benefits, and duration is 
recommended (HM Treasury, 2003a, 2003c; Schexnayder et al., 2003). For example, two empirical 
studies based on the data from past similar projects have been carried out by Mott MacDonald and Dr 
Bent Flyvberg. Table 2.4.2 (Mott MacDonald, 2002) and Table 2.4.3 (Flyvbjerg, 2004) shows the 
adjustment ranges for the estimates of cost and/or time overrun for different categories of projects. Dr 
Flyvjberg presented different percentiles for probability distribution of optimism bias. In addition, 
researchers in the PWC study (PWC, 2002) showed that taking account of various factors the rate of 
return bids seems to be 1.7% above what one would expect, given the benchmarks used. All of them 
provide valuable references for the estimation of risk factor probability distribution.  
Furthermore, the Monte Carlo simulation is currently regarded by professionals as a powerful 
technique in analyzing cash-flow problems. It is useful when there are many variables with significant 
uncertainties (Reilly, 2005). The more complex the project and the more risks and uncertainty that are 
associated with it, the more valuable will be the Monte Carlo analysis (Dey & Ogunlana, 2004; Stahr, 
2006). There are two methods of determining the distribution of individual variables entering the NPV 
calculation. One method is based on fitting a distribution to the historical data of the variable. If 
historical data is not applicable or not available, then expert assessment is utilized, as described above 
(Stahr, 2006; Watson, 2005).   44
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2.4.5 Critics on the Bids Comparison 
A critical argument by professionals and analysts is that VFM usually reduces a choice 
between two very large net present values, with the small difference between them reliant on the risk 
transfer calculations included in the PSC. Minor changes in the underlying assumption will cause the 
model to give completely different results (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). Choosing whether the best VFM 
option is a single number or a range of NPV values is essential. For example, the preferred bidder in 
the building project of Ministry of Defense (MoD) in the UK had offered a price slightly below the cost 
of PSC and was spuriously accurate. As shown in Figure 2.4.6 (NAO, 2002), the PPP bid price is 
£746.1 million and the expected PSC value is £746.2 million. Based on the point estimate, the PPP deal 
was accepted since it was lower than the expected PSC value. On the other hand, the range of PSC 
values ranges from £690m (the 2.5
th percentile of PSC distribution) to £807m (the 97.5
th percentile of 
PSC distribution), falling within the 95% confidence level with 5% chance that actual cost would fall 
outside of this range. Based on the 95% confidence interval, there is no significant evidence to accept   46
the PPP deal, since it falls within the range of PSC. For this reason, the HM Treasury (UK) officials 
drew the conclusion, “recent NAO’s (National Audit Office, UK) reports have highlighted that in some 
instances the related Procuring Authorities had treated the PSC as a single pass/fail test to justify the 
choice of a PPP procurement route, and potentially striven for spurious accuracy…, suggesting that 
public sector managers should in future ensure that value for money decisions are not based on one-
dimensional comparisons of single figures” (HM Treasury, 2003b). Ye and Tiong (2000) wrote that 
current practices for bids comparison ignore the outcomes dispersion and depend on deterministic 
outcomes only. The officials at the Washington Department of Transportation (USA) showed that it 
was necessary to move from single value cost estimates to ones that are valued as ranges of probable 
cost for infrastructure projects ( Reilly, 2005; Reilly & Brown, 2004; Reilly et al., 2004;). 
Full statistical analysis of outcomes using the Monte Carlo simulation, incorporating 
sensitivity analysis and worst/best case scenario analysis, gives more realistic risk analysis and 
representation in terms of range (confidence intervals) of possible outcomes, and provides the most 
detailed comparisons (Akintoye et al., 2001; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Stahr, 2006; Watson, 2005). 
Based on these facts, officials using the VFM comparison between the PSC and PPP bids should 
consider a range of potential outcomes for PPP procurement. This spread of values (outcome dispersion) 
highlights the volatility of the project and introduces risk exposure to VFM evaluation. Nevertheless, 
some methods such as mean-variance, Stochastic dominance and expected-loss ratio were developed to 
account for dispersion of outcomes of multiple risky projects ranking. 
The mean-variance rule applies only two criteria. The mean-represented outcome and variance 
(risk) is a scalar measure of variability of outcomes (Oryczak, 2000). If Bid A has an expected NPV 
(ENPV) the same as or higher than that of Bid B, and has a lower variance of NPV (VNPV) than B, 
Bid A is preferable; If Bid A has a ENPV the same as or lower than that of Bid B, and a higher VNPV 
than B, Bid A is the better option. As shown in the Figure 2.4.7 (Park & Sharp-Bette, 1990), the 
efficiency frontier is a curve drawn through the points representing bids that are not dominated by 
some other project. Any point below and to the right of the efficiency frontier represents a bid 
dominated by one on the frontier (Park & Sharp-Bette). Bid A and Bid C dominate both Bid B and Bid 
E, since they have higher ENPV and lower VNPV than Bid B and Bid E. But both Bid A and Bid C fall 
on the efficiency frontier; they don’t dominate each other. The strategy to choose Bid A and Bid C is 
subject to decision-makers’ risk preference (risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-seeking).    47
  
 




Figure 2.4.7 Mean-variance Plot for Bid Comparisons(Park & Sharp-Bette, 
1990)14 
 
However, the mean-variance rule has shortcomings in that if the outcomes are not distributed 
normally, the model solutions may become unreliable. “Typical dispersion statistics used as risk 

















Efficiency Frontier   48
Stochastic dominance is used to analyze mutually exclusive projects by comparing their entire 
cumulative distribution of possible outcomes (Oryczak, 2000). As shown in Figure 2.4.8 (Watson, 
2005), the probability that any specified positive NPV of Bid B exceeds that of Bid A. The decision 
maker should always prefer Bid B over Bid A. As shown in Figure 2.4.9 (Watson, 2005), the 
cumulative probability distribution curves for Bid A and Bid B intersect. Therefore, the comparison is 
guided by the expected NPV. If the ENPV numbers are similar, the risk profile of each bid should be 
considered. The risk-adverse decision-makers might be attracted by the possibility of lesser loss and 
will therefore be inclined to choose Bid A. On the other hand, the risk-seeking decision-makers will be 
attracted by the possibility of higher return and therefore might choose Bid B. 
Stochastic dominance is superior to mean-variance in that it shows a complete picture of 
uncertainty, and also accounts for extreme values (Oryczak, 2000). However, the Stochastic dominance 
computationally is very difficult especially second-degree and third-degree Stochastic dominance. 

















Figure 2.4.8 The NPV Cumulative-probability Distribution Curves for Two Bids 


















































































Figure 2.4.9 : The Intersected Curves of Cumulative-probability Distribution for 
Two Bids (Watson, 2005)16 
 
 
One measure that is particularly useful in summarizing of the overall level of risk in public 
investment is the expected-loss ratio (ELR), which refers to (Limbu et al., 2006; Stahr, 2006; Watson, 
2005): 
ELR = L/(L+G) (2.4.4); 
Where L: the probabilities of the expected loss; 
            G: the probabilities of the expected gain; 
As shown in Figure 2.4.10, the expected value of all losses (L) is defined as the proportion 
which equates to the area B under NPV probability distribution that is less than 0 or any specified value 
used to define loss. The expected value of gain (G) is defined as the proportion under NPV probability 
distribution that is greater than 0 or any specified value that is used to define loss. The area A shows all 
possible NPV values which are under the curve of the NPV probability distribution. This denotes the 
area A = L+G. 
 
Figure 2.4.10 The Display of the Expected –Loss Ratio(Stahr, 2006)17 
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Deciding which methods are appropriate to compare PSC and bids depends on the outcome 
distribution and the risk utility (risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk seeking) of the project client to select a 
preferred bidder. If outcome distribution is normal distribution, a combination of mean-variance/mean-
semi-variance, Stochastic dominance, and the expected-loss ratio for multiple-checking bids ranking 
can ensure the selection of the preferred bidder. If the outcome distribution is not normal distribution, 
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Research Questions 
The research issues with regard to bid evaluation for PPP procurement are summarized in 
Table 3.1.1, which references material from the literature review discussed in the Chapter 2. As shown 
in Table 3.1.1, the Argumentation column summarizes the discussion about what issues have been 
resolved and remain unresolved. The Research gaps column shows the unsolved issues and the 
corresponding research actions. The research gaps will be then converted into the research questions in 
order to arrive at a solution. 
From Table 3.1.1, seven research questions were produced. These research questions are: 
1.  What are the generic risk events inherent in the PPP transport projects over project life?  
2.  How can the risk interdependencies and interactions be modeled over the PPP transport 
project life cycle? 
3.  How can the qualitative effects be converted into quantitative effects while using CBA to 
analyze NPV for the PPP transport projects? 
4.  How can the risk interrelationships be quantified? 
5.  How can the probability distribution for risk effects be estimated? 
6.  How can the probability distribution of project NPV be estimated with overall 
compounding downside and beneficial effects over project life? 
7.  What are the suitable methods that can be used to compare the NPV range values among 
bidding proposals to choose a preferred bidding proposal? 
   52
Table 3.1.1 The Issues Learned from the Literature and Their Corresponding Argumentation, Research Gaps, and Research Questions7 
 
Issues learned from the 
literature  Argumentation  Research gaps  Research questions 
1.  Are risks independent? 
How can the relationship 
of risks be identified if 
they are not physically 
independent? 
As the literature review discussed in Chapter 2, the risks may 
not be independent in reality. 
There is a need to investigate which 
risks would have impact over PPP 
project life, and to model their physical 
interaction effects on project so that we 
can estimate risk costs accurately. 
1  What are the generic risk 
events inherent in the PPP 
projects over project life?  
2  How can we model the risk 
interrelationships of the 
PPP projects?  
2.  Is there a general failure 
to estimate risk costs and 
uncertainty in the mega 




(CEA) be applied to 
evaluate VFM for PPP 
bidding proposals? Which 
one is appropriate?  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the estimation for risk costs and 
uncertainty is not dealt with well for the mega transport projects. 
Either CBA or CEA approach has its own advantages and 
limitations. The CEA is a cost-minimization and a very useful 
tool for both project screening and project ranking (Watson, 
2005). However, CEA with multi-criteria decision making 
(MCDM) causes more often the corruption or other failure 
issues in practice since it's very subjective when the committee 
members of bid-evaluation make a rating for each criterion 
(Lebo & Schelling, 2001). On the other hand, CBA attempts to 
quantify benefits and costs in money terms as far as possible 
(Watson, 2005), which is an important tool for socio-economic 
assessment of government projects and policies. In general, the 
CBA takes advantages over the CEA for the PSC-based bid-
evaluation. That’s because the estimates for the broader benefit 
effects like social benefits can be omitted from the CBA 
approach since they are the same while comparing NPV for the 
PPP procurement with the traditional public procurement (the 
PSC) (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). Furthermore, there is the 
widely belief that the transport investment impact are mainly 
economic in nature and should be measured (Mackie et al., 
2003). However, the major challenge for the CBA is to convert 
qualitative risk effects in non-monetary term into quantitative 
effects in monetary term.  
There is a need to convert qualitative 
risk effects in non-monetary term into 
quantitative effects in monetary term 
and estimate effect probability when 
we apply CBA to evaluate VFM for the 
PPP bidding proposals. 
 
3  How can we quantify the 
qualitative risk effects (see 
section 6.2), while using 
CBA for cash flow 
analysis? 
4  How can we quantify 
physical risk 
interrelationships? 
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2.  What are the criteria that 
are useful to evaluate and 
compare bidding 
proposals under BCA 
approach? 
As the literature review discussed in Chapter 2, when we apply 
CBA as the economic appraisal approach to estimate cash flow 
for PPP bidding proposals, the NPV is a much more reliable 
decision rule than Internal Rate of Return (IRR), Benefit-cost 
Ratios (BC ratios), and Payback Period when we compare VFM 
for PPP bidding proposals for a risky project (Ye & Tiong, 
2000; Watson, 2005).  
None None 
3.  Is preparing the PSC 
(Public Sector 
Comparator) costly? 
As the literature review discussed in the Chapter 2, the PSC 
approach may be itself not a first best approach but a cost-
effective comprise between a full cost-benefit analysis of all 
project options and simply selecting the best private bid 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). The estimate costs for the PSC are 
therefore not supposed to be a research question in the research. 
The research uses the PSC approach for bid evaluation. 
None. None. 
4.  Is the PSC is so subjective 
that it can be easily 
manipulated? 
As the literature review discussed in the Chapter 2, the current 
risk cost estimates usually ignore outcomes uncertainty. It 
ignores the outcomes dispersion and depends on deterministic 
outcomes only. Minor changes in the underlying assumption 
will cause the model to give completely different results 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2002, 2005; Ye & Tiong, 2000). Therefore, 
the PSC in terms of risk cost estimates is supposed to be so 
subjective that it can be easily manipulated (Blyth, 2002; 
Turner, 2003; Shaoul, 2005). It is necessary to move from 
‘single value’ estimates to ‘range values’ estimates for PPP 
infrastructure projects (Grimsey & Lewis; Reilly, 2005; Reilly 
& Brown, 2004;). 
There is a need to apply appropriate 
methods that are able to measure the 
probability distribution of risk 
variables.  
5  How can we estimate 
probability distribution of 
risk effects? 
5.  Are the discount rates 
applied properly and 
consistently when the 
cash flow analysis is 
performed to estimate 
NPV for comparing the 
PSC with bidding 
proposals?  
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a need to apply the different 
discount rates for the PSC and PPP bidding proposals 
respectively so that the discounted cash flow for them can be 
analyzed consistently since they have different risk allocation 
(Broadbent et al., 2003; Grount, 2003). However, the current 
literature has discussion about how to calculate the different 
discount rates that are appropriate and consistent when the 
discounted cash flow analysis is performed to estimate NPV for 
comparing the PSC with bid proposals. 
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6.  Should a single number or 
a range of NPV values be 
examined to choose the 
preferred bidding 
proposal with the best 
VFM? 
As discussed in Chapter 2, basing on a range of NPV values 
than a single NPV value is more reliable to evaluate VFM for 
PPP options, since a range of NPV values highlight the NPV 
volatility and introduce risk exposure into VFM evaluation for 
selecting the preferred bidding proposal (Akintoy et al., 2001; 
Reilly & Brown, 2004; Stahr, 2006).  
Thus there is a need to estimate the 
probability distribution for project NPV 
with overall downside and beneficial 
effects over time. Moreover, there is a 
need to find appropriate methods to 
make a consistent decision-making 
among the different ranges of NPV 
values for selecting the preferred 
bidding proposal.  
6  How can we estimate the 
probability distribution of 
an overall project NPV 
with compounding 
downside and beneficial 
effects over project life? 
7  What are the suitable 
methods that we can 
compare the NPV range 
values between bidding 
proposals to choose a 
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3.2 Research Strategy 
As shown in Figure 3.1, the researcher utilized multi-strategy research to combine a single 
case study incorporated with quantitative and qualitative research strategies as the overall research 
strategy. In the following subsections, the view of points of using multi-strategy and single case study 
as the overall research strategy are discussed. Individual research strategies and methods for each 
question are also discussed. 
 
3.2.1 Multi-Strategy Research 
Bryman (2001) contended that a research strategy can be used to form two distinctive clusters: 
quantitative and qualitative research. If researchers focus on the connection between theory and 
research and between epistemological and ontological considerations, this will suffice. In Table 3.2.1, 
the researcher outlined the differences between quantitative and qualitative research in these three areas. 
In the quantitative research strategy, the researcher emphasizes quantification in collecting and 
analyzing data. In principal orientation, the researcher applies a deductive approach to test theories; in 
epistemological orientation, the researcher bases on a positivist approach inherent in the national 
sciences; in ontological orientation, the researcher embodies a view of reality as an external, objective 
reality. Alternatively, in the qualitative research, the researcher emphasizes words rather than 
quantification in collecting and analyzing data. In principal orientation, the researcher applies an 
inductive approach to generate theories; in epistemological orientation, the researcher rejects 
positivism by relying on individual interpretation of reality; in ontological orientation, the researcher 
embodies a view of reality as a constant projection of individuals’ perception of creation.  
 
Table 3.2.1 Fundamental Differences between Quantitative and Qualitative 
Research Strategies (Bryman, 2001)8 
 
 Quantitative  Qualitative 
Principal orientation to the role 
of theory in relation to research 
Deductive; 
Testing of theory 
Inductive; 
Generation of theory 
 
Epistemological orientation  Natural science model; 
Positivism 
Interpretivism 
Ontological orientation  Objectivism  Constructionism   56
However, there have been many arguments that the above research is based on the 
philosophical and unprofessional orientations. Bryman (2001) contended that research methods cannot 
be determined straightforward from the stance of epistemology or ontology since the distinguishing 
features between quantitative and qualitative research is ambiguous. Bryman wrote that qualitative 
research has been employed by researchers in many studies to test rather than generate theories, or to 
both test and generate. Bryman criticized that the contrast between natural and artificial settings for 
qualitative and quantitative research is frequently exaggerated. Payne and Payne (2004) also contended 
that the logical consistency of philosophical orientations and research strategies and methods are easily 
over-emphasized. They said of Platt’s study of American sociology that, “general 
theoretical/methodological stance are just stances: slogans, hopes aspirations, not guidelines” (Platt, 
1996). Furthermore, Walliman (2006) pointed out that the distinctions between quantitative and 
qualitative research are helpful in describing and understanding reality, and are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. In these studies, these researchers Bryman, Payne and Payne, and Walliman 
concluded that the conditions listed in Table 3.2.1 do not fit many examples of reality. It is normal for 
many examples of research that combine both of quantitative and qualitative research strategies to 
examine different aspects of research problem. Quantitative research can be carried out from an 
interpretivist perspective, just as qualitative research can be carried out from the perspective of natural 
science. Quantitative methods have been used in some qualitative research and qualitative studies can 
be carried out using the opposite approaches. 
Hammersley (1996), Morgan (1998), and Bryman (2001) promoted the multi-strategy 
research that combines both quantitative and qualitative methods. Hammersley proposed three types of 
multi-strategy research which included: facilitation referring to using one research strategy to aid 
another research strategy; complementarity referring to the use of both quantitative and qualitative 
strategies to investigate different aspects of research; triangulation referring to the use of quantitative 
research to validate qualitative research findings or vice versa. Morgan proposed four possible types of 
research strategies that were based on two dimensions of criteria which are defined as: priority 
referring to the decision to use either quantitative or qualitative approaches for gathering data; 
sequence referring to priorities and logic in the research process. Bryman developed a variety of 
research strategies by combining Hammersley and Morgan’s propositions.  
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The objective of the thesis research is to develop a theoretical approach that is able to solve 
the common issues of the current PPP project concessionaire selection methods. The developed 
theoretical approach can build a decision support model that is specific to a particular PPP project for 
the public sector to choose a concessionaire which is capable of creating value for money. It 
investigates different aspects of a phenomenon for the research, which includes determining which risk 
factors will affect NPV for the PPP projects, interpreting the risk interactions over time, measuring and 
analyzing the overall risk effects on net present value over project life cycle, and developing the 
theoretical method for bids selection. It is necessary to employ the multi-strategy research that 
combines quantitative and qualitative research with different priorities and sequence, as the previously 
proposed by Hammersley (1996), Morgan (1998) and Bryman (2001). They will be further described in 
the following sections. 
 
3.2.2 Questions Oriented Strategies 
As shown in Table 3.2.2, Yin (2003) proposed five major research strategies: experiments, 
surveys, archival analysis, histories and case studies; and developed a method to determine when to use 
each strategy. Three conditions should be considered: (a) the type of research questions, (b) the extent 
of control a researcher has over actual behavioural events underlying each and (c) the degree of focus 
on contemporary as opposed to historical events. 
 
Table 3.2.2 Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies (Yin, 2003)9  
 
Research Strategy  Form of Research 
Question 




Experiment What?  How?  Why?  Yes  Yes 
Survey 









History What?  How?  Why?  No  No 
Case Study  What? How? Why?  No  Yes 
 
The basic types of research questions have been generally categorized as who, what, where, 
how, and why. (Hedrick, Bickman, & Rog, 1993 as cited by Yin, 2003) As for what questions, Yin   58
pointed out that there will be two possibilities. First, some types of what questions are exploratory. It 
would be a justifiable to conduct an exploratory study to develop pertinent hypotheses and propositions 
for further inquiry. For the first type of what questions, any of the five research strategies can be used, 
for example, an exploratory survey, an exploratory experiment, or an exploratory case study. Secondly, 
some types of what questions are in form of a, how much or how many line of inquiry. Identifying such 
outcomes is more likely to favor survey or archival records analysis strategies than others. For example, 
a survey can address the what questions. Yin wrote that how and why questions are more explanatory 
than others, because such questions “deal with operational links needing to be traced over time rather 
than mere frequencies or incidence.” Thus, studies, histories, and experiments are preferred strategies 
for how and why questions. 
As shown in Table 3.2.2, further distinctions among various research strategies reflect the 
extent of the researcher’s control over behaviour and the degree of focus on contemporary events. For 
example, histories are a preferred strategy for how and why questions when there is virtually no access 
or control because the historical methods deal with past events. Often there are no relevant people 
remaining alive from that historical period to testify. Thus, evidence that relies heavily on primary 
documents, secondary documents, and cultural and physical artifacts is useful here. On the other hand, 
the case study method is preferred when the relevant behaviour cannot be manipulated in any other 
manner than examining contemporary events. Even though case studies and history strategies can 
overlap, case study is more advantageous than historical methods in dealing with a full range of 
evidence sources such as documents, artifacts, interviews and observations. Historical methods are 
limited in this manner. Finally, Yin (2003) demonstrated that the experiment strategy is complete 
“when an investigator can manipulate behaviour directly, precisely, and systematically”. 
Yin (2003) concluded that “even though each strategy has its distinctive characteristics, there 
are large overlaps among them”  Yin further stated that, “to some extent, the various strategies are not 
mutually exclusive”. Yin even suggested that multiple strategies can be applied to any given study. For 
example, a survey can be applied within a case study or a case study within a survey. 
Based on data in Table 3.2.1 and Table 3.2.2, the researcher developed research strategies and 
methods for each research question as well as the rationales to explain why the particular strategies and 
methods were used (Table 3.2.3).  
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Table 3.2.3 Research Strategies for Each Research Question10 
 
Research question 1  What are the generic types of risks inherent in the PPP transport projects 
over project concession period?  
Research strategy  Qualitative research 
Research method  Literature survey incorporates descriptive analysis 
Rationales 
This is a What question to explore the phenomena of generic types of risk 
events that are currently inherent in the PPP transport projects. The current 
empirical studies have investigated this phenomenon by case studies, 
statistic analysis and descriptive analysis. There is no researcher access to 
or control of actual phenomena. As discussed in Table 3.2.2, the survey 
and archival record analysis are preferred research strategies. However, to 
explain the meaning of nature of generic risk events is different from 
individual to individual. A qualitative research strategy with the literature 
survey and descriptive analysis are applicable to the research question. 
 
A literature survey was conducted to collect the secondary data from the 
previous empirical studies that have explored and interpreted the generally 
and commonly recognized risk factors and events in the PPP transport 
projects. The researcher reorganized and defined a set of the generic types 
of risk factors and events over the whole PPP transport project life cycle 
from the collected secondary data based on the researcher’s own rational 
interpretation. 
 
Research question 2  How can the risk interdependencies and interactions be modeled over the 
PPP transport project life cycle? 
Research strategy  Qualitative and quantitative research 
Research method  Literature survey, interview survey, and questionnaire survey, computer-
aided cause-effect modelling and statistic analysis. 
Rationales 
This is a How question to explain the phenomena about the cause-effect 
for risks and their interactions over the PPP project life cycle, and a How 
much question used to measure the phenomenon of physical risk 
interaction effects. There was no researcher access to or control over actual 
phenomena. However, these phenomena were perceived to be very 
dynamic and complex so that they were supposed to be difficult to be 
directly observed, investigated, traced and explained by nature laws, but 
rather they are able to be explored and learned from the events which have 
ever existed in the historical PPP projects and the experience of project 
practices. As discussed in Table 3.2.2, the preferred research strategies are 
case studies, historical analyses, archival records analyses, and surveys. 
Therefore, literature survey, interview survey, questionnaire survey, 
computer-aided cause-effect modelling and statistic analysis are applicable 
to the research question. 
 
The Taiwan High Speed Rail project was applied to demonstrate the 
development of the proposed theoretical approach. A literature survey was 
conducted to obtain the secondary data from the previous empirical 
studies, which can provide the physical interaction scenarios for PPP 
project risk events. Since each PPP project is unique, the secondary data 
about the risk interrelationships were not supposed to be so close to the 
reality of a particular PPP project selected for model demonstration. 
Therefore, the researcher inquired into the opinions of informants who are 
experienced and expert in the selected project by interview survey as a 
complementary approach for evidence convergence to reduce the gap 
between the investigated phenomena of secondary data and reality. Then, 
the collected data from both of the secondary data and informants’ 
opinions will be interpreted for the risk cause-effect interrelationship over 
the particular PPP project life cycle by computer-aided cause-effect 
modelling. After all, a statistic analysis was performed to formulate the 
physical risk interrelationships.   60
 
Research question 3 
How can the qualitative effects be quantified while using CBA to analyze 
NPV for the PPP transport projects? 
Research question 4  How can the physical risk interrelationships be quantified? 
Research question 5  How can the probability distribution for risk effects be estimated? 
Research strategy  Quantitative research  
Research method  Questionnaire survey with statistic analysis   
Rationales 
This was a How much question to measure the phenomenon of qualitative 
risk effects. There was no researcher access to or control over actual 
phenomena. Since each PPP project may be very unique and the historical 
data are inadequate, the qualitative risk effects and probability are 
supposed to be very different from project to project. Hence, the 
phenomenon for qualifying qualitative risk effects and probability depends 
on the subjective belief, perception, experience, judgment and prediction 
of the informants who are experienced and expert in selected project case. 
A questionnaire survey was designed for sampling from a group of 
informants who are experienced and expert in the selected project case. 
Then, with suitable statistic techniques, the sampled data analysis took 
variability of subjective judgment into account to measure the qualitative 
risk effects and their probability. 
 
Research question 6  How can the probability distribution for project NPV be estimated with 
overall compounding downside and beneficial effects over project life?  
Research strategy  Quantitative research 
Research method  Computer-aided cause-effect modelling and simulation 
Rationales 
This was a How much question to measure the phenomenon for overall 
compounding downside and beneficial effects on project NPV. The 
rationales for this question were generally the same as those for research 
question 4. A computer-aided cause-effect modelling and simulation will 
be conducted to estimate the overall NPV profile arising from the 
interactions between downside and beneficial effects over project life. 
 
Research question 7  What are the suitable methods that can be used to compare the NPV range 
values among bidding proposals to choose a preferred bidding proposal? 
Research strategy  Qualitative research 
Research method  Literature survey 
Rationales 
This was a What question to explore the phenomena for the approaches 
that are useful for risky projects comparison. The rationales for this 
question were generally the same as research question 1. A literature 
survey was conducted to investigate the approaches and their advantages 
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3.3 Theoretical Approach and Assumption 
The objective of the thesis research is to develop a theoretical approach that is able to solve 
the common issues of the current PPP project concessionaire selection methods. The developed 
theoretical approach can build a decision support model that is specific to a particular PPP project for 
the public sector to choose a concessionaire which is capable of creating value for money. The Taiwan 
High Speed Rail project was applied to demonstrate the decision model developed by the proposed 
theoretical approach. 
As shown in Figure 3.3.1, the theoretical approach used is summarized below: 
1.  Investigate the generic risk factors. Explore using literature survey, the generic risk factors 
that have created downside effects on PPP project performance during concession periods. 
2.  Model causal loop diagrams. Model and interpret the risk interdependencies and interactions 
by literature survey, interview survey, and System Dynamics modelling technique. 
3.  Estimate risk effects and probability. Estimate and quantify qualitative risk effects using 
questionnaire surveys by group expert judgment. Infer risk effect probability distribution by 
probability fitting. 
4.  Formulate the functional relations of risk variables for risk network modelling by multiple-
regression analysis. 
5.  Estimate the overall NPV probability distribution. Model the compounding effects for 
combination of both downside feedback loop effects arising from the project risk network and 
beneficial feedback loop effects arising from the bidding proposals over project life through 
the System Dynamics modelling technique; estimate the probability distribution for project 
NPV time-profile by running Monte Carlo simulation. 
6.  Apply decision theories to compare NPV range values. Using the literature survey, investigate 
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The proposed theoretical approach in building a decision support model for concessionaire 
selection was based on the following assumptions: 
1.  The proposed theoretical approach for PPP project concessionaire selection method is 
developed from the perspective of public sectors. 
2.  The public sector has undergone investment feasibility analysis, which indicates that the 
PPP approaches are better than traditional approaches for infrastructure project 
procurement. 
3.  The public sector officials have sufficient capability and skills to set up PPP project 
service specifications, to evaluate and determine which bid ensures the best value for the 
money, and to conduct and manage a long-term PPP contract relationship with the 
private sector officials.  
4.  There are no market failure problems. At least three private sectors have sufficient 
expertise to perform a PPP approach. That is to say, candidates selected through a 
prequalification process are experienced in the infrastructure project life costing and 
project risk management. 
   63
1. Explores generic risk factors
2. Models causal loop 
diagrams/risk network
3. Estimates risk effects and 
probability
4. Infers the functional relations 
among risk variables




6. Applies decision theories to 

























3.4 The State-of-the-Art 
The major risk analysis techniques used in the research were System Dynamics modelling, 
risk rating matrix, multiple-regression analysis, and probability fitting. As shown in Figure 3.4.1, the 
researcher used System Dynamics to model project NPV and various risk cost networks that link to the   64
NPV model. Second, the risk rating matrix attached to the questionnaire was used to rate the risk 
degree. Third, the probability fitting was applied to estimate the probability distribution for the input 
variables in a risk cost network. Fourth, the multiple regression analysis was used to quantify and 
formulate the risk relationships in a risk network. Fifth, the project NPV probability distribution was 
predicted through Monte Carlo simulation. All of these techniques used in the theoretical approach, 























1. SD modeling for NPV Model 
and Risk Cost Networks
2. Multiple-Regression techniques for 
estimating risk interrelationships in a risk 
cost network 
3. Group expert judgment & Probability 
Fitting for estimating the probability 
distribution of input risk variables in a risk 
cost network.
 
Figure 3.4.1 The Major Risk Analysis Techniques19 
 
3.4.1 System Dynamics 
In a large-scale project, applying a causal-effect modelling technique to model risk inter-
dependencies may be more appropriate than the spreadsheet used in current practices for risk cost 
estimates. Systematic dynamic (SD) is a both qualitative and quantitative tool with feedback and causal 
loop diagrams, appropriate for modelling the inter-relationships such as non-linear behaviour, time-
delay effects and causal feedback for a complex project over time (Williams, 2002).  
As shown in Figure 3.4.2 (left), Sterman (2000) demonstrated that SD uses multiple feedback 
loops to describe dynamic behaviour for understanding certain kinds of complex problems that involve 
changes over time. Multiple feedback loops are closed chains of cause and effect links in which   65
information is fed back to generate further action. A causality link is considered positive or negative, 
and is represented by plus and minus signs. A positive link between two variables implies that the 
variables tend to move in the same direction of change. For example, if an increase (decrease) in a 
variable (D) leads to increase (decrease) in another variable (A), then the type of causality is positive. 
Otherwise, it is negative.  
Similarly, there are two types of feedback loops: negative feedback loops and positive 
feedback loops. A negative feedback loop is an equilibrium seeking or stability-seeking loop. The 
negative feedback loop movement directs a system back to the starting or equilibrium point, tending to 
stabilize the system. The positive feedback loop generates growth rather than equilibrium, tending to 
destabilize a given system. System dynamics can model desires, expectations, perceptions, and goals. 
As shown in Figure 3.4.2 (right) (Sterman, 2000), when the difference between real state and desired 
state becomes greater, this will cause a greater correct action to feedback real state to approach the 

























Figure 3.4.2 System Dynamics Feedback Loops (Left) and Go-seeking Feedback 
Loop (Right) (Sterman, 2000)20 
 
 
Kirkwood (1998) wrote that a system compounds specific events which will often cause four 
basic problematic patterns of behaviour over time. As shown in Figure 3.4.3 (Kirkwood), these patterns 
of behaviour are called exponential growth (generally caused by positive feedback loop) , goal seeking 
(generally caused by negative feedback loop), S-shape growth (generally caused by combination of 
positive and negative feedback loops), and oscillation (generally caused by negative feedback loop   66
with delay). Sterman (1992) stated, “It is important to note that the large-scale projects are extremely 
complex, highly dynamic, have multiple feedback and non-linear relationships, and require both hard 
and soft data. That explains why SD can fulfill certain modelling requirements, especially for large-
scale construction models” 
System Dynamics modelling is widely applied to project management (Lyneis & Ford, 2007; 
Rodrigues & Bowers, 1996) which includes research and development (R&D), software development, 
product development, and construction management. The current studies included the impact of client 
behaviour on project development (Rodrigues & Williams, 1998), the product development process 
(Ford & Sterman, 1998), design error-induced construction remedies( Love et al., 2002), design and 
build for construction project (Chritamara et al., 2002), project disruption and delay (Howick, 2003; 
Williams, 2003; Williams et al., 2003), project performance management (Ogunlana et al., 2003), 
change management for construction project (Lee et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2007; Love et al., 2002; Park 
& Pena-Mora, 2004; Motawa et al., 2007), the potential of total cycle time compression and 
development phase for a construction project (Barker & Childerhouse, 2003), the influential factors to 
drive construction innovations (Park & Pena-Mora), product development resources allocation 
(Joglekar & Ford, 2005), and operation management for construction project (Lee et al., 2008). 
From the literature, the researcher found that SD is a sustainability tool for modelling project 
performance. However, Williams (2002) criticized the use of SD simulation based on its deviation 
from discrete event simulation in focusing on the state of the system and rates of change for pseudo-
continuous modelling rather than the details of discrete events. It is difficult to distinguish operational 
detail within the SD models. Furthermore, the problems concerning stochastic value instead of 
deterministic value for risk variables (Williams) and quantifying qualitative data makes SD modelling 
challenging (Coyle, 2000; Luis & Deborah, 2003). Concerning the modelling of detailed discrete-event 
for project operational network; this is not the purpose of the SD model. The SD model is not a real-
time prediction and detection tool that is generally used to improve short-term operation efficiency. On 
the contrary, it is a useful tool for analyzing project performance policies based on the overall trends 
that the SD model generates (Garcia, 2005). Therefore, as bid-evaluation is based on the long-term 
NPV trends, the SD model can be used for this purpose. Concerning parameter inference for a SD 
model, applying correct hybrid tools at the right time for project modelling may be necessary   67
(Williams). The research combines various techniques and tools to infer the risk consequence and 
likelihood for risk variables. 
 
 
Figure 3.4.3 Patterns of System Behaviour (Kirkwood, 1998)21 
 
  
3.4.2 The Hybrid Techniques 
As previously discussed, imperfect information and qualitative data concerning risk events in 
a PPP project may be included. Therefore, the challenge was how to assess the probability distribution 
for the risk effects in term of qualitative and non-monetary data. The risk matrix, which incorporates 
expert judgment and statistic techniques, can be applied to probability distribution for the expected risk 
effect in a risk network. 
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3.4.2.1 Risk Rating Matrix 
A risk matrix is used to plot the project’s risk for an immediate view of the risk profile of a 
project based on each the likelihood and impact rating of each risk event. Mapping risks in a matrix 
over a specific phase of a project will illustrate different consequences of cost and time (Akintoye et al., 
2001; DAU, 2003; Dey, 2002; Kindinger, 2002). Table 3.4.1 (modified from Australia Government, 
2005; Cooper et al., 2005) is an example of risk matrix with risk effect scale numbering from 1 to 25. A 
higher rating indicates a greater level of risk effetc. The researcher designed a questionnaire survey 
based on the 1 to 25 scale in form of the risk matrix shown in Table 3.4.1. The researcher sent this 
questionnaire survey to participants asking them to rate the risk effect for all of the risk events over the 
project life cycle using expert judgment. The purpose was to provide a consistent scale of magnitude to 
rate and quantify the expected risk effect for each risk event.  
 
3.4.2.2 Expert Judgment 
In Chapter 2, the researcher discussed the fact that the PPP projects are usually unique and 
lack historical data, especially for software data, and thus it may be necessary to gain information 
gained from the project expert who has project expertise and knowledge. Expert judgment is said to 
encounter cognitive limitations due to the potential biases associated with the individual subjective 
views (Akintoye et al., 2001). However in the research, the researcher incorporated group expert 
judgment and statistic techniques to assess subjective data in a systematic way, thus reducing 
subjective bias. To reduce the potential bias arising from an individual judgment to make a consistent 
decision, the questionnaire was sent to participants who were a group of risk experts in order to obtain 
sufficient sample size of data for statistic analysis. A group of participants might be the project 
managers, project engineers, contractors, subcontractors, core service operational managers and 
stakeholders, departmental stakeholders, technical consultants, issuance companies, financial and legal 
advisers and others who are experienced in many facets of a large-scale transport project.  
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3.4.2.3 Multiple Regression Analysis 
The regression modelling technique has been extensively recommended in the construction 
engineering and management field to predict the project performance (Liou & Huang, 2008; Molenaar 
& Songer, 2001; Russell, 1992). The regression modelling technique is used by professionals when it is 
hypothesized that one variable (X, the independent variable) statistically causes another variable (Y, the 
dependent variable) to change. The researcher will apply the quadratic multiple regression model 
including interaction terms and quadratic terms to quantify the functional relations for a dependent risk 
variable and its independent variables in a risk cost network, which is expressed as: 






1 1 1 3 2 3 3 1 2 2 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 ... ... ...
 
, where Yi = the value of the dependent variable in risk network i; β0 to βj = constant or regression 
coefficients; Xi1 to Xij = the value of the independent variables in risk network i; i = the ith risk cost 
network; j = number of relatively independent variables; εi = the RANDOM NORMAL(0, σ) for the 
error term of Yi that is a normal distribution with mean of 0 and standard deviation σ, where σ = square 
root of mean square error (MSE). This is a random variation that was incorporated into the regression 
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models. Especially, the interaction terms Xn-1Xn will be modeled to examine the statistical interaction 
effects of risk variables Xn-1 and Xn in a risk network. An example is shown in section 6.3.1. 
 
3.4.2.4 Probability Fitting 
A series of theoretical distribution functions were applied to fit the data collected from a 
questionnaire survey. The process of identifying and confirming the distribution was called fitting a 
distribution (Molenaar & Songer, 2001; Park & Sharp-Bette, 1990; Springer, 1997). Park and Sharp-
Bette stated that this process can provide several benefits when fitting a distribution to data applied in 
risk simulation: (a) the empirical distribution for the same variable might be different when obtaining 
different sets of observations at different times. By fitting a theoretical distribution to the data, the 
specified distributions should be less sensitive to random fluctuations between different observations; 
(b) if empirical distributions are defined for observed data, then their use in the simulation implied that 
no random variables falling outside the range of the observed data would be generated. On the other 
hand, with a fitted theoretical distribution, random variables outside the range of the observed data can 
be generated. “This is a much desired feature in risk simulation, since many project outcomes depend 
heavily on the probability that an ‘extreme’ event may occur.( Park & Sharp-Bette, 1990)”  
In probability fitting, a fitted probability distribution for the input risk variables in a risk cost 
network can be inferred. Since each risk cost network links to the NPV model, the researcher could 
thus predict the probability distribution of NPV values by Monte Carlo simulation. 
 
3.4.2.5 Monte Carlo Simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation is used to study outcome variability. Each risk event can be triggered 
by one or more causes and can result in one or more consequences. Once the probability for each main 
event and any sub-events is estimated and determined, the likelihood for these causal sub-events is 
combined to calculate the occurrence likelihood for the main event. Monte Carlo simulation is 
currently regarded as the most powerful technique for cash-flow analysis. It is useful when there are 
many variables with significant uncertainties (Reilly, 2005). The more complex the project and the   71
more risks and uncertainty that are associated, the more valuable Monte Carlo simulation analysis will 
be (Dey & Ogunlana, 2004; Stahr, 2006; Watson, 2005). 
 
3.4.3 Ranking Decision Rules 
As discussed in chapter 2, mean-variance/mean-semi-variance, stochastic dominance and 
expected-loss ratio were applied to compare and rank the NPV range values for bidding proposals. The 
details are described in chapter 2 and section 7.3. 
 
 
3.5 Research Reliability and Validity  
Research reliability and validity are two important concepts. Reliability is concerned with the 
accuracy of the actual measuring instrument or procedure, while validity is concerned with the success 
of measuring what the researchers set out to measure (Mitchell & Jolley, 2006). To ensure research 
quality, there are four widely used criteria for research: reliability, measurement validity, internal 
validity, external validity. Table 3.5 summarizes the relevant actions that will be taken for each 
criterion test when doing the research. 
 
3.5.1 Reliability 
Reliability reflects the confidence of whether study operations such as data collection 
procedures can be repeated with the consistent results (Bryman, 2001; Payne & Payne, 2004; Yin, 
2003). If a later investigator follows the same procedures as described by an earlier investigator, they 
should yield the same findings and conclusions (Yin). This represents one aspect of creditability by 
minimizing the errors and bias in a study (Mitchell & Jolley, 2006). Yin contended that former research 
work cannot be repeated without documenting the studying procedures and having a database available 
for independent inspection. To ensure reliability, the procedures and every step of the research process 
a described in detail (Mitchell & Jolley); all collected data and evidences, including copies of archives, 
the secondary data, interview records and questionnaires should be well-documented and organized and   72
stored in a database for easy access (Yin). All data and evidence sources should be sufficiently cited in 
the relevant database to maintain a chain of evidence (Yin), ranging from initial research questions to 
ultimate research conclusions, for the external observer to trace.  
 
3.5.2 Construct validity 
Yin (2003) defined construct validity as “establishing correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied” . It is also referred to as measurement validity (Bryman, 2001). It concerns the 
question of whether the operational set of measures used to measure the concepts accurately reflects the 
concepts of interest (Bryman; Yin).  
To ensure construct validity, the researcher will take three actions as recommended by Yin 
(2003). First, triangulate multiple data sources. Bryman (2001) referred to triangulation as using more 
than one method or source of data in the study of social phenomena. Deacon, Bryman, and Fenton 
(1998) stated that triangulation is being increasingly used to refer to a process of cross-checking 
findings from both qualitative and qualitative research. Yin recommended collecting information from 
multiple sources and triangulating them to encourage convergence lines of inquiry. He wrote that “with 
data triangulation, the potential problems of construct validity also can be addressed because the 
multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon” The 
researcher used multiple sources of evidence, including preliminary studies, governments officials’ 
report archives, interviews and questionnaire survey forms collected from those participants who were 
from both public and private sectors and were experienced or expert in the selected case project. 
Furthermore, the multiple sources of evidence were compared and cross-checked for data triangulation. 
Secondly, a chain of evidence was conducted which was mentioned in the reliability function. Lastly, 
the draft for research reports was reviewed by key participants who are experienced or expert in the 
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3.5.3 Internal validity 
Mitchell and Jolley (2006) defined internal validity as referring to (a) the rigor with which the 
study was conducted (e.g., the research design, the care taken to conduct measurements, and decisions 
concerning what was and wasn't measured); and (b) the extent to which the research designers had 
accounted alternative explanations for any causal relationships they explore. As for the studies that do 
not explore causal relationships, only the first of these definitions should be considered when assessing 
internal validity. The researcher focused on building a cause-effect model to predict project NPV trend 
for PPP project bid-selection, which involves the above two definitions.  
 
Table 3.5 Criteria and Actions to Ensure Research Quality12 
Criteria Actions  Phase of research process to 
take actions 
Reliability  •  The research procedure will be described in 
detail (Mitchell & Jolley, 2006). 
•  Well documented data (Yin, 2003; Tellis, 1997).
•  Makes citations for data sources (Yin, 2003; 
Tellis, 1997). 
•  Establishes a database (Yin, 2003; Tellis, 1997).
•  Makes a chain of evidence (Yin, 2003; Tellis, 
1997). 
•  Data collection 
Construct 
validity 
•  Collects multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 
2003; Tellis, 1997). 
•  Conducts data triangulation (Yin, 2003; Tellis, 
1997). 
•  Makes a chain of evidence (Yin, 2003; Tellis, 
1997). 
•  Let key informants review the draft for the case 
study report (Yin, 2003; Tellis, 1997). 
•  Data collection 
•  Composition 
Internal 
validity 
•  Applies cause-effect modelling (Yin, 2003) 
•  Does pattern-matching with analytic analyses 
such as descriptive statistics, probability 
distribution analysis. scenario & sensitivity 
analysis and discrepancy comparison (Kazell & 
Keravnou, 2003; Mitchell & Jolley, 2006; Yin, 
2003). 
•  Data analysis 
External 
validity 
Formulate theory and prepositions (Yin, 2003). 
Use falsification to test generalization (Flyvbjerg, 
2006).  
•  Research design 
 
As for the first definition, the researcher has designed the research in terms of formulating 
research questions and theory propositions, and setting up methods for data collection and analysis and 
research reliability and validity by following a series logic process from top to bottom. This introduced 
the research philosophies, developed overall research strategies for the whole research as well as   74
individual research strategies for each research question based on the research strategies in order to set 
up research methods for data collection and analysis. This ensured the rigor and quality of the research. 
As for the second definition, Yin (2003) stated that when an event cannot be directly observed, 
the internal validity for case study research concerns the problem of making inferences by questions 
such as: “Is the inference correct?” “Have the rival explanations and possibilities been considered?” “Is 
the evidence convergent?” “Does it appear to be airtight?” As described above, the researcher used 
multiple sources of evidence with triangulation (Yin) which were based on literature survey, 
questionnaire survey and interviews, and causal relationships that could not be directly observed by the 
researcher. Furthermore, Yin pointed out that a logic model which deliberately stipulates a complex 
chain of events over time has become increasingly useful in recent years, especially in doing case study 
evaluation. This type of evaluation uses logic models as an analytic technique matching, empirically 
observed events to theoretically predicted events. The researcher applied cause-effect modelling 
technique to model the cause-effect interrelationship network for negative events and positive effects to 
predict the NPV trend pattern for the PPP case project. This was then tested for precision of pattern 
matching by discrepancy comparison between predicted and real values (Kazell & Keravnou, 2003; 
Mitchell & Jolley, 2006; Yin).  
 
3.5.4 External validity 
A major inquiry is “how can a single case possible be representative so that it might yield 
findings that can applied more generally to other cases?” (Bryman, 2001) Yin (2003) stated analogizing 
a case study to survey research, in which a sample can be readily generalized with a larger population 
or universe was not correct. He asserted that survey research relies on statistical generalization 
(enumerate frequencies) of populations or universes, whereas case studies rely on analytical 
generalization (generalize theories) to a broader theory. Yin took an example of how a case study can 
be generalized to theory. This was illustrated in Jacobs (1961) book, The Death and Life of Great 
American Cities. In this book, Jacobs covered broad theoretical issues in urban planning, such as the 
role of sidewalks, the role of neighborhood parks, the need for primary mixed uses, the need for small 
blocks, and the processes of slumming and un-slumming, rather than reflect the single experiences of 
New York. In practice, aggregating these issues represents building a theory of urban planning, which   75
is still a significant contribution to the field on urban planning. Flyvbjerg (2006) similarly stated that a 
single case with small-N research to study related phenomena is more often at the front of theoretical 
development. The objective of the thesis research is to develop a theoretical approach that is able to 
solve the common issues of the current PPP project concessionaire selection methods. The researcher 
needed to investigate different aspects of issues and phenomena by the small-N research as stated by 
Flyvbjerg (2006), which included the need to explore both positive and negative factors that will affect 
PPP project NPV, the need to model and interpret the interrelationships between these factor variables 
over project life cycle, and the need to measure the overall effects of these factors on project NPV. An 
analogy to build a theory for urban planning was developed by Jacobs (1961) that aggregates these 
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Chapter 4 Risk Factors and Causal Loop Diagrams 
 
 
The purpose of the research was to evaluate and compare the long-term project NPV trends 
with risk impact between the bidding proposals against base case from a public perspective. Therefore, 
the researcher investigated and identified the generic risks which would impact PPP project 
performance in the first instance. The risk interdependencies (cause-effect interrelationships) were 
addressed based on the case scenarios by causal loop diagrams. These risk causal loop diagrams were 
then be converted to the quantitative SD models to evaluate risk effects on the project NPV by 
interview and questionnaire survey. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the generic risk factors for PPP projects were collected from the 
secondary data including two major sources: empirical studies and official publications. The collected 
secondary data were then summarized into a set of generic PPP risk factors with explanations of how 
the risk factors would physically interact in the construction and operation stages. 
 
4.1 Literature Reviews for Risk Factors 
The researcher used a survey reviewing the current literature on PPP project risk factors 
published from 2000 to 2006. The sources for empirical studies included journal articles and 
conference papers, research reports, textbooks, commercial or organizational documents, and so on. 
The sources for official publications included the practice guidance, records, reports or other 
documents published by the governmental organizations. Table 4.1.1 and Table 4.1.2 summarize 
several empirical studies and official publications respectively by outlining the author names, research 
methods to collect risk factors, the project types to which the risk factors apply, and the project phases 
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Table 4.1.1 Risk Data Sources from the Empirical Studies13 
 
Authors  Research methods  Types of Project  Risk Focuses 
Li (2005)  Literature survey  Generic PPP projects  The whole project 
life cycle 





Literature survey  Generic PPP projects  The whole project 
life cycle 
Thomas (2003)  Literature survey/ 
case study  BOT road projects  The whole project 
life cycle 
Dey (2002)  Literature survey  Large-scale construction 
projects  Construction 
Mott MacDonald 
(2002)  Not available  Large-scale public projects  Construction 
Akintoye et al (2001)  Literature survey/ 
case study  Generic PPP projects  The whole project 
life cycle 
Shen et al.(2001)  Interview survey  Sino-foreign joint ventures 
of construction projects 
The whole project 
life cycle 
Wang (2000)  Literature survey/ 
case study 
Generic BOT infrastructure 
projects 
The whole project 
life cycle 
Moody (2006)  Not available  Generic PPP projects  Construction  







Road tunnel infrastructure 
projects  Construction  
Mills (2001)  Not available  Generic PPP projects  Construction  
 
 




Types of Project  Risk Focuses 
HM Treasury (2003)  No available  Generic PPP projects  The whole project life cycle
Partnership Victoria 
(2001)  No available  Generic PPP projects  The whole project life cycle
South Africa  (2001)  No available Generic  PPP  projects  The whole project life cycle
United Nations (2000)  No available  Generic PPP projects  The whole project life cycle
European Commission 
(2003)  No available  Generic PPP projects  The whole project life cycle
 
However, the current data sources for risk factors have the following issues:   
 
1.  No clear data sources: Most of the authors in the literature mentioned that risk factors were 
collected from literature surveys, interview surveys or case studies, but the authors did not 
give references for this data. It is problematic that the researcher cannot demonstrate research 
reliability described previously in Chapter 3 in which outcomes are predictable and coherent.   78
Therefore, to achieve research reliability, the researcher clearly displayed the data sources for 
each of the identified risks, as shown in Table 4.1.3. 
2.  Ambiguous terminologies for risk factors: Most of the empirical studies lacked descriptions or 
definitions of listed risk factors, and it was difficult to accurately and consistently establish the 
causal relationships for risk factors. Furthermore, some empirical studies used ambiguous 
terminologies to describe risk factors, which lead to misunderstandings of the meanings and 
properties of risks. These issues will incorrectly and inconsistently describe and measure risks. 
As a result, the research could not meet the requirements for internal validity described 
previously in Chapter 3. Therefore, to achieve internal validity, the researcher defined and 
described the generic risk factors before structuring causal loop diagrams. 
3.  No clear logic to choose and classify risk events: Choosing and classifying risk events seemed 
to differ among studies. Most researchers did not clearly explain the logic of how to choose 
and classify the risk events. Unclear logic to choose and classify risks would incorrectly and 
inconsistently address, measure and generalize the physical risk interrelationships for PPP 
projects, which would lead to failure in both internal and external validity as described in 
Chapter 4. Therefore, in order to achieve internal and external validity with a clear boundary 
to model the physical risk interrelationships, the researcher uniformly classified all risk events 
into project-related risk events (internal risks) and non project-related events (external risks) 
for respective construction and operation phases. 
4.  Incomplete and unrepresentative risk factors: The risk lists developed and concluded by most 
of the authors of reviewed literature might be incomplete and unrepresentative risks for 
PPP/PFI projects. The result was that the research cannot meet the requirements for construct 
validity and external validity described in Chapter 3. To achieve both construct and external 
validity, the researcher maximized the completeness and coverage to summarize risk factors 
by cross-checking and triangulating the risk events derived from different data sources, 
including the empirical studies shown in Table 4.1.1, the official publications shown in Table 
4.1.2, and the reviewed literature and cases. A list of generic risk factors that have been 
developed drawn from the secondary data is outlined in Table 4.1.3. They are categorized as 
availability, design, construction, operation, cost, technology, organization, finance, contract,   79
third party, asset ownership, economy, market, politics, regulation, industrial relation, and 
Force Majeure. 
 






Project Phases  Evidence 
Availability risks 
(1)  Land 
unavailable  Internal Construction 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Melbourne City Link 
(Hodge, 2004), the Yangtze Three 
Gorges Project (Lu, 2004), the 
Bangkok Second Stage Expressway 
(The Work Bank, 1999). 
(2)  Resources 
unavailable  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the London Underground 
(NAO, 2004a), the Bangkok Elevated 
Road and Track System (The Work 
Bank, 1999), the Labin B Power 
Plant (Lu, 2004), the STEPS Deal 
(PAC, 2005b), the BBC’s White City 
2 Development (PAC, 2006b). 
(3)  Performance 
unavailability  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the London Underground (EC, 
2002; PAC, 2005a), the Melbourne 
City Link (Hodge, 2004). 
Design risks 
(4)  Scope changes  Internal  Construction/ope
ration 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Channel Tunnel Rail 
Link(PAC, 2006a),  the Thailand 
Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont, 2004) 
(5)  Defective 
design  Internal Construction 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Melbourne City Link 
(Hodge, 2004). 
(6)  Design 
changes  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the BBC’s White City 2 
Development (PAC, 2006b), the 
Melbourne City Link (Hodge, 2004), 
the Thailand Underground Rail 
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Construction risks 
(7)  Construction 
cost overrun  Internal Construction 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Boston’s Artery/tunnel, the 
Great Belt Rail Tunnel, the 
Shinkansen Joetsu Rail Line, and the 
Channel Tunnel (Flyvbjerg et al., 
2003; Reilly, 2005). 
(8)  Construction 
delay  Internal Construction 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Melbourne City Link 
(Hodge, 2004), the Thailand 
Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
(9)  Defective 
construction  Internal Construction 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Melbourne City Link 
(Hodge, 2004). 
(10)  Construction 
changes  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Melbourne City Link 
(Hodge, 2004). 




Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: Airwave(PAC, 2002a), London 
Underground(PAC, 2005a). 




•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Melbourne City Link 
(Hodge, 2004). 
Operation risks 
(13)  Low operating 
productivity  Internal Operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Karvina Sewerage (EC, 
2004b), the Thailand Underground 
Rail Project (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
(14)  Mis-pricing Internal Operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the ASA and Rethmann and 
the RWE Entsorgung (EC, 2004b). 
(15)  Revenue loss  Internal  Operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
(PAC, 2006a), the Melbourne City 
Link (Hodge, 2004), the ASA and 
Rethmann (EC, 2004b). 
(16)  System 
breakdown  Internal Operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Melbourne City Link 
(Hodge, 2004), the Thailand 
Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont, 2004). 




•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Thailand Underground Rail 
Project (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 
2004).   81
(18)  Accidents and 
safety issues  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the London Underground (EC, 
2002; NAO, 2004a), the Thailand 
Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
Cost risks 
(19)  Price 
escalation  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the London Underground (EC, 





Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the London Underground 
(PAC, 2002a; PAC, 2005a), National 
Physical Laboratory (NAO, 2006). 
Organization risks 
(21)  Poor 
cooperation/ 
coordination 
Internal  Construction/ 
Operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the London Underground (EC, 
2002), the Yangtz River Three 
Gorges (Lu, 2004). 
Finance risks 
(22)  Finance 
unavailable  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Channel Tunnel Rail 
Link(PAC, 2006a), the National Air 
Traffic Services(PAC, 2003c). 
(23)  Refinancing 
liabilities  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
(BBC NEWS, 2007),  the National 
Air Traffic Services (NAO, 2004b; 
PAC, 2003c), the Norfolk and 
Norwich Hospital (PAC, 2006c), the 
BBC’s White City 2 Development 
(PAC, 2006b), the Darent Valley 
Hospital (NAO, 2005). 
(24)  Insolvency of 
contractor  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Thailand Underground Rail 
Project (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 
2004), the Royal Armouries 
Museums in Leeds (PAC, 2001). 
(25)  Ownership 
change  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
(PAC, 2006a) 
(26)  Tax increases  External  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Xiaolangdi Project on 
Yellow River (Lu, 2004). 






•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Laibin B Power Plant (Lu, 
2004). 
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Contract risks 
(28)  Contractual 
disputes  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Melbourne City Link 
(Hodge, 2004), the Thailand 
Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
(29)  Inflexible 
contract 
arrangements 
Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the National Air Traffic 
Services (NAO, 2004b; PAC, 
2003c), the Redevelopment of MOD 
Main Building (PAC, 2003b), the 
Nessebar “Golden Bug” Landfill 
(EC, 2004b). 




Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the London Underground 
(NAO, 2004a), National Airport 
Traffic Services (PAC, 2003c), the 
Thailand Underground Rail Project 
(Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004) 
(31)  Contract 
breach  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the North-South Expressway 
(NSE) and the Kuala Lumpur-Karak 
Highway (The Work Bank, 1999), 
the New IT Systems for Magistrates’ 
Courts: the Libra Project (PAC, 
2003a), the Melbourne City Link 
(Hodge, 2004). 
(32)  Contract 
remedies/ 
penalties 
Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the London Underground (EC, 
2002), the Melbourne City Link 
(Hodge, 2004), the Thailand 
Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
Third party risks 
(33)  Default of 
subcontractor   Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the London Underground (EC, 
2002), the Melbourne City Link 
(Hodge, 2004), the National Physical 
Laboratory (NAO, 2006), the 
Thailand Underground Rail Project 
(Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
(34)  Inspection and 
testing delay   Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Thailand Underground Rail 
Project (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 
2004). 
Asset ownership risks 
(35)  Latent defect  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the London Underground (EC, 
2002). 
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(36)  Shorter asset 
life  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the London Underground (EC, 
2002; NAO, 2004a). 
(37)  Less residual 
values  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the London Underground (EC, 
2002; NAO, 2004a) . 
(38)  Termination 
liabilities  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the North-South Expressway 
(NSE) and the Kuala Lumpur-Karak 
Highway (The Work Bank, 1999), 
the National Physical Laboratory 
(NAO, 2006) 
Economy risks 
(39)  Higher level of 
inflation rate  External  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
(PAC, 2006a), the Thailand 
Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont, 2004) 
(40)  Volatility of 
exchange rate  External  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the North-South Expressway 
(NSE) and the Kuala Lumpur-Karak 
Highway(The Work Bank, 1999), the 
Water Conservancy and Hydropower 
Project in Southern China (Lu, 
2004), the Thailand Underground 
Rail Project (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
(41)  Higher level of 
interest rate  External  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the North-South Expressway 
(NSE) and the Kuala Lumpur-Karak 
Highway(The Work Bank, 1999), the 
Harnaschpolder Wastewater 
Treatment Project (Smith, 2006).  
Market risks 
(42)  Less demand   Internal/ 
external  Operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
(PAC, 2006a), the National Air 
Traffic Services (PAC, 2003c). 
(43)  Higher 
competition  External Operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
(PAC, 2002b), the Melbourne City 
Link (Hodge, 2004), the Zhuhai 
International Airport(Lu, 2004). 
(44)  Downside 
economic 
events 
External  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Asia Toll Road Projects 
(The Work Bank, 1999), the 
Thailand Underground Rail Project 
(Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
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Politics risks 
(45)  Political 
interference  External  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Bangkok Elevated Road 
and Track System (The Work Bank, 
1999), the Constanta Water and 
Wastewater Project (EC, 2004b), the 
Prescom in Targoviste. (EC, 2004b). 
Regulatory risks 







•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: National Air Traffic Services 
(NAO, 2004b; PAC, 2003c), the 
Melbourne City Link (Hodge, 2004), 
the Liaoning Wastewater Treatment 
Plant (Lu, 2004). 






•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: National Air Traffic Services 
(NAO, 2004b; PAC, 2003c), the 
Water and Wastewater Infrastructure 
in Southern China (Lu, 2004). 
(48)  Law/policy 
changes  External  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the London Underground (EC, 
2002), the Melbourne City Link 
(Hodge, 2004). 
Environment risks 
(49)  Unforeseen 
site conditions  Internal Construction 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Thailand Underground Rail 
Project (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 
2004). 
(50)  Environmental 
pollutions  Internal  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Great Belt and Oresund 
Links/Demark (Flyvbjerg et al., 
2003). 
Industrial relation risks 
(51)  Industrial 
disputes  External  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the Vasco da Gama Bridge 
(EC, 2003), the Thailand 
Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
Force Majeure risks 
(52)  Force Majeure  External  Construction/ 
operation 
•  Data sources: Table 4.1.1 & Table 
4.1.2 
•  Case: the London Underground (EC, 
2002), the Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
(PAC, 2002b), the Melbourne City 
Link (Hodge, 2004), the Labin B 
Power Plant (Lu, 2004), the Thailand 
Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
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4.2 Risk Causal Loop Diagrams 
One of the core mechanisms of PPP procurement is risk allocation so that the public and 
private parties work together to properly and efficiently deal with the risks for better performance in 
the long-term life of the project. In this chapter, the researcher explores the downside effects of a PPP 
project in giving the public sector a clear picture to start risk allocation and which risks would be 
suitable for transfer to the private sector. Once risks are allocated between the public sector and private 
sector, Chapter 7 will describe the balance effects (beneficial effects) with their costs arising from the 
risk management actions that might be addressed in later bidding proposals.  
A framework for risk causal loop diagrams (CLD) used to investigate the downside effects is 
based on the following principles and methods: 
1.  In Chapter 4, the causal loop diagrams (CLDs) were built to address risk interrelationships, 
which were based on the case scenarios described current literature. They were empirically 
confirmed by interviews to examine whether the CLDs could fit the applied case of the 
Taiwan high speed rail.  
2.  All of the risk factors, including their direct variables and intermediate variables were 
described by the causal loop diagrams with evidence to explain the consequences during the 
construction and operation phases of the project. 
3.  Since the research analyzed NPV cash flow for PPP bidding proposals, all of the direct risk 
consequences or intermediate risk consequences were converged into construction cost 
overrun at construction phase and revenue loss at operate phase respectively, so that NPV 
values could be estimated by linking both construction cost overrun and revenue loss into the 
NPV cash flow model. 
4.  The researcher explored the downside effects giving the public sector an idea of where to start 
risk allocation for a PPP project. Thus, the risk causal loop diagrams were based on the 
following objectives: 
a.  Only model the risk variables that have completely different effects when 
implemented in private and public parties respectively, so that a judgment can be 
easily made for risk allocation between two parties for a PPP project. The researcher 
did not model those soft risk effects arisen from human factors because there is no   86
obvious difference between the private and public party. For example, the human 
factors like de-motivation and exhaustion would happen in a person naturally 
whether the person was affiliated with the private or the public sector. Therefore, 
modelling such soft risks as human factors would be beyond the scope of the research. 
b.  Risk allocation is made through PPP contract management, so the risk management 
should be able to be converted to the commercial contract terms and conditions. 
Therefore, the risk causal loop diagrams were modeled based on the major risk 
variables that can be allocated through commercial contract terms and conditions. 
 
Based on the principles and methods presented, 52 risk casual loop diagrams were completely 
analyzed and addressed in Appendix V. Some indicative causal loop diagrams were extracted from 
Appendix V and discussed in the following sections. 
 
4.2.1 Land unavailable 
The term, land unavailable, refers to the risk costs and delays arising from acquiring lands for 
infrastructure construction. As shown in Figure 4.2 (1), the land unavailable risk event would cause 
construction delay due to the fact that there is no land available on which to start building an 
infrastructure (Hodge, 2004; Lu, 2004; The Work Bank, 1999). The construction delay would be likely 
to further cause the construction cost overrun risk event since the extra costs were incurred during 
maintenance of the purchased materials and equipment and paying for manpower during the 
construction time delay. Furthermore, the construction cost overrun risk event could possibly lead to 
finance unavailable risk event due to the risk of running out of money and having to borrow more 
money from other financial institutes. Consequentially, the unavailability of land would create a 
vicious circle (the positive loop 1) of more resources unavailable, more construction delays and more 
cost overruns. The construction delay also leads to the performance unavailable risk that the 
infrastructure will not be available for operation, thus resulting in revenue loss. In general, land 
unavailable risk would cause dynamic feedback effects on construction cost overruns during the 
construction phase and also on revenue loss during the operation phase respectively.    87
The land unavailable risk would likely be triggered by the industrial disputes risk event that 
would result should residents protest against the unsatisfied land acquisition costs or the environment 























Figure 4.2 (1) Causal Loop Diagram for ‘Land Unavailable’ Risk Event22 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. as a 
BOOT contract for the City Link road infrastructure project in Melbourne. It was one of the Australia’s 
largest public BOOT infrastructure projects, costing AUD$2.1 billion. Due to delays for land available 
by the agreed date, the government authority was liable for costs associated with those delays incurred 
by project contractor, Transurban, (Hodge, 2004). In addition, Lu (2004) in the Yangtze Three Gorges 
Project (China) indicated that this lead to delays in project progress due to expensive land acquisition 
and difficult resident relocation. The Work Bank’s report (Work Bank, 1999) also reflected that the 
PPP contract for the Bangkok Second Stage Expressway had the same problem in that the government 
authority transferred the land too late to the project contractor, Bangkok Expressway Company Limited 
(BECL) due to the land acquisition difficulties.  
 
4.2.2 Resources unavailable 
The term, resources unavailable, refers to the possibility that the quantity or quality of the 
material resources of equipment, facilities or materials, and the like, the manpower resources such as 
manager, engineers, and the like, and the energy resources such as water, power, gas, and the like 
cannot meet contract requirements, and therefore are unavailable for construction and/or operation. 



































Figure 4.2 (2) Causal Loop Diagram for ‘Resources Unavailable’ Risk Event23 
 
As shown in Figure 4.2 (2), the resources unavailable risk event would cause construction 
delays due to inadequate quantity and quality of manpower, materials and equipment for building 
infrastructure (NAO, 2004a; Work Bank, 1999a). The construction delays would likely cause 
construction cost overruns risk event since the extra costs were incurred while maintaining the 
purchased materials, equipment and paying for the recruited manpower during the construction time 
delay. Furthermore, the construction cost overrun risk would possibly result in the finance unavailable 
risk due to expenditure of money borrowed from the financial institutes. This would likely cause the 
event of resources unavailable due to insufficient funds for manpower, materials and equipment 
required to build infrastructure. Consequently, it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to 
cause more risk in construction delay and construction cost overrun. The construction delay would also 
result in performance unavailable because the infrastructure would not be ready to deliver its services. 
This would lead to revenue loss, with not enough credit to repay the debt, which will result in financial 
unavailable. Consequently, it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to cause yet again more 
risk in resources unavailable so that performance unavailable resulting in more revenue loss. At the 
operation stage, the resources unavailable risk event would directly cause low operating productivity 
event due to inadequate quantity and quality of manpower, materials and equipment which are required 
to deliver its services efficiently (NAO, 2004a; PAC, 2005b). It would lead to revenue loss which 
would cause financial unavailable again, which will create a vicious circle (the positive loop 3) to cause   89
more risk in resource unavailable which leads to more low operating productivity and then more 
revenue loss. The low operating productivity would also directly cause performance unavailable since 
the adequate quantity and quality of manpower, materials and equipment is not available to operate the 
whole infrastructure. It would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 4) to cause revenue loss which 
leads to financial unavailable and more risk in resource unavailable. Finally, the resources unavailable 
risk event would result in dynamic feedback effects on construction cost overrun during construction 
phase and revenue losses during operation phase respectively.  
The resources unavailable risk event would be likely to be triggered by the default of 
subcontractors risk events that the subcontractors are incapable of supplying materials, equipment, and 
manpower to build or operate the infrastructure (Hodge, 2004; NAO, 2006). The financial unavailable 
risk event is when the project contractor has insufficient capital to purchase materials, equipment or 
manpower required to build infrastructure  (PAC, 2006). The industrial disputes risk events include 
strikes, industrial action, civil commotion, or public protests, which would cause materials, equipment, 
and manpower that cannot be supplied in time (EC, 2003). The Force Majeure risk events like 
earthquake, storm, flood, war, and fire, etc. make supply for materials, equipment or manpower 
unavailable (EC, 2002; Grey, 2004). 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As 
for the cases, the UK National Audio Office’s report (NAO, 2004a) on the London Underground 
indicated that they are unclear for both of the PPP project operation contractor, LUL, and infrastructure 
construction contractors, Infracos, to sustain and develop staff skilled to run PPP contract for the Tube 
network. In a report, the members of the UK Public Account Committee (PAC) for PFI criticized the 
fact that the professional skills for PFI contract management were not sustained for the operational 
phase due to unnecessary staff changes (PAC, 2005b). In addition, the Work Bank officials reported 
that staff changes were problematic in that there was not enough skilled personnel to deal with the PPP 
contract for the Bangkok Elevated Road and Track System (Work Bank, 1999). Lu (2004) indicated in 
a case study on BOT contract for the Labin B Power Plant (China) that the government officials took 
the materials unavailable risk to guarantee the fuel supply. Furthermore, the PFI contract for the BBC’s 
White City 2 Development indicated that the space and technical capacity at White City 2 were under-
utilized because experienced staff with professional skills were not utilized (PAC, 2006b). 
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4.2.3 Performance unavailable 
The term performance unavailable refers to the possibility that asset performance is delayed or 
disrupted to deliver services outlined in the output specifications. As shown in Figure 4.2 (3), the 
performance unavailable risk event would delay or disrupt the services so that the operating contractor 
cannot meet the contract performance requirements, resulting in a contract breach (Hodge, 2004; PAC, 
2005a). This would cause a  contract remedies/penalties  risk event in which the operating contractor 
must pay for the penalties and problems fixing costs according to contract terms and conditions (PAC, 
2005a). The greater the cost for fixing a problem, the greater the loss for services. In addition, 
performance unavailable event would likely cause the contract disputes risk event that would cause 
contracting parties to argue over who should be held accountable for defective issues (Hodge, 2004). 
The more contract disputes exist between parties, the more contract remedies/penalties are incurred to 
settle the disputes. Therefore, the contract remedies/penalties risk event arising from contract break or 
contract disputes would lead to revenue loss risk event. Moreover, the performance unavailable would 
directly cause revenue loss because the infrastructure cannot deliver its services (Hodge, 2004). The 
cumulative revenue loss would likely cause the financial unavailable risk resulting in the lack of 
adequate credits by the contractor to pay debt. This would likely cause the insolvency of contractor risk 
event so that the contractor was unable to provide the services. Consequently, this would lead to a 

























































Figure 4.2 (3) Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Performance Unavailable’ Risk Event24   91
Furthermore, the performance unavailable event would cause a contract breach risk event 
when the operating parties could not provide services to meet the contract requirements. This event 
would lead to termination liability for which the operating parties pay according to the contract terms 
and conditions (Work Bank, 1999). This would result in revenue loss risk event and then financial 
unavailable. Consequently, these events create a vicious cycle (the positive loop 2) at performance 
unavailable risk again. As stated above, the financial unavailable risk event would likely result in 
resources unavailable because the project contractor would not have enough capital to purchase 
materials, equipment or manpower that are required to operate the infrastructure. This would also 
create a vicious circle (the positive loop 3) at performance unavailable risk. In general, the resources 
unavailable risk event would result in dynamic risk feedback effects on revenue loss during the 
operation phase.  
The performance unavailable risk event would be likely to be triggered by several risk events 
such as the resource unavailable event (NAO, 2004a; PAC, 2005b; Work Bank, 1999) that the 
materials, equipment, and manpower of the contractor cannot meet the operation requirements for 
infrastructure; the construction delay event (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004; Hodge, 2004; Work 
Bank); failed commissioning tests, and inspection and testing delay events (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont) 
in which infrastructure is inoperable; and low operating productivity (EC, 2004c). System breakdown 
(Hodge), high maintenance frequency (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont) and accidents and safety issues (EC, 
2002; NAO, 2004a) lead to the infrastructure that cannot be operated under normal conditions so that 
the contractor performance cannot meet the contract requirements; insolvency of contractor events 
occur (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont) which result in bankruptcy and the incapability to operate the 
infrastructure. Shorter asset life (EC, 2002; NAO, 2004a) occurs when the infrastructure is disposed of 
and thereby contracts can no longer deliver services. Industrial disputes (EC, 2003; Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont) occur when strikes, industrial action, civil commotion, or public protests result in the 
inability to supply materials, equipment, and manpower  to operate the infrastructure. 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. The 
members of the European Commission reported (EC, 2002) on the London Underground and indicated 
both the PPP project operation contractor, LUL, and infrastructure construction contractors, Infracos, 
should assume the responsibility to make the railway infrastructure available and in working condition. 
The members of the UK Public Accounts Committee criticized the government authority for not   92
terminating the contract with the PFI project service contractor, LUL, when the LUL officials failed to 
deliver the project and broke the contract with London Underground (PAC, 2005a). Moreover, Hodge 
(2004) indicated in the Melbourne City Link case study that the project contractor, Transurban, 
initiated an AUD$37 million claim against the government authority for less demand and subsequent 
financial loss due to contract breach. 
 
4.2.4 Design changes 
The term design changes refers to the possibility that the changes of originally agreed design 

































Figure 4.2 (4) Cause Loop Diagram for “Design Changes” Risk Event25 
 
As described above, the Figure 4.2 (4) shows that the design changes risk event would cause 
construction change events (PAC, 2006b) since the construction depends on the design. The more 
construction changes occur, the more construction delays would occur. The construction delays would 
lead to construction cost overruns at the construction stage, which would likely lead to finance 
unavailable events due to lack of money for construction. It would result in more risks in resources 
unavailable events and more risk in construction delays since the construction parties would not have 
adequate funds for employment. Again, this would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) and 
cause more risk in construction delay, and more construction cost overruns. This would also lead to 
performance unavailable event as the infrastructure would not be ready to deliver its services, resulting 
in revenue loss. Revenue loss would lead to financial unavailable events since there would not be 
enough credit to repay the debt. Furthermore, as previously described, the financial unavailable event 
would likely lead to a resources unavailable event because there would be inadequate amounts of   93
money for the required tasks and resources. Consequently, it would create a vicious circle (the positive 
loop 2) and cause increased risk in performance unavailable events and more risk in revenue loss. In 
general, the design changes would cause dynamic feedback effects on construction cost overruns 
during construction phase and revenue losses during operation phase, respectively.  
The design changes risk event would possibly be triggered by the risk events such as: (a) 
scope changes (PAC, 2006a) which result when design or construction parameters need to be changed 
to meet the new scope requirements; and (b) contract remedies/penalties (Hodge, 2004; PAC, 2006b) 
because the remedies for poor performance failed to meet output specifications. 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As in the PFI 
contract for the BBCs White City 2 Development, the members of the UK Public Account Committee 
(PAC) criticized the fact that £60 million was needed for additional costs (an increase of 29%) due to 
the design changes. Introducing variations after contracting inevitably increase risk costs (PAC, 2006b). 
In addition, Hodge (2004) indicated that the tunnel in the Melbourne City Link project needed to be 
redesigned after experts discovered it had defective construction; this led to delays in the tunnel 
opening. Furthermore, the Ghosh and Jintanapakanont (2004) reflected in their case study of the 
Thailand Underground Rail Project that design change is one of the most important factors regarding 
project delivery. 
 
4.2.5 Construction cost overrun 
The term construction cost overrun refers to the possibility that the infrastructure is incapable 
of delivering within the budget. As shown in Figure 4.2 (5), the construction cost overrun risk event 
would possibly lead to finance unavailable events due to inadequate capital availability for construction 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Reilly, 2005). This would likely lead to resources unavailable events in which 
there was not enough money to purchase materials and equipment, or to recruit skilful manpower for 
infrastructure. These events would result in construction delays in the construction phase and then 
construction cost overruns due to the need for purchasing new materials and equipment and paying for 
recruited manpower during the construction time delay. This creates a vicious circle (the positive loop 
1) causing more risk in resources unavailable events, and more construction delays and cost overruns.    94
On the other hand, the construction delays would also cause performance unavailable events 
because the infrastructure might not be ready to deliver services. It would also lead to revenue loss 
since there would be insufficient credit to repay the debt, resulting in financial unavailable events. 
Consequently, this would create a vicious cycle (the positive loop 2) causing more risk in resources 
unavailable events resulting in more construction delays and performance unavailable events which 






























Figure 4.2 (5) Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Construction Cost Overrun’ Risk 
Event26 
 
The construction cost overrun event is often triggered by risk events such as: (a) construction 
delays resulting in extra costs incurred during the construction time delay; and (b) price escalation 
which is the unexpected increase in the labor costs, materials and equipments used for infrastructure 
construction (Hodge, 2004). Contract remedies/penalties is defined as the extra costs for remedies for 
defective construction which had failed to meet contract requirements (Hodge). Insurance increase 
occurs when the agreed project insurances substantially increases during the construction stage (Lu, 
2004). 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. 
Many researchers have found (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Reilly, 2005) that in 9 out of 10 transport 
infrastructure projects, costs are underestimated resulting in cost overruns. For rail projects, actual 
costs are on average 45% higher than estimated costs (standard deviation =38). For all project types, 
the actual costs are 28% higher than the estimated costs (standard deviation = 39). Cost 
underestimation and cost overruns across 20 nations and 5 continents appear to be a global   95
phenomenon that has not decreased over the past 70 years. For example, in the Boston, Massachusetts 
artery/tunnel project in the US, there is 196% of cost overruns; 110% of cost overruns exist for Great 
Belt rail tunnel in Denmark, 100% of cost overruns exist for Shinkansen Joetsu rail line in Japan; and 
80% cost overruns exist for Channel tunnel in the UK and France, respectively. 
 
4.2.6 Construction delay 
The term construction delay refers to the possibility that the officials of the facility are 
incapable of delivering on time. As discussed, Figure 4.2 (6) shows that the construction delay risk 
events would likely cause construction cost overrun risk events because of the extra costs incurred 
during the construction time delay. Then, the construction cost overrun risk event would lead to a 
finance unavailable event due to lack of capital. This event then leads to resources unavailable events 
because of inadequate funds for materials and manpower for infrastructure construction. A construction 
delay would result. Again, the vicious circle would occur (the positive loop 1) and cause more risk in 











































Figure 4.2 (6) Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Construction Delay’ Risk Event27 
 
On the other hand, the construction delay events would also cause performance unavailable 
events since the infrastructure would not be ready to deliver its services. This would lead to revenue 
loss based on bad credit issues which will result in financial unavailable events. Consequently, the 
positive loop 2 would cause yet again more risk in construction delays so that more performance 
unavailable events would result in more revenue loss. Furthermore, at the operating stage, the resources   96
unavailable event would directly cause performance unavailable events due to the lack of materials or 
manpower for infrastructure performance. Positive loop 3 would cause increased risk in revenue loss. 
In general, the construction delay risk event would result in dynamic feedback effects on construction 
cost overruns during construction phase and revenue losses during the operation phase. 
 
The construction delay would be likely to be triggered by the risk events such as: (a) land 
unavailable events (Hodge, 2004; Lu, 2004; Work Bank, 1999) which is when the land cannot be 
acquired on time for infrastructure construction; (b) resources unavailable events (NAO, 2004a; Work 
Bank) created when the required materials, equipments and manpower are not ready for construction; 
(c) construction changes (Hodge) which occur when additional time is needed to complete construction; 
(d) complex system interface/integration(PAC, 2005a) which is a likely delay in design and 
construction work since the designed and constructed infrastructure is incompatible with other public 
systems; (e) delays in contract change negotiation (Hodge; NAO, 2004b; PAC, 2003c) which is the 
additional time needed to reach an agreement between parties for construction changes; (f) contract 
remedies/penalties (EC, 2002; Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004; Hodge) when time is needed to remedy 
construction problems in order to meet contract requirements; (g) inspection/testing delays (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont) when there is a delay in project commissioning because of additional time needed to 
passing inspection and testing; (h) approval delay occurs when the permits or licenses needed to 
proceed with construction as scheduled are delayed in processing; (i) industrial disputes (EC, 2003; 
Hodge) cause the time delay due to strikes, industrial action, civil commotion or public protests.  
These risks have been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. 
Hodge (2004) indicated the government authority was to pay for construction delays due to delays 
arising from land acquisition and industrial disputes in the Melbourne City Link project. Moreover, 
Ghosh and Jintanapakanont (2004) reflected on the Thailand Underground Rail Project that 
construction delay was one of the most important factors leading to project delivery delay.  
  
4.2.7 Defective construction 
The term defective construction refers to the situation in which the equipment, system or facility cannot 
meet the construction standards and requirements. As shown in Figure 4.2 (7), the defective   97
construction would cause failed commission tests (Hodge, 2004) at the end of construction stage that 
the facilities cannot pass the operating tests. This results in a contract remedies/penalties risk to fix 
defect issues which would result in design changes and construction changes. The more construction 
changes, the more construction delays would occur. As described above, the extra costs incurred in 
maintaining the existing materials and equipment, purchasing new materials and equipment and paying 














































































Figure 4.2 (7) Cause Loop Diagram for “Defective Construction” Risk Event28 
 
This fact would likely cause finance unavailable events due to lack of money for construction. 
This would further result in more risk in resources unavailable events which would likely cause more 
risk in defective design and more risk in defective construction since the construction parties may lack 
money. Consequently, this would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) causing more risk in 
defective construction, more risk in construction delay and construction cost overruns.  
On the other hand, the defective construction would possibly cause a series of risk events at 
the operation stage such as: (a) low operating productivity (EC, 2004a; Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004) 
which exists when system operating productivity is lower than the output specification that was setup 
in the contract requirements; (b) high maintenance frequency (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont) which occurs   98
when the maintenance frequency is higher than expected so that the system cannot deliver service as 
required; (c) system breakdown (Hodge, 2004) when that system would completely fail to deliver 
services; (d) accidents and safety issues (Hodge) which occur when the system cannot be operated as 
safely as the contract required; (d) shorter asset life (EC, 2002; NAO, 2004a) occurs when the system 
has a shorter life than the expected time set up in the contract output specifications. All of these would 
lead to performance unavailable events in which the infrastructure is not able to deliver services as 
required in the contract output specifications. The more performance unavailable events occur, the 
more revenue loss occurs as well. This fact would be likely to cause financial unavailable events which 
would result in more risk in resources unavailable events in which the contract parties do not have 
adequate money to employ the required materials, equipment and manpower from suppliers to deliver 
services. Consequently, this creates a vicious circle (the positive loop 2) causing more risk in defective 
construction. In addition, performance unavailable events would lead to contract breaches that result in 
infrastructure performance inability to meet contract requirements. This would necessitate construction 
remedies/penalties risk events to fix defect issues. This would likely cause contract disputes risk events 
in which contract parties argue with each other relative to who should be responsible for defect issues. 
The more contract disputes occur, the more contract remedies/penalties costs would incur to settle the 
disputes. The contract remedies/penalties would result in design changes and construction changes yet 
again thus causing more risk in construction delay. Consequently, this again creates the vicious circle 
(the positive loop 3) causing more risk in performance unavailable events and more risk in revenue loss. 
Furthermore, the resources unavailable events would create two vicious circles (the positive 
loop 4 and loop 5) causing more risk in performance unavailable events and low operating productivity 
respectively since there would not be adequate money to secure the required materials, equipment and 
manpower from suppliers to deliver service. In general, the defective construction risk event would 
result in dynamic feedback effects on construction cost overrun during construction phase and revenue 
losses during operation phase respectively.  
The defective construction events would be likely to be triggered by the following situations: 
(a) the defective design event (Hodge, 2004) in which the design created cannot meet output 
specifications; (b) default of subcontractors (EC, 2002; Hodge, 2004; NAO, 2006; PAC, 2002a) so that 
the construction provider cannot meet contract requirements because the subcontractors are incapable 
or insolvent; (c) resources unavailable event (Lu, 2004; NAO, 2004a; PAC, 2002a, 2006b; Work Bank,   99
1999) such that the quantity and quality of the materials, equipment, and manpower required for 
construction are inadequate; (d) complex system interface/integration (PAC, 2002a; PAC, 2005a) in 
which the constructed system is difficult to interface with or incompatible with other public systems. 
This type of risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 
4.1.2. Hodge (2004) indicated relative to the Melbourne City Link project that a major consortium 
subcontractor, TOVJ, needed to pay the project contractor, Transurban AUD$153.6 millions to settle a 
dispute over delays and traffic problems caused by faulty construction. 
 
4.2.8 Notes on the Time Delay  
In the Causal Loop Diagrams, the TIME DELAY would lead to ‘revenue loss’ in the following 
situations. This will be explained by cash flow diagrams. 
 
Case 1: Construction time delay at construction stage would lead to revenue loss at 
construction stage. As shown in the Case 1 cash flow diagram, the upper one that is the scheduled cash 
flow is compared with the lower one that is the actual cash flow. In the scheduled cash flow, the 
construction is scheduled to complete and start to operate at time t. But in the actual cash flow, the 
construction cannot be completed until time t+τ. Therefore, the construction delay τ at 
CONSTRUCTION STAGE would lead to revenue loss (the scheduled income: b1+b2+b3+b4 from 
time t to time t+τ) at CONSTRUCTION STAGE since the project cannot be operated to earn money 
from time t to time t+τ. During construction delay τ, the new construction costs c1+c2+c3+c4 are born. 
Thus, the actual loss is b1+b2+b3+b4+c1+c2+c3+c4. 
The more time delay τ in completing construction, the more delay in earning money. In other 
words, the more construction delays, the more revenue loss due to the increased performance 
unavailable (the project cannot start to service). This would lead to a serious financial problem because 
there is no revenues in the expected timeline to repay the debt (principle and interest) borrowed from 
the financing institutions for investment at the construction stage. Furthermore, the financial 
unavailable would lead to resources unavailable due to a lack of capital to recruit manpower, and 
purchase materials and equipment for construction, therefore causing construction delays. 
Consequently, this would create a vicious cycle that increases risk in construction delay which leads to   100
performance unavailable which leads to revenue losses which lead to financial unavailable which leads 
to resource unavailable which leads to more risk in construction delay.  
Therefore, in such a case, the PPP projects don’t generate income until completing 
construction but revenue loss during construction delay at construction stage due to performance 
unavailable (project cannot be started for services) which would lead to financial unavailable which in 
turn would generate effect on resource unavailable which would lead to more construction delay at 




Case 2: Operation time delay at operation stage would lead to revenue loss at operation stage  
As shown in the Case 2 cash flow diagram, the THSR project is scheduled to operate from time t to 
time T. But in the actual cash flow, the project cannot be operated to earn money from time t’ to time 
t’+τ due to performance unavailable (services are stopped to repair system breakdown or solve the 
accidents & safety issues). Therefore, the operation delay τ at OPERATION STAGE would lead to 
revenue loss (the scheduled income: b1+b2+b3+b4 from time t’ to time t’+τ) at OPERATION STAGE 
since the project cannot be operated to earn money from time t’ to time t’+τ. During operation delay τ, 
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Case 1: Construction time delay at construction stage would lead to revenue loss at 
construction stage 
Revenue loss   101
 
At operation stage, project services are stopped or delayed (performance unavailable) due to 
some events such as system breakdown, accidents and safety issues. This would create a vicious circle 
of increased risk in revenue loss (no income) during OPERATION STAGE which would lead to 
financial unavailable which would lead to resource unavailable (there will be not enough capital to 
purchase materials, equipment or to recruit manpower required to operate the project.) which would 
lead to more risk in performance unavailable. The loop 3 in the Figure 4.2.(3) is such a case. (Note: 
performance unavailable (variable 3) is caused by some events such as system breakdown (variable 16). 
Thus, the dependent variable 3 is the function of the independent variable 16.) 
 
Case 3: Construction time delay at operation stage would lead to revenue loss at operation stage 
As shown in the Case 3 cash flow diagram, the THSR project is scheduled to operate from time 
t to time T. But in the actual cash flow, the project cannot be operated to earn money from time t’ to 
time t’+τ due to performance unavailable (services are stopped to remedy defective construction). 
Therefore, the construction delay τ at OPERATION STAGE would lead to revenue loss (the scheduled 
income: b1+b2+b3+b4 from time t’ to time t’+τ) at OPERATION STAGE since the project cannot be 
operated to earn money from time t’ to time t’+τ. During construction delay τ, the new costs 
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Case 2: Operation time delay at operation stage would lead to revenue loss at operation stage 
Revenue loss   102
The defective construction that refers to civic work cannot meet the construction standards and 
contract requirements will need to be remedied or reworked. At operation stage, the remedy or rework 
(construction changes) for defective construction would lead to construction delay at OPERATION 
STAGE, because the extra time is needed to remedy construction defects. This would lead to 
performance unavailable that the project cannot be operated for services during remedy or rework. 
Consequently, it would create a vicious circle that increases risk in revenue loss during OPERATION 
STAGE which would lead to financial unavailable which in turn would lead to resources unavailable 
which leads to more risk in performance unavailable. The loop 2 in Figure V4 and the Loop 2 in Figure 
V5 of the Appendix V are examples of such a case. A real case is the Melbourne City Link (Hodge, 
2004) addressed in Appendix V5. The defective construction was found out in two tunnels of the 
Melbourne City Link, which led to revenue loss due to the need to seal tunnels for construction rework 
at operation stage.  
From this description, only revenue loss during CONSTRUCTION STAGE leads to 
construction delay during CONSTRUCTION STAGE and revenue loss during OPERATION STAGE 
leads to operation delay or construction delay during OPERATION STAGE. There is no such case that 
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Case 3: Construction time delay at operation stage would lead to revenue loss at operation stage 
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Chapter 5 Taiwan High Speed Rail Project Risks 
 
 
5.1 The Background of THSR 
The network for Taiwan high speed rail (THSR) is shown in Figure 5.1.1. The THSR consists 
of a 345km (220 miles) route from northern Taiwan to southern Taiwan. The THSR is designed for 
express trains capable of traveling at up to 350 km/h. The THSR allows travelers to make the trip in 
roughly 90 minutes as opposed to the current 4 to 6 hours travel time by conventional rail or auto 
highway system. The total cost for this project is currently estimated to be USD $16.5 billion; it would 
be one of the largest privately funded transport schemes to date in the world (Mott MacDonald, 2007).  
This project is delivered in build-operate-transfer (BOT) mode. The project consortium, the 
Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation (THSRC), won the bid and signed the Taiwan High Speed Rail 
Construction and Operation Contract and Station Area Development Contract with the project authority, 
the Bureau of High Speed Rail (BHSR), Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) on 
July 23, 1998. The THSRC was officially authorized with a 35-year concession for THSR construction 
and operation, and a 50-year concession for station specific zone developments. Private investment 
companies committed to civil works, stations, track work, electrical and mechanical systems, 
maintenance bases and financial costs of approximately $13.1 billion in U. S. dollars.  
Actual construction began in March 2000 and running tests started in January 2005. With time 
overruns of one and half years, the operation began on January 5, 2007. Initially THSRC officials 
expected the ridership to be 163,000 passengers per line daily, but projected that eventually ridership 
will be 336,000 passengers per day by the year 2033. This will see the high-speed line account for 
5.5% of the transportation market in Taiwan (BHSR, 2009). 
To avoid conflicts with other forms of transportation where ever possible, there are 10 new 
stations, along with large number of new bridges, tunnels and viaducts. As illustrated in Figure 5.1.2, 
no less than 300km of the lines totaling 345km in length have been built either in tunnels or on viaducts. 
The route includes steep gradients to cross the terrain. Initially, THSPC looked at German and French 
high-speed technology to form the core system for THSR which uses German ICE power cars and   104
French TGV Duplex intermediate trailers. However, Japanese technology was ultimately chosen, with 
Kawasakis 700 series Shinkansen trains used as models. The finished product has been classified as 



















Figure 5.1.2 Tunnels and Viaducts on The THSR Network(BHSR, 2009)30 
 
The project had been plagued by repeated controversy, including allegations of poor quality 
construction, claims of unresolved safety concerns based on three derailments during tests in early 
November 2006, and the 1-year delay. Supporters of the project believed THSR would help relieve 
traffic congestion along the heavily traveled western corridor while providing the advantages of greater   105
safety, higher transit volume, low land occupancy, energy economy and low pollution. It had also been 
stated that the THSR will help to promote balanced development for western Taiwan (Shan, 2006). 
 
5.2 Risk Scenarios of THSR Project 
The interview survey was conducted to explore the risk scenarios of THSR project. The 
purposes of the interview survey were: (a) to modify the causal loop diagrams created in Chapter 4 to 
ensure that the physical risk causal relationships fit the likely risk scenarios for the applied case of the 
THSR project; (b) to gather parameter information for risk variables to model risk cost network for the 
THSR project. The timeline and method for interviewing are referenced in Appendix II. The interview 
statements for 52 risk scenarios of THSR project were completely addressed in Appendix VI. Some 
indicative risk scenarios were extracted from Appendix VI and discussed in the following section. 
 
5.2.1 ‘Land Unavailable’ on THSR 
As discussed in the Section V1 and the CLD illustrated in Figure V1, failure to acquire the 
lands on schedule would be possibly be a result of industrial disputes risk events, and would likely 
cause construction delay risks. Relative to the THSR project, the interview statements are: 
“The overall length of lands for the whole route of THSR runs through the west corridor of 
Taiwan is about 345 kilometers. Among of them, the private lands occupy about 789 hectares, 
which were acquired by expropriation, whereas the public lands occupy about 101 hectares, 
which were acquired by appropriation. These include lands for routes and five station zones 
that include Taoyuan Station, Hsinchu Station, Taichung Station, Chaiyi Station and Tainan 
Station. In addition, the lands for constructing and operating six maintenance depots and bases 
from north Taiwan to south Taiwan are required, which includes Hsichih Depot, Liuchia 
Depot, Wujhi Depot, Taibao Base, Main Workshop and Tsoying Depot. The private and 
public lands occupy about 221 hectares. Most of the scheduled land acquisition can be 
completed to support the start of other work packages, but a delay in land acquisition on 
schedule would seriously delay the completion of other work packages including track work,   106
civic work, station construction, depot construction and signal & communication systems of 
the M/E core system.”  
“All of land acquisition requires a negotiation with the land owners, a setup of property rights 
of superficies and an approval request from the related government authority for lands. 
However, you know there are 1,607 houses, 225 factories, 1,095 graves, and 70 stables on the 
lands. Thus negotiation for acquiring these lands is very complicated. The major delay was 
still caused by several disputes and strikes from the land owners from Taipei to Kaohsiung 
due to various reasons like that the land owners were usually unhappy with the acquisition 
prices, or they cannot find another places for settle, or the Green groups wanted to stop this 
project because they thought it would have a great impact on the environment. In addition, the 
minor delay was caused by obtaining an approval from the government authorities to 
change property right for industrial purpose. This project has been approved by central 
government, but property right change is still under control of local governments. Some of 
local governments did not completely support land acquisition, so most of the approval delays 
for land acquisition are caused by local government.”  
“According to the past experiences, there were about 5% -11% of land owners would argue 
against land acquisition, and about 3%-13% of processing time for land acquisition would be 
delayed for the public transport projects; the larger projects, the more delay.”  
“The land acquisition is a preliminary job before starting other work packages. Our job is to 
remove obstacles and ensure land acquisition can be completion as requested by the Fourth 
Division (which is responsible for Engineering Management and Contract Performance 
Supervision). The Fourth Division estimated that one year behind construction would incur 
additional construction administration cost about NT$5.5 b, which includes manpower costs, 
material and equipment maintenance costs and interests for purchasing material and 
equipment, etc.” 
 
From the above interview statements, the general risk causal loop diagram for land 
unavailable shown in Figure V1 fits the likely scenarios for the THSR project. But, from the statements 
such as, “The major delay was still caused by several disputes and strikes from the land owners…”, and 
“the minor delay was caused by obtaining an approval from the government authorities to change   107
property right for industrial purpose,” the direct causes of land unavailable were industrial disputes and 
approval delays. Therefore, the direct cause and consequences of land unavailable risk events shown in 














Figure 5.2.1 The Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Land Unavailable’31 
 
 
5.2.2 ‘Resources Unavailable’ on THSR 
As discussed in the Section V2 and the CLD shown in Figure V2, resources including 
manpower, material, and energy could not meet the contract requirements for construction and 
operation which had possibly been triggered by financial unavailable issues of default by 
subcontractors, industrial disputes and Force Majeure, and would likely cause construction delay. As 
for the THSR project, the interview statements are: 
“No doubt the subcontractors are the most important resource for supplies. There are 12 
subcontracts for civic works: C210 and C215 were carried by joint venture of subcontractors, 
Obayashi Corp. of Japan and Fu Tsu Construction Co. Ltd of ROC; C220 was carried by joint 
venture of Daiho Corp. of Japan and Chiu Tai General Contractor Co. Ltd of ROC and Kou 
Kai Construction Co. Ltd of ROC; C230 by joint venture of Hyundai Engineering & Corp. of 
Korea, Chung Lin General Contractor Co. Ltd of ROC and Zen Pacific Civil Contractor Co. 
Ltd of Hong Kong; C240 by joint venture of Hyundai Engineering & Corp. of Korea and 
Chung Lin General Contractor Co. Ltd of ROC; C250 by joint venture of Hochtief AG of 
German, Pan Asia Corp. of ROC and Ballast Nedam international of Holland; C260 and C270 
by joint venture of Bilfinger and Berger Bauaktiengesellachaft of German, and Continental 
Engineering Corp. of ROC; C280 by joint venture of Samsung Corp. of Korea, Korea Heavy 
Industries & Construction Co. Ltd. of Korea and International Engineering & Construction 
Corp. of ROC; C291 and C296 by joint venture of Shimizu Corp. of Japan and Evergreen 
Construction Corp. of ROC; C295 by joint venture of Italian Thai Development Public   108
Company Limited of Thailand, Evergreen Construction Corp. of ROC, and Pacific Electric 
Wire & Cable Company of ROC. As for station construction, there are 6 subcontracts: S215 
was carried by subcontractor Futsu/Obayashi JV; S220 by Daiho; S250 by 
Taisei/CEC/CTCI/Taian JV; S280 by Teco/Takenaka JV; S290 by Evergreen/Shimizu JV; 
S395 by SECI. The Core System for Electrical and Mechanical Equipment is supplied by joint 
venture of TSC which includes Japan Shinkansen System and other 6 Japanese companies for 
train units, signaling system, electric power and electric train system, telecommunication 
system, general electrical and mechanical equipment along the rail, training simulator and 
personnel training, etc. Tract work contract was carried by subcontractors TSC and TSIEC. As 
for maintenance depot construction, the detailed design contract D370 was carried by 
subcontractor, Po-Chen International (USA); D220 was carried by Shi-Ya Construction; D290 
and D250 by joint venture of Chung-Ding Construction, Do-Yuan Engineering, and Chung-Lu 
Construction; D295 by joint venture of Do-Yuan Engineering and TVBJ (Australia); D502 by 
Safop (Italy); D503 by Vector Systems Pte. Ltd (Australia), etc.”  
“Apparently, a subcontractor’s skill and coordination capability are the most important 
factors to ensure subcontractors resources can be used to properly build, integrate, and 
perform heterogeneous systems to meet the contract requirements. The Taiwan high speed 
rail is a high-technology project. All of the civic work, track work, mechanical systems and 
electrical systems were types of innovative technologies. Of special importance was the fact 
that Taiwan has complicated geographical features and natural conditions such as soil 
condition, underground water, mountain tunneling, typhoon, flood, and earthquakes, and the 
like which need high-technology solutions to overcome. The subcontractor selection should 
ensure it has enough skilled technicians and equipment to implement high-technology. 
Moreover, there are about 50 major engineering items for all work packages including civic 
engineering, track work, power system, telecommunication system, and signaling system, etc., 
which need to be properly integrated to ensure the whole system can work well. If any 
subcontractor for an item failed, the whole THSR project would risk failure. Most of these 
outsourcing contracts (subcontracts) were contracted by international tendering and carried out 
by joint venture of local and international companies. The differences on language, culture, 
technique between subcontractors would challenge whether the subcontractors and   109
concessionaire can coordinate well to ensure the whole system can be built and performed 
to conform contract requirements.” 
 
“Natural calamity is another threat to disrupt resource supplies. Like Taipei Mass Transit, 
the service was stopped before due to flooding caused by a typhoon. The THSR has suffered 
from the 921 (September 21, 1999) earthquake that led to serious equipment and facility 
damage. We required the concessionaire and their subcontractors who have the Standard of 
Procedure to deal with the risk from the typhoon and earthquake often happens in Taiwan, 
which would likely to cause equipment breakdown and power unavailable so that the 
construction or operation is forced to disrupt.” 
 
“The residents along the THSR line who suffered from the noise of THSR often protested 
against the THSR project construction and operation. Some of the project performance would 
therefore be stopped. The acceptable level is less than 75 decibels to continue for 8 minutes. 
The point test indicated that it often reaches 76 to 94 decibels which would often cause the 
arguments and protects from the residents to stop project services.” 
 
“Another problem is the financial capability of contractor which is a potential risk to delay 
resource supplies and would lead to serious construction and service delay. The 
concessionaire would be easy to suffer financial difficulties before complete construction, 
especially when there was a great delay. That is because the project is only expanding with no 
revenue at construction phase. At operation phase, especially at the beginning of services, like 
Taipei Mass Transit, the demand is usually less than expected. This would lead to financial 
difficulties, too. I would say that the financial difficulties for concessionaire would cause 
significant impact on resource supplies that are required for THSR construction and 
operation.” 
 
“According to the past experience of the similar transport projects like Taipei Mass Transit, 
the minimum average delay for construction due to the lack of resource supplies is about 45 
days. According to the contract mechanism, the Fourth Division of BHSR, which is   110
responsible for Engineering Management and Contract Performance Supervision will step in 
when the lack of resources would delay each work package behind the schedule until 120 
days.” 
 
From the above interview statements, the researcher determined that the direct cause and 
consequence for land unavailable events shown in Figure V2 fit the likely scenarios for the THSR 
project. 
 
5.2.3 ‘Performance Unavailable’ on THSR 
As discussed in the Section V3 and based on the CLD shown in Figure V3, the project 
performance were delayed or disrupted in delivery of services which lead to revenue losses, which 
were possibly triggered by construction delays, resource unavailable, failed commissioning tests, 
inspection and testing delay, low operating productivity, system breakdown, high maintenance 
frequency, accidents and safety issues, insolvency of contractors, shorter asset life, and industrial 
disputes. Relative to the THSR project, the interview statements are below: 
“There would be lots of challenges to start running this state-of-the-art project. The 
preliminary condition is that all of work package should be completed and passed the 
inspection & commissioning tests on schedule for operation. Annual delay to start operation 
would be likely to cost about NT$19.3 billion including NT$13.8 billion for interest and 
NT$5.5 billion for operating cost. Moreover, the basic requirement is that we need high 
quality engineering work to build and operate this high-technology system which should 
dynamically integrate trains, signaling and communication systems, and power systems to 
meet the commissioning test requirement that the THSR is able to efficiently and safely 
operate under high-speed running in 350 km/hr. The train and track are Japanese 
specifications, but the signaling and communication systems are Germany specifications. 
They need to be integrated very well to ensure the whole THSR system can be operated 
without any defect during its expected service life.”  
“For example, if the Turn Out system that is used to guide the trains on the right track is out of 
order, then the regular trains would be canceled or delayed for services, which would cause   111
that the whole system broke down or even lead to the rail crash. The unreliable integration 
between train, track signaling and communication system will then need frequent 
modification and maintenance. All of these would reduce operation efficiency.” 
 
“Another major challenge is the skilled manpower and communication issue. For example, a 
central control room has been built to monitor and operate THSR for the entire 345km line. It 
is similar to the brain controlling the body to work properly. It needs to control access to and 
from depots. It controls the in-cab APT and interlocking that allow route-setting and locking 
functions to be performed at the stations and depots along the route. Any problem on the 
controlling system would cause improper operation and even accident and safety issues. 
However, we require the skilled and practical manpower with good communication and 
coordination to use this state-of-the-art artificial intelligence. Originating from different 
countries, the current staff in the central control room may be skilled to use the central control 
system but speak different languages. There would be potential risk to reduce the operation 
quality and efficiency due to communication and coordination problems between the train 
drivers, maintenance staff and the staff in the central control room.” 
 
“When the THSR stops or there is a delay in service, the direct consequence is revenue loss. 
Being unable to meet service requirements will be penalized. We estimate that the maximum 
number of trains that would delay service on time for more than 30 minutes in a month is 
about 45 trains, and there would be no train delay if the operation company can monitor and 
control whole system well. According to the contract terms and conditions, the half of ticket 
fare should be refunded to every rider if the train behind the schedule more than 30 minutes; 
the whole ticket fare should be refunded if delay more than one hour. Furthermore, the 
cumulative delay service on time would likely to cause 20% of trains that are unable to 
provide service as scheduled. We estimate that the break-even daily capacity is about 60 
trains. If the number of daily in-service train is less than the break-even daily capacity, then it 
would lead to revenue losses.” 
   112
From statement that “all of work package should be completed and passed the inspection and 
commissioning tests on schedule for operation,” the inspection and testing delay and failed 
commissioning tests risk events are included in construction delay. Therefore, they are removed from 
CLD shown in Figure 4.2.3. From the above statements, the researcher indicated that resources 
unavailable (the required for skilled and practical manpower), system breakdown, accidents and safety 
issues, high maintenance frequency, and poor cooperation/coordination (communication and 
coordination problem) would cause low operating productivity (reduce operation efficiency) and then 
lead to performance unavailable events which cannot meet contract service requirements (contract 





























5.2.4 ‘Scope Changes’ on THSR 
As discussed in the Section V4 and the CLD shown in Figure V4, the project scope changed 
after contracting which lead to time delay and extra costs, possibly triggered by law/policy changes 
political interference and Force Majeure. Relative to the THSR project, the interview statements are 
below: 
“The scope change would be a major source to cause construction cost overrun. The politics 
were one of the typical reasons to make the output specifications radically changed. Initially, 
there were 3 stops sited in the cities of Taoyuan, Taichung and Kaohsiung along the whole 
345 km route from the north to south of Taiwan planned for THSR project. The purpose is to 
make the THSR a real high-speed train with minimum stops. However, the citizens of cities   113
that had no stops worried that it would be bad news to their metropolitan development in the 
future. These cities officials strongly expected that if they were on the route of THSR that it 
would help to boost economic development. Later on, these cities started to lobby the central 
government to influence policy and plan with the assistant of legislators. Eventually the stops 
were changed from three to six.” 
 
“During construction the 9/21 earthquake happen in 1999 which caused the most serious 
damage in the late 20th century’ this changed lots of rules for the THSR. The policy-maker 
therefore changed rule that requires earthquake-proof technology.” 
 
“Furthermore, the THSR route passes the South Taiwan Science Park, one of the major 
manufacturer pools of electronics and semiconductor in the world. When the trains pass, it 
will cause unendurable vibration that would significantly influence the products that are 
manufactured on the delicate instruments. The semiconductor industry officials strongly 
argued that the public and private sector should sort it out together. Similarly, the residents 
who live near the whole THSR route often protested the enormous noise produced by the 
THSR. Thus, the rules were changed to request the system design for the higher level of 
earthquake-proof, vibration-proof and noise-proof technology for THSR project.” 
 
From these statements, it is apparent that scope changes are usually caused by law/policy 
changes that arise from political interference (political reasons), Force Majeure (the earthquake), 
industrial disputes (the industrial argument and protest), and thus lead to design changes. Thus, the 
direct causes and consequences for scope change shown in Figure V4 were modified as Figure 5.2.4 to 
fit the THSR project. 
 
4.Scope changes 6.Design changes
48.Law/policy
changes + +  
Figure 5.2.4 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Scope Changes’33 
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5.2.5 ‘Defective Design’ on THSR 
As discussed in the Section V5 and the CLD shown in Figure V5, the defective design would 
lead to a defective system that would potentially cause defective construction and performance 
unavailable events, possibly catalyzed by defaults of subcontractors and resources unavailable events. 
Relative to the THSR project, the interview statements are below: 
“It would be very awful that the THSR is the state-of-art in high-speed rail system, but 
employs an old ticketing system. The ticketing system is one of cases on defective design that 
would make a defective facility. For example, the online booking system is very unfriendly. 
Numerous customers have complained that it takes at least 40 minutes to finish processing a 
transaction because the system must simultaneously handle the seat arrangements and confirm 
that the banks can successfully collect the money. Overbooking also continues to occur. 
Moreover, the malfunction rate for ticket-checking at the gate is still higher than 5%. Frankly 
speaking, it seems that the THSR was doing flight business. Why do the customers need to go 
to the platform 20 minutes before train starts? It seems like boarding time to take a flight. That 
is a train, rather than a plane! This case told us that the subcontractors are very important and 
that they need to be familiar with the THSR operations, and have skilled design staff to design 
and build the ticketing system for the THSR, rather than copying the current flight ticketing 
system. Obviously their performance cannot meet contract requirements, so our supervising 
team has asked them to change design and modify ticketing system to meet THSR output 
service requirements.” 
 
“Another serious issue is that the defective design would cause problem on defective 
construction about system interface and integration. The core power system, train vehicle, 
electrical and mechanical system, and signaling system are a mix of European and Japanese 
systems. The Japanese train vehicle only fits a one-way and one direction signaling system, 
but the European signaling system is one-way & two directions system. Apparently, they are 
not compatible. The benefit for one-way and one direction is that two trains will not crash into 
each other. The drawback is that once the accident happens, the whole line should be closed. 
On the contrary, the benefit for the one-way and two directions system is that the route will 
not need to be closed. However, its drawback is the whole signaling system becomes very   115
complex so that its difficult to integrate with other systems. Any problem about unskilled 
technicians, human ignorance, poor communication, and even system disorder would lead 
to serious rail crash. Our supervising team has also asked them to modify information 
control systems for signaling and communication systems to meet the THSR output service 
requirements.” 
 
Based on these statements, the defective design would normally be caused by default of 
subcontractors, and resource unavailable (unskilled design staff), and could easily lead to defective 
construction (defective facilities) and complex system interface/integration. Thus, the direct causes and 
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Chapter 6 Risk Network Modelling and Simulation 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the base case public sector comparator (PSC) will be a benchmark 
for different project bidding proposals when choosing the preferred bidder to provide the best value for 
money, and the NPV is proposed to measure the long-term value for money for a PPP project. In 
section 6.1, the project NPV cash flow model was constructed to describe risk-free cash flow which 
does not include any valuation of risks. The risk network addressed in section 6.2 will be modeled to 
link with the NPV cash flow model, which will be able to produce time-profiles of NPV for the base 
case (PSC). 
According to an accounting principle, the project cash flow can be calculated as: Net Cash 
Flow F = [sum of revenue (operation revenues) – sum of expense (construction costs + operation costs 
+ interest + depreciation))*[1-tax rate] + annual raising capital - annual principal repayment + 
depreciation, which will be further converted to be net present values discounted over time. The details 
are described in Section 6.1.7.  
Based on the major components of a project NPV cash flow as stated, the researcher divided 
the structure of risk-free cash flow model (Figure 6.1) into one major model linked with six sub-models. 
The project cash flow model is used to calculate NPV values and the six sub-models are: (a) operating 
revenue sub-model which is used to calculate operation costs; (b) construction cost sub-model which is 
used to calculate construction costs; (c) operating cost sub-model which is used to calculate operation 
costs; (d) project financing sub-model which is used to calculate principal repayment and interest; 
Depreciation sub-model is used to calculate depreciation; (e) discount rate sub-model which is used to 
calculate discount rate. 
In Section 6.2, a risk cost network for the expected risk effects was modeled and linked to the 
related sub-models to address its impact on project cash flow. All of the sub-models linked with the 
risk cost network were linked to the project cash flow model in order to calculate NPV values by 
compounding all risk effects. This way, the model structure was clear for ease of management, 
especially when observing the NPV value changes by changing a risk variable. 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Construction Cost Sub-model 
Project Cash-flow Model   118
6.1 Project NPV Cash Flow Modelling 
The model illustrated in Figure 6.1 was used to model the planned spending profile, which 
includes contingency plan budget, NT$54.2 billion to form the public sectors (BHSRs) budgeted model 
(project NPV cash flow: the budgeted). In Section 6.2, all risk cost networks built by SD modelling are 
linked to Figure 6.1 to form risk estimated project cash flow model (project NPV cash flow: the 
estimated) that was proposed in the research methodology. There are two types of data used for 
comparison after the whole risk models were developed: (a) the budgeted by BHSR, and (b) the risk-
adjusted by SD modelling. These two cost profiles were compared with each other to determine 
whether the approach proposed by the research was better than the BHSRs approach. The variables for 
Figure 6.1 are described as the following subsections. 
 
6.1.1 Construction Cost Sub-model 
The planned total construction budget, excluding contingency cost,(the risk cost is budgeted 
as NT$54.2 billion by BHSR) for the THSR project is about NT$377.4 billion (exchange ratio: 1US$ = 
33 NT$ in 1998) which is budgeted for the eight work packages consisting of: civil work (NT$138.2 
billion), track work (NT$21.5 billion), station construction (NT$18.7 billion), depot construction 
(NT$14 billion), Mechanical/Electrical (M/E) core system (NT$79.3 billion), land acquisition 
(NT$55.8 billion), Taipei underground rail (NT$28.9 billion), design and supervision (NT$21 billion) 
(Hsu, 2000). Therefore, the planned total construction costs are the sum of construction cost of all work 
packages:  
PTCC = ∑ i PWB  
Where 
PTCC: planned total construction cost;  
PWBi: planned work package budget; 
i: Work package index 
 
As for construction time, the civil work was scheduled to start in March 2000 and was 
completed by November 2004; the track work was from January 2002 to April 2005; station 
construction was from January 2002 to April 2005; the depot construction was from January 2001 to   119
April 2005; the M/E core system was from September. 2003 to September 2005; the land acquisition 
was from July 1998 to January 2002; the Taipei underground rail was from July 1998 to April 2005; 
the design and supervision was from July 1998 to September 2005 (Hsu, 2000). Therefore, the 
scheduled start time for construction was the earliest start time for all work packages:  
SCST = Min (SSTi) 
where  
SCST: scheduled construction start time;  
SSTi = scheduled start time of work package;  
i: Work package index 
 
The scheduled completion time for construction was the latest completion time for all work 
packages:  
SCCT = Max (SCTi) 
Where 
SCCT: scheduled construction completion time; 
SCTi = scheduled completion time of work package; 
i: Work package index 
 
Thus, the scheduled total construction duration was:  
STCD = SCCT – SCST = Max (SCTi)- Min (SSTi) 
Where 
STCD: scheduled total construction duration; 
SCCT: scheduled construction completion time; 
SCST: scheduled construction start time;  
SCTi = scheduled completion time for work package; 
SSTi = scheduled start time for work package;  
i: Work package index 
 
The planned average annual construction cost for each work package was: 
 
PAWCi =  PWBi / (SCTi - SSTi) 
Where 
PAWC: planned annual work package cost; 
PWBi: planned work package budget; 
SCTi = scheduled completion time for work package; 
SSTi = scheduled start time for work package;  
i: Work package index 
 





















































1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Time (Year)
Planned annual total construction cost : project cash flow_risk free_planned NT$/Year 11111
Cumulative total construction cost : project cash flow_risk free_planned NT$ 222222  
Figure 6.1.1 The SD Model for Total Construction Cost and Its Outputs36 
 
 
The planned annual total construction cost was:  
PATCC = ∑ i PAWC  
Where  
PATCC: planned annual total construction cost; 
PAWC: planned annual work package cost; 
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The cumulative total construction cost from the construction start time to construction 




dt PATCC CTCC  
Where  
CTCC: cumulative total construction cost; 
PATCC: planned annual total construction cost; 
SCST: scheduled construction start time;  
SCCT: scheduled construction completion time; 
 
The related SD variables and parameters shown in Figure 6.1.1 are listed in Appendix III. 
 
6.1.2 Project Financing Sub-model 
The total investment capital for the THSR project was about NT$440.5 billion which was 
increased during the construction phase. The average for annual raising capital during construction 
phase was: 
 
APC = PTCC/STCD= PTCC/(Max (SCTi) - Min (SSTi)) 
Where  
APC: annual project capital;  
PTCC: planned total construction cost;  
STCD: scheduled total construction duration; 
SCTi = scheduled completion time for work package; 
SSTi = scheduled start time for work package;  
i: Work package index 
 
The basic fiscal requirement of the public sector for project capital structure was 30% of total 
capital investment for equity, and the rest was for debt, including the government long-term fund and 
bank loan. Therefore, the equity/dept ratio = 3 to 7 which meant that the equity fraction is 30% and 




APC: annual project capital; 
Wd: debt fraction 
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Expected debt



































































1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 2022 2026 2030 2034
Time (Year)
Borrowing : project cash flow_risk free_planned NT$/Year 11111111111111111
Principal repayment : project cash flow_risk free_planned NT$ 22222222222222222
Interest : project cash flow_risk free_planned NT$ 33333333333333333333  
Figure 6.1.2 The SD Model for Project Finance and Its Outputs37 
 
 
The debt repayment period for THSR project is 20 years. This repayment period should proportionately 
repay both the principal and the interest during loan period, but there is a grace period for debt 




DC: debt capital 
PTCC: planned total construction cost; 
Wd: debt fraction; 
DRP: debt repayment period = 20 years 
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Therefore, the cumulative debt was: 
dt P B Debt
T




B: annual borrowing rate;  
P: annual principle repayment;  
T: construction time + operation time.  
 
The average interest rate for a bank loan to finance a large-scale public project in Taiwan is estimated 
to be 6.73% over 5 years (BHSR, 2007; Hsu, 2000). The annually incurred interest is equal to 
debt*interest rate.  
 
6.1.3 Operating Revenue Sub-model 
There were three income sources at project operation phase. The major one was ticket selling, 
and the rest included advertisement posting charges in the train, and station development benefits. 
The base fare approved by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) were 
NT$3.459 per person*km, which can be annually adjusted by the inflation rate with maximum extra 
increase allowance for 20%, based on the factors like distance, peak time, and so on (BHSR, 2007; Hsu, 
2000). Therefore, the annual base fare was: 
 
Fb = Fo*(1+ rinf)
n 
Where  
Fb: base fare;  
Fo: initial approved fare;  
f & : annual fare increase rate = Fb rinf; 
rinf: inflation rate = 0.0369 
n = the nth year after starting operation. 
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1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 2022 2026 2030 2034
Time (Year)
Average fare : project cash flow_risk free_planned NT$/(person*km) 1111111111111111
Annual ridership : project cash flow_risk free_planned person/Year 2222222222222222
Operating revenue : project cash flow_risk free_planned NT$ 33333333333333333  
Figure 6.1.3 The SD Model for Operating Revenue and Its Outputs38 
 
Therefore, the average fare approved by BHSR was:  
     F ˆ = Fb[1+( FAmin + FAmax)/2] 
Where 
F ˆ : Annual average fare; 
Fb: base fare; 
FAmin: Min fare adjustment allowance = 0; 
FAmax: Max fare adjustment allowance=0.2. 
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According to the research report for ridership forecast conducted by Hsu (2000), the data is 
plotted for the estimated average daily ridership (person/day) as shown in Figure 7.1.3.1. This figure 
showed that the daily ridership forecast can fit a quadratic regression model over time with a very low 
square root of MSE: s=0.0623, high R-sq: 99.8%, and low P value ≈ 0.00, which is below: 
 
The regression equation is: 
Ridership = - 10590 + 10.36 Year - 0.002526 Year**2 
 
S = 0.0623880   R-Sq = 99.8%   R-Sq(adj) = 99.8% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source      DF       SS       MS        F      P 
Regression   2  60.2816  30.1408  7743.78  0.000 
Error       27   0.1051   0.0039 























Ridership =  - 10590 + 10.36 Year
- 0.002526 Year**2
 
Figure 6.1.3.1 The Regression Model for the Estimated Daily Ridership39 
 
The daily ridership demand was: 
DRD = -10590+10.36*Time-0.002526*Time^2 
Therefore, the annual ridership was: 
AR=DRD*365, where AR: the annual ridership 
The annual operating revenue was:  
AOR = AAF*AM*AR 
Where 
AOR: annual operating revenue; 
AAF: annual average fare; 
AM: average mileage = 160 km; 
AR: the annual ridership 
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In addition to operating revenue, the non-operating revenue, like advertisement post, was estimated at 
1% of operating revenue:  
NOR= AOR*0.01 
Where  
NOR: the non-operating revenue; 
AOR: the annual operating revenue 
 
The data for station development benefit obtained from (Hsu, 2000) cannot fit a specific regression 
model well, so the researcher input data as lookup variables in the SD model.  
TOC = ∑ i OC  
Where  
TOC: annual total operating cost;  
OCi: operating cost elements;  























































Annual total operating cost : project cash flow_risk free_planned 1111111111111111  
Figure 6.1.4 The SD Model for Operating Cost and Its Outputs40 
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Technical labour =  4083 + 296.6 Year
+ 3.920 Year**2
 
The regression equation is 
Technical labour = 4083 + 296.6 Year + 3.920 Year**2 
 
S = 304.619   R-Sq = 99.4%   R-Sq(adj) = 99.3% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source         DF         SS         MS           F                    P 
Regression   2  395019345  197509672  2128.50  0.000 
Error          27      2505405      92793 

































Non-technical labour =  996.7 + 35.75 Year
+ 1.351 Year**2
 
The regression equation is 
Non-technical labour = 773.3 + 77.65 Year 
 
 
S = 238.515   R-Sq = 89.5%   R-Sq(adj) = 89.1% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source        DF        SS        MS               F       P 
Regression   1  13550207  13550207  238.19  0.000 
Error          28   1592900     56889 













































Maintenance facilities & equipm =  2515 + 9.87 Year
+ 3.943 Year**2
 
The regression equation is 




S = 319.943   R-Sq = 93.7%   R-Sq(adj) = 93.3% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source      DF        SS            MS            F          P 
Regression   2  41304532  20652266  201.75  0.000 
Error          27   2763817    102364 























Energy =  2699 + 194.1 Year
+ 2.302 Year**2
 
The regression equation is 




S = 61.1770   R-Sq = 99.9%   R-Sq(adj) = 99.9% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source      DF         SS              MS            F             P 
Regression   3  159375238  53125079  14194.61  0.000 
Error          26      97308      3743 
Total          29  159472546 
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6.1.4 Operating Cost Sub-model 
The total operating costs consisted of four cost elements: (a) energy costs, (b) technical labor 
costs, (c) non-technical labor costs, (d) maintenance facility costs. All of them, as estimated by 
BHSR(2007), can fit quadratic regression models with low S value (the square root of MSE), high R-sq, 
and low p-value, as shown in Table 6.1.4.1. The related SD variables and parameters shown in Figure 
6.1.4 are listed in Appendix III. 
 
 
6.1.5 Depreciation Sub-model 
Hsu (2000) indicated that the depreciation for THSR asset was assumed as the declining 
balance method allocated each year with a given fraction of the book balance at the end of the previous 
year, over the depreciation lifetime of L years (Park & Sharp-Bette, 1990): 
α=λ(100%/L) 
Dn =  1 − n BB α =
1 ) 1 (
− −
n
asset C α α  
n
asset n C BB ) 1 ( α − = , n=1,...L 
Where  
α: the fraction of the book balance; 
λ: multiplier =1.5 
Dn: the depreciation value at nth year;  
Casset: the estimated cost of asset; 
BBn: book balance or accounting value of asset after period n;  
L: asset life time = 30 years 
 
 
6.1.6 Discount Rate Sub-model 
The weight average cost of capital (WACC) before it is risk-adjusted, is normally used as a 
discount rate for project financial analysis, which is (Park & Sharp-Bette, 1990): 
 
rwacc = were+wdrd(1-tm) 
Where  
rwacc: Weight Average Cost of Capital; 
we: equity fraction;  
re: return on equity;  
wd: debt fraction;  
rd: debt interest;  
tm: tax rate  
 








































Depreciation : project cash flow_risk free_planned 1111111111  





It is adjusted by inflation effect as: 
 
r’wacc = rwacc +rinf+ rwacc rinf 
Where  
r’wacc: inflation adjusted discount rate; 
rwacc: Weight Average Cost of Capital; 
rinf: inflation rate  
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Discount rate Average return
on equity WACC
<Debt fraction> <Equity fraction>


















1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 2022 2026 2030 2034
Time (Year)
WACC : project cash flow_risk free_planned Dmnl 1111111111
Inflation adjusted disount rate : project cash flow_risk free_planned Dmnl 2222222  
Figure 6.1.6 The Discount Rate SD Model and Outputs42 
 
6.1.7 Project NPV Cash Flow Model 
As shown in Figure 6.1.7, the project net cash flow = profit A/T (after tax) + annual raising 
capital - annual principal repayment + depreciation = (∑Revenue[i] - ∑Expense[j])*(1-tax rate) + 
























' ) 1 (
 
Where  
NPV: net present value; 
Bn: the cash receipts at nth year; 
Cn: the cash expenses at nth year; 
Fn: cash flow at the nth year; 
r’wacc: inflation adjusted discount rate; 
L: project life.  




























































1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 2022 2026 2030 2034
Time (Year)
"Cash flow A/T" : project cash flow_risk free_planned NT$ 1111111
NPV cash flow : project cash flow_risk free_planned NT$ 22222222  
Figure 6.1.7 The Project Cash Flow Model and Outputs43 
 
 
There was a hump at the start of the graphs (see Figure 6.4.1). From the beginning of THSR 
project in 1988 until 2004, the THSRC (project contractor) continued borrowing money form financing 
institutions every year for construction. Since the income (the borrowed money) was more than 
outcome (the investment in construction), the NPV curve is gradually climbing until around 2004. In 
2004, the THSRC stopped borrowing money so that there was no income but outcome (spending 
money in construction) after year 2004 during construction stage. Because the outcome is much more 
than income, the NPV curve started to sharply decline after 2004 during the latter half of construction 
stage until starting to operate THSR project. This is why there was a hump at the beginning of the 
graphs and why the project NPV cash flow is positive before the completion of the project. 
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The public sector BHSR had budgeted NT$54.2 billion for a contingency plan as risk 
premium (Hsu, 2000). Then, the required project capital = planned total construction cost + 
contingency plan budget. The project finance model should take contingency plan budget into account 
as shown in Figure 6.1.8, which compares the NPV project cash flow as risk-free (planned by BHSR) 










































































NPV cash flow : project cash flow_risk free_planned 1111111111
NPV cash flow : project cash flow_risk adjusted_budgeted 222222222  
Figure 6.1.8 The Project Cash Flow Model Including Risk Budget44 
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6.2 System Dynamics for Risk Network Modelling 
The probability of occurrence of a risk event and its magnitude of impact are used in 
evaluating “risk exposure” or “risk effect”. In a simplified form, if the probability of occurrence of a 
risk event is P and its magnitude of impact on a project criterion is I, then the expected value (EV) of 
this risk effect would be (Akintoye, et al., 2001; Cooper, 2005): EV = (P)(I). 
The thesis research used 1 to 25 scale values to represent the expected values of the risk effect. 
As described in Chapter 3, Chapter 8.9 and Appendix IV, the questionnaire survey was conducted to 
investigate and estimate the qualitative risk effects through expert judgment. Then, the probability 
distribution for the expected risk effects of risk variables and the functional relations among risk 
variables were inferred and quantified by the probability fitting and the multiple-regression analysis. 
All of the risk network models are completely analyzed in Appendix VII. Some indicative risk network 
models were extracted from Appendix VII and discussed in the following sections. 
 
6.2.1 RCN for ‘Land Unavailable’ on THSR 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI1 and the Figure VI1, the direct 
causes for land unavailable events were approval delays and industrial disputes, and the direct 
consequence was construction delays. Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model was applied to 
address the relationship between land unavailable, approval delays and industrial disputes for the SD 
model as shown in Figure 6.2.1:  
 
RDk(lu) = β0k + β1k* RDk(id) + β2k* RDk(ad)+εk, k = c 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
lu: risk event for ‘land unavailable’; 
id: risk event for ‘industrial disputes’; 
ad: risk event for ‘approval delay’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 
εk: the random error for the multiple regression model; 












Figure 6.2.1 The SD Model for ‘Land Unavailable’ Risk Effect45 
 
 
6.2.2 RCN for ‘Resource Unavailable’ on THSR 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI2 and the Figure VI2, the direct 
causes for resources unavailable events were default of subcontractors, Force Majeure, industrial 
disputes, and financial unavailable, and the direct consequence was construction delay. Therefore, the 
linear multiple-regression model was applied to address the relationship between resources unavailable 
events, default of subcontractor, Force Majeure, industrial disputes, and finance unavailable events for 
the SD model as illustrated in Figure 6.2.2. 
 
RDk (ru) = β0k +β1k*RDk(ds)+β2k*RDk(fm)+β3k*RDk(id)+β4k*RDk(fu)+εk, k = c, o 
 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
ru: risk event for ‘resource unavailable’; 
ds: risk event for ‘default of subcontractors’; 
fm: risk event for ‘Force Majeure’; 
id: risk event for ‘industrial disputes’; 
fu: risk event for ‘financial unavailable’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k, β3k, β4k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 
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Figure 6.2.2 The SD Model for ‘Resources Unavailable’ Risk Effect46 
 
6.2.3 RCN for ‘Performance Unavailable’ on THSR 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI3 and the Figure VI3, the direct 
cause for performance unavailable event was low operating productivity, and the direct consequences 
were revenue losses, contract remedies/penalties, and contract breaks. Therefore, the multiple-
regression model was applied to address the functional relationship between performance unavailable 
and low operating productivity for the SD model illustrated in Figure 6.2.3: 
 
RDk (pu) = β0k +β1k*RDk(lop)+εk, k =o 
 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
pu: risk event for ‘performance unavailable’; 
lop: risk event for ‘low operating productivity’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 
εk: the random error for the multiple regression model; 
 
As for the direct consequence of contract remedies/penalties, according to the interview 
statements described in Section VI3, the researcher assumed that the number of trains that would likely 
delay on-time service was in linear proportion to the expected risk effect caused by risk event 
performance unavailable between the maximum consequence (the maximum number of delayed trains) 
and minimum consequence (the minimum number of delayed trains). Therefore, by using interpolation, 
the likely number of delayed trains was: 
 
DeT = Int[(RD(pu) - RDmin)/(RDmax - RDmin)*(DeTmax - DeTmin) + DeTmin] 
 
Where 
DeT: the number of trains that would likely delay on-time service; 
Int[x]: integer function; 
RD: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
pu: risk event ‘performance unavailable’; 
RDmax: 25;  
RDmin: 1; 
DeTmax: 45 trains; 
DeTmin: 0 train; 
 
Thus, the penalty (refund) for on-time delay that is the average of delay for more than 30 
minutes and one hour was:    136
 
   Afr= (1+0.5)/2*AAF 
ODR = DeT*Afr*Apt*AM 
where 
Afr: the average fare refund; 
ODR: on-time delay refund; 
DeT: the number of trains that would likely delay on-time service; 
AAF: the annual average fare, as shown in Section 6.1.3; 
Apt: the average person per train = 350 person/train; 
AM: average mileage = 160 km; 
 
According to the interview statement in Appendix VI3, another consequence for capacity loss 
arising from less capacity than break-even daily capacity was: 
 
CLE =Int(DeT*0.2) 
CL = CLE*12/(BEDC*2*365)*TOC 
 
Where 
CLE: capacity loss effect; 
Int[x]: Integer function; 
DeT: the number of trains that would likely delay on-time service; 
CL: capacity loss; 
BEDC: break-even daily capacity for a single way =60; 








































Figure 6.2.3 The SD Model for ‘Performance Unavailable’ Risk Effect47 
 
6.2.4 RCN for ‘Construction Cost Overrun’ on THSR 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI7 and the Figure VI7, the direct 
causes for construction cost overrun were construction delay, variability of interest rate, price 
escalation and insurance increases, and the direct consequence was finance unavailable. Therefore, the 





















Figure 6.2.4 The SD Model for ‘Construction Cost Overrun’ Risk Effect48 
 
E = Cradj+Cins+Cint  








CCO = CE-CPC 
where 
E: the annual expense; 
Cradj: the risk adjusted annual construction cost; 
Cins: the annual insurance cost; 
Cint: the annual interest; 
CE: the cumulative expense; 
CPC: the cumulative project capital; 
AC: the annual raising capital 
RCCT: the risk adjusted construction completion time; 
RCST: the risk adjusted construction start time 
CCO: the construction cost overrun; 
 
6.2.5 RCN for ‘Construction Delay’ on THSR 
Based on statements made in Section VI8 and the Figure VI8, the direct causes for 
construction delay were land unavailable and resources unavailable, construction changes, delay in 
contracts, change negotiation, ownership changes, delays, and unforeseen site conditions. The direct 
consequences were construction delay and performance unavailable. As shown in Figure 6.2.5, the 
variable time delay effect on construction delay was assumed to be in linear proportion to the expected 
risk effect between the maximum time consequence (maximum time delay in each work package) and 
minimum consequence (maximum time delay in each work package). Therefore, the variable time 
delay effect in every work package is modeled below:   138
 
TDij = (RDi-RDmin)/(RDmax-RDmin)*(TCMAXij-TCMINij)+TCMINij 
where 
TDij: time delay effect for a risk event on a work package (in percentage); 
RDi: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
TCMAXij: maximum time delay effect for a risk event in a work package (in percentage); 
TCMINij: minimum time delay effect for a risk event in a work package (in percentage); 
RDmax: 25;  
RDmin: 1; 
i: risk event index; 
j: work package index 
 
The variable increased completion time for work package was: 
∆TDik = ∑TDik·( SCTk- SSTk)+ ∑TDim·( SCTm- SSTm) 
   ∆TDim = ∑TDim·( SCTm- SSTm) 
where 
∆TDik: increased completion time for a work package caused by a risk event; 
TDik: time delay effect for a risk event in a work package (in percentage); 
SCTk: scheduled completion time for a work package; 
SSTk: scheduled start time for a work package;  
i: risk event index; 
m: work package index for ‘land acquisition’; 
k: work package index j≠ m (because when execution of workpackage k depends on 
execution of ‘land acquisition’ workpackage m) 
 
 
Thus, the risk-adjusted construction completion time for a work package was: 
RCCTj = SCTj+∆TDij 
Where 
RCCTj: the risk-adjusted construction completion time for a work package; 
SCTj: scheduled completion time for a work package; 
i: risk event index; 
j: work package index 
 
As the result, the risk variable construction delay was: 
CD = Max(RCCTj)-Max(SCTj) 
where 
CD: construction time delay; 
Max(xj): the maximum value of the elements in an array xj; 
RCCTj: the risk-adjusted construction completion time for a work package; 
SCTj: scheduled completion time for a work package; 
i: risk event index; 
j: work package index 
 
As shown in Figure 6.2.5, the variable construction delay cost was: 
CDC = CD*ACDC 
where 
 CD: construction time delay; 
ACDC: average administration cost due to construction time delay 
   139









































































6.2.6 RCN for ‘Mis-pricing’ on THSR 
The direct causes of mis-pricing and the inflexible contract arrangement influence policy on 
the fare adjustment rate for train ticket which would influence operating revenue are illustrated in the 
operating revenue sub-model. As shown in Figure 6.2.6, the expected fare adjustment rate is in linear 
reverse relationship with the expected risk effect caused by the risk event inflexible contract 
arrangement between the maximum consequence and minimum consequence. Therefore, by using 
interpolation, the expected fare adjustment rate was: 
EFA = (RD(ica) – RDmax)*(FAmax-FAmin)/( RDmin - RDmax)*+FAmin 
 
where 
EFA: the expected fare adjustment rate 
FAmax: maximum fare adjustment allowance = 0.2; 
FAmin : minimum fare adjustment allowance = 0; 
RD: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
Ica: risk event ‘inflexible contract arrangement’; 
RDmax: 25;  
RDmin: 1 























































Figure 6.2.6 The SD Model for ‘Mis-pricing’ Risk Effect50 
 
 
6.2.7 RCN for ‘Accidents and Safety Issues’ on THSR 
Based statements in Section VI18 and the Figure VI18, the direct causes of accidents and 
safety issues were resources unavailable, defective construction and complex system 
interface/integration, and Force Majeure, The direct consequences were low operating productivity, 
and contract remedies/penalties (the expected accident and safety loss). Therefore, the linear multiple-
regression model was applied to address the direct cause relationships for the SD model as illustrated in 
Figure 6.2.7:  
 
RDk (asi) = β0k +β1k*RDk(ru)+β2k*RDk(dc)+β3k*RDk(csi)+β4k*RDk(fm)+εk, k =o 
where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
asi: risk event ‘accidents and safety issues’; 
ru: risk event ‘resources unavailable’; 
dc: risk event ‘defective construction’; 
csi: risk event ‘complex system interface/integration’; 
fm: risk event ‘Force Majeure’ 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k, β3k, β4k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 
εk: the random error for the multiple regression model;   141
 
As for the direct consequence of contract remedies/penalties, according to the interview statements, 
the maximum accident and safety loss for death penalty and system damage due to human factor 
and national disaster is NT$0.174 billion. The researcher assumes the expected accident and safety 
loss is in linear proportion to the expected risk effect caused by ‘accidents and safety issues’ 
between the maximum consequence (maximum accident and safety loss) and minimum 
consequence (minimum accident and safety loss). Therefore, by using interpolation, the expected 
accident and safety loss at operation stage was: 
 
EASL = [RD(asi) - RDmin]/(RDmax - RDmin)*(ASDmax - ASDmin) + ASDmin 
ASDmax = Apt*Acdh 
Where 
EASL: expected accident and safety loss; 
RD: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
asi: risk event ‘accidents and safety issues’; 
RDmax: 25;  
RDmin: 1; 
ASDmax: maximum accident damage, NT$1.3 millions; 
ASDmin: minimum accident damage, NT$ 0.00 billions; 
Apt: average person per train; 































Figure 6.2.7 The SD Model for ‘Accident and Safety Issues’ Risk Effect51 
 
6.2.8 RCN for ‘Price Escalation’ on THSR 
From the scenario statements described in Section VI19, Section VI39, Figure VI19, and 
Figure VII39, the variability of inflation rate would influence money for time, which is linked with the 
discount rate sub-model shown in Figure 6.1.6 to replace the inflation rate. Then, the new value for 
inflation adjusted discount rate would be linked with project cash flow model shown in Figure 6.1 to 
change NPV value. The new value for inflation adjusted discount rate illustrated in Figure 6.2.8 (a) was:    142
r’wacc= rwacc+ rinf+ rwacc rinf  
              Where  
r’wacc: inflation adjusted discount rate; 
rwacc: Weight Average Cost of Capital; 
rinf: variability of inflation rate 
 
In addition, the variability of inflation rate would be linked with the operation revenue sub-
model to replace the inflation rate to change fare increase rate below: 
AFIR’ = Fb rinf 
where 
AFIR’ = risk adjusted annual fare increase rate; 
Fb: base fare; 
rinf: variability of inflation rate 
 
Furthermore, based on the scenario statements described in Section VI19, Section VII40, 
Figure VI19, and Figure VII40, the variability of exchange rate would influence construction cost and 
operation cost which is linked with the construction cost sub-model shown in Figure 6.1.1 and 
operation cost sub-model shown in Figure 6.1.1. The new values for construction cost and operation 
cost illustrated in Figure 6.2.8 (b) were: 
CCadj =(PATCC+CDC)* r’ex / rrex 
Where 
CCadj: risk adjusted construction cost; 
                        PATCC: planned annual total construction cost; 
CDC: construction delay cost 
r’ex: risk adjusted exchange rate = MAX(rrex, rex) 
rrex: reference exchange rate = 33; 
MAX(A,B): maximum function of two alternatives A, B;  
rex= ‘variability of exchange rat’ addressed in Appendix VII40 
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Figure 6.2.8 (a) Risk Variables ‘Variability of Inflation Rate’ and ‘Inflation 
Adjusted Discount Rate’ Are Linked with Discount Rate Sub-model, Operation 
Revenue Sub-model and Project Cash Flow Model Respectively52 









































































Figure 6.2.8 (b) Risk Variable ‘Risk Adjusted Exchange Rate’ and ‘Reference 
Exchange Rate’ Are Linked with Construction Cost Sub-model and Operation 
Cost Sub-model Respectively53 
 
 
6.2.9 RCN for ‘Finance Unavailable’ on THSR 
Per statements in Section VI22 and the Figure VI22, the direct causes for finance unavailable 
were unsuitable regulatory policy, construction cost overruns, and revenue losses. The direct 
consequences were resources unavailable events, and insolvency of contractor.  
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As in Section VI22, The risk variable for ‘finance unavailable’ was the function of two 
independent variables: percentage of construction cost overrun for construction stage, and debt service 
coverage (Dsc) for operation stage, which was: 
 
RDk(fu) = π +εk, k=c; 
                                                          =  sc D +εk, k=o; 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
fu: risk event ‘finance unavailable’; 
π : average percentage of construction cost overrun; 
sc D : average Debt Service Coverage 
 
The percentage of construction cost overrun and the exponential smooth for average 
percentage of construction cost overrun were: 









EXP: annual total expense; 
APC: annual project raising capital; 
t: time at construction stage 
tcs: construction start time 
 
According to the interview statement, the RDk(fu) during construction stage was assumed to 
be a linear reverse relationship with π  when -100% < π  < 0% :  
 RDk(fu) =1+εk, π  ≤ -100%; 
              =(π +1)( RDmax - RDmin)+ 1+εk, -100% < π  < 0%; 
             =25+εk, π  ≥ 0% 
Where  
RDmax: 25;  
RDmin: 1; 
k: time period  c (construction stage) 
 
The debt service coverage (Chang & Chen, 2001) and the exponential smooth for average debt 
service coverage were:  











Eb: Earnings before Interest, Tax and Depreciation 
I: Interest 
Pr: Principal Repayment   146
Tm: Tax Rate 
 
According to the interview statement, the RDk(fu) during operation stage was assumed to be a 
linear relationship with  sc D  when 0 <  sc D < D
*
sc (desired DSC level) :  
 RDk(fu) =1+εk,  sc D  ≥ D
*
sc; 
              = RDmax -  sc D ( RDmax - RDmin) / D
*







RDmax: 25;  
RDmin: 1; 

















































Figure 6.2.9 The SD Model for ‘Finance Unavailable’ Risk Effect54 
 
 
6.3 The Sample Data Analysis 
As addressed in Chapter 3, the large-scale PPP projects are usually unique over a long-term 
life, so the historical data are imperfect. It is necessary to obtain information from the project experts 
(Dey & Ogunlana, 2004). The research conducted a questionnaire survey to measure the expected risk 
effect for the project risk events. The purposes of the questionnaire survey were: (a) to quantify risk 
effects by project experts; (b) to consistently scale the expected risk effect for project risk events; (c) to   147
infer the probability distribution for exogenous risk variables in a risk cost network by probability 
fitting; (d) to quantify risk variable relationships by multiple-regression analysis. The plan for 
questionnaire survey is described in Appendix IV. 
Approximately 60 to 70 questionnaires were delivered to the public sector Bureau of High 
Speed Rail (BHSR) for the THSR project. These respondents included the experts with a cross section 
of disciplines, and stakeholders who covered all areas of interest on the risk events for the THSR 
project as described in Chapter 5. Eventually, 43 copies were received. 6 samples were collected from 
those respondents who were employed at the Bureau for less than 3 years who were screened out for 
data analysis. This is because the respondents who had working experience of more than 3 to 5 years in 
a transit project are senior staff in public sector BHSR. It was reasonable to infer that they make more 
sensible decisions than the junior staff which have had working experience of less than 3 years to 
estimate THSR project risks. Thus, there were 37 samples which were valid for further analysis 
(Appendix IV).  
  
6.3.1 An Example for Multiple-regression Analysis 
The ANOVA analysis was performed to justify whether the multiple-regression models for 
relational expressions were adequate. For example, Figure 4.2 (7) showed ‘defective construction’ risk 
variable was caused by its independent variables including ‘defective design’ ‘default of subcontractor’ 
‘resource unavailable’ and ‘complex system interface/integration’. The ANOVA analysis was applied 
to examine the functional relation between the risk variable ‘defective construction’ and its 
independent variables. In the Step 0, the ANOVA analysis started with a regression model that 
included linear terms, square terms and interaction terms. Some of them that were not statistically 
significant (p-values > α =0.05) were removed one at a time and in various sequences to see if the 
regression model got better. The p-value for liner term ‘poor cooperation/coordination’, square term 
‘poor cooperation/coordination*poor cooperation/coordination’ and interaction terms ‘defective 
design*poor cooperation/coordination’ ‘default of subcontractor*poor cooperation/coordination’ and 
‘resource unavailable *poor cooperation/coordination’ were greater than α =0.05, so these terms were 
not significant and removed from the regression model one at a time. 
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Step 0: the regression model included linear terms, square terms and interactions terms 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for defective construction 
Term                            Coef  SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                         -86.4947  68.7219  -1.259  0.221 
defective design                   -17.9445  17.0044  -1.055  0.303 
default of subcontractor              2.2538   1.8011   1.251  0.224 
resource unavailable                13.1980   3.6789   3.587  0.002 
poor cooperation/coordination         5.8947   8.9588   0.658  0.517 
defective design*defective design      5.3866   2.1408   2.516  0.020 
default of subcontractor*             0.0516   0.0226   2.285  0.032 
  default of subcontractor 
resource unavailable*                0.3413   0.1003   3.403  0.003 
  resource unavailable 
poor cooperation/coordination*        -0.0538   0.3977  -0.135  0.894 
  poor cooperation/coordination 
defective design*                   -1.0349   0.4341  -2.384  0.026 
  default of subcontractor 
defective design*                   -3.1535   0.8740  -3.608  0.002 
  resource unavailable 
defective design*                    0.6733   1.0637   0.633  0.533 
  poor cooperation/coordination 
default of subcontractor*              0.2703   0.0799   3.384  0.003 
  resource unavailable 
default of subcontractor*              -0.0494   0.1063  -0.465  0.646 
  poor cooperation/coordination 
resource unavailable*                 -0.4911   0.2475  -1.984  0.060 
  poor cooperation/coordination 
S = 0.0878113  PRESS = 0.749337 
R-Sq = 98.32%  R-Sq(pred) = 92.59%  R-Sq(adj) = 97.25% 
 
In the Step 1, the insignificant terms were removed one at a time by following the sequence: 
interactions termsÆsquare termsÆlinear terms. It indicated that an adequate regression model that the 
individual interactions, square terms and linear terms were almost significant (p-value <α =0.05). The 
R-Sq(adj) slightly reduced from 97.25% to 97.08%, and the p-value for the whole regression model 
was much less than 0.05. 
 
Step 1: removing interactions termsÆsquare termsÆlinear terms one at a time 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for defective construction 
Term                                                     Coef   SE Coef        T         P 
Constant                                          -16.5042  30.6798  -0.538  0.595 
defective design                              -16.9875  14.2546  -1.192  0.244 
default of subcontractor                     2.0502   1.4370   1.427  0.166 
resource unavailable                          8.1481   2.7043   3.013  0.006 
poor cooperation/coordination           0.4467   0.0846   5.284  0.000 
defective design*defective design      4.8706   1.9962   2.440  0.022 
default of subcontractor*                    0.0458   0.0211   2.167  0.040 
  default of subcontractor 
resource unavailable*                        0.2456   0.0916   2.681  0.013 
  resource unavailable 
defective design*                              -0.9408   0.4051  -2.323  0.028 
  default of subcontractor 
defective design*                              -2.5400   0.8107  -3.133  0.004 
  resource unavailable 
default of subcontractor*                    0.2290   0.0753   3.041  0.005 
  resource unavailable 
S = 0.0905552  PRESS = 0.577116 
R-Sq = 97.89%  R-Sq(pred) = 94.29%  R-Sq(adj) = 97.08% 
 
Analysis of Variance for defective construction 
Source               DF    Seq SS    Adj SS    Adj MS             F         P 
Regression         10     9.8975   9.897531  0.989753  120.70   0.000 
  Linear                4     9.7797   0.262038  0.065509       7.99   0.000 
  Square                3     0.0273   0.068086  0.022695      2.77   0.062 
  Interaction          3     0.0905   0.090511  0.030170      3.68   0.025   149
Residual Error    26     0.2132   0.213207  0.008200 
Total                   36    10.1107 
 
 
In the Step 2, the insignificant terms were removed one at a time by another sequence: square 
termsÆinteractions termsÆlinear terms. It indicated that a better regression model was obtained that 
the individual interactions, square terms and linear terms were almost significant (p-value <α =0.05). 
The R-Sq(adj) slightly increased from 97.25% to 97.46%, and the p-value for the whole regression 
model was much less than 0.05. This regression equation was: defective construction = -82.93-
18.61*defective design+2.40*default of subcontractors+12.58*resources unavailable+6.78*Poor 
cooperation/coordination +6.00*defective design^2+0.06*default of subcontractors^2+0.34*resources 
unavailable^2-1.15*defective design*default of subcontractors-3.26*defective design*resources 
unavailable+0.28*default of subcontractors*resources unavailable-0.33*resources unavailable*Poor 
cooperation/coordination 
However, the extreme condition analysis (see section 8.5) indicated that the response variable 
‘defective construction’ = 1208.32 when all of the predictor variables had a maximum value of 25; the 
response variable ‘defective construction’ = -80.24 when all of the predictor variables had a minimum 
value of 1. When the SD model ran a simulation, it indicated an ERROR message like “Unable to 
converge simultaneous loop at time …” Thus, this regression model could not meet the requirements. 
Therefore, it was necessary to kept looking for an appropriate regression model in the Step 3. 
 
Step 2: removing square termsÆinteractions termsÆlinear terms one at a time 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for defective construction 
Term                                                   Coef  SE Coef       T           P 
Constant                                       -82.9271  41.5152  -1.998    0.057 
defective design                            -18.6069  13.3175  -1.397   0.175 
default of subcontractor                    2.3965   1.3497   1.776    0.088 
resource unavailable                       12.5791   3.2232   3.903    0.001 
poor cooperation/coordination        6.7780   2.8677   2.364      0.026 
defective design*defective design   5.9960   1.9306   3.106     0.005 
default of subcontractor*                 0.0564   0.0203   2.780     0.010 
  default of subcontractor 
resource unavailable*                       0.3389   0.0953   3.555  0.002 
  resource unavailable 
defective design*                               -1.1472   0.3893  -2.947  0.007 
  default of subcontractor 
defective design*                                -3.2554   0.8227  -3.957  0.001 
  resource unavailable 
default of subcontractor*                     0.2817   0.0742   3.798  0.001 
  resource unavailable 
resource unavailable*                         -0.3307   0.1497  -2.209  0.037 
  poor cooperation/coordination 
S = 0.0844740  PRESS = 0.494748 
R-Sq = 98.24%  R-Sq(pred) = 95.11%  R-Sq(adj) = 97.46% 
 
Analysis of Variance for defective construction 
Source               DF   Seq SS      Adj SS      Adj MS          F         P 
Regression         11   9.9323    9.932341  0.902940   126.54   0.000 
  Linear                4    9.7797    0.154369  0.038592       5.41   0.003   150
  Square               3    0.0273    0.100031  0.033344       4.67   0.010 
  Interaction         4    0.1253    0.125322  0.031330       4.39   0.008 
Residual Error    25    0.1784    0.178396  0.007136 
Total                   36    10.1107 
 
 
In the Step 3, the remaining terms were removed one at a time in various sequences until an 
appropriate regression model could be found. Consequently, a linear regression model might be able to 
meet the requirements. This linear regression model was: defective construction = 6.58+0.12*default of 
subcontractor+0.15*resource unavailable+0.31*poor cooperation/coordination. It indicated that the p-
value for the individual linear terms and the whole regression model was much less than 0.05. The R-
Sq(adj) for this regression model slightly reduced from 97.46% to 96.20%. It also passed the extreme 
value testing when the SD model ran the simulation. Consequently, we concluded that the linear 
regression model ‘defective construction = 6.58+0.12*default of subcontractor+0.15*resource 
unavailable+0.31*poor cooperation/coordination’+Ramdom Normal~(μ, σ), where μ=0; σ=0.1’ was 
adequate and appropriate to represent the functional relation between the risk variable ‘defective 
construction’ and its independent variables.  
 
Step 3: removing remaining terms one at a time. 
 
Analysis of Variance for defective construction 
Source               DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS          F             P 
Regression           4     9.7797  9.77968   2.44492   236.33  0.000 
  Linear                4     9.7797  9.77968   2.44492   236.33  0.000 
Residual Error    32     0.3311  0.33106   0.01035 
Total                   36  10.1107 
 
Term                                                   Coef   SE Coef       T         P 
Constant                                          6.5782  0.815954    8.062   0.000 
default of subcontractor                  0.1186  0.005293   22.411  0.000 
resource unavailable                        0.1475  0.023740    6.211  0.000 
poor cooperation/coordination        0.3137  0.083858    3.741  0.001 
S = 0.103307   PRESS = 0.431655 
R-Sq = 96.52%  R-Sq(pred) = 95.73%  R-Sq(adj) = 96.20% 
 
Analysis of Variance for defective construction 
Source               DF    Seq SS  Adj SS   Adj MS       F         P 
Regression            3    9.7585  9.75855  3.25285  304.79  0.000 
  Linear                 3    9.7585  9.75855  3.25285  304.79  0.000 
Residual Error    33    0.3522  0.35219  0.01067 
Total                   36  10.1107 
 
 
After ‘boundary adequacy tests’, ‘structure assessment tests’, ‘dimensional consistency tests’, 
‘parameter assessment tests’, ‘extreme condition analysis’, ‘integration error tests’, ‘behaviour 
reproduction tests’, and ‘sensitivity analysis’ for SD model validation (see chapter 8), there are not 
unreasonable outputs in the SD simulation as a result of the choice of a linear scale.   151
There will be a possibility as a result of the choice of a non-linear scale. Following the same 
procedure of regression analysis as stated in point 1 for the possible functional relations among risk 
variables, there are six adequate regression models that their interactive terms or square terms are 
significant (p-value <α =0.05). These six models are shown in Table 6.3.1: 
 
Table 6.3.1 The Nonlinear Regression Models16 








+6.00*defective design^2+0.06*default of 
subcontractors^2+0.34*resources unavailable^2-










Contract breach = 12.98-0.93*failed commission 
tests+0.19*insolvency of contractor-0.23*law/policy 
changes+0.07*failed commissioning tests^2 




Land unavailable = 6.95+0.18*approval 








9.78  35.75 
> 25* 
Contract breach(o)
Contract breach = 2.39+0.63*insolvency of 
contractor+0.58*law/policy change-0.02*insolvency 
of contractor*law/policy change 
3.00  20.25 
Law policy 
changes(o) 
Law policy changes = 16.17+0.12*downside 
economic events+0.10*political interference-
0.86*industrial disputes+0.05*industrial 
disputes^2+0.02*industrial disputes*Force Majeure 
15.59  41.41 
> 25* 
*1≤ the range values of a risk variable ≤ 25  
 
The extreme condition analysis (see section 8.5) was applied to test the above six regression 
models that their interactive terms or square terms are significant. It indicates that all of these 
regression models but “Contract breach” model have gone beyond their specified range from 1 to 25. 
We found out that the “Contract breach” regression model has a significant interaction term. So, the 
selection of a non-linear scale is still a possibility. 
All of the multiple-regression models are included in Appendix VIII.   152
6.3.2 An Example for Probability Fitting 
As described in Chapter 3, probability fitting was performed to determine the best-fitted 
probability distribution for the expected risk effect of the exogenous risk variables in a risk cost 
network. For example, the fitted probability distribution for the expected risk effect of the exogenous 
risk variable political interference, at the construction and operation phases, were Triangular 
distribution and Weibull distribution respectively, which is illustrated in Figure 6.3.1. 
 
Probability Distribution of Political Interference (Construction) 















































Figure 6.3.1 The Fitted Probability Distribution for the Expected Risk Effect of 
‘Political Interference’ At Construction and Operation Phases55 
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The probability plot, P-P plot or Q-Q plot with the chi-square statistics or Anderson-Darling 
statistics were conducted to examine whether the selected probability distribution can fit the exogenous 
risk variables. It is addressed in Chapter 8, Model Validation.  
All of the parameter values for the probability distribution of exogenous risk variables are 
displayed in Appendix III. 
 
 
6.4 Monte Carol Simulation for Risk Compounding Effects  
Once the parameter values inferred from empirical data for the exogenous risk variables and 
the functional relation of risk variables had been confirmed by probability fitting and multiple-
regression analysis, the Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 iterations was performed on the SD model 







































NPV cash flow : the budgeted by BHSR 11111111111111
NPV cash flow : the risk adjusted by SD modeling 2222222222222
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In Figure 6.4.1 the researcher compares two NPV cash flows: the budgeted, estimated  by 
BHSR (the public sector), and the risk adjusted, estimated by SD modelling. The figure indicates that 
the expected NPV estimated by the SD modelling (no.2: red line) is much lower than the budgeted one 
(no.1: blue line) estimated by BHSR, which had risen from the SD models taking risk interactions on 
NPV into account. Figure 6.4.2 illustrates the probability distribution for the expected project NPV in 
year 2036, indicating that NT$156.50 billion for mean value and (-NT$13.43 billion, NT$326.42 
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7.1 System Dynamics for Bidding Proposal Modelling 
As previously stated, the core feature of a PPP project is suitable risk allocation so that risks 
can be transferred to a private concessionaire who is capable of cost-effectively manage and control 
risks to create the expected value for money (Allan, 2001; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Loosemore, 2007). 
Therefore, the methodology development for PPP project contractor selection should be based on risk 
analysis. The research developed a system dynamic model for risk cost network modelling in Chapter 6 
to evaluate downside feedback loop effects (reinforcing risk effects) arising from risk interactions. 
Then based on the risk cost network model, a system dynamic model for bidding proposal modelling 
was developed to evaluate beneficial feedback loop effects (reducing and balancing risk effects) arising 
from the risk control and management schemes in a bidding proposal. As a result, the compounding 
effects that combined downside effects and beneficial effects on project NPV were estimated through 
Monte Carlo simulation. Then, some suitable decision-making methods for risky project comparison 
were recommended to select a preferred project option (bidding proposal). 
 
7.1.1 The Structure of Bidding Proposals 
Similar to the current practice for PPP bid selection, the research proposed that the bidding 
proposals submitted to the public sector for bid competition should include cost components illustrated 
in Table 7.1, which would be modeled to estimate the overall NPV range values for bid benchmarking. 
They are explained row by row as below: 
(1) Raw cost: This includes direct cost and indirect cost for land acquisition, construction 
work package, operation and maintenance that is basically required and listed in the output 
specification provided by the public sector. This is a base cost without including any valuation of risk 
control and management. To avoid that a bidder who uses false low bidding prices to win contract 
award, the base case acts as the benchmark that the bidders would be asked to give a reasonable   156
explanation on their raw cost structure if there is a large cost gap between the bidding proposals and the 
base case. 
 







(PSC)  Bid A  Bid B  Bid C  Bid D  Bid E 
(1) Raw Cost 
1. Land Acquisition schemes and costs; 
2. Construction schemes and costs; 
3. Operation and Maintenance schemes and costs; 




1.  Risk Control Scheme for Finance; 
2.  Risk Control Scheme for Default of Subcontractors; 
3.  Risk Control Scheme for Latent defect; 
4.  Risk Control Scheme for Downside Economic Events; 
5.  Risk Control Scheme for Political Interference; 
6.  Risk Control Scheme for Unforeseen Site Conditions; 
7.  Risk Control Scheme for Greater Environmental Expectation; 
8.  Risk Control Scheme for Force Majeure; 
… 
(3) Retained Risk The public sector’ Risk Control scheme and costs. 
(4) Competitive 









































Figure 7.1.1 The Exogenous Variables, Risk Network and NPV Model58 
 
(2) Transferred risk: In addition to the plan and scheme for raw cost components, the 
concessionaire candidates (the private sectors/the bidders) are requested to demonstrate their capability 
of managing and controlling the allocated risks in their bidding proposals. On the other hand, the public   157
sector should examine the private sectors bidding proposals to see how efficiently the private sectors 
risk management and control schemes can reduce the transferred risk effect. To some extent, all of the 
risk control schemes for the allocated risks proposed by the private sectors would have both positive 
and negative influences. Using these schemes is an attempt to create better VFM in order to produce 
higher project NPV. The schemes will result in beneficial influences if they can reduce risk costs more 
efficiently. Otherwise, the schemes will result in downside influences because they have step up risk 
costs that then become new risk events. The private sectors should demonstrate the risk reduction 
schemes and costs in their bidding proposals, and the public sectors should evaluate the compounding 
effects and costs of the risk control schemes on project NPV to choose a preferred project 
concessionaire. 
As illustrated in Figure 7.1.1, the sources of risk events are the exogenous risk variables (input 
variables/independent variables of risk cost network xij), which would cause a network of risk events 
that are the endogenous risk variables (dependent variables yik) that would finally link to the NPV 
model. As a result, the NPV and all endogenous risk variables in a risk network are the function of 
exogenous risk variables:  
yik = f(xij); NPV= f(yik) = f(xij);  
   where 
               xij: exogenous risk variables; 
                                                          yik: endogenous risk variables 
i: ith risk network; 
j: jth exogenous risk variable of a risk network; 



















Figure 7.1.2 The Cause-effect Tree of Exogenous Risk Variable ‘Default of 
Subcontractors’59 
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Obviously, the exogenous risk variables are controllable variables that would influence both 
NPV and endogenous variables. If the exogenous risk variables can be cost-effectively controlled and 
reduced, then the effects of endogenous variables on the project NPV can be controlled and reduced. 
For example, the default of subcontractors is one of the exogenous risk variables that assumes the 
public sector BHSR would transfer it to the private sector for the THSR project. As discussed in 
chapter 4 and chapter 5, Figure 7.1.2 shows output results from the Vensim software for the cause and 
effect tree for default of subcontractors risk effect output. These results show that the exogenous risk 
variable default of subcontractors would trigger a network consisting of other risk effects such as 
defective construction, defective design, and resources unavailable events that are the endogenous risk 
variables from the upstream (left hand side) to the downstream (the right hand side). Eventually, these 
would link to the project NPV (the end of downstream is the cash flow NPV).  
Figure 7.1.2 shows three tiers of cause-effect only. If the risk effect default of subcontractors 
can be controlled and reduced cost effectively, then the triggered risk effects and NPV can be 
controlled and reduced. Therefore, the researcher has promoted that a risk control scheme focusing on 
controlling and reducing the exogenous risk effects be addressed in the bidding proposal. The bidding 
proposal needs to include the activities/actions that can be applied to both of exogenous and 
endogenous risk variables. For example, the risk control scheme for default of subcontractors might be 
composed of several project risk management activities such as subcontractor recruitment, material 
procurement, staff training, design and construction quality controlling, and so on. As shown in Table 
7.1.1, this scheme would be able to manage and reduce the risk effect default of subcontractors to a 
controllable level. 
 
Table 7.1.1 The ‘Default of Subcontractors (DOS)’ Risk Control Scheme18 
 
 
The ‘Default of Subcontractors (DOS)’ Risk Control Scheme addressed in the Bidding Proposals: 
•  Activities (Zhang, 2004):  
o  subcontractors recruitment 
o  material procurement  
o  staff training 
o  design and construction quality controlling 




(3) Retained risk: Retained risk is defined as the risk schemes and costs provided by public 
sector for those risks that are not transferred to the private sector. For a meaningful comparison, within   159
the bidding proposals, the bidding costs should be adjusted by the proportion of risk retained and 
retained risk costs. 
(4) Competitive neutrality: Competitive neutrality is defined as any cost adjusted by 
neutralizing the competitive advantages between the public sector and private sector. For example, the 
public sector is exempt from the following costs: (a) operating income tax, (b) performance bonds that 
are used to guarantee construction performance, and (c) royalties which are balance funds consists of a 
percentage of net profit. The private sector is not exempt from these costs. Therefore, this should be 
modeled for meaningful bids comparison. 
 
7.1.2 Risk Control Schemes Modelling 
As discussed in chapters 4 through 6, there are always positive feedback loops (reinforce 
feedback loops) to generate, amplify and reinforce risk effects in a risk causal loop diagram. The 
negative feedback loops (the balance feedback loops) would reduce risk effects to seek status balance 
and equilibrium. Figure 7.1.3 shows a system dynamics causal loop diagram (left hand side) and a 
behaviour curve (right hand side) for an SD goal seeking structure. This shows that the corrective 
action will be initiated to bring the state of the system back in line with the goal (the desired state) if 
there is a discrepancy between the desired and actual state (Sterman, 2000). The larger gaps between 
the desired and actual states would tend to create a large response (the greater action), while small gaps 
would tend to generate a small response (the less action). As for risk control schemes, goals for risk 
reduction would require actions in order to gradually result in an exponential decay for goal-seeking 
behaviour to approach the goal (the desired risk effect that is under control level). This is shown in the 
upper curve of right hand side on Figure 7.1.3. 
System dynamics goal seeking structure is applied to model the risk-reduction performance 
efficiency for a bidding proposal. The more efficient the scheme is, the faster the risk effects can be 
reduced to the desired, controllable level within the desired time. As a result, the compounding effects 
on NPV of combining the risk interaction effects and risk control effects can be evaluated. The risk-
reduction performance efficiency is defined as: 
 
   160





= η & (7.1.1) 
 
 Where η & : performance efficiency; 
                        ΔRD: the reduction of risk effect; 
        ΔT: risk control time; 




Figure 7.1.3 The ‘Goal Seeking’ Structure and Behaviour(Sterman, 2000)60 
 
 
For instance, the default of subcontractor (DOS) is one of exogenous risk variables that the 
risk control schemes proposed in the bidding proposals that the bidders would need to address to 
manage and control. Figure 7.1.4 is a risk causal loop diagram which indicates there are at least three 
positive (reinforcing) feedback loops that would cause reinforce downside effects triggered by 
exogenous variable default of subcontractor. On the other hand, a DOS control scheme that might be 
composed of several activities would generate a negative (balance) feedback loop to control and reduce 
the downside effect triggered by DOS to the desired controllable-level, risk effect = 5 (Appendix IV) 
under the expected time. 
 
Figure 7.1.5 shows a case in which the SD modelling is applied to model the performance 
efficiency for the DOS risk control schemes among the different bidding proposals. Under the DOS 
risk control scheme, the DOS risk effect should be continuously reduced within the expected time until 
the manageable and controllable level of risk effect = 5 is achieved using the DOS risk effect reduction 


















= &  for Rdij ≥  d R ˆ  (7.1.2) 
                      = 0, otherwise 
 
    Where  
                ij d R & : the DOS risk effect reduction rate; 
Rdij: the random variable for the risk effect of a risk event; 
d R ˆ : the desired risk effect; 
ij Tˆ : the expected time (mean time) to reduce the risk effect to the desired 
level; 
i: index of risk effect (this case is ‘Default of Subcontractor’); 

































Figure 7.1.4 The Positive (Reinforce) and Negative (Balance) Feedback Loops of 
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Figure 7.1.5 The SD Modelling for DOS Risk Control Scheme62   162
 
A Likert scale of 1 through 9 was used to rate the expected risk-reduction effect for the risk 
control schemes among different bidding proposals by members of the bid evaluation panel. This 
reflected the probability of a successful bidding proposals risk control scheme in reducing risk effects 
to the desired level within the expected time. These 9 scales are defined below: 
1: ‘very low’ successful probability; 
2: ‘between 1 and 3’; 
3: ‘low’ successful probability; 
4: ‘between 3 and 5’; 
5: ‘medium/equal’ successful probability; 
6: ‘between 5 and 7’; 
7: ‘high’ successful probability; 
8: ‘between 7 and 9’; 
9: ‘very high’ successful probability; 
 
For example, Table 7.1.2 shows one of rating results from one of the bid evaluation panel 
members for DOS Risk Control Schemes. In this case on the bid evaluation panel, there are 30 
multiple-discipline members who are responsible for rating the expected risk-reduction effect for a risk 
control scheme in a bidding proposal. By using this simple scoring method, 30 samples of data that 
show the probability distribution of how a successful risk control scheme can reduce risk effect are 
obtained from the bid evaluation panel members. By inferring the probability distribution of the 
expected risk effect as addressed in chapter 6, the probability distribution for the expected risk-
reduction effect in a risk control scheme for a bidding proposal can be estimated by probability fitting 
the sampled data. For example, in Table 8.1.3 the researchers assumed the probability distribution for 
all risk control schemes applicable to both construction and operation phase, which is inferred from the 
rating submitted by the bid evaluation panel members. 
 













Rating for the expected effect of ‘DOS Risk Control Schemes’: 
 
           Base case:(| 1)- (| 2)- (| 3)- (| 4)- ( 5)- (| 6)- (| 7)- (| 8)- (| 9) 
           Bid A:        (| 1)- (| 2)- (| 3)- (| 4)- (| 5)- (| 6)- (| 7)- ( 8)- (| 9) 
           Bid B:        (| 1)- ( 2)- (| 3)- (| 4)- (| 5)- (| 6)- (| 7)- (| 8)- (| 9) 
           Bid C:        (| 1)- (| 2)- (| 3)- (| 4)- (| 5)- ( 6)- (| 7)- (| 8)- (| 9) 
           Bid D:        (| 1)- (| 2)- (| 3)- (| 4)- ( 5)- (| 6)- (| 7)- (| 8)- (| 9) 
…   163
Table 7.1.3 The Probability Distribution of the Expected Effects of Risk Control 
Schemes Addressed in Bidding Proposals20 
 
RSC Effects  Base Case Bid A  Bid B  Bid C  Bid D 
DOS control scheme C  Nor (3,5.3)  Tri (1, 5, 9) Nor (6, 5.5) Nor (7, 6.3)  Tri(1, 8, 9) 
DOS control scheme O  Nor (4,5.7)  Nor (7, 5.5) Tri (1, 7, 9) Nor (9, 6.3)  Nor (5, 7.5)
LT control scheme C  Tri (1, 5,9)  Tri (1, 6, 9) Nor (7, 4.1) Tri(1, 5, 9)  Tri(1, 8, 9) 
LT control scheme O  Nor (3,6.1)  Tri (1, 5, 9) Nor (6, 7.3) Nor (5, 4.5)  Nor(6, 6.7) 
PI control scheme C  Nor (9, 5.1) Nor(6, 5.3)  Nor (4, 6.8) Tri (1, 4, 9)  Tri(1, 5, 9) 
PI control scheme O  Tri (1, 7, 9) Tri (1, 6, 9) Nor (7, 3.5) Nor (6, 6.8)  Tri(1, 5, 9) 
FM control scheme C  Nor (7,8.8)  Tri (1, 4, 9) Tri (1, 5, 9) Tri (1, 7, 9)  Nor(8, 9.5) 
FM control scheme O  Nor (7,5.7)  Tri (1, 4, 9) Tri(1, 7, 9)  Nor (7, 9.5)  Nor(7, 6.4) 
GEE control scheme C  Nor (5,6.6)  Nor (7, 6.6) Nor (8, 7.8) Nor (6, 8.4)  Tri(1, 6, 9) 
GEE control scheme O  Tri (1, 5, 9) Tri (1, 7, 9) Nor (6, 5.5) Nor (7, 6.3)  Tri(1, 8, 9) 
DEE control scheme C  Nor (9,6.1)  Tri (1, 7, 9) Tri (1, 8, 9) Nor (5, 7.6)  Nor (7, 4.9)
DEE control scheme O  Nor (9,8.8)  Nor(6, 8.3)  Nor (9, 6.7) Nor (4, 7.9)  Tri(1, 9, 9) 
USC control scheme C  Nor (3,5.7)  Tri (1, 7, 9) Nor (7, 8.5) Tri (1, 6, 9)  Tri(1, 9, 9) 
 
 
Time variable ij T ˆ is the expected time taken for a risk control scheme to reduce the risk effect 
until the desired level. This is assumed to be in linear proportion to the probability distribution for 
expected risk-reduction effect of a risk control scheme between the minimum desired time and the 
maximum desired time. Therefore, the expected time can be formulated as: 
 
   ij T ˆ  = (Tmaxi- Tmini)*(Rcsij- Rcsmax)/(Rcsmin-Rcsmax)+ Tmini (7.1.3) 
  where 
ij T ˆ : the expected time to reduce the risk effect until the desired level; 
Rcsij: the probability distribution for the expected risk-reduction effect of a risk control 
scheme; 
Tmaxi: the maximum desired time for a risk control scheme to reduce a risk effects;   164
Tmini: the minimum desired time for a risk control scheme to reduce a risk effects; 
Rcsmax: 9;  
Rcsmin: 1; 
i: index of risk effect (this case is ‘Default of Subcontractor’); 
j: index of bids 
 
Once a risk control scheme has been rated to estimate its expected risk-reduction effect and 
probability distribution and the expected time to reduce the risk effect until the desired degree has been 
estimated, the time-efficiency (risk-reduction rate) for a risk control scheme can be calculated by using 
the formula 7.1.2. Therefore, the risk effect would change by exponential decay behaviour formulated 
below: 







Rd’ij: new status of a risk effect after risk reduction; 
Rdij: the initial status of a risk effect before risk reduction. 
 
 
Every risk control scheme addressed in a bidding proposal is not free. Concessionaires have to 
pay for the risk-reduction effect, which accounts for the risk-transfer cost. This risk-transfer cost is one 
of the total bidding proposal cost components. If the risk control schemes cannot efficiently manage 
and reduce risk effects, then the invested money of time for risk control schemes might be higher than 
the risk costs can be reduced. That is to say, the risk control schemes would become the new risk 
events. Therefore, the invested costs for the risk control schemes, Crcsij, are linked to the NPV model 
so that the time-cost effects arising from the risk control schemes on the project NPV can be 
compounded. For the case shown in Figure 7.1.5, the DOS effect/cost ratio is exactly the formula used 
in Table 7.1.1 for time-cost performance efficiency. 
Moreover, the base case (PSC for all risks retained) is used as a benchmark against all of the 
bidding proposals. For consistent comparison, the risk transfer level proposed in each bidding proposal 
should reflect the risk transfer level proposed by public sector. Therefore, the expected risk-reduction 
effects and costs for a risk control scheme are adjusted by the fraction of risk-transferred to the private 
sector as follows. 
Rcs’ij = (1- θij)×Rcs i(bc)+ θij×Rcs i(bids) (7.1.5) 
Where 
Rcs’ij: the adjustment for the expected risk-reduction effect for a risk control scheme; 
Rcs i(bc): the expected risk-reduction effect for a risk control scheme proposed in the Base 
Case, which is rated by Bid Evaluation Panel; 
Rcs i(bids): the expected risk-reduction effect for a risk control scheme proposed in the 
bidding proposals, which is rated by Bid Evaluation Panel; 
θij: the fraction of risk-transferred to the private sector   165
 
Crcs’ij = (1- θij)×Crcs i(bc)+Crcs i(bids) (7.1.6) 
Where 
Crcs’ij: the adjustment for a risk control scheme cost; 
Crcs i(bc): the cost for a risk control scheme stated in the Base Case (the cost for all risks 
reserved); 
Crcs i(bids): the cost for a risk control scheme proposed in the bidding proposals (the cost for 
transferred risks only); 
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Figure 7.1.6 The DOS Effect/Cost Ratio for A Risk Control Scheme between Bids 
During Project Construction and Operation Phases63 
 
 
The PPP project risk network is so complicated that it is difficult for officials to estimate how 
the project performance changes from a single individual factor because the risk effects interact with 
each other over time. However, using the SD model proposed by the researcher was able to estimate 
the compounding effects on NPV by combining a single risk effect, the risk interaction effects and the 
reduction effect for a single effect and risk interaction effects. Figure 7.1.6 shows the output of Figure 
7.1.5 for the risk-reduction effect per unit cost of risk control schemes among bids over time. The 
results comprise an exponential decay curve. The steeper the slope, the more efficient is the risk-
reduction effect for a risk control scheme. As a result, the default of subcontractors (DOS) risk effect 
(assume the starting risk effect of DOS is 15) is gradually reduced until reaching the desired risk effect 
(assume ending risk effect of 5). This shows an exponential decay for goal-seeking behaviour as shown 
in Figure 7.1.7. Consequently, Figure 7.1.8 shows the compounding effects on NPV by combining the   166
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Default of subcontractors[Base case] : bids benchmarking 11111
Default of subcontractors[Bid A] : bids benchmarking 222222
Default of subcontractors[BidB] : bids benchmarking 333333
Default of subcontractors[BidC] : bids benchmarking 44444
Default of subcontractors[Bid D] : bids benchmarking 55555  
 
Figure 7.1.7 The ‘Default of Subcontractors’ Risk Effect Reduction over Project 



















































NPV cash flow[Base case] : bids benchmarking 111111
NPV cash flow[Bid A] : bids benchmarking 2222222
NPV cash flow[BidB] : bids benchmarking 3333333
NPV cash flow[BidC] : bids benchmarking 444444
NPV cash flow[Bid D] : bids benchmarking 555555  
 
Figure 7.1.8 The Compounding Effects of ‘Interaction of Risk Effects’ and 
‘Effect/Cost of Risk-reduction Effects’ on the Project NPV Cash Flow65 
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Discount rate is very sensitive to project NPV cash flow. As discussed in chapter 3, the 
discount rates used to estimate NPV cash flow for the base case should be consistent with those used to 
assess private sectors bids. Different discount rates should be adjusted to consistently analyze and 
benchmark the different cash flow between the base case and bidding proposals due to different 
fraction of risk allocation. 
As described in chapter 6, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is calculated to 
determine discounted rate for project cash flow modelling, which is used to estimate cost of capital 
based on capital structure by combining the return on debt and equity as follows (Park & Sharp-Bette, 
1990). 
rwacc = were+wdrd(1-tm) (7.1.7) 
Where  
rwacc: Weight Average Cost of Capital; 
we: equity fraction;  
re: return on equity;  
wd: debt fraction;  
rd: debt interest;  
tm: tax rate  
 
The return on equity re is used to adjust rwacc to calculate NPV cash flow for the bidding 
proposals with different fraction of risk allocation, which generally refers to the annual rate of return 
that an investor expects to earn on an investment in conjunction with the exposed risks. Then, the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is widely recommended for estimating the expected return on 
equity(Hirst et al., 2007; Partnerships Victoria, 2003; Queensland Treasury, 2006). The CAPM refers 
to a firm’s cost of equity capital which is equal to the risk free rate of return on the market, plus a 
premium above the risk free rate, to reflect the relative risk of the investment, which can be expressed 
as (Hirst et al.; Partnerships Victoria, 2003; Queensland Treasury, 2006): 
 
re = rf + βe(rm - rf) (7.1.8) 
Where 
re: expected return on equity; 
rf : risk-free interest rate; 
rm: market rate of return; 
rm - rf: risk premium;  
βe: equity beta measures the correlation between the asset’s risk and the 
overall market; 
 
Since ‘rm - rf’ is risk premium, re needs to be adjusted by adjusting ‘rm - rf’ based on the fraction of risk 
transferred to private sectors as follows. 
 
 r’e = rf -pj βe(rm - rf) for Fn > 0     (7.1.9) 









r’e: expected return on equity adjusted by risk allocation; 
pj: the total portion of project risk premium transferred to the private sector; 
wi: the percentage for the relative importance of a risk effect on NPV; 
θij: the fraction of a risk premium transferred to the private sector; 
rf : risk-free interest rate; 
rm: market rate of return; 
rm – rf: risk premium;  
βe:  equity beta measures the correlation between the asset’s risk and the overall 
market; 
Fn: net cash flow in nth year 
 
 
The percentage for the relative importance of a risk effect on NPV, wi, is calculated based on 
the Pearson correlation coefficients. The Pearson correlation coefficients are obtained by conducting 
sensitivity analysis for Monte Carlo simulation. An example for Pearson correlation, relative risk 
importance, risk allocation, and the percentage of risk premium transferred to the private sector for Bid 
A is shown in Table 7.1.4. 
 
The comments on the low values of the Pearson correlation coefficients (e.g., those Pearson 
correlation coefficients near zero in Table 7.1.4) as a result of correlation analysis are as follows: 
(1)  A Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 iterations was performed on the SD model. Therefore, 
the correlation analysis for the exogenous variables (model input) and NPV values (model 
output) is based on 10,000 samples (sample size N=10,000). 
(2)  As addressed in 8.8.3 the Pareto chart for the relative importance of risk effects on project 
NPV, the p-value is the measure criteria to judge if the correlations are STATISTICALLY 
significant. If the p-value is less than α = 0.05, then the risk variables significantly affect 
project NPV at α = 0.05. Otherwise, they are not statistically significant. The results of 
correlation analysis indicate that most of the exogenous variables listed in Table 7.1.4 are not 
statistically significant except for those economical and financial risk variables. The p-value 
for variability of less demand, variability of interest rate, variability of exchange rate and 
variability of tax rate is close to zero, so they are statistically significant. This result can 
consistently interpret the SD model behaviour that only financial difficulties at operation 
stage will lead to the most detrimental feedback loop (see Figure 8.8.4): revenue loss Æ 
finance unavailable Æ resource unavailable Æ performance unavailable Æ revenue loss, and   169
the current situation of THSR project that the VFM has been eroded because of less revenue 
from lower demand for operation cannot outweigh high private financing cost (high interest 
rate of debt for construction).  
(3)  The correlations in Table 7.1.4 indicates that exogenous risk variables, Force Majeure C 
(The same events may have two variables at construction stage and operation stage 
respectively used for SD model; C means construction stage and O means operation stage.) 
and unforeseen site conditions C have small Pearson correlation values which are near to 
zero. This means they have little effects on project NPV.  
 
Relative to the question,“How were the public: private risk allocations determined for those 
risks that are not statistically significant?” this depends on the risk management capability and risk 
utility (risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk seeking) of the public sector. A major purpose of the PPP 
arrangement is the transfer and allocation of risks to the party who is the most capable of efficiently 
managing these risks (HM Treasury, 2004b). In other words, if the public sector officials feel that 
private sector contractor can be more cost-effective in managing a risk than it does, then the larger part 
of the risk premium will be transferred to the private sector regardless of statistically significance. Most 
of the public sectors are risk-aversive, especially for an infrastructure project, since they will need to 
protect public interests. Hence, the public sectors would generally intend to transfer risks to the private 
sector contractors if they have little confidence of managing a risk. For example, the Australia 
government’s guideline on risk allocation and contractual issues states that the. For example, the 
Australia government’s guideline on risk allocation and contractual issues states that: 
“the government shares a Force Majeure risk only to the extent that the materialised risk 
prevents it from receiving the contracted services. As an example, Force Majeure risk can be 
shared to the extent that the private party is relieved of the risk of contract termination, but 
effectively retains the financial risk of the Force Majeure event. (Partnerships Victoria, 
2001)” 
This guideline also suggests that the preferred allocation for unforeseen site conditions is at private 
party level.   
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Table 7.1.4 An Example: the Percentage of Risk Premium Transferred to the 
Private Sector for Bid A321 
 






Risk Effect  Correlation 
(Pearson) 
Relative 
Importance public private  % 
Default of subcontractors C  0.124  0.047  0.2  0.8  0.038 
Default of subcontractors O  0.066  0.025  0  1  0.025 
Downside economic events C  0.013  0.005  0.3  0.7  0.003 
Downside economic events O  0.065  0.025  0.2  0.8  0.020 
Equity fraction  0.18  0.068  0  1  0.068 
Force Majeure C  0.006 0.002  0.2  0.8  0.002 
Force Majeure O  0.015 0.006  0.3  0.7  0.004 
Greater environmental 
expectation C  0.069 0.026  0.3  0.7  0.018 
Greater environmental 
expectation O  0.081 0.031  0.4  0.6  0.018 
Latent defect C  0.061 0.023  0  1  0.023 
Latent defect O  0.02  0.008  0  1  0.008 
Political interference C 0.128 0.049  0.6 0.4  0.019 
Political interference O 0.065 0.025  0.6  0.4  0.010 
Unforeseen site conditions C  0.001  0.000  0  1  0.000 
Variability of exchange rate  0.372  0.141  0  1  0.141 
Variability of inflation rate  0.03  0.011  0  1  0.011 
Variability of interest rate  0.448  0.170  0  1  0.170 
Variability of less demand  0.738  0.281  0  1  0.281 
Variability of tax rate 0.147  0.056  0.3  0.7  0.039 
Total  2.629  1        0.901 
 
 
As shown in Figure 7.1.9 (left), if the net cash flow for the public sector (the base case: PSC) 
is greater than 0 (net cash inflow), then the discount rates for the private sectors bidding proposals are 
adjusted by reducing in reverse proportion to the fraction of risk transferred to the private sectors. On 
the contrary, as shown in Figure 7.1.9 (right hand side, if the net cash flow for the public sector (the 
base case: PSC) is less than 0 (net cash outflow), then the discount rates for the private sectors bidding 
proposals are adjusted by increasing in linear proportion to the fraction of risk transferred to the private 
sectors. Therefore, the discount rates shown in formula 7.1.7 are adjusted by risk allocation for NPV 
estimates for the bidding proposals are: 
   171
r’wacc = wer’e+wdrd(1-tm) (7.1.10) 
where 
r’wacc: adjusted WACC for bidding proposals; 
we: equity fraction;  
r’e: adjusted return on equity for bidding proposals;  
wd: debt fraction;  
rd: debt interest;  





Figure 7.1.9 The Adjusted Discount Rates for Bidding Proposals for Net Cash 
Inflow (the Left Hand Side) and Net Cash Outflow (the Right Hand Side) Basing 
on the Proportion of Risk Transferred to the Private Sectors66 
 
 
7.2 Monte Carlo Simulation for Bidding Proposals 
There are four bidding proposals, Bid A, Bid B, Bid C, and Bid D which were evaluated to 
compare with the base case. The respective bidding costs and basic information for each are displayed 
in Table 7.2.1(They are hypothetical data.). 
A Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 iterations was performed on the above SD bidding 
proposal models by the software, Vensim, to estimate the compounding effects on NPV. This 
combined downside effects arising from risk interactions and balance effects arising from bidding 
proposal performance. Figure 7.2.1 shows the histogram plots with a probability fitting curve on 
normal distribution to display NPV probability distribution for the base case and the bidding proposals. 
Figure 7.2.2 shows the boxplot to compare mean with a 95% confidence interval for the expected 
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Table 7.2.1 The Price of Bidding Proposals22 
Bidding Cost (NT$)  Base Case  Bid A  Bid B  Bid C  Bid D 
Transferred risk  0.00E+00 4.89E+10 4.47E+10 4.02E+10 3.24E+10 
Raw cost  3.77E+11 3.97E+11 3.58E+11 3.66E+11 3.56E+11 
Retained Risk  5.42E+10 5.26E+09 9.49E+09 1.40E+10 2.18E+10 
Total costs  4.32E+11 4.52E+11 4.12E+11 4.20E+11 4.10E+11 
% risk transfer  0  0.903 0.825 0.741 0.597 
***The total cost has adjusted according to Competitive Neutrality addressed above. 
 
















































































































































Figure 7.2.1 The NPV Probability Distribution of Base Case and Bidding 
Proposals67   173
 
7.3 Comparison Methods for Bids Competition 
The boxplot shown in Figure 7.2.2 indicates that there are large overlaps for the 95% 
confidence bonds between the base case and bidding proposal so that, basing on α = 0.05, there is no 
significant evidence to tell the bidding proposals NPV performance apart. It is difficult to make 
decision about a preferred bidder from the boxplot. 
There have been some methods developed to compare risky projects. The researcher 
introduced some methods that are appropriate and easy to use in comparing bidding proposals and in 
choosing a bidding proposal. 

















Boxplot of NPV for Bidding proposals
 
Figure 7.2.2 The Boxplot with Mean and 95% Confidence Interval for the 




7.3.1 Mean-variance and Mean-Semivariance 
The first method is to apply mean-variance (E-V) criterion for risky project selection. This 
means that the greatest mean (outcome) and the smallest variance (risk) would be the preferred option 
(Park & Sharp-Bette, 1990). 
Figure 7.3.1 shows the mean-variance plot to compare E (NPV) and Var (NPV) among the 
base case and bidding proposals. This indicates that the base case is on the efficiency frontier that is a   174
curve drawn through the points representing options that are not dominated by other options (Park & 
Sharp-Bette, 1990). There is no bidding proposal to dominate the base case by E-V rule. Therefore, 
there is no preferred bidding proposal because the primary condition is that the bidding proposals 
should have better NPV than the base case to demonstrate value for money.  
  


















































To differentiate the bidding proposals from the base case, the mean-semi variance (E-Sh) 
criterion is a good option. However, it is suggested that only NPV variability is below the acceptable 
level is desirable; the variability within the acceptable region was not. Thus, the mean-semi variance 
rule modifies variance that captures only the desirable NPV variation for bidding proposals is defined 
as (Park & Sharp-Bette, 1990): 
    Sh=E[(x-h)
-]
2 =  j
j
j p h x
2 ] ) [(
− ∑ −  (7.3.1)  
where  :  Sh : semivariance Sh; 
  (x-h)
-= x-h when x ≤ h; 
                                                     = 0    when x > h; 
 h: a reference value considered as a lower limit, below which risk is 
occurred; 
Pj: probability of xj occurring 
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The bidding proposals should have greater NPV performance than the base case (a reference 
project that is implemented by traditional public procurement approach rather than PPP approach) does 
in demonstrating VFM. Therefore, h = E (NPV) of base case = NT$1.64e + 11 is selected for E-Sh 
analysis. 
 
Figure 7.3.2 shows the mean-semi variance plot to compare E (NPV) and Var (NPV) among 
the base case and the bidding proposals. This indicates that the efficiency frontier has been disappeared. 
As a result, Bid B dominates the base case and other bids, because it has greatest E (NPV) and smallest 
variance now. Therefore, the Bid B is the preferred option. 
















































However, we still cannot tell apart Bid A vs. Bid C, Bid A vs. base case, Bid C vs. Bid D, and 
Bid C vs. base case if we would like to rank them. The mean-variance or mean-semi variance is 
criticized in that it would become unreliable if the outcomes are not normally distributed (Oryczak, 
2000; Ye & Tiong, 2000). As shown in Figure 7.2.1 and Figure 7.2.2, the shapes of histogram plot and 
boxplot for Bid B are skewed to the left, so the probability distribution for Bid B does not fit normal 
distribution parameters well. Therefore, it may be necessary to test whether Bid B chose by mean-semi 
variance is really the preferred bidding proposal with superior VFM than the others presented proposals 
when other comparison methods without limitation on probability distribution are applied.   176
7.3.2 Stochastic Dominance 
As addressed in Chapter 2, stochastic dominance is applied to analyze mutually exclusive 
projects by comparing the entire cumulative distribution for possible outcomes; this does not require 
specification of the form of a decision makers utility function (Oryczak, 2000, 2003; Park & Sharp-
Bette, 1990; Pribasi et al., 2006). The first-degree stochastic dominance is defined as (Park & Sharp-
Bette): 
Let F(x) and G(y) be cumulative distributions for random variables x and y. Let U be any non-
decreasing function with finite values for any finite x. x stochastically dominates y to the first 
order, denoted by ‘x D y’, if and only if: 
 
F(x) ≤ G(y) for every x   (7.3.2) 
      And F(xo) < G(yo) for some xo 
 
Thus, if the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of x is equal to or below that of y 
everywhere, then x dominates (is preferred to) y; this definition is applicable only if CDF of x and y do 
not cross each other.  
In addition to the first-degree stochastic dominance, there is second-degree and third degree 
stochastic dominance. Since they are computationally very difficult (Oryczak, 2003), the researcher 
recommends the first-degree stochastic dominance only.  
Figure 7.3.3 shows the empirical CDF for the base case and all bidding proposals. The figure 
shows that the CDF curves for all options across each other so that it cannot be determined which 
option is preferred by the first-degree stochastic dominance decision rule. 
 





















Empirical CDF of [Base case], [Bid A], [BidB], [BidC], [Bid D]
 
 
Figure 7.3.3 The Empirical CDF of Base Case and Bidding Proposals71   177
7.3.3 The Expected-Loss ratio 
Since mean-variance, mean-semivariance, stochastic dominance cannot help to choose the 
preferred option, the expected loss ratio based on the probability for the expected loss and expected 
value of outcome is introduced. This is defined as below (Limbu et al., 2006; Stahr, 2006; Watson, 
2005): 
Rel= L/(L+V) (7.4.3) 
where  
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Empirical CDF of [BidB] vs.[Bid D]
 
Figure 7.3.4 The Empirical CDF for the Base Case and Bidding Proposals with 
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The bidding proposal should have better NPV performance than the base case does in order to 
demonstrate VFM. Therefore, the expected NPV for the base case, NPVB, is provided as the minimum 
acceptable level. Loss (L) refers to the cumulative probability of NPV less than NPVB  (the expected 
loss), whereas V (VFM) refers to the cumulative probability of NPV greater than NPVB  (the expected 
gain). The expected loss ratio Rel is equal to L/(L+V). The lesser the expected loss ratio is, the less 
risky, and greater VFM the option is. The less the expected loss ratio, the more preferred is the bidding 
proposal. Figure 7.3.4 is used to show the L and V values for Bid B vs. Bid D. The Rel is calculated in 
Table 7.3.1 which indicates that Bid B dominates Bid D which dominates Bid A which dominates the 
base case which dominates Bid C (Bid BÆBid DÆBid AÆBase CaseÆBid C). As a result, the Bid B 
is the preferred option. 
 
 
Table 7.3.1 the Expected-Loss Ratio for Bids Benchmarking23 
 
Bids Benchmarking  Base Case Bid A Bid B Bid C  Bid D 
L=p(x<ENPV of Base Case)  50.299 49.399 42.099 50.899  44.299
V=p(x>=ENPV of Base Case)  49.711 50.611 57.911 49.101  55.701
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Chapter 8 Model Validation 
 
 
As far as model validation was concerned, a variety of tests were developed to diagnose flaws 
and to improve system dynamics modelling. Even though these tests might have different 
terminologies in terms of classification, the testing contents are similar. Sterman (2000) proposed 12 
testing approaches that were summarized from previous studies (Barlas, 1989, 1990, 1996; Forrester, 
1973; Forrester & Senge, 1980) for various purposes. The researcher applied some of them which are 
extensively applied by the current research (Ferreira, 2002; Hao, 2002; Kazeli et al., 2003; Lee et al., 
2005; Martin, 2002; Nguyen & Ogunlana, 2005; Tvedt, 1996) to test SD modelling including: 
boundary adequacy tests, structure assessment tests, dimensional consistency tests, parameter 
assessment tests, extreme condition analysis, integration error tests, behaviour reproduction tests, and 
sensitivity analysis. In Table 8.1, the researcher summarized these tests by displaying measure of 
performance and the results of measures that are addressed in detail in the following sections. 
 
8.1 Boundary Adequacy Tests 
Boundary adequacy tests were used to assess the appropriateness of the model boundary for 
the model purpose (Sterman, 2000). Before starting SD quantitative modelling, the researcher created 
causal loop diagrams (CLDs) based on the generic case scenarios from surveys to interpret risk 
interrelationships for the generic PPP projects. Then, the direct causes and direct consequences of the 
risk variables displayed in CLDs were assessed to make sure the model boundary and causal structure 
for risk interrelationships were adequate and applicable to the specific project case. In this assessment, 
the researcher used evidence gathered from an interview survey with project experts and key 
participants in the THSR project from the Bureau of High Speed Rail (BHSR) in the public sector. All 
of these details have been addressed in chapter 4, chapter 5 and Appendix II.  
The researcher used Vensim, a software package, for system dynamics modelling. Vensim 
includes a variety of tools such as causal tracing analysis tools with cause tree and use tree diagrams 
available to help in easily checking to assure if the exogenous variables of SD models quantitative 
stock flow diagram were consistent with those addressed in the qualitative CLDs. The causal tracing 
tool is a powerful tool for moving through a model tracing what causes something to change, and can   180
be configured to show the causes of a variable (cause tree) or the uses of a variable (use tree) (Ventana 
Systems, 2007).  
For example, Figure 8.1.1 shows the cause tree of risk variable default of Subcontractors C, 
which displays the succeeding risk variables caused by default of Subcontractors C. On the other hand, 
Figure 8.1.2 shows the use tree of risk variable default of Subcontractors C which displays the 
preceding risk variables that would lead to default of Subcontractors C. Since use tree (Figure 8.1.2) 
showed that there were no preceding risk-variable for default of Subcontractors C, so default of 
Subcontractors C is an exogenous risk variable and the remaining risk variables shown in cause tree 
(Figure 8.1.1) are endogenous risk variables.  





Figure 8.1.1 The Cause Tree for Risk Variable ‘Default of Subcontractors C’73 
 
 
Default of subcontractors C
 
Figure 8.1.2 The Use Tree for Risk Variable ‘Default of Subcontractors C’74 
 
 
Table 8.1.1 is a model boundary chart the researcher used to summarize the model scope 
identified by the above approaches, listing key variables including endogenous variables, exogenous 
variables, and those variables excluded from the model. In general, the whole project life cost and 
benefits should be estimated to calculate project NPV. However, the major purpose was to standardize 
bidding proposals with the base case. For the broad costs or benefits such as social benefits and 
ecological impact, the bidding proposals and base case are the same. This does not change the 
benchmarking results without taking those broad costs and benefits into account, so they are excluded 
from SD models. 
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Table 8.1 Measures of Performance24 
 
Section  Category  Measures of Performance  Criteria  Results 
Direct cause and consequence variables of causal 




(Barlas, 1996; Lee et al., 
2005; Nguyen & Ogunlana, 
2005; Sterman, 2000; 
Tvedt, 1996) 
Exogenous risk variables  Confirmed by Vensim structure assessment tools?  Yes 
Model equations  Pass Vensim model checking?  Yes 
Exogenous and endogenous risk variables, 




(Barlas, 1996; Kazeli et al., 
2003; Lee et al., 2005; 
Nguyen & Ogunlana, 2005; 
Sterman, 2000; Tvedt, 
1996)  Net cash flow  F(t) 
F(t)<=0, t<=Tc 
F(t) >=0, t>=Tc 




(Barlas, 1996; Kazeli et al., 
2003; Lee et al., 2005; 
Sterman, 2000; Tvedt, 
1996) 
Equation units  Pass Vensim unit checking?  Yes 
R
2-adj/ s (mean-squared error)  >= 80% 
P-value  < α=0.05  Fits multiple-regression equations for 
endogenous risk variables 
Residual plots/Outlier detection  Meet assumptions of regression 
Probability plot  Close to straight line within 95% 
C.I. 





(Ferreira, 2002; Hao, 2002; 
Kazeli et al., 2003; Lee et 
al., 2005; Martin, 2002; 
Nguyen & Ogunlana, 2005; 
Tvedt, 1996) 
Fits probability distribution for exogenous risk 
variables 
P-value for Anderson-Darling statistic/ Ch-sq 
statistic  > α=0.05 





(Barlas, 1996; Lee et al., 
2005; Nguyen & Ogunlana, 
2005; Sterman, 2000; 
Tvedt, 1996) 
NPV time profiles with 95% C.I. over project life Implausible changes?  No   193
ΔNPV/ΔT (year 2036)  Time step ΔT 
• ΔNPV/ΔT=16.59, when 
0.08333331<ΔT <=1; 
• ΔNPV/ΔT=3.92, where  
0.0078125<=ΔT<= 
0.0833333  8.6 
Integration 
Error Tests 
(Barlas, 1996; Lee et al., 
2005; Sterman, 2000) 
NPV time-profiles over project life  Time step ΔT 
• Unstable and sensitive when 
where  0.08333331<ΔT <=1; 
• Stable when time where 
0.0078125<=ΔT<= 
0.0833333  
Forecasting error (%) 
  14.63% 
% of construction cost overrun 
Test of  
hypotheses by 95% C.I.  No reject 
Forecasting error (%) 
  15.59%  % of construction delay 
  Test of  
hypotheses by 95% C.I.  Not reject 
Forecasting error (%) 





(Ferreira, 2002; Hao, 2002; 
Kazeli et al., 2003; Lee et 
al., 2005; Martin, 2002; 
Nguyen & Ogunlana, 2005; 
Tvedt, 1996) 
Demand for average daily ridership 
(year 2007)  Test of  






(Ferreira, 2002; Hao, 2002; 
Kazeli et al., 2003; Lee et 
al., 2005; Martin, 2002; 
Nguyen & Ogunlana, 2005; 
Tvedt, 1996) 
NPV time profiles with 95% C.I.  Implausible changes  No 
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8.2 Structure Assessment Tests 
Structure assessment tests are used to test whether the SD models are consistent with 
knowledge of the real system relative to model purpose (Sterman, 2000). The purpose of the whole SD 
decision model created by the researcher was to compare long-term NPV values with risk interactions 
among bidding proposals and then choose a preferred bid with best NPV performance. According to 
accounting principles, an aggregated SD decision model is structured with a major model: NPV project 
cash flow model which is linked by six sub-models consisting of: (a)construction cost sub-models, (b) 
project financing sub-model, (c) operating cost sub-model, (d) operation revenue sub-model, (e) 
depreciation sub-model, and (f) discount rate model). Among these sub-models, the risk 
interrelationships described by CLD are modeled and linked to the related sub-model. This forms the 
whole structure of SD decision model. 
 




Exogenous Risk Variables 
 
Endogenous Risk Variables  Excluded 
Default of subcontractors C 
Default of subcontractors O 
Downside economic events C 
Downside economic events O 
Force Majeure C 





Latent defect C 
Latent defect O 
Political interference C 
Political interference O 
Unforeseen site conditions C 
Variability of exchange rate 
Variability of inflation rate 
Variability of interest rate 
Variability of less demand 
















Failed commission tests 
Low operating productivity 
System breakdown 
High maintenance frequency 
Poor cooperation/coordination 
Accidents and safety issues 
NPV cash flow 
Revenue 
Expense 
Risk adjusted annual total 
construction cost 
Annual total operating cost 
Fare increase rate 








National economic loss   195
The researcher used the Vensim software to provide varieties of structure analysis tools for 
model structure assessment including use tree, cause tree, loops, units check, check model, and check 
syntax. The use tree and cause tree can be used to ensure that the structures of risk cause and effect 
relationships are correct. Unit check will be addressed in the next section. The check model and check 
syntax are used to check syntax or semantic errors of model equations (Ventana Systems, 2007). Figure 
8.2.1 shows that SD models created by the researcher have passed the model checking. 
 




Table 8.2 The Partial Display of The Loop List for ‘Default of Subcontractor’4 
Risk Variable26 
 
Loop Number 1 of length 6 
  Default of subcontractors 
       Resources unavailable 
       Risk degree 
       Time delay effect 
       Increased completion time 
       Workpackage duration 
       Risk adjusted construction completion time 
Loop Number 2 of length 9 
  Default of subcontractors 
       Defective construction 
       Failed commission tests 
       Contract breach 
      Has the Contract terminated? 
       Risk degree 
       Time delay effect 
       Increased completion time 
       Workpackage duration 






As for the structure of feedback loops for risk interactions, the researcher checked this using 
the Vensim Loop tool which displays a list of all feedback loops passing through a variable. The loop 
list is ordered from the shortest loop (the one involving the least number of variables) to the longest   196
loop (Ventana Systems, 2007). This type of tool shows useful summary information on risk variable 
interactions. For example, the Vensim Loop tool showed that there are 40 loops that passed through 
risk variable default of subcontractors. Table 8.2 displays a partial list of the loop for risk variable 
default of subcontractors. 
Structure is the set of physical and information interconnections that generates behaviour 
(Ventana Systems, 2007). An alternative option in diagnosing the structural issues of a whole model is 
to examine whether the model output patterns violate physical laws. For example, in reality, there 
would be no revenue generated during the construction phase because revenue would only start to 
accrue during the operation phase when the project begins to deliver a service; there would be 
significant expenditure for infrastructure construction during the construction phase and less 
expenditures during the operation phase. As a result, by totaling revenue and expense over project life, 
the cash flow for a large scale infrastructure project would be generally negative, F(t) < = 0, at the 
construction phase (t < =Tc: construction completion time) and positive, F(t) > = 0, at the operation 
phase (t > =Tc). Figure 8.2.2 shows  the model output to display the cash flow profiles of THSR project 
cash flow during the concession period. Apparently, these results show that common sense of a cash 
flow profile addressed above that curve for taxable income (#3 green line) is negative at the 
construction phase and positive at the operation phase, respectively. It would be a basic structural issue 
if any unusual pattern of cash flow is showing up which would mean that the models structure and 
equations should be individually checked. 
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Figure 8.2.2 The Cash Flow Pattern to Test Model Structure76   197
8.3 Dimensional Consistency Tests 
The purpose of dimensional consistency tests is to ensure all SD model variables are 
consistent with the mathematical equations and objective meaning. To check unit errors, the researcher 
employed the software package, Vensim, which has automated dimensional analysis function. Figure 
8.3 shows that the units used in the SD model were checked and passed testing. 
 
 
Figure 8.3 The Vensim’s Message Window of ‘Unit Check’77 
 
 
8.4 Parameter Assessment Tests 
The parameter assessment test is used to estimate whether the values of a parameter are 
reasonable (Sterman, 2000). The researcher used the questionnaire survey to gather data on the 
expected risk effects measured by the project experts. Multiple regression analysis was applied to 
model and quantify the risk interdependencies (cause-effect interrelationships) among risk variables. 
Therefore, a set of residual plots including residuals versus variables plot histogram of residuals, 
normal plot of residuals, residuals versus fits, and residuals versus order are conducted to test whether 
these multiple-regression models were adequate and that the regression assumptions were met. For 
example, the multiple-regression model for risk variable resource unavailable was calculated and 
output was produced by the software application, Minitab, as follows: 
 
The regression equation is 
resource unavailable = 10.9 + 0.155 default of subcontractor 




Predictor                     Coef   SE Coef      T      P 
Constant                   10.9449    0.5946  18.41  0.000 
default of subcontractor  0.154821  0.007249  21.36  0.000 
Force Majeure             0.102746  0.005392  19.05  0.000 
industrial disputes        0.14269   0.05713   2.50  0.018 
finance unavailable       0.098964  0.006691  14.79  0.000 
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S = 0.159302   R-Sq = 96.8%   R-Sq(adj) = 96.4% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF       SS      MS       F      P 
Regression       4  24.5624  6.1406  241.98  0.000 
Residual Error  32   0.8121  0.0254 
Total           36  25.3745 
 
From the above ANOVA table, the p value for regression was close to 0. The p value for each 
model coefficient test is close to 0 as well. It appears that both coefficients and regression relationship 
between predictors and response are statistically significant at α = 0.05. The four predicators account 
for 96.4% (R-Sq (adj) = 96.4%) of variance of resource unavailable so that the model can fit the data 
extremely well. Moreover, the sign of each coefficient was positive indicating the same direction of 
relationship between predictors and response, thereby meeting the assumed risk relationships addressed 
in the risk causal loop diagram described in chapters 4 and 5.  
In addition to the above tests, the following plots were conducted to exam if the models were 
adequate and the assumptions of regression were met. Figure 8.4.1 shows a plot of the residuals versus 
the predictor, which was used to examine whether there was any non-random pattern where a predictor 
variable was related to the residuals. Figure 8.4.1 indicates, except for 2 or 3 outliers for each predictor, 
that there were no specific patterns or relationships such as curvature and differences in the magnitude 
of the residuals that would have additional effects on the response. Therefore, the model is adequate in 
its linear relationship between response and its predictors. 
The plot for histogram of residuals shown in Figure 8.4.2 indicates there is a normal 
distribution shape without a skewed tail. But there is a bar with standardized residuals more than 2, 
which may be outliers. The points in the normal probability plot shown in Figure 8.4.2 form a straight 
line. Therefore, both the histogram and normal probability plots indicate that the assumption made by 
the researcher that residuals are normally distributed is valid. 
Figure 8.4.2 shows the plot for residuals versus fits, showing a random pattern for the 
residuals on both sides of 0. Most of points are equally spread within the interval of standardized 
residual between -2 and +2 except for 2 points slightly outside this range. Therefore, this data show that 
the assumption that residuals has constant variance is valid.  
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Residuals Versus default of subcontractor
(response is resource unavailable)





























Residuals Versus Force Majeure
(response is resource unavailable)





























Residuals Versus industrial disputes
(response is resource unavailable)





























Residuals Versus finance unavailable
(response is resource unavailable)
Figure 8.4.1 Residuals versus Predictors78 
 
 






















































































Normal Probability Plot Versus Fits
Histogram Versus Order
Residual Plots for resource unavailable
 
 
Figure 8.4.2 Four Types of Residual Plots for Response ‘Resources 
Unavailable’79 
 
The plot for residuals versus order shown in Figure 8.4.2 was used by the researcher to find 
non-random errors. The figure shows that there is not any specific clustering of residuals with positive   200
correlation or negative correlation. Therefore, the residuals are not correlated with one another, thus the 
assumption that the residuals are independent is valid. 
As far as handling with outliers for the inconsistency of expert inputs is concerned, an 
absolute value of the standardized residual larger than 2 indicated an suspect outlier and a number 
larger than 3 indicated a suspect extreme outlier (Barnett & Lewis, 1994; Rousseeuw & Leroy, 2003). 
The software application, Minitab, was used by the researcher to display a table of unusual 
observations with high leverage and standardized residuals. From regression output, Minitab labels 
observations with a standardized residual greater than 2 with an R indicated that the observation had an 
unusual response. This helped the researcher to identify outliers for inconsistent data of expert inputs. 
Once an observation was identified as the suspect outlier points, the researcher fit the regression 
equation with and without the suspect points by reviewing the s (mean-squared error) and R-sq from 
the two models (Barnett & Lewis, 1994; Rousseeuw & Leroy, 2003).  
For example, the residual plots shown in Figure 8.4.3 for the regression model of risk variable 
design changes are outlined below. The data indicated that observation 21 is more than 3 sigmas from 
center line and observation 30 is less than -2. These two points are therefore classified as suspect 
extreme outlier and outlier respectively and are obviously inconsistent with other points. The 
researcher fit the regression equation with and without these suspect points by reviewing the changes of 
s and R-sq values from the two models as the following Table 8.4: 
 
Table 8.4 The Comparison of Regression Models ‘With Suspect Outliers’ and 
‘Without Suspect Outliers’27 
 
With suspect outliers 
The regression equation is 
design changes = 3.56 + 0.249 scope changes + 0.218 
contractual disputes 
 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant       3.5577      0.7522       4.73    0.000 
scope ch      0.24873     0.04094       6.08    0.000 
contract      0.21826     0.03340       6.54    0.000 
 
S = 0.1615      R-Sq = 72.2%     R-Sq(adj) = 70.6% 
Without suspect outliers 
The regression equation is 
design changes = 3.38 + 0.257 scope changes + 0.222 
contractual disputes 
 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant       3.3813      0.6100       5.54    0.000 
scope ch      0.25652     0.03290       7.80    0.000 
contract      0.22183     0.02685       8.26    0.000 
 
S = 0.1289      R-Sq = 81.5%     R-Sq(adj) = 80.4% 
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The s value is reduced from 0.1615 to 0.1289 and R-sq is increased from 72.2% to 81.5%. 
Therefore,  the regression model is acceptable: design changes = 3.38 + 0.257 scope changes + 0.222 
contractual disputes + Nor~(0, 0.248), when we remove the outliers from collected data.  
There are 44 multiple regression models used to address risk relationship parameters which 
are all tested by the above approaches. The results showed that all of the regression models were 
adequate and the regression assumptions were met. 
 


















































































Normal Probability Plot Versus Fits
Histogram Versus Order
Residual Plots for design changes
 




Another parameter assessment test was conducted for exogenous risk variables. The 
researcher applied probability fitting to infer the probability distribution of seven exogenous risk 
variables. Therefore, the probability plot, P-P plot or Q-Q plot with Anderson-Darling statistics or Chi-
square statistics were applied to examine if the data could follow the specified distribution. The 
example shown in Figure 6.3.1 indicates whether Weibull distribution fits the political interference risk 
variable during operation phase. Figure 8.4.4 shows three types of plots that were used by the 
researcher to examine the probability fitting. The probability plot was used to plot each value versus 
the percentage of values along a fitted distribution line. This indicated that most of plotted points fell   202
on or close to the fitted straight line and within the 95% confidence intervals. The p value (>0.25) for 
the Anderson-Darling (AD) statistic was over α = 0.05. In addition, the probability-probability (P-P) 
graph plots the p-value of the fitted distribution versus the p value of the fitted result, with the quantile-
quantile graph (Q-Q) plotting the plot percentile values of the fitted distribution versus percentile 
values of the input data. If the fit is "good," both plots will be nearly linear. Figure 8.4.4 indicates that 
both P-P and Q-Q plots are close to being linear. The p value for the Chi-square statistic test was 
0.8639, which was over α = 0.05. From the above diagnostic plots, the researcher concluded that 






























Probability Plot of political interference
Weibull - 95%  CI
 
 





























































8.5 Extreme Condition Analysis 
The “extreme condition analysis” was performed according to the System Dynamics based 
textbooks or journal articles (Barlas, 1996; Lee et al., 2005; Nguyen & Ogunlana, 2005; Sterman, 2000; 
Tvedt, 1996). The extreme condition analysis refers to the tests that ask whether models behave 
appropriately when the inputs take on values at extreme conditions such as zero or infinity. Models 
should be robust in extreme conditions. Robustness under extreme conditions means the model should 
behave in a realistic fashion no matter how extreme the inputs or policies imposed on it may be. The 
extreme condition analysis can be carried out in two main ways: by direct inspection of the model 
equations and by simulation. Be sure to examine whether the output of the model is feasible or 
reasonable when each input to the equation takes on its maximum and minimum values (Sterman, 
2000). The extreme condition analysis has been performed to see whether there is floating point error 
computing or any unusual output that is not in reality.  
For example, the researcher quantified and scaled the expected risk effect of risk events with 
the risk effect ranged from 1 to 25. The maximum risk effect of 25 and minimum risk effect of 1 for 
exogenous risk variables were input into the model simultaneously and a simulation run to see whether 
the endogenous risk variables, such as resource unavailable performance unavailable and financial 
unavailable, had gone beyond their specified low/high range.  
Figure 8.5.1 indicates the risk effect for resource unavailable, performance unavailable and 
financial unavailable endogenous risk variables were still ranged between 1 and 25 when the effect for 
exogenous risk variables had a maximum value of 25. Figure 8.5.2 indicates the risk effect of 
endogenous risk variables, resource unavailable events, performance unavailable events, and financial 
unavailable events were also scaled within the range between 1 and 25 when the risk effect of 
exogenous risk variables had the minimum value of 1. After extreme condition analysis involving the 
verification of individual equations and by running values at extreme conditions simulation, the 
researcher observed that the output patterns were still in reality. 
When the setup for risk effect is other than the range values from 1 to 25, the output for these 
variables is not feasible or reasonable. Moreover, the simulation results indicate an ERROR message 
like “Unable to converge simultaneous loop at time…”. This error message arose from variables that 
have gone beyond their specified low/high range. For example, the risk variable ‘performance 
unavailable’ may likely go beyond the specified range from 1 to 25 if a more complex model than a   204
linear regression model for the functional relations of the risk variables is applied to the System 
Dynamics model. Since ‘performance unavailable’ is a simultaneous function, the SD simulation will 
compute all the simultaneous equations in the loop of ‘performance unavailable’ iteratively until the 
values of the loop variables no longer change significantly. The iterative computation fails to converge 
when ‘performance unavailable’ has gone beyond their specified low/high range. Then we will receive 
an error message “ .... unable to converge simultaneous loop at time ....” 
In addition, it yields unreasonable outputs for variable DeT (‘the number of trains that would 
likely delay on-time service’ stated in the section 6.2.3 and Appendix VII3) when ‘performance 
unavailable’ has gone beyond their specified low/high range. For instance, the value of ‘the number of 
trains’ becomes negative when the value of ‘performance unavailable’ is less than its minimum value 1. 
Obviously, it violates the physical laws. 
Similarly, other variables such as TDij (‘time delay effect’) stated in Appendix VII8, EFA (‘the 
expected fare adjustment rate’) stated in Appendix VII14, EASL (‘the expected accident and safety 
loss’) stated in Appendix VII18 and ERL (‘the expected reduced life’) stated in Appendix VII36 are 
calculated based on the risk variables that have a range of values from 1 and 25. When the risk 
variables are outside this range, the outputs for these variables are not feasible or reasonable. 
Moreover, the exogenous risk parameters were assigned maximum and minimum values along 
with random distributions that were drawn from the probability distribution. The Monte Carlo 
multivariate sensitivity was performed by sampling a set of numbers from within bounded domain that 
impacted model behaviour when the extreme values of all of parameters were simultaneously sampled. 
This is addressed in Section 8.8: sensitivity analysis. 
 
8.6 Integration Error Tests 
Integration error tests were used to ensure that the SD model outputs were not sensitive to 
choice of time step or integration method (Sterman, 2000). The researcher formulated the SD model in 
continuous time over the project concession period from 1998 to 2036; this encompassed the 
construction phase and the operation phase. There were many variables solved by numerical integration 
over time. The integration error due to time step or integration method may have lead to undesired   205
dynamics to the model. Therefore, the researcher used an integration method to try different time steps 
to examine whether there was major difference between them. 
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Figure 8.5.1 The Risk Effect for Endogenous Risk Variables When the Risk 
Effect for Exogenous Risk Variables Have A Maximum Value 2582 
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Figure 8.5.2 The Risk Effect for Endogenous Risk Variables When the Risk 




The researcher used the Vensim software package to build SD models for the risk network and 
bidding proposal benchmarking. This analysis showed six integration technique options that traded off   206
speed and accuracy; these option were: (a) Euler, (b) Diff, RK4 Auto, (c) RK4 Fixed, (d) RK2 Auto, (e) 
RK2 Fixed, (f) comment for run (Ventana Systems, 2007).  
However, these options can be classified as two major methods: (a) Euler integration, and (b) 
Runge-Kutta integration. The best integration technique choice depends on the model application 
purpose (Sterman, 2000). The Euler integration is a simple linear extrapolation method that is suitable 
for most business and management models with related confusing problems where there are large 
errors from aggregation, mismeasurement, simplification, and lack of information. The Runge-Kutta 
integration is preferred for physical systems models, especially those involving oscillation (Ventana 
Systems, 2007). The SD models built by the researcher is essential in comparing project NPV values 
over long-term among the bidding proposals and then selecting a preferred bidding proposal that would 
have better NPV performance in the future. This model is a good tool to demand long-term stable 
output rather than a precise numerical projection. Moreover, the models used by the researcher do not 
involve oscillation output behaviour. Therefore, the Euler integration was suitable and was chosen for 
the research. 
The researcher used the different default time steps in the Vensim software application to run 
models to examine whether there were apparent NPV changes over the life of the project, as shown in 
Figure 8.6.1 and Table 8.6.1. In the Vensim application, the maximum setup for time step ΔT was 1 
and minimum was 0.0078125. The researcher used 0.0833333 as the base case for time step which 
meant 1 month at intervals of 1/12 of a year (0.0833333 years). The researcher tested ΔT from 1 to 
0.0078125 in order to calculate the NPV values in year 2036 and to examine NPV profile over time.  
The results indicated the NPV time-profile and values were significantly different between 
time steps greater than base case 0.0833333 (line 1 to line 3) and those less than 0.0833333 (line 4 to 
line 9), especially when they were split into two groups at the end of concession period in year 2036. 
Therefore, the researcher calculated the NPV changes in year 2036 against 0.08333331<ΔT <=1 and 
0.0078125<=ΔT<= 0.0833333. Apparently, ΔNPV/ΔT = 16.59 where 0.08333331<ΔT <=1 was 
significantly more than ΔNPV/ΔT = 3.92 where 0.0078125<=ΔT<= 0.0833333. In addition, the 
researcher examined the ranking of the expected NPV values in year 2036 among bidding proposals. 
The results showed in Figure 8.6.2 indicated that the NPV time-profile of all bidding proposals was the 























































NPV cash flow : integration tests_time step=1 1111
NPV cash flow : integration tests_time step=0,5 2222
NPV cash flow : integration tests_time step=0,25 3333
NPV cash flow : integration tests_time step=0,125 444
NPV cash flow : integration tests_time step=0,0833333 555
NPV cash flow : integration tests_time step=0,0625 6666
NPV cash flow : integration tests_time step=0,03125 7777
NPV cash flow : integration tests_time step=0,015625 8888
NPV cash flow : integration tests_time step=0,0078125 9999  
 
Figure 8.6.1 The Integration Tests for NPV Changes by Time Step for Risk84 
 
 
Table 8.6.1 The Integration Tests on Time Step28 
Time Step ΔT 




0.0625 0.03125  0.015625  0.0078125




128.52 125.10 127.19 137.92 143.73 142.74 145.74 147.10  146.97 






From the integration tests, the researcher concluded that the integration error was sensitive to 
long-term NPV values and NPV time-profile when time step was set up as 0.08333331<ΔT <=1. The 
long-term NPV values and NPV time-profile were stable when time step was set as 0.0078125<=ΔT<= 
0.0833333. The researcher used 1 month at intervals of 1/12 of a year (0.0833333 years) for simulation. 
The researcher did this because some output like construction delay and cost overrun are normally 
reviewed and examined each month. 
























NPV cash flow[Base case] : bid_time step=1 1
NPV cash flow[Bid A] : bid_time step=1 2
NPV cash flow[BidB] : bid_time step=1 3
NPV cash flow[BidC] : bid_time step=1 4

























NPV cash flow[Base case] : bid_time step=0,5 1
NPV cash flow[Bid A] : bid_time step=0,5 2
NPV cash flow[BidB] : bid_time step=0,5 3
NPV cash flow[BidC] : bid_time step=0,5 4
























NPV cash flow[Base case] : bid_time step=0,25 1
NPV cash flow[Bid A] : bid_time step=0,25 2
NPV cash flow[BidB] : bid_time step=0,25 3
NPV cash flow[BidC] : bid_time step=0,25 4
























NPV cash flow[Base case] : bid_time step=0,125 1
NPV cash flow[Bid A] : bid_time step=0,125 2
NPV cash flow[BidB] : bid_time step=0,125 3
NPV cash flow[BidC] : bid_time step=0,125 4
























NPV cash flow[Base case] : bid_time step=0,0833333 1
NPV cash flow[Bid A] : bid_time step=0,0833333 2
NPV cash flow[BidB] : bid_time step=0,0833333 3
NPV cash flow[BidC] : bid_time step=0,0833333 4
























NPV cash flow[Base case] : bid_time step=0,03125 1
NPV cash flow[Bid A] : bid_time step=0,03125 2
NPV cash flow[BidB] : bid_time step=0,03125 3
NPV cash flow[BidC] : bid_time step=0,03125 4

























NPV cash flow[Base case] : bid_time step=0,015625 1
NPV cash flow[Bid A] : bid_time step=0,015625 2
NPV cash flow[BidB] : bid_time step=0,015625 3
NPV cash flow[BidC] : bid_time step=0,015625 4
























NPV cash flow[Base case] : bid_time step=0,0078125 1
NPV cash flow[Bid A] : bid_time step=0,0078125 2
NPV cash flow[BidB] : bid_time step=0,0078125 3
NPV cash flow[BidC] : bid_time step=0,0078125 4
NPV cash flow[Bid D] : bid_time step=0,0078125 5  
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8.7 Behaviour Reproduction Tests 
The behaviour reproduction test was used to assess the ability of the model to reproduce the 
behaviour of a system (Sterman, 2000). Discrepancies between the simulation results and real data 
were examined to ensure that a model can properly function to represent reality. There were three types 
of real data available to test the ability of the model to reproduce reality behaviour by discrepancy 
comparisons over THSR project life during construction stage and operation stage respectively 
including: (a) construction cost overrun at completion time, (b) construction delay at completion time, 
and (c) operation demand for the first year during operation stage.  
The forecast error was applied as one of the measuring criteria to test the ability of the model 
in reality reproduction. As shown in the Figure 8.7, Bozarth and Handfield (2006) defined this as the 
deviation of the forecasted quantity from the actual, which can be calculated by the following 
mathematic equation:  














Figure 8.7 The Forecast Error86 
 
 
Forecast accuracy is defined by Bozarth and Handfield (2006): 
 
Forecast Accuracy = maximum of (1–Forecast Error, 0) (Bozarth and Handfield, 2006) 
 
As far as the construction cost overrun is concerned, the actual percentage of cost overrun was 
about 4.54% (Yang, 2005) at construction completion time of January 2007. As illustrated in Figure 
8.7.1, the simulation result was 3.88% for mean and (-13.02%, 20.77%) for 95% confidence interval.   210
The forecast error was approximately 14.63% for cost overruns which was 85.37% for high accuracy. 
In addition, the testing of hypotheses with a 95% confidence interval showed that the 95% confidence 
interval contained the null hypothesis value (the actual cost overrun percentage). There was no 
significant evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the simulation value is equal to the actual cost 
overrun percentage at α=0.05.  
To evaluate the model validity at operation phase, the real data for demand since the THSR 
began operations in January 2007 to December 2007 were used for model testing. The actual demand 
for average daily ridership in year 2007 was about 125,000 people/day (Yang, 2007). As shown in 
Figure 8.7.2, the simulation results showed 124,426 people/day for mean and (30,240 people/day, 
218,162 people/day) for 95% confidence interval. It appears that the forecast error was 0.46% for daily 
ridership demand which meant a very high accuracy rate of 99.54% for 2007. Moreover, the testing of 
hypotheses with a 95% confidence interval indicated that the 95% confidence interval contained the 
hypothesis value (the actual daily ridership demand) in 2007. There was no significant evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis that the simulation value was equal to the actual daily ridership demand in 
2007 at α = 0.05. The demand forecasting by the officials of the BHSRs for 2007 was about 288,000 
people/day, which had a very high margin of error; 130% (forecast accuracy = 0) was related to actual 
demand. These results indicated that the demand projection from the public sector were overly 
optimistic. Additionally, the results indicated that the model created by the researcher that considered 
optimism bias can more accurately predict the demand than the public sector current approach. 
From the above discrepancy comparisons of simulation results against real data, the researcher 
concluded that the model created can robustly predict the expected outcomes for both construction and 
operation phases and thereby suggests a valid model.   211























Figure 8.7.1 Discrepancy between Simulated and Real Data for Construction 
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Figure 8.7.2 Discrepancy between Simulated and Real Data for Average Daily 
Ridership Demand in Year 200788 
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8.8 Sensitivity Analysis 
The sensitivity analysis test was used to test the robustness of the model behaviour in uncertain 
conditions. Numerical sensitivity, behaviour mode, and policy sensitivity are usual types of sensitivity, 
that depend on the purpose of model (Sterman, 2000). Numerical sensitivity is used to examine 
whether the numerical values of the results would change when the assumptions are changed. 
Behaviour mode sensitivity is used to evaluate whether the behaviour pattern of model would change 
when the assumptions are changed. Policy sensitivity is examined to view impacts on the desirability of 
a proposed policy when the assumptions are changed. The researcher conducted Monte Carlo 
simulation for multivariate sensitivity analysis by simultaneously changing the assumptions of all 
exogenous risk parameters along the bounded random distribution. This evaluated the changes of 
project NPV arising from the least downside risk effect and the most downside risk effect as listed 
below: 
•           Behaviour mode sensitivity: Figure 8.8.1 shows the multivariate sensitivity analysis by 
defining the probability distribution values inferred from the empirical data for each 
exogenous risk parameter. By performing 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations, the time graph 
sensitivity output shown in Figure 8.8.1 shows the behaviour of the THSR project NPV over 
the whole concession period including both the construction and the operation phases. The 
spread NPV values in term of 50%, 75%, 95% and 100% confidence bounds are shown at any 
period in time. The expected NPV for base case is highlighted by the central red line which 
reflects the most expected results under the expected risk impact. Figure 8.8.1 showed that the 
base case was raised in the beginning due to continual funding. It then began to decline during 
the latter half of construction phase due to the investment of lots of capital for construction. 
Once the project began operations with a stable revenue stream, it began to climb until the end 
of concession period in year 2036 with NPV value at NT$156.49 billion. A notable feature of 
this sensitivity was that the confidence bounds grew over project life. The outer bounds of 
uncertainty (100%) show maximum NPV values of approximately NT$532.15 billion for the 
best case and minimum values of approximately -NT$76.41 billion for the worst case in 2036 
respectively. There was a widened difference between the best case scenario and worst case 
scenario in 2036, which meant a high degree of uncertainty existed over the long-term life of 
the project. The best case scenarios existed only in the world under the least downside risk   213
effect during project concession period. This may have been due to a very optimistic ridership 
demand-forecast with the least unexpected impact being from the exogenous factors changes 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2004). Therefore, the net positive cash flow increased 
rapidly over the life of the project due to the optimistic estimations. On the other hand, the 
worse case scenarios reflected the fact the project is under the most unexpected risk impact. 
The project performance would encounter the compounding downside effects as William 
(2002) addressed, which are arising from combining both individual risk effect and risk 
interaction effect. With the reinforce feedback of compounding downside effects over time, 
the project performance will gradually worsen over project life. As addressed in the causal 
loop diagram of chapter 4, due to exogenous factors changes, the ridership demand may be 
much less than forecasted, which would result in generating more revenue loss during 
operation stage. This fact could possibly lead to financial difficulties with the project 
contractor being unable to repay the large debt invested during the construction stage. As a 
result, the project couldn’t provide required services without enough capital to pay for 
operation labor, material or equipment. This interprets the debate on PPP as addressed in the 
section 2.3.2 that the value for money will be eroded if the private project contractor cannot 
cost efficiently outweigh the incremental cost of private financing.  
Figure 8.8.2 shows the multivariate sensitivity analysis for the project NPV of bidding 
proposal model that was built on the risk network model. The results indicate that the NPV 
profile pattern for each bidding proposal is similar to the result of multivariate sensitivity 
analysis for risk network model illustrated in Figure 8.8.1. The only difference is that the 
confidence bounds shown in Figure 8.8.2 are much narrower than those shown in Figure 8.8.1. 
Specifically, the results show that the width of 100% confidence bound for bidding proposal 
model at the end of concession period 2036 reduced to two thirds of that for risk network 
model. This is because the interactions of downside reinforce feedback has been controlled 
and reduced by balance feedback arising from the actions of bidding proposals over project 
life. 
The NPV profile patterns generated by the above multivariate sensitivity analysis for 
both risk network model and bidding proposal model indicated the behaviour of model is still   214
very stable and plausible to explain in the real world when the researcher changes the 
alternative assumptions of parameters. 
 
•           Numerical and policy sensitivity: From the multivariate sensitivity analysis, the Pearson 
correlation coefficients between exogenous risk variables and NPV values were used to 
calculate the relative importance expressed by percentage. This was displayed by the Pareto 
chart (Figure 8.8.3). These results showed that those economical or financial risk variables 
such as variability of less demand, variability of interest rate, variability of exchange rate, 
equity fraction and variability of tax rate accounted for almost 70% of total effects on NPV 
and the non-financial risk variables accounted for the remaining 30%. The p value < 0.05 for 
the correlation test also showed that there was strong evidence to support those economical 
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Figure 8.8.2 The Multivariate Sensitivity Analysis for The Project NPV of 
Bidding Proposal Model90 
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Figure 8.8.3 The Pareto Chart for the Relative Importance of Risk Effects on 
Project NPV91 
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Figure 8.8.3 showed that variability of less demand was the most important risk 
variable significantly affecting NPV performance. This would be likely to create a most 
vicious feedback loop: revenue loss Æ finance unavailable Æ resource unavailable Æ 
performance unavailable Æ revenue loss as shown in Figure 8.8.4. From the SD risk net 
work model and causal loop diagrams, we observed that this is the most essentially common 
path for most casual loops to pass. These results showed that there are 957 reinforce-
feedback loops interacting in risk variable revenue loss, 10718 ones interacting in risk variable 
finance unavailable events, 8051 ones in resources unavailable, and 5263 ones in performance 
unavailable. The interactions of reinforce-feedback loops accumulate and enlarge thereby 
compounding effects over time. Using these results we can interpret the SD model behaviour 
on why the curve of worse case shown in Figure 8.8.1 declined largely over the project life to 
cause a broad difference from the best case at the end of 2036. 
 

















Currently the project contactor THSRC has encountered financial difficulties by two 
risk events. First, the high interest rate for debt is making the fact that the operating revenues 
cannot cover the large debt invested during the construction stage. Second, the global financial 
crisis emerged since the end of year 2008 has made it a large operating loss after a big fall in 
ridership demand. THSRC has an accumulated operational loss of NT$67.5 billion (US$1.93 
billion) since the THSR started to operate on January 5, 2007. Both risk events have made the   217
company that may not be able to sustain operations (Shan, 2009), which shown as two most 
important risk effects in Figure 8.8.3. Moreover, the trend for THSR at the moment seems to 
be towards the worst case shown in Figure 8.8.1 and vicious circle shown in Figure 8.8.4. This 
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NPV cash flow[Base case] : interest rate=5,5% 1
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The assumptions for the significant risk variables would be sensitive enough to 
influence the policy when selecting a preferred bidding proposal. For example, the variability 
of interest rates of the capital sources would influence the NPV performance which would 
change the benchmarking order of bidding proposals. Figure 8.8.5 showed the expected NPV   218
values of project proposals over project life when the interest rates were 4%, 5%, 5.5% and 
6% respectively. By the use of decision methods proposed in the Section 7.3, the 
benchmarking order ranked by NPV in 2034 was Bid AÆBid D ÆBid BÆBid CÆbase case 
when the interest rate was equal to or less than 4%; the benchmarking order was Bid AÆBid 
D ÆBid CÆBid BÆbase case when the interest rate was 5%; the benchmarking order was 
Bid AÆBid B ÆBid DÆBid CÆbase case when the interest rate was 5.5%; the 
benchmarking order was Bid BÆBid A ÆBid DÆBid CÆbase case when the interest rate 
was 6%. Obviously, the benchmarking order changed when the interest rates changed. This 
concluded that the selection of a preferred bidding proposal was very sensitive to interest rates. 
The central policy for PPP project procurement is aimed at improving VFM by 
selecting a proper private contractor that is capable of efficiently manage risks to provide 
better NPV performance than traditional public procurement methods (Grimsey & Lewis, 
2005; Shaoul, 2005). Since VFM is demonstrated by the difference of project NPV between 
the base case and bidding proposals, the researcher promoted the fact that assumptions of risk 
parameters in the base case should be carefully set up to reflect the reality under the public 
procurement, so that the benchmarking was meaningful in choosing the preferred bidder who 
is really capable of deliver value for money. For example, the sensitivity analysis indicated 
that the long-term NPV comparison was sensitive to an interest rate. Therefore, the researcher 
proposed that the estimation of a possible range of values for risk variables to minimize 
sensitivity effects arising from the changes of a single parameter value. For example, the 
major government capital source of government is a long-term bond with a probable interest 
rates of 5.5%, and an extreme range from 5% to 6% for large-scale public infrastructure 
projects under central government policy. The researcher inferred range values for variability 
of interest rate risk variable would be close to a random triangular (5%, 5.5%, 6%) from the 
real data. Similarly, following the above principles, the parameter assumptions for other 
financial risk and non-financial risk variables are set up as range values according to real 
empirical data. SD models would then put out range values of NPV for each bidding proposal 
as a result of concurrently changing multiple parameter assumptions, which could 
accommodate the assumption changes for a single value. 
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8.9 Justification of “Univariate” Approach 
8.9.1 The Problems 
The “univariate” approach was originally proposed in the submitted PhD thesis that it used a risk 
matrix for the conversion of the 2 dimensional measures of likelihood and impact into a single measure 
of risk. This approach has the following technical limitations: 
 
1. Using a risk matrix for conversion is arbitrary and arguable. 
 
Since the expert judgment regarding risk effect measurement is very subjective, the observation 
and interpretation of the same risk factors may be inconsistent among different project experts. In 
addition, the risks involved in PPP projects are unique. There may be the same type of risk factors 
among different projects, but different likelihood and impact exist. A clear definition of risk likelihood-
impact scales are designed and tailored to reflect the specific risk characteristics of a particular project 
that may be helpful to reduce risk measurement bias. Therefore, the risk matrix used in this thesis 
research originally intended to provide the consistent definition of categorized scales with the 
corresponding numerical scales for risk likelihood-impact measures to reduce potential subjective bias 
when the project experts measured risk effects (see Appendix IV). 
However, using a risk matrix for converting two-dimension categorical data to one-dimension 
ordinal numerical data for risk effect rating seems arbitrary and arguable. For example, there will be a 
question about why is LOW PROBABILITY MEDIUM IMPACT (numerical rating: 10) in the risk 
matrix worse than VERY HIGH LIKELIHOOD LOW IMPACT (numerical rating: 11)? Even though 
the numerical ranking depends on “RF values” calculation which depends on the “numerical weights” 
which are tailored to suit a particular project (see Appendix IV), the settings of “numerical weights” are 
arbitrary and also difficult to be justified according to the project characteristics. 
 
 2. Using a risk matrix to produce ordinal data for regression analysis is unreliable. 
 
There are fundamental issues in using ordinal data for regression analysis. First, in general it 
implies the data must be interval in nature if regression ananlysis is used. There has been a continuing 
debate about whether it is legitimate to use ordinal data in parametric statistical procedures in the 
literature (see Appendix IXG). Second, the “rankings” of the ordinal values in the risk matrix are 
sensitive to the numerical scales. The different sets of numerical scales produce different weights   220
which produce different rankings in the risk matrix (see Section 2.1, Appendix IX). Since the ordinal 
values produced by the risk matrix are critical input to the regression analysis, there will be a 
fundamental error in the analytical process for the use of regression. 
Most of the literature simply used the two-dimensional risk matrix for prioritising or categorising 
the importance of risk factors only. It seems to be unsupported by any extensive literature or research 
that using a risk matrix for the conversion of the 2 dimensional measures of likelihood and impact into 
a single measure of risk, especially the issue that impact and probability are not commensurate 
dimensions. Thus, a “multivariate (bivariate)” approach using a two-dimensional independent set of 
values for probability and impact was undertaken to examine if it can resolve some of the concerns 
about the use of ordinal nature of data for regression. 
8.9.2 A Statistical Analysis 
As shown in Appendix IX, a statistical analysis was performed to examine the reliability and 
appropriateness of “univariate” and “multivariate (bivariate)” approaches in the use of regression by 
testing the sensitivity of risk relationships (including both ordinal and ratio relationships) to the 
numerical scales. It was performed from two different perspectives: “single-observed data (sample size 
/ number of project experts = 1)” and “multiple-observed data (sample size / number of project experts 
= 37 in this thesis research)”, because this provided us with an insight to clarify and justify reliability 
and appropriateness in using both approaches for regression analysis. 
As a result, when data are based on “single-observed data”, the statistical analysis appears that the 
ordinal and ratio relationships are very sensitive to the numerical scales regardless of which approaches 
are used to measure risks. As data are based on “multiple-observed data”, the ordinal and ratio 
relationships are consistent among different sets of numerical scales at 95% confidence level if 
“univariate” approach is used. On the contrast, as data are based on “multiple-observed data”, the 
ordinal and ratio relationships are inconsistent among different sets of numerical scales at 95% 
confidence level if “multivariate (bivariate)” approach is used. 
8.9.3 Summary 
From the results of this statistical analysis (see Appendix IX), we can draw the following 
conclusions:    221
1.  Both the “univariate” and “multivariate (bivariate)” approaches are inappropriate in the use 
of regression in the circumstance of “single-observed data (sample size/number of project 
experts = 1)”. That is because the individual outcomes are easily subject to the numerical 
scales. Using different sets of numerical scales will change both ordinal and ratio 
relationships of risk factors. 
2.  The “univariate” approach is not supported by any extensive literature and has potential 
technical limitations on converting two conceptually distinct dimensions (Impact and 
Probability) into one single measure, but the “univariate” statistical analysis  supports the 
data are reliable in the use of regression in some circumstances (see Appendix IX). First, the 
data from conversion and expert judgment are arbitrary and arguable, but they have face 
validity. Second, using ordinal data in parametric statistical procedures has drawn much 
debate in the literature. However, this has received wide range of acceptance. It is used not 
only in psychology and marketing researches but also in other areas. Many researches have 
noted that the ordinal data can be treated as interval data in parametric statistical procedures 
under certain conditions. The “univariate” approach can generally meet these conditions for 
the use of regression (see Appendix IXG). Third, the rankings of the ordinal values in the 
risk matrix are sensitive to the numerical scales, but the “univariate” statistical analysis (see 
Appendix IX) appears that this effect will be reduced as sample size (number of project 
expects) increases. As the sample size increases, the standard error of the mean decreases 
and hence the data characteristics in terms of expected risk effect values (mean values), 
ordinal and ratio relationships among different sets of numerical scales remain consistent. 
Therefore, the “univariate” approach is reliable in the use of regression in the circumstance 
of “multiple-observed data (sample size / number of project expert = 37 in this thesis 
research)”. 
3.  The “multivariate (bivariate)” statistical analysis (see Appendix IX) has shown that the data 
characteristics in terms of expected risk effect values (mean values), ordinal and ratio 
relationships among different sets of numerical scales don’t come up with consistent results 
at α=0.05 significance (95% confidence level) in the circumstance of “multiple-observed 
data.”  Because of the technical problem that impact and probability are not commensurate 
dimensions, the compounding data variation respectively arisen from each of the “Impact”   222
and “Likelihood” scale values will become a greater data variation which have a great effect 
on mean values. As the sample size (the number of project experts) increases, this doesn’t 
greatly contribute to reduction of the sensitivity of risk ordinal and ratio relationships to 
numerical scales. In addition, most of the literature simply used the two-dimensional scales 
(impact and probability) for prioritising or categorising the importance of risk factors, rather 
than for the use of regression. Therefore, the “multivariate (bivariate)” approach is not 
reliable and not recommended in the use of regression. 
4.  Due to some potential technical limitations in the proposed “univariate” approach, the 
System Dynamics (SD) model itself may well be based on some slightly suspect data, and so 
the conclusions this thesis research has drawn may not be 100% reliable. Since the SD model 
testing results (Chapter 8) are generally acceptable, the problems of the proposed 
“univariate” approach do not detract from the basic structural validity of the SD model or 
affect the fundaments of the methodology that are proposing in the rest of the thesis. This 
thesis research suggests that the future researchers look into the numerical-scale problems 
concerning risk measurement and may attempt to solve problems for the legitimate use of 
ordinal data in parametric statistical procedures.     
 
8.10 Justification of the expert judgment 
Expert judgment seeks to reflect the range of credible scientific judgments (Hora & Jensen, 
2002). Technical knowledge, experience, and judgment ability play critical roles to define good experts. 
Technical knowledge refers to an understanding of the body of literature for the problem of interest. 
Experience and judgment refers to the ability to integrate information and theories beyond the reported 
data (Hetes & Richmond, 2009). 
However, motivational bias arises when experts may frequently have direct or indirect vested 
interests in influencing the outcome to the question at hand. Their judgments may be influenced by 
motivational bias, whether consciously or unconsciously (McAndrew et al., 2009; Pronin et al., 2004.). 
The stakes may be clear or subtler in some cases. For example, in the former cases, the outcome of a 
question may impact employment or investments; in the latter cases the professional reputation of a 
particular expert may be associated with a particular point of view or theory, making it difficult to 
express an alternative perspective (Morgan & Henrion, 1990).   223
Motivational bias is perhaps difficult to identify and manage, but it can be reduced through 
appropriate approaches for the selection of experts (Hillson & Hulett, 2004). The selection of experts is 
critical to the success of expert judgment. Not only can a suitable approach help to identify and chose 
experts who span the range of credible views, but it can help to reduce motivational biases (Cooke, 
2004). A number of approaches have been cited in the literature for nominating and selecting the 
experts. The common principles on the selection of experts are (Cooke, 2004; Keeney & Winterfeldt, 
1991; Keith, 1996; Macgill et al., 2000; Morgan & Henrion, 1990; Rosqvist, 2003; USNRC, 1996; 
USEPA, 2009; USEPA, 2006): 
(a)  Multiple disciplines: The selection of experts should seek to ensure diversity in background. 
If experts are selected from multiple legitimate perspectives and relevant expertise to 
address the questions, the expert judgment will indicate of the range of plausible opinions.  
(b)  Technical balance: The selection of experts should seek to ensure that their disciplines can 
be represented equitably. This includes institutional or stakeholder balance. The balance of 
views can help to avoid or reduce potential motivational bias due to specific vested interests. 
(c)  Transparent process: For highly influential problems that are likely to attract controversy, 
transparency in the selection process is essential to help establish that the selection of 
experts can be done carefully to represent the range of credible viewpoints and to reduce 
the opportunity that will choose a highly influential expert with the vested interests. One 
possible principle is to use a transparent process with public comments for the nomination 
process. 
(d)  Independent peer review: Another selection principle is to employ an independent peer 
review group. Independence means that the participants in the peer review group have no 
vested interests in choosing an expert. The outside groups are allowed to participate in the 
expert selection process by accepting nominations from the public for consideration. This 
principle can reduce the motivational bias arisen from the influential stakeholders who will 
try to choose an expert with the judgment towards their viewpoint. 
 
The researcher conducted interview surveys (see Appendix II) and questionnaire surveys (see 
Appendix IV) to collect information on the risk scenarios and risk effects of the THSR project from the 
project experts. Those experts were from a cross section of disciplines and stakeholders that covers all   224
area of interest on the 52 risks described in chapter 4. They had ever participated in THSR project and 
had wide experiences on mass transit projects that were similar to THSR project. They were the senior 
members of the THSR project authority, Bureau of High Speed Rail (BHSR), and the project financing 
institute, International Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), which included project managers and 
project teams, discipline engineers, commercial specialists, safety and environmental specialists, 
contract managers, financial specialists, and the like. The experts were selected based on multiple 
disciplines and technical balance principles addressed in the aforementioned point (a) and (b) to ensure 
that the expert judgment employed in the data collection reflected the range of credible scientific views. 
The researcher proposed a Bid Evaluation Panel to account for the expert judgment in 
evaluating the bidding proposals (see Section 7.1.2 and Table 7.1.2). The Bid Evaluation Panel 
members should follow the regulation Government Procurement Act set forth by the government 
procurement authority, Public Construction Commission, Executive Yuan, Taiwan, ROC, to selecting 
an appropriate group of experts. It states that a panel selected to participate in evaluation and selection 
of a preferred bidding proposal should include individuals who:  
(i) have possessed and demonstrated the necessary knowledge and expertise on procurement 
matter; (ii) shall be appointed within or outside the entity. Among them, at least one third of 
the total number shall be outside experts or scholars; (iii) shall be selected from a 
recommended list complied by the responsible entity acting together with the Ministry of 
Education, the Ministry of Examination and other relevant entities. The recommended list 
shall be made public on the Information network; (iv) shall not be selected for interests of 
specific suppliers. The same experts or scholars shall be avoided for different procurements 
(PCC, 2007). 
 
The motivational bias may be difficult to identify and manage, but it can be reduced through 
appropriate approaches for the selection of experts. The above selection condition (i) and (ii) represent 
a broad diversity of independent opinions; condition (iii) represents the fact that the experts are selected 
through a transparent process by the independent peer review group; condition (iv) represents the fact 
that the direct vested interests can be avoided. All of these conditions conform to the aforementioned  
principles (a)-(d) for the selection of experts which are designed to reduce the motivational bias.  
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Chapter 9 Conclusions 
 
 
9.1 Summary of Research Findings 
Due to the impacts of financial difficulties, technical inefficiency, incorrect pricing, and poor 
quality of services under traditional public procurement, large-scale infrastructure project procurement 
officials began turning to the private sector in the 1980s. Officials of public sector engaging the private 
sector infrastructure financing and operations are expected to mitigate risks, save costs, improve 
innovation and services and enhance revenues, employment and economic growth (The World Bank, 
1999b).This approach is called public-private partnership (PPP) and is defined as “a cooperative 
venture between the public and private sectors, built on the expertise of each partner, that best meets 
clearly defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards” 
(Kernaghan, 1993). Value for Money (VFM) is a core objective of the PPP projects. The VFM concept 
refers to the optimal combination of whole life costs and benefits of the project under consideration to 
meet the users requirement; it does not simply mean the lowest costs or cheapest price (HM Treasury, 
2004; United Nations, 2002). By PPP arrangement, risks are transferred and allocated to the party who 
is the most capable of managing them in a cost effective manner. This requires the optimization of risk 
allocation between public and private sector in order to achieve the best VFM. Many researchers have 
revealed in previous studies that a critical contributor to the success of a PPP project is the selection of 
the right private-sector partner, the concessionaire, who would provide the best overall performance 
and value throughout the PPP development process (Aziz, 2007; Chan et al., 2001; Zhang, 2005). 
However, many common issues concerning the current contractor selection methods for PPP projects 
are learned from literature survey below:  
1.  The current concessionaire-selection methods are not based on risk assessment. The PPP 
infrastructure projects, such as build-operate-transfer (BOT) transportation projects, are 
usually very complex with highly dynamic and interdependent risks and uncertainties over a 
long-term project life cycle (Reilly, 2005). Based on this fact, the risk assessment is critical 
for the PPP project procurement (Dey & Ogunlana, 2004) in order to select a proper project 
partner and examine the project VFM performance.   226
2.  The current concessionaire-selection methods usually lack the global perspective of project 
life cycle. The risk problems of cost, schedule, quality, and the like dynamically reflect over 
the whole project life cycle. For example, many evaluators focus on the construction stage 
only, excluding the project design and operation phase. They are therefore unable to supply 
data on the project performance over the whole project life cycle (The Scottish Government, 
2005). 
These issues lead to the first research question: What are the generic types of risks inherent in the 
PPP transport projects over the life of the project? The researcher needed to investigate what kinds of 
risk factors including both quantitative and qualitative data would impact project performance over the 
construction and operation phases. 
3.  The current concessionaire-selection methods usually do not address interdependently 
dynamic and non-linear risk interactions. In reality, the risks of a mega PPP project are 
interdependent on each other with nonlinear relationships over the long-term project life cycle 
(Williams, 2002). However, based on current practices evaluators assume risk factors are 
independent. “Ignoring or underestimating correlations between variables will tend to 
understate the variance of outcome” (Balcombe & Smith, 1999) so that this could eventually 
lead to wrong judgments on the overall project risk estimates. 
This issue leads to the second research question: How can the interdependencies and interactions 
of risk events be modeled over PPP project life cycle? The researcher needed to explore and model the 
interrelationships of risks.  
4.  The concessionaire-selection methods are normally unable to deal with semi-structured or 
unstructured real world problems. The domain problems for a large-scale infrastructure 
concern finance, technology, economy, contract management, organization, politics, 
regulation, and the like which are heterogeneous, structured, and also unstructured. For 
example, current methods incorporating the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) were criticized by 
experts that these methods were difficult in nature to quantify non-monetary terms (Mackie et 
al., 2003). 
This issue leads to the third and fourth research questions, respectively: How can the qualitative 
risk effects be quantified while using CBA for cash flow analysis? How can the risk interrelationships 
be quantified? The researcher needed to infer mathematic equations for risk interrelationships.   227
5.  Officials using the current concessionaire-selection methods usually ignore the uncertainty of 
outcomes. In the current practices for bids comparison officials also ignore the dispersion of 
outcomes and depend on deterministic outcomes only. Minor changes in the underlying 
assumption will cause the model to yield completely different results (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002, 
2005; Ye & Tiong, 2000). Therefore, the PSC in terms of risk cost estimates is intended to be 
so subjective that it can be easily manipulated (Blyth, 2002; Shaoul, 2005;Turner, 2003). It is 
necessary to move from single value estimates to range values estimates for PPP infrastructure 
projects (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Reilly, 2005; Reilly & Brown, 2004;).  
This issue leads to the fifth, sixth and seventh research questions, respectively: How can the 
probability distribution of risk effects be estimated? How can the probability distribution of overall 
project NPV be estimated with compounding both downside and beneficial effects over project life? 
How can range values of project NPV be compared to rank bidding proposals? The researcher needed 
to estimate probability distribution of both exogenous risk variables and the overall project NPV. The 
researcher needed to apply suitable decision rules to rank range values of NPV between bidding 
proposals as well. 
Table 9.1 shows the research questions, research answers/findings with related reliability, and 
validity processing to ensure research answers/findings are reliable and accurate to all of the research 
questions. 
To address the first research question: What are the generic risks inherent over a PPP project 
life? the research performed a literature review and survey to investigate the generic PPP project risk 
factors that would influence project performance. The 52 generic risk factors presented were drawn 
from the current empirical studies and official publications, which included journal articles, conference 
papers, research reports, textbooks, commercial or organizational documents, governments practice 
guidance, records, reports, and the like. The 52 generic risk factors were collected and identified 
through cross-checking the multiple sources of evidence, and were well defined and documented to 
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Table 9.1 The Research Results for 7-Research Questions32 
Research Questions  Research Answers/ Findings  Reliability and Validity 
1.  What are the generic types 
of risks inherent in a PPP 
project over project life? 
52 generic risk factors  • Cross-checking the multiple 
sources of evidence  
• Well defined risk factors 
• Well documented data 
2.  How can we model the 
interdependencies and 
interactions of risk events 
over the PPP project life?  
52 causal loop diagrams  • Cross-checking the multiple 
sources of evidence 
• Boundary adequacy test and 
model structure assessment 
• Well documented data 
3.  How can we quantify the 
qualitative risk effects? 
37 samples for risk effect 
rating  
• Well defined questionnaire and 
risk effect rating scales 
• Well documented data 
4.  How can we estimate the 
probability distribution of 
risk effects? 
13 fitted theoretical 
probability distribution of 
exogenous risk variables. 
• The Probability Plot/P-P plot /Q-
Q plot 
• Anderson-Darling statistic or Chi-
Sq statistic tests 
5.  How can we quantify the 
risk interrelationships? 
31 multiple-regression models  • Residual plots  
• R-sq and p-values statistic tests 
6.  How can we estimate the 
probability distribution of 
overall project NPV with 
compounding both 
downside and beneficial 
effects over project life? 
A NPV time profile with 95% 
confidence interval  
• Behaviour Reproduction Test 
• Monte-Carlo multi-variant 
Sensitivity Analysis 
• Extreme Conditions tests, etc. 
7.  How can we compare range 
values of project NPV to 
rank bidding proposals? 
Project ranking methods 
including Mean-
variance/Mean-semi variance, 
Stochastic Dominance, and the 
Expected-loss Ratio 




  To address the second research question: How can the interdependencies and interactions of 
risk events be modeled over PPP project life cycle? the researcher explored and modeled the risk 
interdependencies and interactions using literature surveys and an interview survey. The multiple-case 
scenarios were investigated from literature for each of generic risk factors including the direct cause 
variables, direct consequence variables and immediate variables to form 52 causal loop diagrams (CLD) 
that addressed interdependencies and interactions for each risk factor. By interviewing the project 
experts and key participants, the researcher cross-checked and confirmed the CLDs drawn and 
constructed from multiple-case scenarios against THSR facts to ensure reliability and validity. The 
CLDs were modified and transformed into quantitative stock-flow diagrams by System Dynamics 
modelling to address dynamic risk interactions over project concession period. The researcher 
conducted model validation using boundary adequacy tests and structure assessment tests to ensure the 
risk variables that were used to address the direct cause and consequence in a causal loop diagram, the   229
exogenous and endogenous risk-variables, and the risk variables in a feedback loop, and the like were 
well-defined in order to meet the output purpose of SD model for a rail transit PPP project. 
To address the third research question: How can the qualitative risk effects be quantified? the 
researcher measured and quantified risk effects using results from a questionnaire survey and expert 
judgment. The questionnaires were sent to project experts and key participants to measure and rate the 
expected risk effects of qualitative risk events as risk effect scaled from 1 to 25. The 37 samples for 
risk effect rating were collected. The questionnaire is included in this dissertation with the standardized 
two-dimension matrix and clear scale definitions used to reduce ambiguity and inconsistency arising 
from subjective expert judgment. Moreover, the researcher detected the outliers of sampled data by 
conducting residual plots to reduce measure errors. All of these measures ensured data collected from 
questionnaire survey was reliable and valid in order to be used to address the expected risk effects for a 
rail transit PPP project. 
To address the fourth research question: How can the risk interrelationships be quantified? the 
researcher inferred and quantified risk interdependencies and interactions by multiple-regression 
analysis. The multiple-regression models were used to represent the equations of risk interrelationships 
addressed in the causal loop diagrams and stock-flow diagrams for research question 2. The researcher 
performed a set of residual plots to check the model adequacy assumptions. The R
2 and p values 
statistics were used to explore if the model could explain variability and would fit the data well. The 
researcher performed these calculations to ensure that multiple regression models can validly represent 
risk interrelationships of a rail transit PPP project. 
To address the fifth research question: How can the probability distribution of the expected 
risk effects (the exogenous variables) be estimated? the researcher estimated the probability 
distribution of the expected risk effects by probability fitting. The probability plot, P-P plot or Q-Q plot 
with Anderson-Darling statistic or Chi-square statistics were conducted by the researcher to discern 
whether the data would follow the specified theoretical distribution to ensure data validity for the 
probability distribution of the expected risk effects for the Taiwan high speed rail project. 
To address the sixth research question: How can the probability distribution of overall project 
NPV be estimated with compounding both downside and beneficial effects over project life? the 
researcher estimated the probability distribution of project NPV with overall compounding downside 
and beneficial effects over project life using System Dynamics modelling and Monte Carlo simulation.   230
The researcher used a risk network model applying System Dynamics techniques to estimate risk 
interaction effects on NPV over time. The researcher used another SD model built on the risk network 
model to estimate the beneficial effects of bidding proposals on NPV over time and to see how 
efficiently the risk effects can be reduced and the NPV performance can be improved. Then the 
researcher input the multiple-regression models for research question 4 and probability distribution for 
research question 5 into the SD model. By performing Monte Carlo simulation, the probability 
distribution of the overall NPV with compounding both downside and beneficial effects over project 
concessionaire period was estimated. The entire SD models were examined by a set of tests including 
behaviour reproduction test, Monte-Carlo, multi-variant sensitivity analysis, and extreme conditions 
tests, and the like to ensure model validity that was applicable to a rail transit PPP project. 
To address the seventh research question: How can the range values of project NPV be 
compared to rank bidding proposals? the researcher examined suitable decision methods gained from 
the literature survey including mean-variance/mean semi variance, stochastic dominance and expected-
loss ratio to compare range values of NPV among different bidding proposals. The current studies by 
Oryczak, (2000, 2003), Park and Sharp-Bette (1990), Rich (2003), and Ye and Tiong (2000) were 
addressed in Chapter 3, and provided information to the researcher on each of the risky project 
comparison methods. Each method had specific advantages and disadvantages, which depended on the 
conditions of NPV probability distribution and project clients risk utility (risk-averse, risk-neutral, or 
risk seeking) in order to select a preferred bidding proposal. The researcher suggested using mean-
variance/mean-semi variance to rank bidding proposals if the NPV probability distribution was close to 
a normal distribution, otherwise stochastic dominance was suggested. The researcher determined that if 
these two approaches could not determine the best proposal from all of bidding proposals, then 
expected loss ratio can be used as a tool to help a project manager make a final decision in bidding 
proposals ranking.  
The objective of the thesis research is to develop a theoretical approach that is able to solve 
the common issues of the current PPP project concessionaire selection methods. The developed 
theoretical approach can build a decision support model that is specific to a particular PPP project for 
the public sector to choose a concessionaire which is capable of creating value for money.  
The thesis research relies on analytical generalization (generalize theories) to a broader theory 
on the PPP project concessionaire selection rather than statistical generalization (enumerate frequencies)   231
to the PPP project populations or universes. By aggregating these validated small-N research methods, 
a broad and complete theoretical approach can be formed to answer all of research questions (Flyvbjerg, 
2006; Jacobs, 1961; Yin, 2003). The thesis research has generated conclusions from Table 9.1 suggest 
that each research finding (research answer) had resulted from each of small-six research methods and 
was reliable and valid to each corresponding research question through processing. Since the proposed 
theoretical approach can solve the common issues (see Table 9.1 for the seven research questions) of 
the current project concessionaire selection methods regardless of the type of PPP projects, it can be 
reasonably concluded that the developed theoretical approach aggregated by six research methods is 
applicable to any type of PPP projects. The Taiwan High Speed Rail project was applied to 
demonstrate SD decision model. The SD model developed by the proposed theoretical approach has 
been validated by a variety of tests (see chapter 8). It was showed that the SD model can properly 
function to represent the reality behaviour of the THSR project. Since the proposed theoretical 
approach can solve the common issues of the current PPP project concessionaire selection methods, it 
can build a decision support model that is specific to a particular PPP project for the public sector to 
choose a concessionaire which is capable of creating value for money. 
The proposed theoretical approach aggregated by six research methods is summarized below: 
1.  Investigate the generic risk factors: Find out the generic risk factors that have downside 
effects on a specific type of PPP project performance during concession period by literature 
survey from the current studies. 
2.  Model causal loop diagrams: Model and interpret the risk interdependencies and interactions 
of a risk network by literature survey, interview survey, and System Dynamics modelling 
techniques. 
3.  Estimate risk effect and probability: Measure and quantify qualitative risk effects through a 
questionnaire survey by the group of expert judgments. Estimate risk effect probability 
distribution by probability fitting. 
4.  Formulate the functional relations of risk variables for risk network modelling by multiple-
regression analysis. 
5.  Estimate overall NPV probability distribution: Model the compounding effects arising from 
both downside feedback loop of a project risk network and beneficial feedback loop of a   232
bidding proposal over project life by System Dynamics modelling techniques; estimate the 
probability distribution of project NPV time-profile by running Monte Carlo simulation. 
6.  Apply decision theories to compare NPV range values: Investigate and apply appropriate 
decision methods and stochastic analysis to compare the probability distribution of NPV 
among the bidding proposals by literature survey, and then apply these methods to help the 
decision-makers to select a preferred bidding proposal. 
 
 
9.2 Strengths and Contributions 
With the research, the researcher provided significant contributions in PPP project 
procurement in the following distinct areas: 
1.  Many researchers mentioned that the risk events of a PPP project are interdependent  over 
project life cycle. Sterman (1992) stated that a large-scale construction project that is complex 
and has highly dynamic and interdependent risks and uncertainties over long-term project life 
cycle. Williams (2002) also mentioned that the risk usually interact each other with nonlinear 
relationships over time in a complex project. Dey and Ogunlana (2004) contended that there is 
a need to analyze risk interactions of complex infrastructure projects such as build-operate-
transfer (BOT) projects over their long-term project life.  
In modern approaches to PPP project risk management, experts assume risk factors 
are independent and ignore the risk interaction effects over project life cycle, so the project 
risks cannot be effectively managed and controlled. For example, the risk assessment 
approaches such as cost estimate validation process (CEVP) proposed by officials of the 
Washington State Department of Transport (Reilly et al., 2004), value for money (VFM) 
assessment guidance proposed by the officials of the UK government (HM Treasury, 2004), 
and public sector comparator-technical note proposed by the Australia government officials 
(Partnerships Victoria, 2001; Partnerships Victoria, 2003) employ Excel spreadsheet to 
analyze project risk costs. In all of these approaches, officials presume project risks are 
independent and therefore do not assess the interaction effects. 
The researcher developed causal loop diagrams to address the cause-effect 
interrelationship between risk variables discussed in Chapter 4. The researcher also conducted   233
the multiple-regression analysis outlined in Chapter 6 to quantify the functional risk 
interrelationships over PPP project life cycle and developed a SD model to assess the risk 
interaction effects on project net present value (NPV) over project life cycle. The goal of the 
researcher was to develop a model to assist project managers in identifying where the 
significant risks are in a project and how these risks can be controlled and mitigated. 
2.  Shaoul (2002,  2005) stated that officials using the current VFM methods based on the 
discounted cash-flow analysis should not forget to address the non-financial risk issues such 
as technical obsolescence, changing regulation and demand.  
Experts using current PPP project cash flow analysis approaches only focus on 
financial risk-factors and ignore the effects of non-financial risk-factors on project cash flow 
so the real costs are underestimated (Zhang, 2004). For example, Liou and Huang (2008) 
reported on their automated approach to negotiations of BOT contracts and Deng (2004) cited 
expert and decision support system for the project financing and cash flow management of 
large-scale infrastructure projects only take financial risk into account without non-financial 
risk thinking. 
The researcher has developed an approach to quantify the effects of non-financial 
risk factors on project NPV over project life cycle, so the overall project NPV can be assessed 
in reality. 
3.  Grimsey and Lewis (2005) summarized the criticisms from studies by Broadbent et al. (2003), 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2003), Heald (2003) and Shaoul (2005) which outlined that current 
approaches for PPP project comparison using a single point estimate will cause the model to 
give completely different results when minor changes are made in the underlying assumption 
when the two alternatives are reasonably close together. Current researchers, including Blyth 
(2002), Grismsey and Lewis (2005) and Reilly (2005) proposed that it is necessary to move 
from single value estimates to range values estimates for PPP infrastructure project 
comparisons on the grounds that the spread of values highlights the volatility of the project 
and introduces risk exposure into the PPP evaluation. This provides a meaningful evaluation 
judgment. 
The researcher has developed an approach to estimate the probability distribution of 
overall project outcomes with impact from compounding downside and benefit effects, which   234
evaluate the dispersion of outcomes rather than deterministic outcomes, so that it provides the 
whole range of project outcomes for bid comparison with less bias. 
 
9.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Although the Taiwan high speed rail (THSR) was applied to demonstrate the SD model 
developed by the proposed theoretical approach, the researcher still lacked some real data. Due to 
commercial confidentiality, the public sector officials of THSR were not allowed to disclose any data 
in terms of cost. For example, the researcher could not obtain bidding proposals with bidding costs and 
project cash flow during construction stage. Most of data in terms of cost obtained by the researcher 
heavily relied on the current literature and this data was limited. The researcher used hypothetical data 
to model risk-reduction effects of bidding proposals. Without comparing simulation results against real 
data, there is inadequate evidence to support the position that the model can properly function to 
represent reality. As a result, the model validation for bidding proposal modelling is very limited. 
Therefore, applying a case with sufficient real data in the future research to test the concessionaire 
selection model developed by the proposed theoretical approach is suggested.  
 The researcher investigated the soft (human factor) effect at the organizational level (i.e., poor 
cooperation/coordination between parties) rather than at the personal level (i.e., philosophical factors 
such as de-motivation and physical factors such as exhaustion). Traditionally, the soft effects are 
investigated to improve performance in project management. For example, multiple design changes in 
a software development project will lead to de-motivation and exhaustion in the software designers. 
The project manager may want to estimate effects these issues would have on the design and 
engineering department of a software project company. Risk allocation is the focus of the thesis 
research. Risk allocation is very different from the traditional project risk management model. Under 
the PPP arrangement, the public sector officials seek those risks that are suitably under the control of 
the private party. The private party officials need to submit a bidding proposal to the public sector 
officials to demonstrate how they are capable of managing risks that are transferred from the public 
sector. The objective of the thesis research is to develop a theoretical approach in building a decision 
model for the PPP project concessionaire selection. This process started with exploring generic risk 
factors from the literature survey. The literature survey indicated that generic risks that would affect a 
large-scale construction project do not include the soft (human factor) effect at the personal level (i.e.,   235
philosophical factors such as de-motivation, and physical factors such as exhaustion) which are usually 
investigated to improve performance in the traditional project management (see Appendix I). Only soft 
effects at the organizational level (i.e., poor cooperation/coordination between parties) are discussed. 
For example, the literature, specifically EC (2002) and Lu (2004), indicated that the soft effect such as 
poor cooperation/coordination between parties at the organizational level would critically affect PPP 
performance. This is an indication that the soft effect at the organizational level, instead of the personal 
level is a critical issue. The human factors of de-motivation and exhaustion at the personal level occur 
in people affiliated with either the private or the public sector. The public sector officials or the private 
party officials may be capable of managing these issues. Thus, these soft issues are excluded in the risk 
allocation. The organization risk (i.e., poor cooperation/coordination between parties) has been 
summarized in Table 4.1.3 and addressed in Appendix V21 and Appendix VI21. 
In addition to the detrimental soft factors that are addressed in chapter 4 and 6 and Appendix 
V and VI, the beneficial soft factors relevant to the project management capability are addressed in 
chapter 7. In the thesis research, there are two stages used to build a systems dynamic (SD) decision 
model for PPP concessionaire selection. In chapter 6, a system dynamic model was developed to 
estimate project downside effects. In addition to the downside effect model built in chapter 6, 
additional system dynamic models for bidding proposal modelling were developed in chapter 7 to 
evaluate the beneficial effects arising from the risk control and management schemes in a bidding 
proposal. Integrating both models creates a decision model used to select a preferred PPP 
concessionaire. A bidding proposal is used to identify the project risk management capabilities of the 
private party, which would include the beneficial soft factors such as leadership, design and 
construction quality control, configuration control, staff training, and so forth. These beneficial soft 
factors are used to reduce the downside effects of a PPP project. Because of lack of real data, the 
researcher used hypothetical data to model risk-reduction effects of bidding proposals. As for the future 
research, using real data of bidding proposals to explore the efficiency of beneficial soft factors on 
project risk control and management is suggested. 
The researcher tried Bayesian analysis with two-dimensional measures for risk network 
modelling for Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR) project. Fifty-two risk events have been identified in 
risk network modelling. This would involve pair wise measures to identify conditional probability 
P(A|B) among 52 risk events for joint distribution for Bayesian analysis. It would possibly need   236
numbers of measures of approximately 2704 (52C2 × 2 + 52 = 2704) in a questionnaire survey. Too 
many questions in a questionnaire survey will not be supported or proposed in most of the literature 
(Groves et al., 2004). Moreover, the qualitative risk events are almost heterogeneous so that it is 
difficult to directly estimate the relative effect and conditional probability. During thesis research, the 
researcher tried a pre-test to ask project experts to evaluate the conditional probability among some 
heterogeneous risks. Most of the project experts were not able to answer questions. It seemed that the 
Bayesian analysis with two-dimensional measures had no advantage over one-dimensional measures 
for THSR project. However, the risks involved in PPP projects are unique (Li & Zou, 2008). It is 
unclear if the technical difficulties on measuring relative effect and conditional probability for 
Bayesian analysis in a risk network modelling for other PPP projects will be the same as THSR project. 
Therefore, the future researchers can compare the results of risk network modelling by Bayesian 
analysis with two-dimensional measures with one-dimensional measures proposed by the thesis 
research for other PPP projects.  
Cost benefit analysis (CBA) is typically used by government officials to evaluate investment 
feasibility for public projects. Benefits and costs are often expressed in money terms, and are adjusted 
for time value of money. The researcher applied CBA with the discounted cash-flow analysis and risk 
analysis to calculate NPV, which is the single criteria to measure and compare project economic 
efficiency over time among the bidding proposals. The accuracy of the outcome of a CBA depends on 
how accurately costs and benefits have been estimated. Some benefits cannot be readily monetized. 
Although the researcher has developed a technique to quantify costs and benefits in monetary term, 
project experts are still relied upon to measure costs and benefits. That is the accuracy of NPV that 
estimated by CBA is heavily subject to project experts. The cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) is 
another form of economic analysis for project investment that compares the relative costs and 
outcomes (effects) of two or more project proposals. The CEA often incorporates multi-criteria 
decision making (MCDA) to weigh multiple outcomes in obtaining a single composite measure. 
Although the use of MCDA relies on subjective decision, it avoids inaccuracy problems on monetizing 
costs and benefits when these are difficult to be monetized. In the future research, it would be 
beneficial to compare the results of ranking project bidding proposals by CBA with CEA.  
   As addressed in the Section 2.3.3, the performance based payment (PBP) mechanism is an 
important source of assurance to the public sector members that the private sector parties are meeting   237
the obligations to deliver services. The PBP mechanism should include appropriate incentives for the 
private sector members to deliver the service in a manner that gives the best value, and promotes 
partnership working. In the thesis research, the transportation project THSR was the case used to 
develop PPP contractor selection methodology. Since the revenues of a transportation project are 
provided by the end users instead of the public sector, the developed methodology did not include PBP 
for THSR project in the research. There was no incentives mechanism. Therefore, a future researchers 
may investigate different types of PPP projects as compared to transportation projects, (e.g., the 
healthcare or education projects that will need to include PBP). Future researchers may attempt to 
model payment and incentive mechanisms and discover how these mechanisms will affect the project 
performance.  
This thesis research proposed a “univariate approach” that used a risk matrix for the conversion 
of the 2 dimensional measures of likelihood and impact into a single measure of risk. This approach is 
not supported by any extensive literature and has potential technical limitations. First, the data from the 
conversion of a risk matrix and expert judgment are arbitrary and arguable. For example, there will be a 
question about why is LOW PROBABILITY MEDIUM IMPACT (numerical rating: 10) in the risk 
matrix worse than VERY HIGH LIKELIHOOD LOW IMPACT (numerical rating: 11)? Even though 
the numerical ranking depends on “RF values” calculation which depends on the “numerical weights” 
which are tailored to suit a particular project (see Appendix IV), the settings of “numerical weights” are 
arbitrary and also difficult to be justified according to the project characteristics. Second, using ordinal 
data in parametric statistical procedures has drawn much debate in the literature. In general, the data 
must be interval in nature if regression analysis is used. Third, the rankings of the ordinal values in the 
risk matrix are sensitive to the numerical scales. The different sets of numerical scales produce 
different weights which produce different rankings in the risk matrix (see Section 2.1, Appendix IX). 
Even if the statistical analysis appeared that the “univariate” approach may work in some 
circumstances (see Appendix IX) , the System Dynamics (SD) model itself may be based on some 
slightly suspect data, and so the conclusions this thesis research has drawn may not be 100% reliable 
due to these potential technical limitations. This thesis research suggests that the future researchers can 
look into the numerical-scale problems concerning risk measurement and may attempt to solve 
problems for the legitimate use of ordinal data in parametric statistical procedures.   238
Since there were no real data in terms of qualitative risk effects, many parameter values in the 
SD model were heavily relied on the interviewees (the project experts). Thus the accuracy and error of 
SD model might be greatly subject to the interviewees. For example, the SD model reported the result 
that the estimate of key output variable “construction delay percentage” was 18.63% for mean, 0.08% 
for standard deviation, and (18.47%, 18.78%) for a 95% confidence interval. The forecast error was 
approximately 0.22%, which represented a small discrepancy between the simulated and real data. This 
remarkable result on low estimation error was checked and analysed in Appendix X to find out why SD 
model reported a low standard deviation and low forecast error for the percentage of construction delay. 
As explained in Appendix X, this is because the data obtained from the interviewees set up a tight 
range value between “the maximum time delay effect” and “the minimum time delay effect” of a risk 
event on a work package. “The maximum time delay effect” and “the minimum time delay effect” are 
two of the key parameters that affect the output values of risk variable “construction delay”. The 
smaller range values between “the maximum time delay effect” and “the minimum time delay effect”, 
the smaller variation in the output values of “construction delay”. This interprets that the low standard 
deviation and low forecast error in the output values of “construction delay” are the result of tight range 
values between “the maximum time delay effect” and “the minimum time delay effect” provided by the 
interviewees. This case reflects that the risk effect values of qualitative risk factors such as “resource 
unavailable” and “ownership change” have to depend on the interviewees’ estimation and hence the 
model outcomes may greatly be constrained to reflect SD model’s real forecasting capacity. 
To enhance the model validity, the model parameters needed to be calibrated (Lyneis, 2008) 
by tracing and comparing the simulation results with the real project data in the future, particularly with 
data concerning the operation stage which would normally be lacking in most large-scale PPP projects. 
As for the behaviour reproduction tests addressed in chapter 8, the researcher can only evaluate the 
model forecasting capability in average daily ridership in 2007 because the THSR project has only 
been in operation since January 2007. The related parameters to average daily ridership should be 
modified every applicable period to ensure that the time profile of model outcome is consistent with the 
reality. 
Although the researcher has established that the theoretical approach has proved to be valid in 
building a decision support model for PPP project concessionaire selection, this theory still requires 
further research to assure its realistic representation. A field investigation with PPP project managers   239
for an overview evaluation on usability in terms of technical view, economic view, organisational view, 
and legal view to examine whether the proposed approach is practical in concessionaire selection for 
the public sector would be necessary. The technical view refers to evaluate the ease to use methods and 
tools of the proposed theoretical approach to build a decision support model for PPP project 
concessionaire selection. For example, the public sectors will need to examine if they have sufficient 
knowledge and skills to apply system dynamics modelling, risk analysis, statistic techniques, and 
decision-making methods used in the proposed theoretical approach. The economic view refers to 
evaluate the cost efficiency to apply the proposed approach. For example, the public sector will need to 
examine how much and how long they can train the staff to apply the proposed approach if they don’t 
have sufficient knowledge and skills. The organizational view refers to the organizational commitment 
to apply the proposed approach. For example, the public sector will need to examine if the staff at 
operational level accept the new approach which is different from the approaches they used to apply 
and the staff at the management level support to use the proposed approach. The legal view refers to 
the legality to use the proposed approach. For example, the public sector will need to examine if the 
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I.1 Empirical Studies  
 
Table I.1.1 Li (2005)’s Three Levels of Risk Factors 
 
Risk Levels  Risk Factors  Risk Events 
Unstable government 
Expropriation or nationalisation of assets 
Poor public decision-making process 
Political and government 
policy 
Strong political opposition/hostility 
Poor financial market 
Inflation rate volatility 
Interest rate volatility 
Macroeconomic 
Influential economic events 
Legislation change 
Change in tax regulation  Legal 
Industrial regulatory change 
Lack of tradition of private provision of public services Social 







Land Acquisition (site availability)  Project selection 
Level of demand for project 
Availability of finance 
Financial attraction of project to investors  Project finance 
High finance costs 
Residual risk   Residual risks 
Delay in project approvals and permits 
Design deficiency  Design 
Unproven engineering techniques 
Construction cost overrun 
Construction time delay 
Material/labour availability 
Late design changes 
Poor quality workmanship 
Excessive contract variation 
Construction 
Insolvency/default of sub-contractors or suppliers 
Operation cost overrun 
Operational revenues below expectation 
Low operating productivity 
Maintenance costs higher than expected 
Meso level 
Operation 
Maintenance more frequent than expected 
Organisation and co-ordination risks 
Inadequate experience in PFI/PPP 
Inadequate distribution of responsibilities and risks 
Inadequate distribution of authority in partnership 
Differences in working method and know-how between 
partners 
Relationship 
Lack of Commitment from either partner 







   262
Table I.1.2 Hodge(2004)’s Risk Categories and Risk Events 
 
Risk Category  Risks 
Securing finance 
Maintaining finance (including changes to loan conditions 
Interest Rate and tax amendments 
Tax rulings 
Finance 




Design and development variants 
Design and development 
Delivery of design 




Disruption to existing services 
Site preparation 
Transport of asset to site 





Repairs and maintenance cost variations 
Security 
Staff training 
Change to requirements 
Cost of keeping existing assets operational 
Latent defects in existing assets 
Change in demand 
Operation 
Third-party revenue 
Uninsurable loss or damage to the assets 





Realisation of residual value of assets 
 
Table I.1.3  Ghosh & Jintanapakanont (2004)’s Risk Factors Influencing Rail Projects 
 
Risk factors 
1. Accuracy of project programme 
2. Errors and omissions 
3. Defective design 
4. Design change 
5. Scope of work definition 
6. Inadequate specification 
7. Conflict of document 
8. Material productivity and shortage 
9. Construction method 
10. Culture difference between consultants 
11. Consultant lacks of adequate number of staff 
12. Subcontractor lack of adequate number of staff 
13. Contractor competence 
14. Subcontractor failure 
15. Coordination with subcontractors 
16. Poor liaison with local authority 
17. Damage to persons or property 
18. Poor team communication 
19. Availability of resources 
20. Treatment of material removed from site 
21. Site access 
22. Unforeseen site condition   263
23. defective construction work 
24. Construction delay 
25. Third party delays 
26. Quantity variations 
27. Change in work 
28. Late drawings and instructions 
29. Cost of tests and samples 
30. System outages 
31. Equipment productivity 
32. Labour productivity 
33. Quality of work 
34. Suitability of materials 
35. Accidents 
36. labour dispute and strike 
37. Inflation 
38. Unavailability of funds 
39. Exchange rate fluctuation 
40. Tender price 
41. Financial failure of contractor 
42. Financial failure of subcontractor 
43. Economic disaster 
44. Cost of legal processes 
45. War 
46. Act of God (Earthquake, landslide, wind, rain and flood) 
47. Fire and theft 
48. Subsurface conditions of geology 
49. Subsurface conditions of ground water 
50. Pollutions and safety rules 
51. Public consultation 
52. Change order negotiation 
53. Delay payment on contract and extras 
54. Delays in solving disputes 
55. Delays in solving contractual issues 
56. Permit and regulation 
57. Ecological constrains 
58. Environmental clearing risk 
59. Infrastructures by others not provided to programme 
 
Table I.1.4 Thomas (2003)’s Risk Category for BOT Road Projects 
 
Project Phase  Risk category 
Pre-investment risk 
Resettlement and rehabilitation risk 
Delay in land acquisition 
Permit/approval risk 
Development phase 
Delay in financial closure 
Technology risk 
Design and latent defect risk 
Completion risk 
Construction phase 
Cost overrun risk 












Project life cycle 
Non-political force majeure risk 
   264
Table I.1.5 Dey (2002)’s Risk Factors for Large-scale Construction Projects 
 







Engineering and design change 
Inflation risk 
Fund risk 
Changes in local law 
Changes in government policy 
Financial & economical risk 
Improper estimate 













Table I.1.6 Mott MacDonald (2002)’s Project Risk Areas 
 
Project risk group  Project risk areas  Project risk type description 
Complexity of contract structure 
Where the complexity of the contract 
structure is likely to result in a delay to the 
contract being signed or impact on works 
duration, costs and benefits achieved. 
Late contractor involvement in design 
Where the late involvement of the contractor 
in the design is likely to lead to redesign or 
problems during construction. 
Contractor capabilities 
Where the contractor’s 
capabilities/experience of managing projects 
of a similar nature is likely to impact on his 
ability to perform the works program on 
schedule and/or to the required quality. 
Government guidelines 
Where existing government guidelines for 
procurement may not provide the Client with 
the necessary guidance to procure adequately.
Dispute and claims occurred 
Where disputes and claims are likely to occur 
if no mechanisms exist to manage effectively 
adversarial relationships between project 
stakeholders. 
Information management system 
Where effective information management and 
communication methods are essential to 
enable the delivery of the project. 
procurement 
Other (specify) 
Where other influencing factors that relate to 
procurement are likely to affect the project 
outcome. 
Design complexity 
Where the complexity of design (including 
requirements, specifications and detailed 
design) is such that it needs significant 
management to reduce the impact on project 
outcomes. 
Degree of innovation 
Where the degree of innovation required due 
to the nature of a project requires unproven 
methods to be used to deliver the project. 
Project specific 
Environmental impact 
Where the nature of the project has a major 
impact on its adjacent area where there is a 
strong likelihood of objection from 
neighbours and the general public.   265
Other (specify) 
Where other project specific influencing 
factors are likely to affect the project 
outcome. 
Inadequacy of the business case 
Where project scope changes are likely to 
occur as a result of the poor quality of 
requirement specifications and inadequate 
project scope definition. 
Large number of stakeholders 
Where project scope changes are likely to 
occur as a result of conflicting requirements 
or bad co-ordination of project stakeholders. 
Funding availability 
Where project delays or changes in scope are 
likely to occur as a result of the availability of 
funding (i.e. departmental budget spent or 
insufficient contingency funds). 
Project management team 
Where the Client project management team’s 
capabilities/experience of managing projects 
of a similar nature is likely to impact on the 
project outcome. 
Poor project intelligence 
Where the quality of initial project 
intelligence (e.g. preliminary site 
investigation, user requirements surveys, etc) 
is likely to have a significant impact on the 




Where other Client specific influencing 
factors are likely to affect the project 
outcome. 
Public relations 
Where a high level of effort is required to 
address public concern about the project, 
which may have a significant impact on the 
project outcomes. 
Site Characteristics 
Where the characteristics of the proposed 
environment for the project are highly 
sensitive to the project’s environmental 
impacts. 
Permits / Consents / Approvals 
Where there is a likelihood of significant 




Where other influencing factors that relate to 
the proposed environment for the project are 
likely to affect the project outcome. 
Political  Where the project outcomes are sensitive to 
political influences. 
Economic  Where the project outcomes are sensitive to 
economic influences. 
Legislation /Relations  Where the project outcomes are sensitive to 
legislation and regulation changes. 




Negative influencing factors that are external 
to the project that have an impact that are not 
identified above. 
 
Table I.1.7 Akintoye et al (2001)’s PFI/PPP Project Risk Factors 
•  Site acquisition 
•  Delay in feasibility studies/planning approval 
•  Design and construction risks (i.e. cost/overruns; poor technical solution) 
•  Commissioning and operating risks (including maintenance) 
•  Occupation demand (revenue) and usage risks over time 
•  Obsolescence / Technology risk 
•  Residual value risk 
•  Economic risks (including: fall in revenue; financiers pulling out, etc.) 
•  Legislative / Regulation risks (e.g., future planning regulations, health and safety features etc.)   266
•  Taxation risks (Change in taxes/laws) 
•  Bid process / Complicated negotiations 
•  Political (long time governmental support of international projects) 
•  Corruption 
•  Consortium structure 
•  Local partner 
•  Project management ability 
•  Existing infrastructure 
•  Raw material (supply, availability, etc.) 
•  Financing (foreign exchange) 
•  Force majeure 
•  Operation and maintenance failure 
•  Market competition 
•  Revenue tariffs/demand change 
•  Project performance 
•  Foreign exchange/inflation 
•  Financing risks 
 
Table I.1.8 Shen et al. (2001)’s Risk List Associated with Sino-foreign Joint Ventures Typed PFI/PPP 
Construction Projects 
 
(1) Financial risks 
Bankruptcy of project partner 
Difficult convertibility of currency 
Loss due to fluctuation of interest rate 
Loss due to fluctuation of currency exchange rate 
Low credibility of shareholders and lenders 
(2) Legal risks 
Breach of contracts by other participants 
Breach of contracts by project partner 
Lack of enforcement of legal judgment 
Loss due to insufficient law for joint ventures 
Uncertainty and unfairness of court justice 
(3) Management risks 
Change of organization within local partner 
Improper project feasibility study 
Improper project planning and budgeting 
Improper selection of project type 
Inadequate choice of project partner 
Inadequate project organization structure 
Incompetence of project management team 
Incomplete contract terms with partner 
Increase in project management overheads 
Poor relation and disputes with partner 
Poor relation with government departments 
Problems associated with culture difference 
Project delay 
(4) Market risks 
Competition from other similar projects 
Fall short of expected income from project use 
Increase of accessory facilities price 
Increase of labor costs 
Increase of materials price 
Increase of resettlement costs 
Inadequate forecast about market demand 
Local protectionism 
Unfairness in tendering 
(5) Policy and Political risks 
Cost increase due to changes of policies 
Loss incurred due to corruption and bribery 
Loss incurred due to political changes 
Loss due to bureaucracy for late approvals 
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(6) Technical risks 
Technical risk 
Accidents on site 
Design changes 
Equipment failure 
Errors in design drawings 
Hazards of environmental regulations 
Incompetence of transportation facilities 
Increase in site overheads 
Industrial disputes 
Local firm’s incompetence and low credibility 
Materials shortage 
Obsoleteness of building equipment 
Poor quality of procured accessory facilities 
Poor quality of procured materials 
Problems due to partners’ different practice 
Shortage in accessory facilities 
Shortage in skillful workers 
Shortage in supply of water, gas, and electricity 
Subcontractor’s low credibility 
Unknown site physical conditions 
Unusual weather and force majeure 
 
Table I.1.9 Wang (2000)’s List of Risks Associated with BOT Projects in Different Infrastructure Sectors 
 
All sectors 
Force majeure risk 
Political risks (change in law and regulation; revoke; expropriation) 
Financial risks (inflation; interest rate; exchange rate and convertibility) 
Competition risk 
Environmental risk (increasing consciousness in society) 
Land acquisition and compensation risk 
Construction risks (cost overrun; delay; quality) 
Operation risk (operator inability; output quantity and quality; production regularity) 
Condition of facility 
Supply risk (shortage; quality) 
Offtake risk (quantity; pay in time) 
Documentation/contractual risk (conflict and arbitration; applied law) 
Power sector 
Repayment of external debt 
Restriction on imported equipment and raw materials 
Fluctuating demand of power generated 
Problem in bill collection 
Illegal connection to transmission system (power theft) 
Transmission failure 
Lowered tariffs due to competition 
Specification not being fulfilled, resulting in refusal of power purchase by state utility 
Power plant location (inadequate transport facilities) 
Environmental dispute 
Fluctuation of cost and availability of fuel/coal 
Construction delay 
Prolonged downtime during operation 
Liquidated damages or termination of Power Purchase Agreement (output and quality do not meet off-taker’s 
requirement) 
Government’s restrictions on profitability (rate of return) and tariff levels 
Transport Sector (Road) 
Inadequate traffic volume (inadequate traffic forecasts or subsequent deviation) 
Competing routes (particularly free or underpriced ones) 
Restrictions on toll level and increase 
Cost overruns (because of size and scope, particularly if project crosses a hilly region) 
Construction delays (land acquisition; unexpected technical difficulty) 
Long land acquisition period 
Right-of-way disputes (e.g., archaeological mines) 
Necessitating measures to minimize the impact of construction on traveling public   268
Delay in other projects connecting to this road 
Income streams are usually in local currency (exchange rate and convertibility risk) 
Transport Sector (Tunnel and Bridge) 
Geological risks for immersed tunnel 
Safety at work and disturbances to surface traffic in municipal areas 
Health risks of compressed air 
Stability of seabed for submerged tunnel 
Traffic accidents and fire breakouts for tunnels during operation 
Restrictions to harbor navigation and air traffic flight path for bridge 
Hydrological opposition from ferry workers and fishermen 
Bad weather conditions 
Competition from ferries and airlines 
Transport Sector (Rail) 
Long land acquisition period 
Complex relocation of existing utilities 
Uncoordinated attempt in various districts 
Controlled fare levels 
Complexity of getting design approvals 
Competition from road transportation 
Environmental dispute 
Taxation 
Expensive rolling stock and control systems 
Transport Sector (Airport and Port) 
Competition from other airports 
Regional or international trade prosperity 
Tourism business prosperity 
Political stability and spending pattern 
Integration with other connecting facilities 
Inadequate adjoining land for expansion 
Throughput capacity affected by breakdown of equipment, labor disputes, and extreme weather conditions for port
Economic and trade conditions 
Changes in tariff regulations and quotas 
Political risk 
Process plant 
Take-or-pay agreement with gas producer 
Leakage of pipe 
Nonpayment and pilferage 
Controlled tariffs 
Fast changing environmental regulations for waste treatment (rising concerns and advancing technology making 
improvements possible) 
Telecommunication 
Most competitive sector 
High research and development costs 
Restrictions by incumbent operator for new entrants to access to established network 
Addition cost and problem in integrating with existing network including technological incompatibility 
Bureaucracy in licensing 
 
•  Moody (2006)’s research report recommended a methodology to model risks for PFI/PPP infrastructure 
project. It takes the risk factors into account, which include “project simplicity” “reasonability of 
construction schedule” “construction budget” “vulnerability to local” “economic conditions” “site 
conditions” “site access, acquisition and planning” “force majeure” “change in law” and “liquidity 
level.” 
•  Cooper et al (2005)’s book “Project Risk Management Guideline” proposed the risk categories for risk 
allocation of PFI/PPP projects are “location” “design” “construction or acquisition” “finance” 
“ownership and provision of services” “disposal” “assurance of supply” “commercial” “contractual” 
“financial” “security” “supportability” and “regulatory.” 
•  Nguyen and Ogunlana (2005)’s research proposed to model infrastructure projects by considering the 
risk factors into account, which include “project scope change” “rework” “poor quality of practice” 
“inadequate manpower” “breakdown of equipment and plant” “shortage of material” “improper resource 
allocation” “poor project performance” “unclear project objectives” “scope change” “short project 
deadline” “resource constraints” “ineffective resource levelling” “poor subcontractors” “technology 
change” “poor coordination among parties” and “unexpected site conditions.” 
•  Mills (2001)’s study cited from Roozbeh (1995) listed the risk factors for large construction project, 
which include “labours and equipment productivity” “quality of work” “labour, equipment, material   269
availability” “safety” “defective material” “contractor competence” “inflation” “actual quantities of 
work” “labour disputes” “differing site conditions” “defective design” “site access/ right of way permits 
and ordinances” “changes in government regulations” “delay payment on contract” “changes in work” 
“financial failure” “change-order negotiation” “contract-delay resolution” “Acts of God” “Third-party 
delays” and “defensive engineering.” 
 
 
I.2 Official Publications 
 
Table I.2.1 The UK Government’s General Types of Risk (HM Treasury, 2003) 
 
Types of Risk  Descriptions 
Availability risk  The risk that the quantum of the service provided is less than required under 
a contract. 
Business risk  The risk that an organisation cannot meet its business imperatives. 
Construction risk  The risk that the construction of physical assets is not complete time, to 
budget and to specification. 
Decant risk  The risk arising in accommodation projects relating to the need to decant 
staff/ clients from one site to another. 
Demand risk 
The risk that demands for a service does not match the levels planned, 
projected or assumed. As the demand for a service may be partially 
controllable by the public body concerned, the risk to the public sector may 
be less than that perceived by the private sector. 
Design risk  The risk that design cannot deliver the services at the required performance 
or quality standards. 
Economic risk  Where the project outcomes are sensitive to economic influences. For 
example, where actual inflation differs from assumed inflation rates. 
Environment risk  Where the nature of the project has a major impact on its adjacent area and 
there is a strong likelihood of objection from the general public. 
Funding risk  Where project delays or changes in scope occur as a result of the 
availability of funding. 
Legislative risk 
The risk that changes in legislation increase costs. This can be sub-divided 
into general risks such as changes in corporate tax rates and specific ones 
which may affect a particular project. 
Maintenance risk  The risk that the costs of keeping the assets in good condition from budget. 
Occupancy  The risk that a property will remain untenanted – a form of demand risk. 
Operational risk  The risk that operating costs vary from budget, that performance standards 
slip or that service cannot be provided. 
Planning risk 
The risk that the implementation of a project fails to adhere to the terms of 
planning permission or that detailed planning cannot be obtained, or if 
obtained, can only be implemented at costs greater than in the original 
budget. 
Policy risk  The risk of changes of policy direction not involving legislation. 
Procurement risk  Where a contractor is engaged, risk can arise from the contract between the 
two parties, the capabilities of the contractor, and when a dispute occurs. 
Project intelligence risk 
Where the quality of initial project intelligence (eg preliminary site 
investigation) is likely to impact on the likelihood of unforeseen problems 
occurring. 
Reputation risk 
The risk that there, will be an undermining of customer/ media perception 
of the organisations ability to fulfil its business requirements e.g. adverse 
publicity concerning an operational problem. 
Residual value risk  The risk relating to the uncertainty of the value of physical assets at the end 
of the contract. 
Technology risk  The risk that changes in technology result in services being provided using 
non-optimal technology. 
Volume risk  The risk that actual usage of the service varies from the level forecast. 
 
 
The guidance for PFI/PPP project risk management (Australia Government, 2005; Partnerships Victoria, 2001), 
published by the Australia Government, listed common infrastructure and project risk categories as Table 5.2.2. 
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Table I.2.2 The Australia Government’s Risk Category Checklist 
(Australia Government, 2005; Partnerships Victoria, 2001) 
 
Risk Category  Description 
Site risks 
Existing structure  Risk that existing structures are inadequate to support new improvements. 
Site conditions  Risk that unanticipated adverse ground conditions are discovered which 
cause construction costs to increase and/or cause construction delays. 
Approvals 
Risk that necessary approvals may not be obtained or may be obtained only 
subject to unanticipated conditions which have adverse cost consequences 
or cause prolonged delay. 
Environmental (1)  Risk that the project site is contaminated requiring significant expense to 
remediate. 
Environmental (2)  Risk that prior to financial close offsite pollution has been caused from a 
government preferred site (any site) to adjacent land. 
Environmental (3)  Risk that prior to financial close (in case of a non-government site) or after 
financial close (any site) offsite pollution is caused to adjacent land. 
Clean-up and rehabilitation 
Risk that the use of the project site over the contract term has resulted in a 
significant clean up or rehabilitation obligation to make the site fit for 
future anticipated use. 
Native title 
Risk of costs and delays in negotiating indigenous land use agreements 
where project site may be subject to native title or risk injunction and/or 
invalidity of approvals. 
Cultural heritage  The risk of costs and delays associated with archaeological and cultural 
heritage discoveries. 
Availability of site  Risk that tenure/access to a selected site which is not presently owned by 
government or private party cannot be negotiated. 
Design, Construction and Commissioning risks 
Design  The risk that the design of the facility is incapable of delivering the services 
at anticipated cost. 
Construction  The risk that events occur during construction which prevent the facility 
being delivered on time and on cost. 
Commissioning 
The risk that either the physical or the operational commissioning tests 
which are required to be completed for the provision of services to 
commence, cannot be successfully completed. 
Sponsor and Financial risks 
Interest rates pre-completion  The risk that prior to completion interest rates may move adversely thereby 
undermining bid pricing. 
Sponsor risk 
The risk that the private party is unable to provide the required services or 
becomes insolvent or is later found to be an improper person for 
involvement in the provision of these services or financial demands on the 
private party or its sponsors exceed its or their financial capacity causing 
corporate failure. 
Financing unavailable 
The risk that when debt and/or equity are required by the private party for 
the project it is not available then and in the amounts and on the conditions 
anticipated. 
Further finance 
The risk that by reason of a change in law, policy or other event additional 
funding is needed to rebuild, alter, reequip etc the facility which cannot be 
obtained by the private party. 
Change in ownership 
The risk that a change in ownership or control of the private party results in 
a weakening in its financial standing or support or other detriment to the 
project. 
Refinancing benefit 
The risk (upside) that at completion or other stage in project development 
the project finances can be restructured to materially reduce the project's 
finance costs. 
Tax changes  The risk that before or after completion the tax impost on the private party, 
its assets or on the project, will change. 
Operating risks 
Inputs  The risk that required inputs cost more than anticipated, are of inadequate 
quality or are unavailable in required quantities. 
Maintenance and Refurbishment  The risk that design and/or construction quality is inadequate resulting in 
higher than anticipated maintenance and refurbishment costs. 
Changes in output specification 
outside agreed specification range 
Risk that government's output requirements are changed after contract 
signing whether pre or post commissioning. 
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Operator failure  Risk that a subcontract operator may fail financially or may fail to provide 
contracted services to specification. 
Technical obsolescence or 
innovation 
Risk of the contracted service and its method of delivery not keeping pace, 
from a technological perspective, with competition and/or public 
requirements. 
Market risks 
General economic downturn  In a user pays model, the risk of a reduction in economic activity affecting 
demand for the contracted service. 
Competition  In a user pays model the risk of alternate suppliers of the contracted service 
competing for customers. 
Demographic change  The risk of a demographic/socio-economic change affecting demand for 
contracted service. 
Inflation  Risk that value of payments received during the term is eroded by inflation.
Network and Interface risks 
Withdrawal of support network  The risk that, where the facility relies on a complementary government 
network, that support is withdrawn or varied adversely affecting the project.
Changes in competitive network  The risk that an existing network is extended/changed/re-priced so as to 
increase competition for the facility. 
Interface (1) 
The risk that the delivery of core services in a way which is not 
specified/anticipated in the contract adversely affects the delivery of 
contracted services. 
Interface (2) 
The risk that the delivery of contracted services adversely affects the 
delivery of core services in a manner not specified/anticipated in the 
contract. 
Industrial Relations risks 
Industrial relations and civil 
common 
Risk of strikes, industrial action or civil commotion causing delay and cost 
to the project.  
Legislative and Government Policy risks 
Approvals  The risk that additional approvals required during the course of the project 
cannot be obtained. 
Changes in law/policy (1) 
The risk of a change in law/policy of the State Government only, which 
could not be anticipated at contract signing and which is directed 
specifically and exclusively at the project or the services and which has 
adverse capital expenditure or operating cost consequences for the private 
party. 
Changes in law/policy (2) 
In some cases, the risk of a change in law/policy (at whatever level of 
government it occurs) which could not be anticipated at contract signing 
which is general (ie not project specific) in its application and which causes 
a marked increase in capital costs and/or has substantial operating cost 
consequences for the private party. 
Regulation 
Where there is a statutory regulator involved there are pricing or other 
changes imposed on the private party which do not reflect its investment 
expectations. 
Force Majeure risks 
Force majeure  The risk that inability to meet contracted service delivery (pre or post 
completion) is caused by reason of force majeure events. 
Asset Ownership risks 
Technical obsolescence  The risk that design life of the facility proves to be shorter than anticipated 
accelerating refurbishment expense. 
Default and termination 
Risk of 'loss' of the facility or other assets upon the premature termination 
of lease or other project contracts upon breach by the private party and 
without adequate payment. 
Residual value on transfer to 
government 
The risk that on expiry or earlier termination of the services contract the 
asset does not have the value originally estimated by government at which 
the private party agreed to transfer it to government. 
 
Table I.2.3 The South Africa Government’s Risk Categories (South Africa, 2000) 
 
Availability risk  The possibility that the Services to be provided by the Private Party do not meet the 
output specifications of the Institution. 
Completion risks  The possibility that the completion of the Works required for a project.   
Cost over-run risk  The possibility that during the design and construction phase, the actual Project costs 
will exceed projected Project costs.   272
Design risk  The possibility that the Private Party’s design may not achieve the required output 
specifications. 
Environmental risk  The possibility of liability for losses caused by environmental damage. 
Exchange rate risk   The possibility that exchange rate fluctuations will impact on the envisaged costs of 
imported inputs required for the construction or operations phase of the Project. 
Force Majeure risks  The possibility of the occurrence of certain unexpected events that are beyond the 
control of the Parties. 
Inflation risk  The possibility that the actual inflation rate will exceed the projected inflation rate. 
Insolvency risk  The possibility of the insolvency of the Private Party. 
Insurance risk 
The possibility (i) that any risks that are insurable as at the Signature Date pursuant to 
the agreed Project Insurances later become Uninsurable or (ii) of substantial increases in 
the rates at which insurance premiums are calculated. 
Interest rate risk  These are factors affecting the availability and cost of funds.  
Latent defect risk  The possibility of loss or damage arising from latent defects in the Facilities included in 
the Project. 
Maintenance risk  The possibility that (i) the cost of maintaining assets in the required condition may vary 
from the projected maintenance costs, or (ii) maintenance is not carried out. 
Market, demand or 
volume risk 
The possibility that the demand for the Services generated by a project may be less than 
projected. 
Operating risk   Any factors (other than Force Majeure) impacting on the operating requirements of the 
Project. 
Planning risk 
The possibility that the proposed use of the Project Site in terms of the PPP Agreement 
and, in particular, the construction of the Facilities on the Project Site will fail to comply 
with any applicable laws relating to planning, land-use or building. 
Political risk 
The possibility of (i) Unforeseeable Conduct by the Institution or by any other 
government authority that materially and adversely affects the expected return on 
Equity, debt service or otherwise results in increased costs to the Private Party, or (ii) 
expropriating actions of the assets of the Private Party. 
Regulatory risk 
The possibility that Consents required from other government authorities will not be 
obtained or, if obtained, can only be implemented at a greater cost than originally 
projected. 
Residual value risk  The risk that the Project Assets at termination or expiry of the PPP Agreement will not 
be in the prescribed condition for handback to the Institution. 
Resource or input risk  The possibility of a failure or shortage in the supply of the inputs or resources required 
for the operation of a project including deficiencies in the quality of available supplies. 
Subcontractor risk  The risk of subcontractor (first-tier and below) defaults or insolvency.  
Tax rate change risk  The possibility that changes in applicable tax rates or new taxes may decrease the 
anticipated return on equity. 
Technology risk 
The possibility that (i) the technology inputs for the outsourced institutional function 
may fail to deliver the required output specifications, or (ii) technological improvements 
may render these technology inputs out-of-date (“technology refresh or obsolescence 
risk”). 
Utilities risk 
The possibility that (i) the utilities (e.g. water, electricity or gas) required for the 
construction and/or operation of a project may not be available, or (ii) the project will be 
delayed because of delays in relation to the removal or relocation of utilities located at 
the Project Site. 
 
United Nations (2000) published a guideline book on PFI/PPP infrastructure project procurement listed risk factors, 
which include “technical risks: implementation delays, accidents related to technical, underground or equipment 
failures” “delay risks” “efficiency risk due to the service management difficulties” “commercial risks: service 
costs,  income shortfall, and so on” “financial risks:  inflation, difficulty finding funds or in refinancing, interest 
rate change or currency rates change” “technical building risks: ground conditions, bad weather, etc” and “legal, 
political, force majeure risks.”   273
 
European Commission (2003) published a guideline book on  PFI/PPP infrastructure project procurement listed 
risk factors, which include “revenue risks” “choice of private partner” “construction risks” “foreign exchange 
risks” “regulatory/contractual risks” “political risks” “environmental/ archaeological risks” “latent defect risks” 
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The interview survey will be conducted to explore the risk scenarios of THSR project. The purposes of interview 
survey are: first, modify the Causal Loop Diagrams that are created in Chapter 5 to ensure that the risk causal 
relationships can fit the likely risk scenarios of THSR project well; second, gather risk variables and parameters 




The interviewees are the senior members of public sector ‘Bureau of High Speed Rail: BHSR’ for THSR project. 
These informants include expertise from a cross section of disciplines and stakeholders that covers all area of 
interest on the 52 risks described in Chapter 5. They had ever participated in THSR project and have wide 
experiences on mass transit projects that are similar to THSR project, which include: project manager and project 
team, discipline engineers, commercial specialists, safety and environmental specialists, contract managers, etc. In 
addition, the financial institute ‘International Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)’ that provided project financing 
for THSR will also be interviewed for the information on financial risks. The interview organisations include: 
 
•  The 1
st Division of BHSR (function: design and supervision) 
•  The 2
nd Division of BHSR (function: civic engineering) 
•  The 3
rd Division of BHSR (function: mechanical/electrical engineering) 
•  The 4
th Division of BHSR (function: contract performance) 
•  The 5
th Division of BHSR (function: land acquisition) 
•  The 6
th Division of BHSR (function: safety and environment) 
•  ICBC (function: project financing) 
 
The liaise is Mrs Chung: Email: public@nthsr1.hsr.gov.tw; Tel# 886-2-8072-3333 ext 8632. All of the above 




The interview survey was conducted by Internet phone with the following procedure:  
 
1.  The interviewees were made an appointment in advance. 
2.  This interview was conducted by Internet Phone: ‘SkypeOut’. 
3.  The interviewees was informed of the definition of 52 risks and the purpose of interview before 
interview to ensure that the interviewees have enough time to prepare for interviews and answering 
questions. 
4.  All interviews were recorded as MP3 files for evidence by software: ‘Hotkey Sound Recorder’. 





The interview survey was conducted by Internet phone from 11th of June, 2007 to 13
th of August, 2007. Each 




The plan is summarized as below: 
 
Risk Event  The Interviewee  Name  
(anonym)  Date   File Name 
(MP3) 
1.  Land unavailable  5
th Division of BHSR  M1  11/06/07  110607_1.mp3 
2.  Resources unavailable  1
st, 4
th Division of BHSR  M2/M3  13/06/07  130607_2.mp3 
3.  Performance 
unavailability  1
st, 4
th Division of BHSR  M2/M4  15/06/07  150607_3.mp3 
4.  Scope changes  1
st, 4
th Division of BHSR  M5/M4  18/06/07  180607_4.mp3 
5.  Defective design  1
st  Division of BHSR  M6  19/06/07  190607_5.mp3 
6.  Design changes  1
st  Division of BHSR  M6  19/06/07  190607_6.mp3 
7.  Construction cost 
overrun  1
st  Division of BHSR  M2  21/06/07  210607_7.mp3 
8.  Construction delay  1
st  Division of BHSR  M2  21/06/07  210607_8.mp3   275
9.  Defective construction  2
nd  Division of BHSR  M7  19/06/07  190607_9.mp3 
10.  Construction changes  2
nd , 4
th Division of BHSR  M7/M4  19/06/07  190607_10.mp3 
11.  Complex system 
interface/ integration  3
rd, 4
th Division of BHSR  M8/M9  25/06/07  150607_11.mp3 
12.  Failed commissioning 
tests  1
st  Division of BHSR  M6  26/06/07  260607_12.mp3 
13.  Low operating 
productivity  4
th Division of BHSR  M9  27/06/07  270607_13.mp3 
14.  Mis-pricing 4
th Division of BHSR  M10  27/06/07  270607_14.mp3 
15.  Revenue loss  4
th Division of BHSR  M10  27/06/07  270607_15.mp3 
16.  System breakdown  3
rd Division of BHSR  M8  28/06/07  280607_16.mp3 
17.  High maintenance 
frequency  3
rd Division of BHSR  M8  28/06/07  280607_17.mp3 
18.  Accidents and safety 
issues  6
th Division of BHSR  M11  02/07/07  020707_18.mp3 
19.  Price escalation  1
st, 4
th Division of BHSR  M12/M10  03/07/07  030707_19.mp3 
20.  Complex technologies  1
st, 3
rd  Division of BHSR  M6/M8  04/07/07  040707_20.mp3 
21.  Poor cooperation/ 
coordination  1
st  Division of BHSR  M12  05/07/07  050707_21.mp3 
22.  Finance unavailable  1
st, 4
th Division of BHSR/ ICBC M14/M10/M1
3  09/07/07 090907_22.mp3 
23.  Refinancing liabilities  1
st, 4
th Division of BHSR/ ICBC M14/M10/M1
3  10/07/07 100707_23.mp3 
24.  Insolvency of contractor  1
st, 4
th Division of BHSR  M14/M10  10/07/07  100707_24.mp3 
25.  Ownership change delay  1
st, 4
th Division of BHSR  M14/M15  10/07/07  100707_25.mp3 
26.  Tax increases  4
th Division of BHSR  M16  12/07/07  120707_26.mp3 
27.  Insurance increases  4
th Division of BHSR  M16  12/07/07  120707_27.mp3 
28.  Contractual disputes  4
th Division of BHSR  M15  16/07/07  160707_28.mp3 
29.  Inflexible contract 
arrangements  4
th Division of BHSR  M15  17/07/07  170707_29.mp3 
30.  Delay in contract change 
negotiation  4
th Division of BHSR  M15  17/07/07  170707_30.mp3 
31.  Contract breach  4
th Division of BHSR  M15  16/07/07  160707_31.mp3 
32.  Contract 
remedies/penalties  4
th Division of BHSR  M15  16/07/07  160707_32.mp3 
33.  Default of subcontractor   1
st, 4
th Division of BHSR  M2/M15  18/07/07  180707_33.mp3 
34.  Inspection and testing 
delay   1
st, 4
th Division of BHSR  M6/M9  19/07/07  100707_34.mp3 
35.  Latent defect  4
th Division of BHSR  M15  23/07/07  230707_35.mp3 
36.  Shorter asset life  1
st, 4
th Division of BHSR  M2/M4  24/07/07  240707_36.mp3 
37.  Less residual values  1
st, 4
th Division of BHSR  M2/M4  24/07/07  240707_37.mp3 
38.  Termination liabilities  1
st, 4
th Division of BHSR  M14/M15  16/07/07  160707_38.mp3 
39.  Higher level of inflation 
rate 
1
st  Division of BHSR/ 
ICBC  M14/M17 25/07/07  250707_39.mp3 
40.  Volatility of exchange 
rate 
1
st  Division of BHSR/ 
ICBC  M14/M17 25/07/07  250707_40.mp3 
41.  Higher level of interest 
rate 
1
st  Division of BHSR/ 
ICBC  M14/M17 25/07/07  250707_41.mp3 




th Division of BHSR/ 
ICBC  M14/M17 26/07/07  260707_42.mp3 
43.  Higher competition  1
st, 4
th Division of BHSR/ 
ICBC  M14/M17 26/07/07  260707_43.mp3 




th Division of BHSR/ 
ICBC  M14/M17 26/07/07  260707_44.mp3 
45.  Political interference  1
st  Division of BHSR  M18  30/07/07  300707_45.mp3 
46.  Unsuitable regulatory 
policy  1
st  Division of BHSR  M18  31/07/07  310707_46.mp3 
47.  Approval delays  1
st  Division of BHSR  M18  01/08/07  010807_47.mp3 
48.  Law/policy changes  1
st, 4
th Division of BHSR  M18/M15  02/08/07  020807_48.mp3 
49.  Unforeseen site 
conditions  2
nd  Division of BHSR   M19  06/08/07  060807_49.mp3 
50.  Greater environmental 
expectation  6
th Division of BHSR  M20  08/08/07  080807_50.mp3 
51.  Industrial disputes  1
st Division of BHSR  M18  09/08/07  090807_51.mp3 
52.  Force Majeure  1
st, 6
th Division of BHSR  M21/M11  13/08/07  130807_52.mp3   276
Appendix III SD Model Variables and Parameters 
 
 
A. Parameter values of the exogenous risk variables in SD model 
 
Exogenous Risk Variables  Project Phase Parameter Estimates 
Default of subcontractors  Construction  Default of subcontractors C= RANDOM TRIANGULAR(8.36, 
24.69 , 6.71 , 18.7 , 24.69 , 1234 ),Units: Dmnl 
Default of subcontractor  Operation  Default of suncontractors O= RANDOM TRIANGULAR(8, 25 , 
6.29 , 18.76 , 25 , 1234 ), Units: Dmnl 
Downside economic events  Construction  Downside economic events C=RANDOM NORMAL(1, 25 , 18.14 , 
4 , 1234 ), Units: Dmnl 
Downside economic events  Operation  Downside economic events O=RANDOM NORMAL(1, 25 , 16.51 , 
5.75 , 1234 ), Units: Dmnl 
Force Majeure  Construction  Force Majeure C=RANDOM NORMAL(1, 25 , 18.27 , 4.96 , 
1234 ), Units: Dmnl 
Force Majeure  Operation  Force Majeure O=RANDOM TRIANGULAR(4, 25 , 2.5 , 17.5 , 25 , 
1234 ), Units: Dmnl 
Greater environmental expectation  Construction  Greater environmental expectation C=RANDOM NORMAL(1, 25 , 
15.78 , 5.3 , 1234 ), Units: Dmnl 
Greater environmental expectation  Operation  Greater environmental expectation O=RANDOM TRIANGULAR(5, 
25 , 3.37 , 17.79 , 25 , 1234 ), Units: Dmnl 
Latent defect  Construction  Latent defect C=RANDOM NORMAL(1, 25 , 15.89 , 3.91 , 1234 ), 
Units: Dmnl 
Latent defect  Operation  Latent defect O=RANDOM NORMAL(1, 25 , 17.49 , 4.03 , 1234 ), 
Units: Dmnl 
Political interference  Construction  Political interference C=RANDOM TRIANGULAR(2, 25 , 1 , 
14.91 , 25 , 1234 ), Units: Dmnl 
Political interference  Operation  Political interference O=RANDOM NORMAL(1, 25 , 8 , 4.1 , 
1234 ), Units: Dmnl 
Unforeseen site conditions  Construction  Unforeseen site conditions C=RANDOM NORMAL(1, 25 , 11.89 , 
3.24 , 1234), Units: Dmnl 
Variability of exchange rate  Construction/ 
Operation 
Variability of exchange rate=RANDOM NORMAL(25.16, 34.58 , 
30.73 , 3.34 ,1234 ), Units: Dmnl 
Variability of inflation rate  Construction/ 
Operation 
Variability of inflation rate=RANDOM TRIANGULAR(0, 0.09 , 
0.02 , 0.0369 , 0.07 , 1234 ), Units: 1/Year 
Variability of interest rate  Construction/ 
Operation 
Variability of interest rate=RANDOM TRIANGULAR(0.01, 0.13 , 
0.0175 , 0.067 , 0.07 , 1234 ), Units: 1/Year 
Variability of less demand  Construction/ 
Operation 
Variability of less demand=RANDOM NORMAL(-0.13, 0.71 , 
0.166 , 0.32 , 0 ), Units: Dmnl 
Variability of tax rate  Construction/ 
Operation 
Variability of tax rate=RANDOM TRIANGULAR(0.15, 0.25 , 0.15 , 
0.18 , 0.25 , 1234 ), Units: Dmnl 
Equity fraction  Construction/ 
Operation  Equity fraction=0.3, Units: Dmnl 
 
 
B. Parameter values of other variables in SD model 
(There is a partial list for variable equations only) 
 
"% Construction delay"[Proposal]=IF THEN ELSE(Time<=Actual construction completion time[Proposal], Construction 
delay[Proposal]/Scheduled total construction time, 0)Units: Dmnl 
  
"% risk transfer"[Proposal]=0, 0.901, 0.812, 0.732, 0.602, Units: Dmnl 
 
Accidents and safety issues[Proposal]=IF THEN ELSE(Time>VMAX(Risk adjusted construction completion 
time[workpackage!,Proposal]), 5.93+0.2*Force Majeure[Proposal]+0.253*Defective construction[Proposal]+0.104*"Complex 
system interface/integration"[Proposal]+0.0971*Resources unavailable[Proposal], 1)Units: Dmnl 
 
Actual construction completion time[Proposal]=VMAX(Risk adjusted construction completion 
time[workpackage!,Proposal])Units: Year 
 
Actual total construction time=VMAX(Risk adjusted construction completion time[workpackage!,Proposal!])-VMIN(Risk 
adjusted construction start time[workpackage!])Units: Year 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of DEE control scheme[Base case]=Bidding cost of DEE control scheme[Base case]Adjusted bidding cost 
of DEE control scheme[Bid A]=  Bidding cost of DEE control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of DEE risk transfer C[Bid 
A]+Fraction of DEE risk transfer O[Bid A])/2)+Bidding cost of DEE control scheme[Bid A] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of DEE control scheme[BidB]=Bidding cost of DEE control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of DEE risk 
transfer C[BidB]+Fraction of DEE risk transfer O[BidB])/2)+Bidding cost of DEE control scheme[BidB]   277
 
Adjusted bidding cost of DEE control scheme[BidC]=Bidding cost of DEE control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of DEE risk 
transfer C  [BidC]+Fraction of DEE risk transfer O[BidC])/2)+Bidding cost of DEE control scheme[BidC] 
Adjusted bidding cost of DEE control scheme[Bid D]=Bidding cost of DEE control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of DEE risk 
transfer C[Bid D]+Fraction of DEE risk transfer O[Bid D])/2)+Bidding cost of DEE control scheme[Bid D]Units: NT$ 
  
Adjusted bidding cost of DOS control scheme[Base case]=Bidding cost of DOS control scheme[Base case] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of DOS control scheme[Bid A]=Bidding cost of DOS control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of DOS risk 
transfer C  [Bid A]+Fraction of DOS risk transfer O[Bid A])/2)+Bidding cost of DOS control scheme[Bid A] 
Adjusted bidding cost of DOS control scheme[BidB]=Bidding cost of DOS control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of DOS risk 
transfer C[BidB]+Fraction of DOS risk transfer O[BidB])/2)+Bidding cost of DOS control scheme[BidB] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of DOS control scheme[BidC]=  Bidding cost of DOS control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of DOS 
risk transfer C[BidC]+Fraction of DOS risk transfer O[BidC])/2)+Bidding cost of DOS control scheme[BidC] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of DOS control scheme[Bid D]= Bidding cost of DOS control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of DOS 
risk transfer C[Bid D]+Fraction of DOS risk transfer O[Bid D])/2)+Bidding cost of DOS control scheme[Bid D]Units: NT$ 
  
Adjusted bidding cost of FM control scheme[Base case]=Bidding cost of FM control scheme[Base case] 
Adjusted bidding cost of FM control scheme[Bid A]=Bidding cost of FM control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of FM risk 
transfer C[Bid A]+Fraction of FM risk transfer O[Bid A])/2)+Bidding cost of FM control scheme[Bid A] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of FM control scheme[BidB]=Bidding cost of FM control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of FM risk 
transfer C 
  [BidB]+Fraction of FM risk transfer O[BidB])/2)+Bidding cost of FM control scheme[BidB] 
Adjusted bidding cost of FM control scheme[BidC]=Bidding cost of FM control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of FM risk 
transfer C[BidC]+Fraction of FM risk transfer O[BidC])/2)+Bidding cost of FM control scheme[BidC] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of FM control scheme[Bid D]=Bidding cost of FM control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of FM risk 
transfer C[Bid D]+Fraction of FM risk transfer O[Bid D])/2)+Bidding cost of FM control scheme[Bid D]Units: NT$ 
  
Adjusted bidding cost of GEE control scheme[Base case]=Bidding cost of GEE control scheme[Base case] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of GEE control scheme[Bid A]=Bidding cost of GEE control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of GEE risk 
transfer C[Bid A]+Fraction of GEE risk transfer O[Bid A])/2)+Bidding cost of GEE control scheme[Bid A] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of GEE control scheme[BidB]=Bidding cost of GEE control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of GEE risk 
transfer C  [BidB]+Fraction of GEE risk transfer O[BidB])/2)+Bidding cost of GEE control scheme[BidB] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of GEE control scheme[BidC]=Bidding cost of GEE control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of GEE risk 
transfer C  [BidC]+Fraction of GEE risk transfer O[BidC])/2)+Bidding cost of GEE control scheme[BidC] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of GEE control scheme[Bid D]=Bidding cost of GEE control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of GEE risk 
transfer C[Bid D]+Fraction of GEE risk transfer O[Bid D])/2)+Bidding cost of GEE control scheme[Bid D]Units: NT$ 
  
Adjusted bidding cost of LT control scheme[Base case]=Bidding cost of LT control scheme[Base case] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of LT control scheme[Bid A]=Bidding cost of LT control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of LT risk 
transfer C[Bid A]+Fraction of LT risk transfer O[Bid A])/2)+Bidding cost of LT control scheme[Bid A] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of LT control scheme[BidB]=Bidding cost of LT control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of LT risk 
transfer C[BidB]+Fraction of LT risk transfer O[BidB])/2)+Bidding cost of LT control scheme[BidB] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of LT control scheme[BidC]=Bidding cost of LT control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of LT risk 
transfer C[BidC]+Fraction of LT risk transfer O[BidC])/2)+Bidding cost of LT control scheme[BidC] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of LT control scheme[Bid D]=Bidding cost of LT control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of LT risk 
transfer C[Bid D]+Fraction of LT risk transfer O[Bid D])/2)+Bidding cost of LT control scheme[Bid D]Units: NT$ 
  
Adjusted bidding cost of PI control scheme[Base case]=Bidding cost of PI control scheme[Base case] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of PI control scheme[Bid A]=Bidding cost of PI control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of PI risk transfer 
C[Bid A]+Fraction of PI risk transfer O[Bid A])/2)+Bidding cost of PI control scheme[Bid A] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of PI control scheme[BidB]=Bidding cost of PI control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of PI risk transfer 
C[BidB]+Fraction of PI risk transfer O[BidB])/2)+Bidding cost of PI control scheme[BidB] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of PI control scheme[BidC]=Bidding cost of PI control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of PI risk transfer 
C[BidC]+Fraction of PI risk transfer O[BidC])/2)+Bidding cost of PI control scheme[BidC] 
 
Adjusted bidding cost of PI control scheme[Bid D]=Bidding cost of PI control scheme[Base case]*(1-(Fraction of PI risk transfer 
C[Bid D]+Fraction of PI risk transfer O[Bid D])/2)+Bidding cost of PI control scheme[Bid D]Units: NT$   278








The questionnaire survey will be conducted to measure risk effects. The purposes of questionnaire survey are: first, 
quantify risk effects by project experts; second, consistently scale the expected risk effect for each risk event; third, 
quantify the interrelationships between risk variables and infer the probability distribution for the input risk 





The main target respondents are the senior members of public sector ‘Bureau of High Speed Rail: BHSR’ for 
THSR project. These respondents include expertise from a cross section of disciplines and stakeholders that covers 
all area of interest on the risk events for THSR project described in Chapter 6. They had ever participated in THSR 
project and have wide experiences on mass transit projects that are similar to THSR project, which include: project 
manager and project team, discipline engineers, commercial specialists, safety and environmental specialists, 
contract managers, etc. In addition, the financial institute ‘International Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)’ that 
provided project financing for THSR is also one of the target respondents. The organisations for questionnaire 
survey include: 
 
•  The 1
st Division of BHSR (function: design and supervision) 
•  The 2
nd Division of BHSR (function: civic engineering) 
•  The 3
rd Division of BHSR (function: mechanical/electrical engineering) 
•  The 4
th Division of BHSR (function: contract performance) 
•  The 5
th Division of BHSR (function: land acquisition) 
•  The 6
th Division of BHSR (function: safety and environment) 
•  ICBC (function: project financing) 
 
The liaise and coordinator is Mrs Chung/BHSR: Email: public@nthsr1.hsr.gov.tw; Tel# 886-2-8072-3333 ext 
8632, who agreed to assist the researcher to dispatch questionnaires to the members of the above organizations and 





The questionnaire survey was conducted by the following procedure:  
 
1.  The questionnaire will be sent out to the liaise and coordinator, Mrs Chung/BHSR. She will print out the 
questionnaire and dispatch about 60-70 copies of questionnaire to the respondents. 
2.  The liaise and coordinator, Mrs Chung/BHSR will collect the questionnaires back by the deadline of survey 
period, and then send them back to the researcher by airmail. 
3.  The questionnaire is designed with ‘Questionnaire Instructions’ before starting to answer questions. The 
liaise and coordinator, Mrs Chung/BHSR, would also help the respondents with how to answer the question. 
Moreover, the researcher leaves email and Skype contacts for question inquiry. 
4.  Without a clear standardised-definition, the sampled data for risk effect gathered from respondents would be 
inconsistent so that it would likely to mislead data interpretation. To reduce ambiguity and inconsistency, 
which is the ‘measurement error’ in statistical term that means the discrepancy between the respondents’ 
response mean and the sample true mean (Groves et al., 2004), the Table 1 ‘The Reference Matrix for 
Rating Risk Effects’, Table 2 ‘The Definition of Measure Dimensions for Risk Likelihood and Impact’, and 
Table 3 ‘The Definition of Risk Events’ are attached to the questionnaire so that the respondents would have 
clear definitions to complete the questionnaire. 
5.  There are 34 risk variables listed in questionnaire for rating the expected risk effects. 
6.  To meet a meaningful statistically large-sample condition (Anderson et al., 2002), 30-35 valid samples are 
expected to be returned for the research. The respondents who have working experience more than 5 years 
in a transit project are senior staff in public sector BHSR so that it is reasonable to think they can make 
more sensible decision than the junior staff that have working experience less than 3 years to estimate 
THSR project risks. If the research can gather more than 30 samples from the respondents who have more 
than 5-year working experience, then the samples collected from the respondents who have working 





The questionnaire survey will be conducted from 12th of Nov, 2007 to 30th of Nov, 2007. Each respondent was 
given 2 weeks to complete the questionnaire by 25
th of Nov. An additional 1 week will be given to those 





The questionnaire is designed as below. 
 
 
Part A: The Questionnaire Instructions 
 
•  This form would enable us to consistently measure and quantify the expected risk effect for Taiwan High 
Speed Rail project. 
•  1 to 25 rating scale is used to estimate risk effects. 
•  Please refer to the attached Table 1: ‘The Reference Matrix for Rating Risk Effect, which is used to guide the 
respondents to rate risk effect. The expected risk effect is defined by the ‘Impact’ and ‘Likelihood’ of a risk 
event. There are 5 dimensions for Impact (the vertical dimension of matrix) and Likelihood (the horizontal 
dimension of matrix) respectively, which is categorised as ‘Very Low’ ‘Low’ ‘Medium’ ‘High’ and ‘Very 
High.’ For example, if a risk event is perceived to have ‘Very High’ impact and ‘Medium’ likelihood, then 
two dimensions are intersected at ‘21’.  That is the risk effect for a specific risk event is 21.  
•  The 5-dimension for Impact and Likelihood is defined as Table 2. 
•  The definition for each risk event is listed in Table 3. 
•  Please refer to the attached Table 1-3, basing on your own perception of a risk effect on the THSR project, 
answer each question listed in Part B. Please check a proper rating for risk effect of a risk event. 
•  If you have any question about this questionnaire, please feel free to contact the researcher at email: 




Part B: The Questions 
 
•  Your background 
 
Please provide the following information about yourself: 
 
1.  Organisation in which you service: 
 The 1
st Division of BHSR (function: design and supervision) 
 The 2
nd Division of BHSR (function: civic engineering) 
 The 3
rd Division of BHSR (function: mechanical/electrical engineering) 
 The 4
th Division of BHSR (function: contract performance) 
 The 5
th Division of BHSR (function: land acquisition) 
 The 6
th Division of BHSR (function: safety and environment) 
 ICBC (function: project financing) 
 
2.  What is your job position: 
 Senior manager 
 Manager 
 Senior engineer 
 Engineer 
 Other; please specify:                                                                                                                                    
 
3.  Number of years of working experience in a mass transit project including Taiwan High Speed Rail project: 
 Less than 3 years 
 3 years to 5 years 
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•  Rating risk effects 
 
1.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘land unavailable’ at Construction phase? 
  






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
L        VL              L               M                 H               VH
 
2.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘resource unavailable’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)






L        VL              L               M                 H               VH       VL              L               M                 H               VH L
 
3.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘scope change’ at Construction phase and Operation? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)






L        VL              L               M                 H               VH       VL              L               M                 H               VH L
 
4.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘defective design’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)






L        VL              L               M                 H               VH       VL              L               M                 H               VH L
 
5.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘design changes’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)






L        VL              L               M                 H               VH       VL              L               M                 H               VH L
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6.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘defective construction’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)






L        VL              L               M                 H               VH       VL              L               M                 H               VH L
 
7.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25)of the risk 
event ‘construction changes’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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8.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘complex system interface/integration’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)






L        VL              L               M                 H               VH       VL              L               M                 H               VH L
 
 
9.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘failed commissioning tests’ at Construction phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
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10.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘low operating productivity’ at Operation phase? 
 
Operation Phase  I
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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11.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘system breakdown’ at Operation phase? 
 
Operation Phase  I
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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12.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘high maintenance frequency’ at Operation phase? 
 
Operation Phase  I
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)






      VL              L               M                 H               VH L
 
 
13.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘accidents and safety issues’ at Operation phase? 
 
Operation Phase  I
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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14.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘complex technologies’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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15.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘poor cooperation/coordination’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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16.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘finance unavailable’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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17.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘insolvency of contractor’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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18.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25)t of the 
risk event ‘ownership change delay’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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19.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘contractual disputes’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)






L        VL              L               M                 H               VH       VL              L               M                 H               VH L
 
20.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘inflexible contract arrangement’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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21.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘delay in contract change negotiation’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17 (  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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22.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘contract breach’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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23.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘default of subcontractor’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  17)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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24.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘latent defect’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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25.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘shorter asset life’ at Operation phase? 
 
Operation Phase  I
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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26.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘downside economic events’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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27.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘political interference’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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28.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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29.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘approval delay’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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30.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘law/policy changes’ at Construction phase and Operation phase)? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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31.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25)of the risk 
event ‘unforeseen site conditions’ at Construction phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
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32.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘greater environmental expectation’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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33.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘industrial disputes’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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34.  Basing on the definitions described in the attached Table 1-3, what is the expected risk effect (1-25) of the 
risk event ‘Force Majeure’ at Construction phase and Operation phase? 
 






(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
(   1)(   2)(   4)(   5)(   7)
(  17)(  19)(  22)(  24)(  25)
(  15)(  18)(  20)(  21)(  23)
(   9)(  12)(  13)(  14)(  16)
(   3)(   6)(   8)(  10)(  11)
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Table 2 The Definition of Measure Dimensions for Risk Likelihood and Impact   
Dimensions Likelihood  Impact 
Very High  Is expected to occur 
It would cause major cost overrun; schedule would be 
hopelessly lost with no chance of recovery; 
performance degradation is such that the system or 
facility is unusable. 
High 
Will probably occur in most 
instances. 
It would cause the budgeted cost estimates increased 
substantially; major slippage to delivery milestones; 
performance degradation has substantial impact on 
outcome and would severely degrade capability if not 
corrected. 
Medium  Might occur at some time. 
It would cause budgeted cost estimates increased 
noticeably and may be manageable within current 
contingency; some slippage to delivery milestones; 
performance degradation has noticeable effect on 
outcome and may be at the limit of acceptability. 
Low  May occur but only in 
exceptional circumstances. 
It would cause budgeted cost estimates increased 
slightly; minor slippage to delivery milestones; minor 
reduction in performance degradation but tolerable. 
Very Low  Not likely to occur. 
Budgeted cost estimates won’t exceed; no overall 
change to delivery milestones; negligible impact on 
performance anticipated; reduction in performance 








17 19 22 24 25 
15 18 20 21 23 
9  12 13 14 16 
3 6 8  10  11 
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Table 3 The Definition of Risk Events 
 
Risk Event  Definition 
1. Land unavailable  The term ‘land unavailable’ refers to the risk of costs and delays arising from 
acquiring lands for infrastructure construction. 
2. Resources unavailable  The term ‘resources unavailable’ refers to the possibility that the quantity or 
quality of the material resources such as equipment, facilities or materials, 
etc., the manpower resources such as manager, engineers, etc., and the energy 
resources such as water, power, gas, etc., cannot meet contract requirements 
so that they are unavailable for construction and/or operation. 
3. Performance unavailable  The term ‘performance unavailable’ refers to the possibility that the 
performance of asset are delayed or disrupted to deliver services set up in the 
output specifications. 
4. Scope changes  The term ‘scope changes’ refer to the risk that the originally agreed scope of 
work definition is changed after contracting signing whether pre or post 
commissioning, which will lead to additional costs and time delay. 
5. Defective design  The term ‘defective design’ refers to the risk that the design of facility does 
not achieve the required output specifications. 
6. Design changes  The term ‘design changes’ refers to the risk that the changes of originally 
agreed design or the correction of the defective design lead to additional costs 
and time delay. 
7. Defective construction  The term “defective construction” refers to the equipment, system or facility 
cannot meet the construction standards and requirements. 
8. Construction changes  The term ‘construction changes’ refers to the equipment, system or 
infrastructure need to be remedied or reworked due to construction defects or 
design changes. 
9. Complex system 
interface/integration 
The ‘complex system interface/integration’ refers to the designed and 
constructed infrastructure is unable to interface with or incompatible with 
other public systems, which may need the structural changes to design and 
construction work. As a result, it leads to the substantial cost overrun and 
delivery delay at construction phase. Even though it is able to interface with or 
compatible with the other public sector systems, it may lead to large upgrade 
and maintenance costs at operation phase. 
10. Failed commissioning tests  The ‘failed commissioning tests’ refers to the risk that either the physical or 
the operational commissioning tests which are required to be completed for 
the provision of services to commence, cannot be successfully completed or 
acceptable by the agreed date. 
11. Low operating productivity  The ‘low operating productivity’ refers to the risk that the system operating 
productivity is lower than the output specifications. 
12. System breakdown  The ‘system breakdown’ refers to the possibility that the system or facility 
cannot work, which leads to unexpected costs and additional time for services 
delivery. 
13. High maintenance frequency  The ‘high maintenance frequency’ refers to the risk that the additional cost 
and time delay to deliver services because the mean-time-between-repairs 
cannot meet the service output requirements. 
14. Accidents and safety issues  The ‘accidents and safety issues’ refers to the risk that the loss and time delay 
to deliver services due to the frequent accidents and safety issues which 
cannot meet the service output requirements. 
15. Complex technologies  The ‘complex technologies’ refers to the risks that the selected technology 
used for engineering or services is technically complex or expensive to 
maintain, or market volatility results in early obsolescence, or not innovated 
enough to keeping pace with competition and/or public requirements. 
16. Poor cooperation and 
coordination 
The ‘poor cooperation and coordination’ refers to the risk that the cooperation 
and coordination within a party and among different industrial parties 
including public party, private party and third parties cannot work well over 
contracting periods, which may lead to inefficient project performance and 
time delay at construction and operation phase. 
17. Insolvency of contractor  The ‘insolvency of contractor’ refers to the possibility of the insolvency of 
private party that it is unable to provide the required services. 
18. Ownership change delay  The ‘ownership change delay’ refers to the risk that a change in ownership 
would need additional time that would result in project performance delay. 
19. contractual disputes  The ‘contractual disputes’ refers to the risk of time delay and additional costs 
to solve contractual disputes. 
20. Inflexible contract 
arrangement 
The ‘inflexible contract arrangement’ refers to the risk of time delay and 
additional costs to change the contract contents due to inflexible contract   289
change mechanism. 
21. Delay in contract change 
negotiation 
The ‘delay in contract change negotiation’ refers to the risk of time delay to 
negotiate and arrange contract changes between the government authority and 
project contractor. 
22. Contract break  The ‘contract break’ refers to the risk of time delay and additional costs 
arising from being failed in meeting contract requirements. 
23. Default of subcontractors  The ‘default of subcontractors’ refers to the risk of subcontractors/suppliers or 
service providers go out of business or encounter difficulties in supplying the 
contracted services to specification through the required life of the capability 
due to insolvency or incapability, which leads to the construction risks or 
operation risks. 
24. Latent defects  The ‘latent defects’ refers to the possibility of loss or damage arising from 
latent defects within existing infrastructure that infringe the patents held by 
the third parties. 
25. Shorter asset life  The ‘shorter asset life’ refers to the risk that design life of the facility proves 
to be shorter than the planned, which lead to additional cost of upgrade. 
26. Downside economic events  The ‘downside economic events’ refers to the possibility that the demand for 
the services generated by a project may be less than projected due to the 
impact of specific downside economic events, which results in revenue below 
projections. 
27. Political interference  The ‘political interference’ refers to the possibility of unforeseeable conduct 
by the political parties that materially and adversely affect the public decision-
making process or project implementation. 
28. Unsuitable regulatory policy  The ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ refers to the possibility that the public 
regulatory policies do not reflect project investment expectations or do not 
reflect the public interests. 
29. Approve delays  The ‘approve delays’ refers to the delays to obtain the consents from each the 
government authorities. If obtained, the additional cost and time are required. 
30. Low/policy changes  The ‘low/policy changes’ refers to the risk of a change in law/policy will lead 
to the additional cost and time to comply with the change. 
31. Unforeseen site conditions  The ‘unforeseen site conditions’ refers to the unanticipated adverse site 
conditions such as unusual surface condition of geology and ground water are 
discovered, which will lead to additional construction time and cost. 
32. Greater environmental 
expectation 
The ‘greater environmental expectation’ refers to the possibility of greater 
environmental protection expectation on air, water and noise at the level 
which is greater than that of original environmental regulations and contract 
requirements. 
33. Industrial disputes  The ‘industrial disputes’ refers to the risk of strikes, industrial action, civil 
commotion, or public protests causing delay and cost to the project. 
34. Force Majeure  The ‘Force Majeure’ refers to the possibility of occurrence of naturally 
unexpected events like earthquake, storm, flood, etc. or man-made events like 
war, and fire that are beyond the control of both public and private parties 
which may affect the construction or operation of the project. 
 
Part C: The Results 
 
There were 43 questionnaires in total received by the 14
th of December 2007, which includes 13 copies from those 
respondents who have working experience more than 5 years; 24 copies from those who have working experience 
between 3 years to 5 years; 6 copies from those who have working experience less than 3 years. As stated above, 
the samples obtained from those who have working experience less than 3 years will be screened out. Therefore, 
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12 17  18  11  5  6  21 
15  20  24 22 20 12 14 
12  22  20 9 12 7 19 
16  21  10 19 17 14 20 
13  23  16 11 21 12 21 
16  19  12 19 15 13 22 
23  19  19 17 22 18 19 
17  21  13 17 19 11 22 
17  18  13 18 13 12 24 
24  17  16 16 16 17 17 
19  20  12 23  8  14 18 
23  24  17 15 11 14 21 
15  16  11 16 18 14 17 
14  24  14 13 22 12 19 
20  18  13 20 23 11 23 
22  16  19 20 20 15 16 
13  10  11 24 10 13 24 
22  21  7  18 10 13 16 
25  18  15  18  18 8 23 
20  15  21 16 20 15 11 
10  25  9 12 6 16  13 
14  22  17 19  9  15 20 
15  21  14 22  8  11 25 
18  23  21 14 19 19 20 
8  22  14 21 15 12 23 
21  23  15  20  14 4 13 
9  23  16 20 17 13 20 
21  13  17 17 14 11 16 
19  23  14 22  2  10 14 
11  20  23  23  12 8 22 
18  24  15 25 23 10 11 
6  14  18 14 13 10 24 
4 24  21  21  11  9  3 
11  11  20 22 25 10 18 
18  25  17  24  15 9 24 
7  22  18 15 16 13 15 
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Table 5 The Sample Data for the Expected Risk Effect on Operation Phase  
Force Majeure  default of 









20 23 20 21 5  10 
19 16 15 21 9  19 
23 15 24 21 10  7 
17 24 14 23 4  21 
21 25 22 13 3  16 
20 16 19 12 7  22 
23 24 22 13 5  20 
11 18 10 18 2  19 
25 19 12 22 10  24 
16 21 15 14 16  19 
21 15 15 14 8  13 
18 17 15 11 2  18 
19 24 20 16 18  15 
24 8 12  24 9 15 
14 18 16 15 11  24 
23 12 8 22 4  24 
19 10 17 16 11  23 
22 22 18 17 12  22 
12 21 13 8  6  22 
12 13 17 24 13  23 
9 22  14  24 8 23 
4  23 16 12 11  20 
24 23 18 15 3  13 
22 21 23 10 5  18 
22 13 18 6  8  14 
17 11 19 20 7  21 
14 18 23 9 14 12 
15 20 20 2  4  11 
21 22 21 18 6  25 
7 19  19  19 7 20 
18 20 21 20 6  14 
13 19 20 25 1  16 
24 22 17 19 9  21 
16 17 21 7 12 16 
18 14 12 23 7  5 
17 17 16 19 8  17 
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B. Risk measurement mechanism 
 
The researcher proposed a “univariate” mechanism that it used a risk matrix for the conversion of the 2 
dimensional measures of likelihood and impact into a single measure of risk with 1 to 25 ordinal numerical scales. 
There are two-dimension categorical data found in ‘Impact’ and ‘Likelihood’ in the risk matrix. The vertical 
dimension is Impact, which is categorized from Very Low (VL) to Very High (VH). The horizontal dimension is 
Likelihood, which is categorized from Very Low (VL) to (VH), too. Combining impact and likelihood data, there 
are 25 qualitative scales (categorical data) used to define and describe the risk effect shown in Table 1. These are 
then transformed into ordinal numerical scales for use as indicators to rate relative risk effect in the questionnaire 
survey.  
 The thesis research employed the method as advocated by Cooper et al. (2005) to transform 25 
qualitative scales to 25 ordinal numerical scales:  
(1)  Cooper et al. (2005) defined the risk factor (RF) from 0 (low) to 1(high) which reflect the likelihood 
of a risk arising and the severity of its impact. One of ways to calculate risk factors is formula of the 
product of the likelihood and consequence measures: 
 
RF=P*C 
Where P = risk likelihood measure, on a scale of 0 to 1; 
Where C = consequence measure, on a scale of 0 to 1. 
 
(2)  To represent the risk characteristics of Taiwan High Speed Rail project, the qualitative likelihood 
and impact scales should be converted to suitable numerical scales to calculate RF. After consulting 
with some of the project experts in BHSR, 1-9 and 5-1000 were used to respectively weigh 
qualitative likelihood and impact. As shown in Table 6, the qualitative likelihood scales from VL to 
VH are converted to 1-9 ordinal points. The product formula shown in (1) has one significant 
disadvantage that high impact but low likelihood may make it unwise to be allocated low risk 
factors (Cooper et al., 2005). For example, a catastrophic earthquake is a rare occurrence in Taiwan. 
But once it happens, it would have serious impact on the Taiwan High Speed Rail. Hence, to reduce 
this risk, a large range of scale with 5-1000 ordinal points was used to convert qualitative impact 
scales from VL to VH. The higher level of impact scales such as VH and H will have more 
weighted numerical points. For consistently comparative results, the numerical scales were 
normalized to a scale of 0 to 1 (Goodwin & Wright, 2004).  
(3)  With the product of normalized impact and likelihood scales, the 25 RF values for 25 qualitative 
scales in the 5 x 5 risk matrix were calculated as shown in Table 6. 
(4)  Based on the ranking of RF values, the 25 qualitative scales (categorical data) were thus 
transformed into 1-25 ordinal numerical scales (ordinal data) as shown in Table 7. If there is a tie, 
then following the logic described in (2) that the higher level of impact scales would have more 
weight so would have higher ranks is helpful.  
(5)  As a result, the procedure from (1) to (4) is exactly the logic for how the two-dimension categorical 
data were converted to a one-dimension ordinal data as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 6 RF Values in the Risk Matrix30   
Normalized  Numerical  Impact RF 
0.5479452  1000  VH  0.0228311 0.045662 0.1141553 0.1598174 0.205479 
0.3835616  700  H  0.0159817 0.031963 0.0799087 0.1118721 0.143836 
0.0547945  100  M  0.0022831 0.004566 0.0114155 0.0159817 0.020548 
0.0109589  20  L  0.0004566 0.000913 0.0022831 0.0031963 0.00411 
0.0027397  5  VL  0.0001142 0.000228 0.0005708 0.0007991 0.001027 
 
1 1825    VL  L  M  H VH  Likelihood
Numerical 1  2  5  7  9  24 
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(VH,VH) 0.2054  25 
(VH,H) 0.1598  24 
(H,VH) 0.1438  23 
(H,H) 0.1141  22 
(VH,M) 0.1118  21 
(H,M) 0.0799  20 
(VH,L) 0.0456  19 
(H,L) 0.0319  18 
(VH,VL) 0.0228  17 
(M,VH) 0.0205  16 
(H,VL) 0.0159  15 
(M,H) 0.0159  14 
(M,M) 0.0114  13 
(M,L) 0.0045  12 
(L,VH) 0.0041  11 
(L,H) 0.0031  10 
(M,VL) 0.0022  9 
(L,M) 0.0022  8 
(VL,VH) 0.001  7 
(L,L) 0.0009  6 
(VL,H) 0.0007  5 
(VL,M) 0.0005  4 
(L,VL) 0.0004  3 
(VL,L) 0.0002  2 
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Appendix V The Analysis of CLD 
 
 
V1.  Land unavailable 
 
The term, land unavailable, refers to the risk costs and delays arising from acquiring lands for infrastructure 
construction. As shown in Figure V1, the land unavailable risk event would cause construction delay due to the fact that there is 
no land available on which to start building an infrastructure (Hodge, 2004; Lu, 2004; The Work Bank, 1999). The construction 
delay would be likely to further cause the construction cost overrun risk event since the extra costs were incurred during 
maintenance of the purchased materials and equipment and paying for manpower during the construction time delay. 
Furthermore, the construction cost overrun risk event could possibly lead to finance unavailable risk event due to the risk of 
running out of money and having to borrow more money from other financial institutes. Consequentially, the unavailability of 
land would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) of more resources unavailable, more construction delays and more cost 
overruns. The construction delay also leads to the performance unavailable risk that the infrastructure will not be available for 
operation, thus resulting in revenue loss. In general, land unavailable risk would cause dynamic feedback effects on construction 
cost overruns during the construction phase and also on revenue loss during the operation phase respectively.  
The land unavailable risk would likely be triggered by the industrial disputes risk event that would result should 
residents protest against the unsatisfied land acquisition costs or the environment and ecology impact (Hodge, 2004; Lu, 2004; 























Figure V1 Causal Loop Diagram for ‘Land Unavailable’ Risk Event 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. as a BOOT contract for the City Link 
road infrastructure project in Melbourne. It was one of the Australia’s largest public BOOT infrastructure projects, costing 
AUD$2.1 billion. Due to delays for land available by the agreed date, the government authority was liable for costs associated 
with those delays incurred by project contractor, Transurban, (Hodge, 2004). In addition, Lu (2004) in the Yangtze Three Gorges 
Project (China) indicated that this lead to delays in project progress due to expensive land acquisition and difficult resident 
relocation. The Work Bank’s report (Work Bank, 1999) also reflected that the PPP contract for the Bangkok Second Stage 
Expressway had the same problem in that the government authority transferred the land too late to the project contractor, 
Bangkok Expressway Company Limited (BECL) due to the land acquisition difficulties. 
 
V2.  Resources unavailable 
 
The term, resources unavailable, refers to the possibility that the quantity or quality of the material resources of 
equipment, facilities or materials, and the like, the manpower resources such as manager, engineers, and the like, and the energy 
resources such as water, power, gas, and the like cannot meet contract requirements, and therefore are unavailable for 
construction and/or operation. 
As shown in Figure V2, the resources unavailable risk event would cause construction delays due to inadequate 
quantity and quality of manpower, materials and equipment for building infrastructure (NAO, 2004a; Work Bank, 1999). The 
construction delays would likely cause construction cost overruns risk event since the extra costs were incurred while 
maintaining the purchased materials, equipment and paying for the recruited manpower during the construction time delay. 
Furthermore, the construction cost overrun risk would possibly result in the finance unavailable risk due to expenditure of money 
borrowed from the financial institutes. This would likely cause the event of resources unavailable due to insufficient funds for 
manpower, materials and equipment required to build infrastructure. Consequently, it would create a vicious circle (the positive 
loop 1) to cause more risk in construction delay and construction cost overrun. The construction delay would also result in 
performance unavailable because the infrastructure would not be ready to deliver its services. This would lead to revenue loss, 
with not enough credit to repay the debt, which will result in financial unavailable. Consequently, it would create a vicious circle 
(the positive loop 2) to cause yet again more risk in resources unavailable so that performance unavailable resulting in more 
revenue loss. At the operation stage, the resources unavailable risk event would directly cause low operating productivity event 
due to inadequate quantity and quality of manpower, materials and equipment which are required to deliver its services 
efficiently (NAO, 2004a; PAC, 2005b). It would lead to revenue loss which would cause financial unavailable again, which will 
create a vicious circle (the positive loop 3) to cause more risk in resource unavailable which leads to more low operating 
productivity and then more revenue loss. The low operating productivity would also directly cause performance unavailable since 
the adequate quantity and quality of manpower, materials and equipment is not available to operate the whole infrastructure. It 
would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 4) to cause revenue loss which leads to financial unavailable and more risk in 
resource unavailable. Finally, the resources unavailable risk event would result in dynamic feedback effects on construction cost 


































Figure V2 Causal Loop Diagram for ‘Resources Unavailable’ Risk Event 
 
The resources unavailable risk event would be likely to be triggered by the default of subcontractors risk events that 
the subcontractors are incapable of supplying materials, equipment, and manpower to build or operate the infrastructure (Hodge, 
2004; NAO, 2006). The financial unavailable risk event is when the project contractor has insufficient capital to purchase 
materials, equipment or manpower required to build infrastructure  (PAC, 2006a). The industrial disputes risk events include 
strikes, industrial action, civil commotion, or public protests, which would cause materials, equipment, and manpower that 
cannot be supplied in time (EC, 2003). The Force Majeure risk events like earthquake, storm, flood, war, and fire, etc. make 
supply for materials, equipment or manpower unavailable (EC, 2002; Grey, 2004). 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases, the UK 
National Audio Office’s report (NAO, 2004a) on the London Underground indicated that they are unclear for both of the PPP 
project operation contractor, LUL, and infrastructure construction contractors, Infracos, to sustain and develop staff skilled to run 
PPP contract for the Tube network. In a report, the members of the UK Public Account Committee (PAC) for PFI criticized the 
fact that the professional skills for PFI contract management were not sustained for the operational phase due to unnecessary staff 
changes (PAC, 2005b). In addition, the Work Bank officials reported that staff changes were problematic in that there was not 
enough skilled personnel to deal with the PPP contract for the Bangkok Elevated Road and Track System (Work Bank, 1999). Lu 
(2004) indicated in a case study on BOT contract for the Labin B Power Plant (China) that the government officials took the 
materials unavailable risk to guarantee the fuel supply. Furthermore, the PFI contract for the BBC’s White City 2 Development 
indicated that the space and technical capacity at White City 2 were under-utilized because experienced staff with professional 
skills were not utilized (PAC, 2006b). 
 
V3.  Performance unavailable 
 
The term performance unavailable refers to the possibility that asset performance is delayed or disrupted to deliver 
services outlined in the output specifications. As shown in Figure V3, the performance unavailable risk event would delay or 
disrupt the services so that the operating contractor cannot meet the contract performance requirements, resulting in a contract 
breach (Hodge, 2004; PAC, 2005a). This would cause a  contract remedies/penalties  risk event in which the operating contractor 
must pay for the penalties and problems fixing costs according to contract terms and conditions (PAC, 2005a). The greater the 
cost for fixing a problem, the greater the loss for services. In addition, performance unavailable event would likely cause the 
contract disputes risk event that would cause contracting parties to argue over who should be held accountable for defective 
issues (Hodge, 2004). The more contract disputes exist between parties, the more contract remedies/penalties are incurred to 
settle the disputes. Therefore, the contract remedies/penalties risk event arising from contract break or contract disputes would 
lead to revenue loss risk event. Moreover, the performance unavailable would directly cause revenue loss because the 
infrastructure cannot deliver its services (Hodge, 2004). The cumulative revenue loss would likely cause the financial unavailable 
risk resulting in the lack of adequate credits by the contractor to pay debt. This would likely cause the insolvency of contractor 
risk event so that the contractor was unable to provide the services. Consequently, this would lead to a performance unavailable 
event again. This would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1.) 
Furthermore, the performance unavailable event would cause a contract breach risk event when the operating parties 
could not provide services to meet the contract requirements. This event would lead to termination liability for which the 
operating parties pay according to the contract terms and conditions (Work Bank, 1999). This would result in revenue loss risk 
event and then financial unavailable. Consequently, these events create a vicious cycle (the positive loop 2) at performance 
unavailable risk again. As stated above, the financial unavailable risk event would likely result in resources unavailable because 
the project contractor would not have enough capital to purchase materials, equipment or manpower that are required to operate 
the infrastructure. This would also create a vicious circle (the positive loop 3) at performance unavailable risk. In general, the 

























































Figure V3 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Performance Unavailable’ Risk Event 
 
The performance unavailable risk event would be likely to be triggered by several risk events such as the resource 
unavailable event (NAO, 2004a; PAC, 2005b; Work Bank, 1999) that the materials, equipment, and manpower of the contractor 
cannot meet the operation requirements for infrastructure; the construction delay event (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004; Hodge, 
2004; Work Bank); failed commissioning tests, and inspection and testing delay events (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont) in which 
infrastructure is inoperable; and low operating productivity (EC, 2004c). System breakdown (Hodge), high maintenance 
frequency (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont) and accidents and safety issues (EC, 2002; NAO, 2004a) lead to the infrastructure that 
cannot be operated under normal conditions so that the contractor performance cannot meet the contract requirements; 
insolvency of contractor events occur (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont) which result in bankruptcy and the incapability to operate the 
infrastructure. Shorter asset life (EC, 2002; NAO, 2004a) occurs when the infrastructure is disposed of and thereby contracts can 
no longer deliver services. Industrial disputes (EC, 2003; Ghosh & Jintanapakanont) occur when strikes, industrial action, civil 
commotion, or public protests result in the inability to supply materials, equipment, and manpower  to operate the infrastructure. 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. The members of the 
European Commission reported (EC, 2002) on the London Underground and indicated both the PPP project operation contractor, 
LUL, and infrastructure construction contractors, Infracos, should assume the responsibility to make the railway infrastructure 
available and in working condition. The members of the UK Public Accounts Committee criticized the government authority for 
not terminating the contract with the PFI project service contractor, LUL, when the LUL officials failed to deliver the project and 
broke the contract with London Underground (PAC, 2005a). Moreover, Hodge (2004) indicated in the Melbourne City Link case 
study that the project contractor, Transurban, initiated an AUD$37 million claim against the government authority for less 
demand and subsequent financial loss due to contract breach. 
 
V4.  Scope changes 
 
The term scope changes refers to the probability that the originally agreed upon scope of work outlined at the contract 
agreement has been changed after contracting signing, either pre- or post-commissioning. This event leads to additional costs and 
time delays in a project. 
As shown in Figure V4, the scope changes risk event would naturally cause design changes and construction changes 
risks (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004) thus leading to further to construction delays. At the construction stage, the construction 
delay would likely lead to construction cost overruns (PAC, 2006a) due to the extra costs incurred in maintaining materials and 
equipment, and paying for manpower during the delay. This event would lead to the financial unavailable risk event resulting in 
bankruptcy. The construction party would likely reduce scope changes due to inadequate funds being available for the originally 
agreed scope of work definition. This would create a vicious cycle (the positive loop 1) to increase risk in scope changes, which 
would cause more risks in construction delays and construction cost overruns. At the construction stage, scope changes would 
also directly cause delay in contract change negotiation risk events (NAO, 2004a; PAC, 2003c) in which the parties involved in 
the design and construction take time to negotiate an agreement for scope changes. All of these risk events would be likely to 
cause further construction delay risk events, consequently creating a vicious cycle (the positive loop 2) to make more risk in 
scope changes.  
Furthermore, the financial unavailable would lead to resources unavailable due to a lack of funds to recruit manpower, 
and purchase materials and equipment for construction, therefore causing construction delays. This also would create a vicious 
cycle (the positive loop 3) and increase risk in construction delays. On the other hand, at the operation stage the construction 
delays would cause performance unavailable events so that the asset performance would be delayed or disrupted in the delivery 
of services until after completing the construction changes. This would lead to increased risk in revenue loss, causing more risk 
in financial unavailable. As a result, the operation party would likely ask to reduce scope changes due to money shortage in order 
to deliver the originally agreed scope of services. Consequently, this too would create a vicious cycle (the positive loop 4) to 


















































Figure V4 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Scope Changes’ Risk Event 
 
Furthermore, as stated above, the financial unavailable event would likely lead to the resources unavailable event due 
to insufficient capital to recruit manpower and purchase materials and equipment for performance. This too would create a 
vicious cycle (the positive loop 5) to cause yet again more risk in performance unavailable and more risk in revenue loss. In 
general, the scope changes risk event would result in dynamic feedback effects on construction cost overruns during construction 
phase and revenue losses during operation phase, respectively.  
The scope changes risk event would likely be triggered by several risk events such as: (a) the financial unavailable 
event (PAC, 2006a) in which the contractors would have inadequate funds to deliver the originally agreed scope of services as 
outlined in the output specification; (b) law/policy changes (EC, 2002) in which the output specification would be changed to 
follow the government authorities policy changes; (c) political interference (EC, 2004d) in that the output specification originally 
set up in the PPP contract might be against the political benefits with certain political implications; (d) industrial disputes (EC, 
2003) indicating that the output specification originally set up in PPP contract may be controversial and therefore forced to 
change by public protests; (d) Force Majeure (Lu, 2004) in which the uncontrolled events such as natural and unforeseen man-
made events would make the scope of output specification changed.  
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the case, it would 
happen in Channel Tunnel Rail Link. The members of the UK Public Account Committee (PAC) reported that the Section 2 of 
Link will open in 2007, but that the costs will exceed budget mainly due to changes to the works (PAC, 2006a). In addition, 
Ghosh & Jintanapakanont (2004) in their case study in the Thailand Underground Rail Project demonstrated that the scope 
changes for work definition is the most important factor in project delivery. 
 
V5.  Defective design 
 
The term “defective design” refers to the probability that the design of facility does not achieve the required output 
specifications. 
As shown in Figure V5, the defective design risk event would cause defective construction at the construction stage 
since construction depends on design. Then, the defective construction would incur contract remedies/penalties risk to fix 
defective issues, which would further result in design changes and construction changes. (Hodge, 2004; Lu, 2004) The more 
construction changes occur, the more construction delays occur. 
As described, the extra costs incurred in maintaining the existing materials and equipment, purchasing new materials 
and equipment and paying for recruited manpower during the construction time delay lead to construction cost overruns which 
likely lead to the finance unavailable event due to running out of money for construction. This would result in resources 
unavailable event and increased risk in defective design since the construction parties would not have adequate money to employ 
qualified, skillful design engineers. Consequently, this would create a vicious cycle (the positive loop 1) causing increased risk in 
defective design, and more risk in construction delay and construction cost overrun. Moreover, at the operating stage, the 
defective construction would also cause the performance unavailable event because the asset might not be available to deliver 
services. It would lead to a contract remedies/penalties risk to fix defective issues, which would further result in design changes 
and construction changes. As described above, the more construction changes exist, the more construction delays occur. It would 
lead to performance unavailable events because the infrastructure would not be ready to deliver services. Therefore, this would 
create a vicious circle (the positive loop 2) causing increased risk in construction delays, and more risks in performance 
unavailable events.  
At operation stage, the performance unavailable event due to defective construction would be likely to cause the 
contract disputes risk event so that contract parties argue about who should be responsible for defective issues. The more contract 
disputes occur, the more contract remedies/penalties would incur to settle the disputes. All of the contract remedies/penalties 
actions arising from contract breach and contract disputes would lead to revenue loss, resulting in insufficient credit to repay the 
debt and would result in the financial unavailable event. This would cause resources to be unavailable and performance 
unavailable because the operating party has inadequate funds to acquire materials, equipment and manpower from the suppliers 
in order to deliver service. Consequently it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 3) with increased risk in performance 
unavailable events and more risk in revenue loss. Generally, the defective design risk event would result in a dynamic feedback 
effect on construction cost overruns during the construction phase and revenue losses during the operation phase, respectively.  















































Figure V5 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Defective Design’ Risk Event 
 
The defective design risk event would be likely be triggered by the default of subcontractors (Hodge, 2004), meaning 
that it cannot meet contract specification due to insolvency or incapability of design subcontractors. Resources unavailable events 
occur when the designer cannot meet contract specification because of insufficiently qualified manpower (Lu, 2004; NAO, 2004a; 
PAC, 2005b; PAC, 2006b). 
This risk has been described in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. Hodge (2004) indicated that relative to the Melbourne City Link 
a major consortium subcontractor, TOVJ, initiated litigation against the project consortium, Transurban, alleging flaws in the 
design of two faulty City Link tunnels.  
 
V6.  Design changes 
 
The term design changes refers to the possibility that the changes of originally agreed design or the correction of the 

































Figure V6 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Design Changes’ Risk Event 
 
As described above, the Figure V6 shows that the design changes risk event would cause construction change events 
(PAC, 2006b) since the construction depends on the design. The more construction changes occur, the more construction delays 
would occur. The construction delays would lead to construction cost overruns at the construction stage, which would likely lead 
to finance unavailable events due to lack of money for construction. It would result in more risks in resources unavailable events 
and more risk in construction delays since the construction parties would not have adequate funds for employment. Again, this 
would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) and cause more risk in construction delay, and more construction cost overruns. 
This would also lead to performance unavailable event as the infrastructure would not be ready to deliver its services, resulting in 
revenue loss. Revenue loss would lead to financial unavailable events since there would not be enough credit to repay the debt. 
Furthermore, as previously described, the financial unavailable event would likely lead to a resources unavailable event because 
there would be inadequate amounts of money for the required tasks and resources. Consequently, it would create a vicious circle 
(the positive loop 2) and cause increased risk in performance unavailable events and more risk in revenue loss. In general, the   299
design changes would cause dynamic feedback effects on construction cost overruns during construction phase and revenue 
losses during operation phase, respectively.  
The design changes risk event would possibly be triggered by the risk events such as: (a) scope changes (PAC, 2006a) 
which result when design or construction parameters need to be changed to meet the new scope requirements; and (b) contract 
remedies/penalties (Hodge, 2004; PAC, 2006b) because the remedies for poor performance failed to meet output specifications. 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As in the PFI contract for 
the BBCs White City 2 Development, the members of the UK Public Account Committee (PAC) criticized the fact that £60 
million was needed for additional costs (an increase of 29%) due to the design changes. Introducing variations after contracting 
inevitably increase risk costs (PAC, 2006b). In addition, Hodge (2004) indicated that the tunnel in the Melbourne City Link 
project needed to be redesigned after experts discovered it had defective construction; this led to delays in the tunnel opening. 
Furthermore, the Ghosh and Jintanapakanont (2004) reflected in their case study of the Thailand Underground Rail Project that 
design change is one of the most important factors regarding project delivery. 
 
V7.  Construction cost overrun 
 
The term construction cost overrun refers to the possibility that the infrastructure is incapable of delivering within the 
budget. As shown in Figure V7, the construction cost overrun risk event would possibly lead to finance unavailable events due to 
inadequate capital availability for construction (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Reilly, 2005). This would likely lead to resources 
unavailable events in which there was not enough money to purchase materials and equipment, or to recruit skilful manpower for 
infrastructure. These events would result in construction delays in the construction phase and then construction cost overruns due 
to the need for purchasing new materials and equipment and paying for recruited manpower during the construction time delay. 
This creates a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) causing more risk in resources unavailable events, and more construction delays 
and cost overruns.  
On the other hand, the construction delays would also cause performance unavailable events because the 
infrastructure might not be ready to deliver services. It would also lead to revenue loss since there would be insufficient credit to 
repay the debt, resulting in financial unavailable events. Consequently, this would create a vicious cycle (the positive loop 2) 
causing more risk in resources unavailable events resulting in more construction delays and performance unavailable events 






























FigureV7 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Construction Cost Overrun’ Risk Event 
 
The construction cost overrun event is often triggered by risk events such as: (a) construction delays resulting in extra 
costs incurred during the construction time delay; and (b) price escalation which is the unexpected increase in the labor costs, 
materials and equipments used for infrastructure construction (Hodge, 2004). Contract remedies/penalties is defined as the extra 
costs for remedies for defective construction which had failed to meet contract requirements (Hodge). Insurance increase occurs 
when the agreed project insurances substantially increases during the construction stage (Lu, 2004). 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. Many researchers have 
found (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Reilly, 2005) that in 9 out of 10 transport infrastructure projects, costs are underestimated resulting 
in cost overruns. For rail projects, actual costs are on average 45% higher than estimated costs (standard deviation =38). For all 
project types, the actual costs are 28% higher than the estimated costs (standard deviation = 39). Cost underestimation and cost 
overruns across 20 nations and 5 continents appear to be a global phenomenon that has not decreased over the past 70 years. For 
example, in the Boston, Massachusetts artery/tunnel project in the US, there is 196% of cost overruns; 110% of cost overruns 
exist for Great Belt rail tunnel in Denmark, 100% of cost overruns exist for Shinkansen Joetsu rail line in Japan; and 80% cost 
overruns exist for Channel tunnel in the UK and France, respectively. 
 
V8.   Construction delay 
 
The term construction delay refers to the possibility that the officials of the facility are incapable of delivering on time. 
As discussed, Figure V8 shows that the construction delay risk events would likely cause construction cost overrun risk events 
because of the extra costs incurred during the construction time delay. Then, the construction cost overrun risk event would lead   300
to a finance unavailable event due to lack of capital. This event then leads to resources unavailable events because of inadequate 
funds for materials and manpower for infrastructure construction. A construction delay would result. Again, the vicious circle 











































Figure V8 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Construction Delay’ Risk Event 
 
On the other hand, the construction delay events would also cause performance unavailable events since the 
infrastructure would not be ready to deliver its services. This would lead to revenue loss based on bad credit issues which will 
result in financial unavailable events. Consequently, the positive loop 2 would cause yet again more risk in construction delays so 
that more performance unavailable events would result in more revenue loss. Furthermore, at the operating stage, the resources 
unavailable event would directly cause performance unavailable events due to the lack of materials or manpower for 
infrastructure performance. Positive loop 3 would cause increased risk in revenue loss. In general, the construction delay risk 
event would result in dynamic feedback effects on construction cost overruns during construction phase and revenue losses 
during the operation phase. 
 
The construction delay would be likely to be triggered by the risk events such as: (a) land unavailable events (Hodge, 
2004; Lu, 2004; Work Bank, 1999) which is when the land cannot be acquired on time for infrastructure construction; (b) 
resources unavailable events (NAO, 2004a; Work Bank) created when the required materials, equipments and manpower are not 
ready for construction; (c) construction changes (Hodge) which occur when additional time is needed to complete construction; 
(d) complex system interface/integration(PAC, 2005a) which is a likely delay in design and construction work since the designed 
and constructed infrastructure is incompatible with other public systems; (e) delays in contract change negotiation (Hodge; NAO, 
2004b; PAC, 2003c) which is the additional time needed to reach an agreement between parties for construction changes; (f) 
contract remedies/penalties (EC, 2002; Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004; Hodge) when time is needed to remedy construction 
problems in order to meet contract requirements; (g) inspection/testing delays (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont) when there is a delay 
in project commissioning because of additional time needed to passing inspection and testing; (h) approval delay occurs when the 
permits or licenses needed to proceed with construction as scheduled are delayed in processing; (i) industrial disputes (EC, 2003; 
Hodge) cause the time delay due to strikes, industrial action, civil commotion or public protests.  
These risks have been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. Hodge (2004) indicated 
the government authority was to pay for construction delays due to delays arising from land acquisition and industrial disputes in 
the Melbourne City Link project. Moreover, Ghosh and Jintanapakanont (2004) reflected on the Thailand Underground Rail 
Project that construction delay was one of the most important factors leading to project delivery delay.  
  
V9.  Defective construction 
 
The term defective construction refers to the situation in which the equipment, system or facility cannot meet the 
construction standards and requirements. As shown in Figure V9, the defective construction would cause failed commission tests 
(Hodge, 2004) at the end of construction stage that the facilities cannot pass the operating tests. This results in a contract 
remedies/penalties risk to fix defect issues which would result in design changes and construction changes. The more 
construction changes, the more construction delays would occur. As described above, the extra costs incurred in maintaining the 
existing materials and equipment, purchasing new materials and equipment and paying for recruited manpower during the 
construction time delay would lead to construction cost overruns.  













































































Figure V9 Cause Loop Diagram for “Defective Construction” Risk Event 
 
This fact would likely cause finance unavailable events due to lack of money for construction. This would further 
result in more risk in resources unavailable events which would likely cause more risk in defective design and more risk in 
defective construction since the construction parties may lack money. Consequently, this would create a vicious circle (the 
positive loop 1) causing more risk in defective construction, more risk in construction delay and construction cost overruns.  
On the other hand, the defective construction would possibly cause a series of risk events at the operation stage such 
as: (a) low operating productivity (EC, 2004a; Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004) which exists when system operating productivity 
is lower than the output specification that was setup in the contract requirements; (b) high maintenance frequency (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont) which occurs when the maintenance frequency is higher than expected so that the system cannot deliver service 
as required; (c) system breakdown (Hodge, 2004) when that system would completely fail to deliver services; (d) accidents and 
safety issues (Hodge) which occur when the system cannot be operated as safely as the contract required; (d) shorter asset life 
(EC, 2002; NAO, 2004a) occurs when the system has a shorter life than the expected time set up in the contract output 
specifications. All of these would lead to performance unavailable events in which the infrastructure is not able to deliver 
services as required in the contract output specifications. The more performance unavailable events occur, the more revenue loss 
occurs as well. This fact would be likely to cause financial unavailable events which would result in more risk in resources 
unavailable events in which the contract parties do not have adequate money to employ the required materials, equipment and 
manpower from suppliers to deliver services. Consequently, this creates a vicious circle (the positive loop 2) causing more risk in 
defective construction. In addition, performance unavailable events would lead to contract breaches that result in infrastructure 
performance inability to meet contract requirements. This would necessitate construction remedies/penalties risk events to fix 
defect issues. This would likely cause contract disputes risk events in which contract parties argue with each other relative to who 
should be responsible for defect issues. The more contract disputes occur, the more contract remedies/penalties costs would incur 
to settle the disputes. The contract remedies/penalties would result in design changes and construction changes yet again thus 
causing more risk in construction delay. Consequently, this again creates the vicious circle (the positive loop 3) causing more risk 
in performance unavailable events and more risk in revenue loss. 
Furthermore, the resources unavailable events would create two vicious circles (the positive loop 4 and loop 5) 
causing more risk in performance unavailable events and low operating productivity respectively since there would not be 
adequate money to secure the required materials, equipment and manpower from suppliers to deliver service. In general, the 
defective construction risk event would result in dynamic feedback effects on construction cost overrun during construction 
phase and revenue losses during operation phase respectively.  
The defective construction events would be likely to be triggered by the following situations: (a) the defective design 
event (Hodge, 2004) in which the design created cannot meet output specifications; (b) default of subcontractors (EC, 2002; 
Hodge, 2004; NAO, 2006; PAC, 2002a) so that the construction provider cannot meet contract requirements because the 
subcontractors are incapable or insolvent; (c) resources unavailable event (Lu, 2004; NAO, 2004a; PAC, 2002a, 2006b; Work 
Bank, 1999) such that the quantity and quality of the materials, equipment, and manpower required for construction are 
inadequate; (d) complex system interface/integration (PAC, 2002a; PAC, 2005a) in which the constructed system is difficult to 
interface with or incompatible with other public systems. 
This type of risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. Hodge (2004) 
indicated relative to the Melbourne City Link project that a major consortium subcontractor, TOVJ, needed to pay the project 
contractor, Transurban AUD$153.6 millions to settle a dispute over delays and traffic problems caused by faulty construction. 
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V10.   Construction changes 
 
The term construction changes refers to the possibility that the equipment, system or infrastructure need to be 
remedied or rework due to construction defects or design changes. As described, Figure V10 shows that the construction changes 
would cause construction delay events because the extra time would be needed to remedy construction. The more construction 
changes occur, the more construction delays would result. The construction delays would lead to construction cost overruns at 
the construction stage which would likely lead to finance unavailable events due to lack of money for construction completion. 
This would result in more risk in resources unavailable events and more risk in construction delays since the construction parties 
would not have sufficient monies to employ qualified and skilled construction manpower. Consequently, this would create a 
vicious circle (the positive loop 1) and cause more risk in construction delays and more risk in construction cost overruns. This 
would also lead to performance unavailable events that preclude the delivery of the infrastructure for services. This would result 
in revenue loss which causes finance unavailable events since there would not be enough credit available to repay the debt. 
Furthermore, the financial unavailable event would likely to lead to resources unavailable events because there would not be 
enough money to recruit manpower, purchase materials and equipment for performance completion. Again, this would create a 
vicious circle (the positive loop 2) causing more risk in performance unavailable events and more risk in revenue losses. In 
general, the construction changes would result in dynamic feedback effects on construction cost overruns during the construction 





























Figure V10 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Construction Changes’ Risk Event 
 
Construction changes would be likely to be triggered by design changes (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004; Hodge, 
2004; PAC, 2006b; Work Bank, 1999) because the construction depends on design. This risk has been described in the secondary 
data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. Hodge (2004) indicated relative to the Melbourne City Link case study that the 
operation of the southern section of City Link was delayed a year due to work remedies needed for tunnel cracking and leaking. 
 
V11.   Complex system interface/integration 
 
The complex system interface/integration refers to the probability that the designed and constructed infrastructure is 
unable to interface with or incompatible with other public systems. This might necessitate the need for major changes for design 
and construction work. As a result, this leads to the substantial cost overruns and delivery delays in construction phase. Even 
though a project may be able to interface with or be compatible with the other public sector systems, this interface may lead to 
large upgrade and maintenance costs in the project operation phase.  
As shown in Figure V11, the complex system interface/integration would likely cause defective construction because 
the constructed system may be difficult to interface with or may be incompatible with other public systems (PAC, 2002a, 2005a). 
Then further consequences arise as a result of defective construction as described above in Section (9) Defective construction. In 
general, the complex system interface/integration risk event would result in dynamic feedback effects on construction cost 
overruns during the construction phase and revenue losses during the operation phase.  
The complex system interface/integration would likely be triggered by the complex/innovative technology when 
applied technology is not able to solve the system interface/integration issues (NAO, 2006). 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. This type of risk has 
occurred in the London Underground. The members of the UK Public Account Committee (PAC) reported that because of 
interface issues, the Central line modernization and the Jubilee line extension of London Underground were both substantially 
over budget and the contractors did not deliver the improvements envisaged at the commencement of the projects. The London 
Underground PPP projects involved complex interface across the entire network of the current systems. Such issues can create 
the potential risk costs associated with logistical complexities in managing and maintaining many interfaces between the new 
assets and old assets, and a significant level of difficulties in integrating asset varieties such as signals, tracks and trains across 
the 11 lines in the London Underground network (PAC, 2005a). 
One of the other cases the researcher examined was the Airwaves project which had high risk events in complex 
system interface/integration aspects. A key requirement for this PPP project was the need for interoperability of new radio 






















































































































Figure V12 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Failed Commission Tests’ Risk Event 
 
V12.  Failed commissioning tests 
 
The failed commissioning tests refers to the possibility that the operational commissioning tests which are required to 
be completed before starting services cannot be successfully completed or acceptable by the agreed date. As shown in Figure 
V12, the failed commissioning tests arise when officials at facilities cannot pass the operating tests arising from defective 
construction risks because the built infrastructure could not meet the contract requirements.  
This would lead contract remedies/penalties risks in order to correct defective issues (Hodge, 2004) thus resulting in 
design changes and construction changes. The more construction changes occur, the more construction delays result. As 
described, the extra costs incurred in maintaining the existing materials and equipment, purchasing new materials and equipment 
and paying for recruited manpower during the construction time delay would lead to construction cost overruns which would 
likely lead to finance unavailable events due to lack of money for final construction. This would result in more risk in resources 
unavailable events likely leading to more risk in defective design and more risk in defective construction since the construction   304
parties would not have adequate money to employ qualified and skilled design and construction engineers. Consequently, this 
would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) causing more risk in defective construction and more risk in failed 
commissioning tests.  
The failed commissioning tests would lead to performance unavailable events which cause the inability of the 
infrastructure to deliver services as required in the contract output specifications (Hodge, 2004). The more performance 
unavailable occurs, the more revenue loss results. This would likely lead to financial unavailable events resulting in more risk of 
resources unavailable events as the contract parties do not have adequate money to employ the required materials, equipment and 
manpower from suppliers to deliver services. Consequently, this would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 2) causing more 
risk of defective construction and then more risk of failed commission tests. In addition, performance unavailable events would 
lead to contract breach so that infrastructure performance cannot meet contract requirements. It would then be necessary for 
officials to invoke construction remedies/penalties in order to fix defect issues.  
This would also cause contract disputes risk events as the contract parties argue with each other for whom should be 
take responsibility for defect issues. The more contract disputes occur, the more contract remedies/penalties would incur to settle 
the disputes. The contract remedies/penalties would result in design changes and construction changes which would cause more 
risk in construction delays. Consequently, this would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 3) causing more risk in 
performance unavailable events and more risk in revenue loss.  
Furthermore, the resources unavailable events would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 4) causing more risk in 
performance unavailable events since there would not be adequate money to employ the required materials, equipment and 
manpower from suppliers to deliver services. In general, the failed commissioning tests would cause dynamic feedback effects on 
construction cost overruns during the construction phase and revenue losses during operation phase. 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. Hodge (2004), in the 





































Figure V13 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Low operating productivity’ Risk Event 
 
V13.  Low operating productivity 
 
Low operating productivity refers to the possibility that the system operating productivity is lower than the output 
specifications. 
As shown in Figure V13, the low operating productivity would lead to performance unavailable events which cause 
the infrastructure not to be able to deliver services as required in the contract output specification (EC, 2004a; Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont, 2004). The more performance unavailable events occur, the more revenue losses result. This would cause 
financial unavailable events which would result in more risk of resources unavailable events in which the contract parties do not 
have adequate money to employ the required materials, equipment and manpower from suppliers to deliver services. 
Consequently, this would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) causing more risk of low operating productivity and then 
more risk of performance unavailable events. 
In addition, the resources unavailable events would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 2) causing more risk of 
performance unavailable events since there would not be adequate money to employ the required materials, equipment and 
manpower from suppliers to deliver services. Furthermore, performance unavailable events would lead to contract breaches as 
the infrastructure performance party cannot meet contract requirements. This would make it necessary for contract 
remedies/penalties to be invoked to fix defective issues. This would likely cause contract disputes risk events in which the 
contract parties argue with each other in order to determine who should take responsibility for defective issues. The more 
contract disputes occur, the more contract remedies/penalties incur in order to settle the disputes. The contract remedies/penalties 
would result in revenue losses which would cause more risk of finance unavailable events. Consequently, this would create a   305
vicious circle (the positive loop 3) causing more risk performance unavailable events and more risk of revenue loss. In general, 
the low operating productivity risk events would result in dynamic feedback effects on revenue loss during the operation phase. 
The low operating productivity would be likely to be triggered by such events as: (a) the defective construction as the 
contracted infrastructure cannot deliver the services as required in the PPP contract (EC, 2004a; Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004); 
(b) the resources unavailable events occurring that affect the quantity and quality of the materials, equipment and manpower 
required for operations that make them inadequate (NAO, 2004a; PAC, 2005b); (c) high frequency of maintenance events caused 
by the constructed system needing to be maintained in a higher frequency than expected resulting in the inability to deliver 
services as required. 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As shown in European 
Committees case studies (EC, 2004b) on the Karvina sewerage in the Czech Republic, the operational efficiency of this PPP 
project was much lower than output specification that were established in the contract. In addition, the Ghosh and 
Jintanapakanont (2004) reflected that the low operating productivity had significant impact on services delivered for the Thailand 
underground rail project 
 
V14.  Mis-pricing 
 
Mis-pricing is defined as the possibility that the service prices are regulated incorrectly which will lead to revenue 
losses. As shown in Figure V14, mis-pricing would lead to revenue losses when the service fees are not regulated correctly (EC, 
2004b). This would likely cause financial unavailable events which would result in more risk of resources unavailable events so 
that the contract parties do not have adequate money to employ the required materials, equipment and manpower from suppliers 

























Figure V14 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Mis-pricing’ Risk Event 
 
Mis-pricing would likely be triggered by the following events: (a) unsuitable regulatory policies in which the 
government authorities do not allow the project pricing cap to vary according to the actual market demand variants over the long-
term of the project (EC, 2004b); (b) inflexible contract arrangements such as fixed-cost contracts which do not allow price caps 
to be changed as needed. (NAO, 2004b; PAC, 2003c).  
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As shown in the European 
Committees case studies on the ASA and Rethmann project in Hungary, this PPP solid waste management project officials need 
to collect service fees from the population and the subcontractors (EC, 2004b). The committee members indicated that the mis-
pricing would lead to potential revenue losses. In addition, relative to the RWE Entsorgung in Bulgaria, another PPP solid waste 
management project, officials indicated that the fee for project services was often a political question in municipal council 
debates. As a result, the approved fee for project services was not sufficient to cover the expenses, and the project contractor 
faced uncertainty in the future revenues (EC, 2004b). 
 
V15.  Revenue losses 
 
The complex system interface/integration would likely be triggered by the complex/innovative technology when 
applied technology is not able to solve the system interface/integration issues (NAO, 2006). 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. This type of risk has 
occurred in the London Underground. The members of the UK Public Account Committee (PAC) reported that because of 
interface issues, the Central line modernization and the Jubilee line extension of London Underground were both substantially 
over budget and the contractors did not deliver the improvements envisaged at the commencement of the projects. The London 
Underground PPP projects involved complex interface across the entire network of the current systems. Such issues can create 
the potential risk costs associated with logistical complexities in managing and maintaining many interfaces between the new 
assets and old assets, and a significant level of difficulties in integrating asset varieties such as signals, tracks and trains across 
the 11 lines in the London Underground network (PAC, 2005a). 
One of the other cases the researcher examined was the Airwaves project which had high risk events in complex 
system interface/integration aspects. A key requirement for this PPP project was the need for interoperability of new radio 
networks across different emergency services like fire service and the ambulance service (PAC, 2002a). 



























































Figure V15 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Revenue Losses’ Risk Event 
 
In addition, performance unavailable events would lead to contract breaches as infrastructure performance contractors 
cannot meet contract requirements. It would be necessary for officials to invoke contract remedies/penalties with additional costs 
in order to fix defective issues. This also would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 2) causing more risk of revenue loss. 
The contract breach would also be likely to cause contract disputes risk events in which contracted parties argue each other to 
determine who should take responsibility for defect issues. The more contract disputes occur, the more contract 
remedies/penalties would incur to settle the disputes. Consequently, this would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 3) 
causing more risk of revenue losses. Moreover, if the contract defects could not be remedied, the contract breach would also 
likely cause a termination liability risk event resulting in compensation being paid for contract termination. This would also 
create a vicious circle (the positive loop 4) causing more risk of revenue losses. Additionally, the finance unavailable events 
would likely cause insolvency of contractor resulting in the inability of that contractor to provide the required services. 
Consequently, this would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 5) causing more risk in performance unavailable and more risk 
in revenue losses again. In addition, if refinance is necessary, the finance unavailable events would likely cause refinance liability 
concerns thus increasing public sector costs. Again, this would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 6) causing more risk of 
revenue losses again. In general, the revenue losses would be reinforced through dynamic feedback effects during the operation 
phase of the project.  
The revenue losses would likely be triggered by the following issues: (a) mis-pricing when service fees are not 
regulated correctly by officials (EC, 2004b); (b) high frequency maintenance issues resulting in higher than expected 
maintenance costs (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004); (c) price escalation issues when the labor, material and equipment costs for 
infrastructure operations are increased (EC, 2002; Lu, 2004); (d) tax increases and insurance increases occurring when the project 
is taxed and insured more than expected (Lu, 2004); (e) less demand for the services generated by a project than expected (PAC, 
2003c, 2006a); (f) less residual value so that the infrastructure life value is less than contractual requirement (EC, 2002; NAO, 
2004a); (g) performance unavailable events occur in which the infrastructure cannot deliver the required services (Hodge, 2004); 
(h) contract remedies/penalties (EC, 2002; Hodge) in which the additional costs are used to address issues arising from 
contractual breaches and contractual disputes; (i) termination liability compensation which must be paid for contract termination 
(Work Bank, 1999); (j) refinance liability that increased costs for the public sector due to project refinancing requirements (Work 
Bank). 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. The members of the UK 
Public Account Committee (PAC) reflected that the channel tunnel rail link project (the Link) lost revenues due to less demand 
for the use of the completed project (PAC, 2006a). Hodge (2004) indicated that the Melbourne city link project lost revenues due 
to defective design and construction. Members of the European Committees indicated the ASA and Rethmann project in 
Hungary lost revenues due to mis-pricing (EC, 2004b). 
 
V16.  System breakdown 
 
The ‘system breakdown’ refers to the possibility that the system or facility cannot work, which leads to unexpected costs and 
additional time for services delivery. 
 
As shown in Figure V16, the ‘system breakdown’ that the built facilities cannot work arisen from ‘defective construction’ would 
lead to ‘performance unavailable’ that the infrastructure is not able to deliver services (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004; Hodge, 
2004). As the previous description, the more ‘performance unavailable’ is, the more ‘revenue loss’ would be. This would likely 
lead to ‘financial unavailable’ which would result in more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ that the contract parties has no adequate 
money to employ the required materials, equipment and skilled manpower from suppliers to deliver services. Consequentially, it 
would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to cause more risk in ‘defective construction’ and then more risk in ‘system 
breakdown’, and a vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to cause more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ and then more risk in 
‘revenue loss’ as well. The ‘system breakdown’ would also lead to take ‘contract remedies/penalties’ risk and then more risk in 
‘revenue loss’ since the additional costs have to pay for the punishment that the services don’t meet contract requirement. 
Consequentially, it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 3) to join the positive loop 2 to cause more risk in 
‘performance unavailable’ and then more risk in ‘revenue loss.’ In addition, it’ll be necessary to take ‘contract 
remedies/penalties’ risk to fix defective issues, which would result in ‘design changes’ and ‘construction changes’ which would   307
cause more risk in ‘construction delay.’ The ‘construction delay’ would lead to ‘performance unavailable’ since the infrastructure 
cannot deliver services until its problems are fixed. Consequentially it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 4) to cause 
more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ and more risk in ‘revenue loss’ again. As sated above, the ‘performance unavailable’ 
would also be likely to cause ‘contract disputes’ risk event that contract parties argue each other for whom should be take 
responsibility for defective issues. The more ‘contract disputes’ are, the more ‘contract remedies/penalties’ would incur to settle 
the disputes. Consequentially, it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 5) to join the positive loop 3 to cause more risk in 
‘performance unavailable’ and then more risk in ‘revenue loss.’ In general, the ‘system break’ risk event would result in 














































Figure V16 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘System Breakdown’ Risk Event 
 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases, Hodge (2004)’s case 
study in the Melbourne City Link indicated that the tunnel was closed due to the defective construction on cracking and leaking. 
In addition, the Ghosh & Jintanapakanont (2004)’ case study in the Thailand Underground Rail Project reflected that the system 
breakdown has significant impact on services delivery. 
 
V17.  High maintenance frequency 
 
The “high maintenance frequency” refers to the risk that the additional cost and time delay to deliver services because the mean-
time-between-repairs cannot meet the service output requirements. 
 
As shown in Figure V17, the ‘high maintenance frequency’ would directly lead to ‘low operating productivity’ since the 
infrastructure cannot deliver services when it is under maintenance. It would further result in positive loop 1, 2, and 3 as 
described in ‘#13 Low operating productivity.’ Moreover, ‘high maintenance frequency’ would also directly cause ‘revenue loss’ 
due to the maintenance costs are more than expected. In general, the ‘high maintenance frequency’ risk event would result in 
compounding consequences on ‘revenue loss’ through these three feedback dynamics over the operation phase.  
 
The ‘high maintenance frequency’ would be likely to be triggered by the ‘defective construction’ that the system which is built 
cannot be maintained as required in the PPP contract (Hodge, 2004); ‘complex system interface/integration’ that the system 
which is built is difficult to interface with or incompatible with other public systems so that it makes low operating efficiency 
(PAC, 2002a; PAC, 2005a). 
 









































Figure 4.2 (17) Cause Loop Diagram for ‘High Maintenance Frequency’ Risk Event 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. In addition, the Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont (2004)’ case study in the Thailand Underground Rail Project reflected that the high maintenance frequency has 
significant impact on services delivery. 
 
V18.  Accidents and safety issues 
 
The ‘accidents and safety issues’ refers to the risk that the loss and time delay to deliver services due to the frequent accidents 
and safety issues which cannot meet the service output requirements. 
 
As shown in Figure V18, the ‘accidents and safety’ would lead to ‘performance unavailable’ that the infrastructure is not able to 
deliver services as the contract requirements (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004). It would further result in positive loop 1, 2, and 3 
as described in ‘#13 Low operating productivity.’ In general, the ‘accidents and safety issues’ risk event would result in 
compounding consequences on ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these three feedback dynamics over the operation phase.  
 
The ‘accidents and safety’ would be likely to be triggered by the ‘defective construction’ that the infrastructure is defective 
(Hodge, 2004); ‘resources unavailable’ that the quantity and quality of the materials, equipment, and manpower required for 
operate are inadequate; ‘complex system interface/integration’ that the system which is built cannot interface with or 
incompatible with other systems well (EC, 2002; NAO, 2004a); ‘Force Majeure’ that the naturally unexpected events or man-








































Figure V18 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘High Maintenance Frequency’ Risk Event 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases, the European 
Commission’s report (EC, 2002) and the National Audit Office’s report (NAO, 2004a) on the London Underground indicated the 
Underground has potential safe issues that the PPP infrastructure contractors, Infrocos, must inspect and maintain asset in a way   309
that meets safety standards set out in contract. In addition, the Ghosh & Jintanapakanont (2004)’ case study in the Thailand 
Underground Rail Project reflected that the accident is one of the biggest risks that this project need to be controlled and dealt to 
ensure provide a safe transport system. 
 
V19.  Price escalation 
 
The ‘price escalation’ refers to the possibility that the labour, material and equipment costs for infrastructure construction and 




































Figure V19 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Price Escalation’ Risk Event 
 
 
As shown in Figure V19, at the construction stage the ‘price escalation’ risk event would lead to the ‘construction cost overrun’ 
since the labor material and equipment costs for infrastructure construction are increased (Hodge, 2004). The ‘construction cost 
overrun’ would possibly lead to ‘finance unavailable’ due to running out of capital needed for construction. This would likely 
further lead to ‘resources unavailable’ that there is no adequate money to purchase materials and equipment or to recruit skilful 
manpower for infrastructure. It would result in ‘construction delay’ at construction and then ‘construction cost overrun’ that extra 
costs incurred in maintaining the existing materials and equipment, purchasing new materials and equipment, and paying for 
recruited manpower during the construction time delay. Consequentially it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to 
cause more risk in ‘resources unavailable’, more ‘construction delay’ and ‘construction cost overrun’. On the other hand, at 
operation stage the ‘construction delay’ would also cause ‘performance unavailable’, from which the infrastructure won’t be 
ready to deliver its services. It would lead to ‘revenue loss’ so that there’s not enough credit to repay the debt which will result in 
‘financial unavailable.’ Consequentially it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to cause yet again more risk in 
‘resources unavailable’ so that more ‘construction delay’ and ‘performance unavailable’ resulting in more ‘revenue loss.’ 
Moreover, the ‘price escalation’ would directly lead to the ‘revenue loss’ since the labor, material and equipment costs for 
infrastructure operations are increased (EC, 2002; Lu, 2004), which would create the positive loop 2 as well to result in more risk 
in ‘revenue loss.’ In general, the ‘price escalation’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost 
overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these two feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phase.  
 
The ‘price escalation’ would be likely to be triggered by the risk events such as ‘higher levels of inflation rate’ and “higher levels 
of interest rate” that would make cost increased for manpower, material and equipment (EC, 2002; Lu, 2004). 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases, the European 
Commission’s report (EC, 2002) indicated that the infrastructure companies, Infracos, should take the risks of changes in the 
projected costs due to inflation or other factors. In addition, as shown in Lu (2004)’s case study, in 1992 China government 
deregulated the prices of major building materials, i.e. still reinforcing bars, cement and timber, etc., which led to the costs of 
labour, materials and equipments used for infrastructure projects were soared. 
 
V20.  Complex/non-innovative technology 
 
The ‘complex/non-innovative technology’ refers to the risks that the selected technology used for engineering or services is 
technically complex or expensive to maintain, or market volatility results in early obsolescence, or not innovated enough to 
keeping pace with competition and/or public requirements. 
 
As shown in Figure V20, the ‘complex/non-innovative technology’ would be likely to cause ‘complex system 
interface/integration’ risk event because the applied technology is not only able to solve but to create the system 
interface/integration issues (NAO, 2006). The ‘complex system interface/integration’ would further be likely to cause ‘defective 
construction’ because the system which is built is possibly difficult to interface with or incompatible with other public systems. 
Then the further consequences arisen from ‘defective construction’ is the same as described above in Section (9) Defective 
construction and (11) Complex system interface/integration. In general, the ‘complex/non-innovative technology’ risk event 
would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these five 
feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phase. 












































































FigureV20 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Complex/Non-innovative Technology’ Risk Event 
 
 
The ‘complex/non-innovative technology’ would be likely to be triggered by the ‘political interference’ that the public authority 
would make a decision under the political pressure to choose technically complex, expensive to maintain, or market volatility 
results in early obsolescence, or not innovated enough to keeping pace with competition and/or public requirements (EC, 2004b). 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the case, for example, the PPP 
project for Airwaves, UK has such a risk. As described above, this project needs a very high degree of interoperability between 
different forces throughout the UK. However, the wide range of systems for high degree of interoperability is likely to present 
additional problems in the future by being more complex to maintain and upgrade as technology continues to develop (PAC, 
2002a).  
 
Moreover, as occurred in PFI contract for the National Physical Laboratory, the project contractor could not meet the highly-
complex technical challenging requirements and then fail to deliver the required performance. Consequently it would lead to 
contract default and termination (NAO, 2006). 
 
V21.  Poor cooperation/coordination 
 
The ‘poor cooperation and coordination’ refers to the risk that the cooperation and coordination within a party and among 
different industrial parties including public party, private party and third parties cannot work well over contracting periods, which 
may lead to inefficient project performance and time delay at construction and operation phase. 
 
As shown in Figure V21, at the construction stage, the ‘poor cooperation and coordination’ risk event would lead to ‘construction 
delay’ because the public party, private party and third parties cannot work well over contracting periods, which may lead to 
inefficient project performance and time delay (EC, 2002; Lu, 2004). The ‘construction delay’ would likely lead to ‘construction 
cost overrun’ due to the extra costs that are likely to incur in maintaining the purchased materials, equipment and paying for 
recruited manpower during the construction time delay, which lead to ‘financial unavailable’ that run out of money for 
construction. As stated above, the ‘financial unavailable’ would lead to ‘resources unavailable’ due to no enough money to 
recruit manpower and purchase materials and equipment for construction, which would therefore cause ‘construction delay.’ 
Consequently, this would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to make more risk in ‘construction delay.’ Moreover, the 
‘construction delay’ would also lead to ‘performance unavailable’ that the infrastructure won’t be ready to deliver its services, 
which would result in ‘revenue loss.’ ‘Revenue loss’ would lead to ‘financial unavailable’ since there’s no enough credit to repay 
the debt. Furthermore, as previous description, the ‘financial unavailable’ would likely lead to ‘resources unavailable’ due to no 
enough money to recruit manpower and purchase materials and equipment for performance. Consequentially it would create a 
vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to cause more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ and more risk in ‘revenue loss.’ In addition, 
the ‘performance unavailable’ arisen from ‘construction delay’ would be likely easy to cause ‘contract disputes’ risk that contract 
parties argue each other for whom should be take responsibility for delay in operating. The more ‘contract disputes’ are, the more 
‘contract remedies/penalties’ would incur to settle the disputes. This would result in ‘construction cost overrun’, which 
consequentially join positive loop 1 to make more risk in ‘construction delay’ and then more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ 
On the other hand, the ‘poor cooperation and coordination’ would directly lead to ‘performance unavailable’ (EC, 2002; Lu, 
2004) which would cause ‘contract break’ which would lead to ‘contract remedies/penalties’ actions which result in more 
‘revenue loss.’ Consequentially it join positive loop 2 to make more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ and then more risk in 
‘revenue loss.’ In general, the ‘poor cooperation and coordination’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on 
‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these three feedback dynamics over the construction and 
operation phase. 
    311
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for case, the European 
Commission’s report (EC, 2002) on the London Underground criticized that the operating company, LUL, must cooperate with 
the infrastructure companies, Infrascos, one another in performing services under the PPP contract as a key objective. If LUL 
fails to do so, Infraco can claim compensation for costs and relief from performance. In addition, as shown in Lu (2004)’s case 











































Figure V21 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Complex/Non-innovative Technology’ Risk Event 
 
 
V22.  Finance unavailable 
 
The “finance unavailable” refers to the risk that when debt and/or equity required by the project are not available on the amounts 





































Figure V22 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Finance Unavailable’ Risk Event 
 
As shown in Figure V22, the ‘finance unavailable’ risk event would cause ‘resources unavailable’ due to no enough money to 
employ manpower, materials and equipment that are required to build and operate infrastructure (PAC, 2006a). At the 
construction stage, the ‘resources unavailable’ would cause ‘construction delay’ due to inadequate quantity and quality of 
manpower, materials and equipment that are available to build infrastructure, which would be likely further the cause of 
‘construction cost overrun’ since the extra costs were incurred in maintaining the purchased materials, equipment and paying for 
recruited manpower during the construction time delay. Furthermore, the ‘construction cost overrun’ risk would possibly lead to 
‘finance unavailable’ due to running out of money borrowed from the financial institutes. Consequentially it would create a 
vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to cause more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ and then more risk in ‘construction cost overrun. 
The ‘construction delay’ would also cause ‘performance unavailable’, from which the infrastructure won’t be ready to deliver its 
services. It would lead to ‘revenue loss’ so that there’s not enough credit to repay the debt, which will result in ‘financial 
unavailable.’ Consequentially it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to cause yet again more risk in ‘resources 
unavailable’ so that more ‘construction delay’ and ‘performance unavailable’ resulting in more ‘revenue loss.’ At the operation 
stage, the ‘resources unavailable’ risk event would directly cause ‘performance unavailable’ due to inadequate quantity and 
quality of manpower, materials and equipment which are required to deliver its services efficiently. It would lead to ‘revenue 
loss’ and further ‘financial unavailable’ again, which will create a vicious circle (the positive loop 3) to cause more risk in 
‘resource unavailable’ which leads to more ‘performance unavailable’ and then more ‘revenue loss’. Furthermore, the ‘finance   312
unavailable’ would also directly cause ‘insolvency of contractor’ that the contractor is completely unable to provide the service 
any longer due to financial difficulty, which would further lead to ‘performance unavailable’ again (PAC, 2001). Consequentially, 
it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 4) to cause ‘revenue loss’ which would result in more risk in ‘financial 
unavailable.’ In general, the ‘financial unavailable’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost 
overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these four feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phases.  
 
The ‘finance unavailable’ risk event would be likely to be triggered by the ‘ownership changes’ (PAC, 2006a) that would result 
in a weakening in its financial standing or support or other detriment to the project because there would be a great time delay to 
contract a new owner with financial support to deliver services; ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ and ‘political interference’ (Lu, 
2004; PAC, 2003c) that the financial difficulties arisen from that the government authorities allow a low equity-debt ratio of 
project financing but the political imperatives make an inflexible pricing cap for service delivery conflicting with the principles 
of market regulation; ‘construction cost overrun’ that the party runs out of capital needed for construction (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; 
Reilly, 2005); ‘revenue loss’ that the party runs out of capital needed for operation (PAC, 2003c). 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the case of this risk, for example, 
it may happen in Channel Tunnel Rail Link. The UK Public Account Committee (PAC) warned that the future demand for the 
Link project is less than the projected leads to the weaker financial capability of the project contractor, LCR, to repay the 
construction costs, especially when LCR has not adequate equity capital to reflect the high level of commercial risks and sustain 
the project performance. As the result, the government authority, Department for Transport (TfT), had to provide more and more 
financial support at taxpayer’s costs. The PAC suggested that in considering such major projects in future, the government 
authorities need to satisfy themselves that there is reasonable consistency between the degree of risk transfer and the extent of 
investors’ equity stake in the project (PAC, 2006a). 
 
Another case is PPP project for National Air Traffic Services (NATS), UK.  The project contractor, NATS, faced financial crisis 
on downturn in income due to less demand than expected in the air traffic volume. The government authority tried to relax the 
price cap on NATS to share this risk between NATS, its investors, and its customers. However, before such a solution is 
negotiated, NATS is unable to access the commercial funds it required to invest in new capacity (PAC, 2003c). 
 
V23.  Refinance liabilities 
 
The “refinance liabilities” refers to the risk that at completion or other stage in project development the project finances can be 
restructured to materially reduce the private sector’s finance costs and lead to increase the public sector’s liabilities. 
 
As shown in Figure V23, the ‘refinance liability’ risk event would cause ‘construction cost overrun’ at construction stage and 
‘revenue loss’ at operation stage respectively since the public sector needs to take risk costs in refinance liability arisen from the 
refinancing benefits of the private sector (NAO, 2005; PAC, 2006c; PAC, 2006b). Then the ‘construction cost overrun’ and 
‘revenue loss’ would be likely to create two vicious circle (positive loop 1 and 2) to make more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ 
which would likely take more risk in ‘refinance liability.’ In general, the ‘financial unavailable’ risk event would result in 
compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these two feedback dynamics 













Figure V23 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Refinance Liability’ Risk Event 
 
 
The ‘refinance liability’ risk event would be likely to be triggered by the ‘finance unavailable’ that the project contractor needs to 
gain new finance support due to being incapability to pay debt (NAO, 2004b; PAC, 2003c). 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. One of the cases for this risk is PPP 
project for National Airport Traffic Services (NATS). The UK Public Account Committee (PAC) reported that the unsuitable 
regulatory policy of government authority didn’t require a strong financial structure for the PPP project bidders, which led to the 
financial risks that the project contractor, NATS, has no insufficient equity capital to deal with adverse event like less revenue 
due to less demand on international air traffic volume (PAC, 2003c). To solve this problem, it is necessary to make re-financing 
for NATS to have a much more robust financial capability, enabling it to make further vital investment to expand the capacity of 
air traffic control to meet future growth and limit delays. However, to obtain this solution, it required concessions from 
shareholders and financial institutions to ensure this solution was a realistic option, which took much time and immense 
challenge (NAO, 2004b). The UK National Audit Office warned that “the decision on how to take the refinancing gains should 
always be based on value for money considerations but there may also be accounting and financing issues for public authorities 
to consider.(NAO, 2005)”    313
 
In addition, the BBC NEWS reported on 15th of January, 2007 (BBC NEWS, 2007) that the Paris Commercial court has 
approved for a major debt restructuring plan to cut the operator’s debt to £2.84bn ($5.6bn) from £6.2bn. The Link operator, Euro-
tunnel, has been struggling after running up debts building the tunnel. 
 
Moreover, as occurred in the Norfolk and Norwich PFI Hospital project, the UK Public Account Committee (PAC) criticized that 
the project contractor, Octagon, took much gains to boost its investment return from the project refinancing, but the government 
authority, the Trust, could be left with liabilities now include not just the cost of the hospital but all the additional borrowings of 
Octagon (PAC, 2006c). The other cases like the PFI contract for the BBC’s White City 2 Development (PAC, 2006b) and PFI 
contract for the Darent Valley Hospital (NAO, 2005) have the same risk on refinance liabilities caused by refinance benefits of 
the private sector. 
 
V24.  Insolvency of contractor 
 

































Figure V24 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Insolvency of Contractor’ Risk Event 
 
As shown in Figure V24, the ‘insolvency of contractor’ would cause ‘performance unavailable’ since the operating party is 
completely not able to deliver services any longer due to financial difficulty (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004; PAC, 2001). As 
previous prescriptions, the ‘performance unavailable’ would likely to lead to ‘revenue loss’ because the infrastructure is not 
ready to operate, which would further result in ‘financial unavailable.’ Consequentially it would create a vicious circle (the 
positive loop 1) to cause more risk in ‘insolvency of contractor.’ Moreover, the ‘financial unavailable’ would also lead to 
‘resources unavailable’ that the contract parties has no adequate money to employ the required materials, equipment and 
manpower from suppliers to deliver services. Consequentially, it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to cause more 
risk in ‘finance unavailable’ which causes in more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ and then more risk in ‘performance 
unavailable.’ On the other hand, ‘performance unavailable’ would lead to ‘contract break’ that the operate party cannot fulfill the 
contract of its obligation to deliver services any longer due to insolvency. This would be likely to cause ‘termination liability’ 
that the compensation has to be paid for contract termination, which would consequentially create a vicious circle (the positive 
loop 3) to cause more risk in ‘revenue loss’ which would join the positive loop 2 to lead to more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ and 
thus more risk in ‘contract break’ again. In addition, ‘contract break’ would also lead to ‘ownership change’ since the original 
operate party cannot fulfill the contract of its obligation to deliver services any longer, which would consequentially create 
another vicious circle (the positive loop 4) to cause more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ because there would be a great time delay 
to contract a new owner with financial support to deliver services. The positive loop 4 would join the positive loop 3 to reinforce 
more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ and thus more risk in ‘performance unavailable.’ In general, the ‘insolvency of contractor’ risk 
event would result in compounding consequences on ‘revenue loss’ through these four feedback dynamics over the operation 
phase.   
 
The ‘insolvency of contractor’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘finance unavailable’ that the operating contractor cannot 
deliver the required services any longer due to financial difficulties (PAC, 2001). 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As occurred in PFI contract for the 
Royal Armouries Museums in Leeds, the UK Public Account Committee (PAC) criticized that when the project contractor, RAI, 
faced with the possible insolvency and the consequent disruption to operations, the government authority didn’t use the full 
strength of its commercial position as well as their legal rights to get the best possible solution for the taxpayer (PAC, 2001). 
 
In addition, as Ghosh & Jintanapakanont (2004)’ case study in the Thailand Underground Rail Project, the delay due to the 
financial difficulties with contractors is one of the most important components for project delivery delay.    314
 
V25.  Ownership change 
 
The ‘ownership change’ refers to the risk that a change in ownership would result in a weakening in its financial standing or 
support or other detriment to the project. 
 
As shown in Figure V25, the ‘ownership change’ would be likely to cause ‘finance unavailable’ (PAC, 2006a) since there would 
be a great time delay to contract a new owner with financial support to deliver services, which would further lead to ‘resources 
unavailable.’ As stated in (2) Resources unavailable, at the construction stage, the ‘resources unavailable’ would be likely to 
create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to cause more risk in ‘construction delay’, more risk in ‘construction cost overrun’, 
and more risk in ‘finance unavailable.’ Moreover, the ‘construction delay’ would also cause ‘performance unavailable’, from 
which the infrastructure won’t be ready to deliver its services. It would lead to ‘revenue loss’ so that there’s not enough credit to 
repay the debt, which will result in ‘financial unavailable.’ Consequentially it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 2) 
to cause yet again more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ so that more ‘performance unavailable’ resulting in more ‘revenue loss’ 
resulting in more ‘finance unavailable.’ On the other hand the ‘performance unavailable’ would be also likely lead to ‘contract 
breach’ since operating party cannot deliver its services, which would create another vicious circle (the positive loop 3) to cause 
more risk in ‘ownership change.’ In general, the ‘ownership change’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on 
‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these three feedback dynamics over the construction and 
operation phases.   
 
The ‘ownership change’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘contract break’ that the operating contractor cannot deliver the 
services as contract requirements (Hodge, 2004). 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the case, it may happen in 
Channel Tunnel Rail Link. The UK Public Account Committee (PAC) warned that the current project contractor, LCR, may not 
able to hold the ownership of the Link project to provide services in the future due to financial problems on the uncertainties such 
as less revenues and construction overrun. Any future changes to the ownership of LCR will need to protect the interests of the 


































Figure V25 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Ownership Change’ Risk Event 
 
 
V26.  Tax increases 
 
The ‘tax increases’ refers to the risk that tax is increased before or after completion, which will affect the project financial 
performance. 
 
As shown in Figure V26, the ‘tax increases’ would directly cause ‘revenue loss’ (Lu, 2004) since the project service revenue is 
taxed more than the expected, which would further lead to ‘finance unavailable’ because the operate party has no enough credits 
to pay debt. It would further cause ‘resource unavailable’ that the operate party has no adequate money to employ the required 
materials, equipment and manpower from suppliers to deliver services, which would likely lead to ‘performance unavailable.’ 
Consequentially, it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to cause more risk in ‘revenue loss’ so that more ‘finance 
unavailable’ resulting in more ‘resource loss’, and more ‘performance unavailable’ resulting in more risk in ‘revenue loss.’ In 
general, the ‘tax increases’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘revenue overrun’ through this feedback 
dynamics over the operation phases.  
 
The ‘tax increases’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘law/policy changes’ that the government authority increases tax rate more 
than expected (Lu, 2004).   315
 














Figure V26 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Tax Increase’ Risk Event 
 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the case, Lu (2004)’s case study 
on Xiaolangdi Project on Yellow River (China) indicated both domestic and foreign contractors for this project were required to 
pay the taxes at increased rates because China government implemented a tax reform after signing contract.  
 
V27.  Insurance increases 
 
The ‘insurance increase’ refers to the possibility that the agreed project insurances become insurable or substantially increases in 

























Figure V27 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Insurance Increases’ Risk Event 
 
As shown in Figure V27, the ‘insurance increases’ would directly cause ‘construction cost overrun’ (Lu, 2004) at construction 
stage and ‘revenue loss’ at operate stage respectively, which would further lead to ‘finance unavailable’ because the operate party 
has no enough credits to pay debt. As previously stated, this would further cause ‘resources unavailable’ that the contractors have 
no adequate money to employ the required materials, equipment and manpower from suppliers to deliver services, and then 
further cause ‘construction delay’ at the construction stage and ‘performance unavailable’ at operation stage respectively. These 
would create two vicious circles (positive loop 1 and 2) to cause more risk in ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ 
respectively. In general, the ‘insurance increase’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost 
overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these two feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phases. 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the case, Lu (2004)’s case study 
on BOT contract for the Laibin B Power Plant indicated that the project contract shall take risk at insurance increases for cargo 
transportation, third party liability, property loss, etc. 
 
V28.  Contractual disputes 
 
The ‘contractual disputes’ refers to the risk of time delay and additional costs to solve contractual disputes. 
As shown in Figure V28, the ‘contractual disputes’ would be likely to directly cause ‘contract remedies/penalties’ (Hodge, 2004) 
which would be likely to further cause ‘construction cost overrun’ at construction stage and ‘revenue loss’ at operating stage 
respectively since the additional costs are needed to settle the disputes. As previously stated, both of ‘construction cost overrun’ 
and ‘revenue loss’ would be likely lead to ‘finance unavailable’ due to running out of credits available to pay debt, which would 
be likely to result in ‘resource unavailable’ that the contractors has no adequate money to employ the required materials, 
equipment and manpower from suppliers to deliver services. Consequentially, it would create two vicious circles: the positive 
loop 1 would cause more risk in ‘construction delay’ which would cause more risk in ‘construction cost overrun’ at construction 
stage, and the positive loop 2 would cause more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ which would cause more risk in ‘revenue loss’ 
at operation stage. Moreover, the ‘contract remedies/penalties’ would directly cause ‘construction delay’ because it is necessary 
to take the additional time to solve disputes. This would cause ‘construction cost overrun’ to reinforce the positive loop 1 to 
make more risk in ‘construction cost overrun’, and cause ‘performance unavailable’ to reinforce the positive loop 2 to make more 
risk in ‘revenue loss.’ Furthermore, as the previous description, ‘performance unavailable’ would lead to ‘contract break’ that 
infrastructure performance cannot meet contract requirements and then it’ll be necessary to take ‘construction 
remedies/penalties’ risk to fix defective issues. Consequentially, it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 3) to cause   316
more risk in ‘construction delay’ which would cause more risk in ‘revenue loss’ yet again. In general, the ‘contractual disputes’ 
risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through 









































Figure V28 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Contractual Disputes’ Risk Event 
 
The ‘contractual disputes’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘performance unavailable’ that the contract parties argue each other 
for whom should be take responsibility for defective issues which result in performance failure (Hodge, 2004); ‘inflexible 
contract arrangement’ that the PPP contract lacks a change mechanism to incorporate appropriate arrangements for dealing with 
the necessary variants of long-term project life and enough room for innovation (EC, 2004b); ‘latent defect’ that the contractual 
claims would be likely to be arisen from the technologies that the project contractors employ to build and perform the existing 
infrastructure have been infringed the third-party patents (EC, 2002).  
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases, the Hodge (2004)’s 
case study on the Melbourne City Link indicated that the project contractor, Transurban, initiated an AUD$37 million claim 
against the government authority for compensation for financial loss due to contract breach. Moreover, the project subcontractor, 
TOJV, initiated litigation against the project contractor for negligence in the design of two City Link tunnels. The Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont (2004)’ case study on the Thailand Underground Rail Project also reflected that the contractual issues and 
disputes was the fundamental risk in project management .  
 
V29.  Inflexible contract arrangement 
 
The ‘inflexible contract changes’ refers to the risk of time delay and additional costs to change the contract contents due to 
inflexible contract change mechanism. 
 
As shown in Figure V29, the ‘inflexible contract arrangement’ would be likely to directly cause ‘contractual disputes’ (EC, 
2004b), which would cause ‘contract remedies/penalties’ since the additional time and costs are needed to settle the disputes. As 
previously stated in (28) Contractual disputes, consequently the ‘inflexible contract arrangement’ would result in compounding 
consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through three feedback dynamics (the positive loops 
1, 2, and 3) over the construction and operation phases respectively. Moreover, the ‘inflexible contract arrangement’ would be 
likely to directly cause ‘delay in contract change negotiation’ (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004; PAC, 2003c), which is described 
in “#30 Delay in contract change negotiation.” Furthermore, the ‘inflexible contract arrangement’ would be likely to directly 
cause ‘mis-pricing’ because the inflexible contract change mechanism like the fixed-cost contract  that didn’t allow the service 
price cap to change according to the actual market demand variants in the long-term project life so that the project contractor is 
unable to deliver services due to financial difficulties (NAO, 2004b; PAC, 2003c). In general, the ‘inflexible contract changes’ 
risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through 
these three feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phases. 
 
The ‘inflexible contract changes’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ because traditionally the 
public sector like tightly defined contract documents without flexible change mechanism so not prone to different interpretations 
(Lu, 2004; PAC, 2003c). 


















































Figure V29 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Inflexible Contract Arrangement’ Risk Event 
 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. In addition, as the case of PPP project 
for National Air Traffic Services (NATS), UK described above, the project contractor, NATS, faced financial difficulties due to 
less demand than expected in the air traffic volume, especially the government authority didn’t allow the price cap to vary 
according to the amount of traffic and inflation rate. As a result, it took time and cost to reach an agreement and contract change 
to relax the price cap on NATS (PAC, 2003c). The National Audit Office of UK suggested that “where capital intensive 
businesses like NATS, that are particularly exposed to international shocks, are to have to their prices regulated, automatic 
mechanisms to share the risk of volume change with customers should be considered (NAO, 2004b).” 
 
In addition, the lack of flexibility for the long-term PFI contract for the Redevelopment of MOD Main Building would need 
additional costs to meet future requirements that are genuinely uncertain (PAC, 2003b). As described above, European 
Committee’s case studies (EC, 2004b) on the Nessebar “Golden Bug” Landfill project indicated this PPP project was easy to 
cause disputes and unable to solve disputes due to lacking flexible contract mechanism. 
 
V30.  Delay in contract change negotiation 
 
The ‘delay in contract change negotiation’ refers to the risk of time delay to negotiate and arrange contract changes between the 



































Figure V30 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Delay in Contract Change Negotiation’ Risk Event 
 
 
As shown in Figure V30, the ‘delay in contract change negotiation’ would be likely to directly cause ‘construction delay’ (Hodge, 
2004; NAO, 2004b; PAC, 2003c) at construction stage and performance unavailable’ at operating stage as well since the 
construction work and operation service cannot be started until reaching a change agreement between the parties. As stated above, 
consequently at the construction stage, the ‘construction delay’ would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to cause more 
risk in ‘construction cost overrun’ which would cause more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ which would lead to more risk in 
‘resources unavailable’ which would result in ‘construction delay’ and more risk in ‘construction cost overrun’ again yet. On the 
other hand, consequently at operation stage, the ‘performance unavailable’ would create another vicious circle (the positive loop 
2) to cause more risk in ‘revenue loss’ which would cause more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ which would lead to more risk in 
‘resources unavailable’ which result in more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ and more risk in ‘revenue loss’ again yet. 
Moreover, the ‘finance unavailable’ would be likely to cause that the construction party would likely to ask for more ‘scope 
changes’ due to no adequate money for the originally agreed scope of work definition set up in output specification. This would   318
further cause ‘delay in contract change negotiation’ that the parties who involve the design and construction need to take time for 
negotiation to reach a change agreement. Consequently it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 3) to make more risk in 
‘delay in contract change negotiation’ and more risk in ‘construction cost overrun’ and more risk in ‘revenue loss.’ In general, 
the ‘delay in contract change negotiation’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ 
and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these four feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phases. 
 
The ‘delay in contract change negotiation’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘scope changes’ (NAO, 2004a) that described as 
above, and ‘’inflexible contract arrangement’  that the contract documents lack flexible change mechanism to room contract 
changes (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004; PAC, 2003c). 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases, the National Audit 
Office’s report (NAO, 2004a) on the London Underground indicated that it would be complex to negotiate with the PPP 
infrastructure contractors, Infrocos, to change the service scope out of the originally agreed one in the contract due to the project 
operating company LUL changing its requirements. In addition, concerning the PPP project for National Airport Traffic Services 
(NATS), there were time delays to reach an agreement and contract change to relax the price cap varied according to the air 
traffic volume and inflation for project contractor, NATS (PAC, 2003c). In addition, the Ghosh & Jintanapakanont (2004)’ case 
study in the Thailand Underground Rail Project reflected that contract change negotiation is one of the contractual issues to delay 
service delivery. 
 
V31.  Contract breach 
 
































































Figure V31 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Contract Break’ Risk Event 
 
 
As shown in Figure V31, the ‘contract breach’ would be likely to directly cause ‘ownership change’ since the project contractor 
cannot fulfil its contract obligation any longer (Hodge, 2004). The ‘ownership change’ would be likely to cause ‘finance 
unavailable’ since there would be a great time delay to contract a new owner with financial support to deliver services. This 
would further lead to ‘resources unavailable’ that there is no enough money to employ the skilled manpower and to purchase the 
required materials and equipment for construction and operation. As previously described, consequently this would create a 
vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to make more risk in ‘construction delay’ which would result in more risk in ‘construction cost 
overrun’ at construction stage, and another vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to make more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ 
which would result in more risk in ‘revenue loss’ at operation stage. Moreover, as previously stated, the ‘performance 
unavailable’ would be likely to cause ‘contract breach’ because the project contractor cannot deliver services that need to meet 
contract requirements any more. This would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 3) to make more risk in ‘ownership 
changes.’ Furthermore, the ‘contract breach’ would directly cause ‘termination liabilities’ (The Work Bank, 1999) that the 
possible service disruption would increase the government’s liabilities at taxpayer’s costs, which would be likely to result in 
‘construction cost overrun’ at construction stage and ‘revenue loss’ at operation stage respectively which would result in ‘finance 
unavailable’, which would consequently create a vicious circle (the positive loop 4) to make more risk in ‘contract break.’ On the 
other hand, in case that the ownership won’t change, then ‘contract breach’ would be likely to directly cause ‘contract 
remedies/penalties’ (Hodge, 2004) that it’s necessary to take actions to remedy the problem that cannot meet contract 
requirements, which would cause ‘construction delay’ and ‘construction cost overrun’ at construction stage and ‘revenue loss’ at 
operation stage respectively, which would further lead to ‘performance unavailable’ which would consequently create a vicious 
circle (the positive loop 5) to make more risk in ‘contract breach.’ In addition, the ‘performance unavailable’ would be likely to 
cause ‘contractual disputes’ which cause ‘contract remedies/penalties’ which result in ‘construction delay’ and ‘performance 
unavailable’ since it needs to take additional time to settle disputes. Consequently it would create a vicious circle (the positive 
loop 6) to make more risk in ‘contract breach’ again yet. In general, the ‘delay in contract change negotiation’ risk event would   319
result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these six feedback 
dynamics over the construction and operation phases.  
 
The ‘contract break’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘law/policy changes’ that the contract performance cannot adapt to the 
updated law/policy (EC, 2002); ‘environmental pollutions’ that the performance cannot meet environmental regulations and 
contract requirements (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004); ‘less residual value’ that the value of infrastructure is less than contract 
requirement (EC, 2002; NAO, 2004a).  
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases, the Work Bank’s case 
study report (The Work Bank, 1999) indicated that if the BOT concession contracts for the North-South Expressway (NSE) and 
the Kuala Lumpur-Karak Highway (Malaysia) are terminated due to default of the concessionaire, no compensation is to be paid 
to the concessionaire for the loss of its rights or investment. However, where termination is due to the Government’s default, the 
Government will generally grant compensation for the loss suffered by the concessionaire, which would include the loss of future 
profits. So the Government takes full risks of default and contract termination. 
 
In addition, it would occur in PFI contract for the New IT Systems for Magistrates' Courts: the Libra Project. The UK Public 
Accounts Committee criticized that the government authority didn’t terminate contract with the PFI project service contractor, 
LCL, when it has been failed to delivery project and break contract for London Underground. As the result, the risk transfer 
didn’t really take place (PAC, 2003a). Moreover, Hodge (2004)’s case study in the Melbourne City Link indicated that the 
project contractor, Transurban, initiated an AUD$37 million claim against the government authority for a decrease in customers 
and subsequent financial loss due to contract breach. 
 
 
V32.  Contract remedies/penalties 
 
The ‘contractual remedies/penalties’ refers to the risk of time delay and costs for the remedies for poor performance that fails to 




































Figure V32 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Contract Remedies/Penalties’ Risk Event 
 
 
As shown in Figure V32, the ‘contractual remedies/penalties’ would be likely to directly cause ‘construction delay’  and 
‘construction cost overrun’ at construction stage, and ‘performance unavailable’ and ‘revenue loss’ at operation stage as well 
since the additional time and costs to fix problems that make project performance failed to meet contract requirements (EC, 2002; 
Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004; Hodge, 2004). As stated above in “(31) Contract breach,” this would create two vicious circles 
(the positive loop 1 and 2) to make more risk in ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively. 
 
The ‘contractual remedies/penalties’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘construction disputes’ (Hodge, 2004), ‘contract breach’ 
(Hodge, 2004), and ‘industrial disputes’ (EC, 2003) that it’s necessary to take actions to remedy the problems and settle the 
disputes arisen from the failed project performance which cannot meet contract requirements or public protects, etc.  
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases, the European 
Commission’s report indicated that the London Underground received substantial and sustained under performance, it required a 
range of remedies set up in the PPP contract to ensure no break in service under the contract (EC, 2002). In addition, the Hodge 
(2004)’s case study on the Melbourne City Link indicated the subcontractor, TOJV, needed to complete remedial work on tunnel 
as a result of leaks. The Ghosh & Jintanapakanont (2004)’ case study on the Thailand Underground Rail Project also reflected 
that the contractual issues and disputes was the fundamental risk in project management . 
 
V33.  Default of subcontractors 
 
The ‘default of subcontractors’ refers to the risk of subcontractors/suppliers or service providers go out of business or encounter 
difficulties in supplying the contracted services to specification through the required life of the capability due to insolvency or 
incapability, which leads to the construction risks or operation risks. 


































Figure V33 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Default of Subcontractors’ Risk Event 
 
 
As shown in Figure V33, the ‘default of subcontractors’ would be likely to directly cause ‘resources unavailable’ because the 
manpower, material or equipment suppliers cannot provide contracted services due to insolvency or incapability (Hodge, 2004; 
NAO, 2006). As previously stated, consequently this would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to make more risk in 
‘construction delay’ which would cause more risk in ‘construction cost overrun’ which would lead to more risk in ‘finance 
unavailable’ which would result in more risk in ‘resource unavailable’ at the construction stage. It would also create another 
vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to make more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ which would make more risk in ‘revenue loss’ 
which would lead to more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ which would result in more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ yet again. On 
the other hand, the ‘default of subcontractors’ would be likely to directly cause ‘defective design’  which would cause ‘defective 
construction’ (Hodge, 2004) because the design and construction work implemented by design and construction subcontractors 
cannot meet contract specification due to insolvency or incapability. This would be likely to lead to ‘performance unavailable’ 
from which the infrastructure asset has broken down so that it won’t be able to deliver its services, which would lead to take 
‘contract remedies/penalties’ risk to fix effective issues. The ‘contract remedies/penalties’ would further result in ‘revenue loss’ 
since it needs additional costs to fix defective issues. Consequently it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 3) to make 
more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ which make more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ yet again. In general, the ‘default of 
subcontractors’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ 
respectively through these three feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phases. 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases, the European 
Commisssion’s report (EC, 2002) on the London Underground indicated that material failure by project operators, LUL, to 
comply with its obligations under contract, and default event where the project infrastructure builders, Infraco’s assets have been 
nationalized or a change in law were documented. In addition, the Hodge (2004)’s case study on the Melbourne City Link 
indicated this project suffered serious construction delay due to insufficient tolling technologies of subcontractor, TOVJ. the 
project subcontractor, TOVJ, In addition, the UK National Audit Office’s report (NAO, 2006) reflected that the PFI contract for 
National Physical Laboratory cannot achieve satisfactory output specification without the sufficiently technical capability of the 
subcontractors. The Ghosh & Jintanapakanont (2004)’ case study in the Thailand Underground Rail Project also indicated the 
default of subcontractors is one of the most important risks for project delivery delay. 
 
V34.  Inspection and testing delay 
 
The ‘inspection and testing delay’ refers to the risk of delay of the third parties like subcontractors/suppliers or any other service 
providers for design, construction, and operation, for example, the performance inspection and testing by independent consultant, 

























Figure V34 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Inspection and Testing Delay’ Risk Event   321
 
As shown in Figure V34, the ‘inspection and testing delay’ would be likely to directly cause ‘construction delay’  at construction 
stage and ‘performance unavailable’ at operation stage respectively (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004). As previously stated, 
consequently this would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to cause more risk in ‘construction cost overrun’ which 
would lead to more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ which would result in more risk in ‘resource unavailable’ which would lead to 
more risk in ‘construction delay’ at the construction stage. It would also create another vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to 
which would make more risk in ‘revenue loss’ which would lead to more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ which would result in 
more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which lead to more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ at the operation stage. In general, the 
‘default of subcontractors’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue 
loss’ respectively through these two feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phases.  
 
The ‘inspection and testing delay’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘resources unavailable’ that the skilled manpower might not 
be available due to the default of subcontractor who is responsible for inspection and testing (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As Ghosh & Jintanapakanont (2004)’ 
case study in the Thailand Underground Rail Project, the delay due to the third party is one of the most important components for 
project delivery delay.  
 
V35.  Latent defects 
 
The ‘latent defects’ refers to the possibility of loss or damage arising from latent defects within existing infrastructure that 
infringe the patents held by the third parties. 
 
As shown in Figure V35, the ‘latent defects’ would be likely to directly cause ‘contractual disputes’ (EC, 2002) because the 
contractual claims would be arisen from the technologies that the project contractors employ to build and perform the existing 
infrastructure have been infringed the patents held by the third-parties. The ‘contractual disputes’ would cause ‘contract 
remedies/penalties’, which would lead to ‘construction delay’ and ‘construction cost overrun’ at construction stage, and 
‘performance unavailable’ and ‘revenue loss’ at operation stage as well since it needs extra time and costs to settle disputes.  
Consequently, as previously stated, it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) at construction stage to cause more risk 
in ‘finance unavailable’ which would lead to more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which would result in more risk in 
‘construction delay’ which would make more risk in ‘construction cost overrun.’ It would also create a vicious circle (the 
positive loop 2) at operation stage to cause more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ which would lead to more risk in ‘resources 
unavailable’ which would result in more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ which would make more risk in ‘revenue loss.’ 
Moreover, the ‘performance unavailable’ would be likely to cause ‘contract breach’ and ‘contractual disputes’ since the services 
delivery is failed to meet contract requirements, and the arguments arisen from which parties have to take responsibility for 
performance failure. As previous descriptions, consequently this would create two vicious circles (the positive loop 3 and 4) to 
result in more risk in ‘contract remedies/penalties’ which would make more risk in ‘revenue loss.’ In general, the ‘latent defects’ 
risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through 
these four feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phases.  
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the case, the European 
Commission’s report (EC, 2002) on the London Underground indicated that the PPP infrastructure contractor, SSL Infraco, 
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V36.  Shorter asset life 
 
The ‘shorter asset life’ refers to the risk that design life of the facility proves to be shorter than the planned, which lead to 

































Figure V36 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Shorter Asset Life’ Risk Event 
 
 
As shown in Figure V36, the ‘shorter asset life’ would be likely to directly cause ‘performance unavailable’ (EC, 2002; NAO, 
2004a) because the life of infrastructure is shorter than contract requirement. As stated above, consequently this would create a 
vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to cause more risk in ‘revenue loss’ which would make more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ 
which would lead to more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which would result in more risk in ‘performance unavailable’. 
Moreover, as stated above, the ‘performance unavailable’ would also create another vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to make 
more risk in ‘contract breach’ which would make more risk in ‘contract remedies/penalties’ which would result in ‘revenue loss’ 
and ‘performance unavailable’ yet again. In general, the ‘shorter asset life’ risk event would result in compounding consequences 
on ‘revenue loss’ through these two feedback dynamics over the operation phase.  
 
The ‘shorter asset life’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘defective construction’ (EC, 2002; NAO, 2004a) that the quality of 
construction cannot meet contract requirement so that it would be likely to reduce the planned asset life; ‘complex/non-
innovative technology’ since the asset is difficult to maintain and upgrade so it would be likely to result in early obsolescence.   
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the case, the European 
Commission’s report (EC, 2002) and the National Audit Office’s report (NAO, 2004a) on the London Underground indicated 
that the PPP infrastructure contractors, Infrocos, should assume the responsibility to ensure the Underground infrastructure is 
restored to full health and maintained in an expected value and life condition consistent with good industry practice. 
 
V37.  Less residual value 
 
The ‘less residual value’ refers to the risk that project assets at termination or expiry of the PPP agreement will not be in the 
































Figure V37 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Less Residual Value’ Risk Event 
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As shown in Figure V37, the ‘less residual value’ would be likely to directly cause ‘revenue loss’ because the value of 
infrastructure is less than contract requirement (EC, 2002; NAO, 2004a). As previously stated, this would create a vicious circle 
(the positive loop 1) to cause more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ which would cause more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which 
would cause more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ which would lead to more risk in ‘revenue loss’ yet again. Moreover, as 
previous descriptions, the ‘performance unavailable’ would create another vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to cause more risk 
in ‘contract breach’ which make more risk in ‘contract remedies/penalties’ which result in more risk in ‘performance 
unavailable’ yet again. In general, the ‘less residual value’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘revenue 
loss’ through these two feedback dynamics over the operation phase.  
 
The ‘less residual value’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘defective construction’ that the quality of construction cannot meet 
contract requirement so that it would be likely to reduce the planned asset value; ‘complex/non-innovative technology’ since the 
asset is difficult to maintain and upgrade so it would be likely to result in the greater depreciation (EC, 2002; NAO, 2004a). 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As described above, the PPP 
infrastructure contractors, Infrocos, should assume the responsibility to ensure the London Underground infrastructure is restored 
to full health and maintained in an expected value and life condition(EC, 2002). In addition, the National Audit Office’s report 
(NAO, 2004a) on the London Underground indicated that the PPP infrastructure contractors, Infracos, must ensure all range of 
assets under its control  are projected to have at least half their lives left to run at contract close in 2033. 
 
V38.  Termination liabilities 
 
The ‘termination liabilities’ refers to the asset ownership of private party or public party is terminated due to contract breach, 




























Figure V38 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Termination Liabilities’ Risk Event 
 
 
As shown in Figure V38, the ‘termination liabilities’ would be likely to directly cause ‘revenue loss’  because the possible 
service disruption arisen from ‘contract breach’ (NAO, 2006) would increase the government’s liabilities at taxpayer’s costs, 
which would be likely to result in ‘construction cost overrun’ at construction stage and ‘revenue loss’ at operation stage 
respectively (The Work Bank, 1999). As previously stated, both would result in ‘finance unavailable’. This would consequently 
create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to make more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which would make more risk in 
‘construction delay’ which would lead to more risk in ‘construction cost overrun’ at construction stage; this would also create 
another vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to make more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which would lead to more risk in 
‘performance unavailable’ which would result in more risk in ‘revenue loss.’ In general, the ‘termination liabilities’ risk event 
would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these two 
feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phases.  
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As described above, the Work Bank’s 
case study report (The Work Bank, 1999) indicated that if the BOT concession contracts for the North-South Expressway (NSE) 
and the Kuala Lumpur-Karak Highway (Malaysia) are terminated due to default of the concessionaire, no compensation is to be 
paid to the concessionaire for the loss of its rights or investment. However, where termination is due to the Government’s default, 
the Government will generally grant compensation for the loss suffered by the concessionaire, which would include the loss of 
future profits. 
 
In addition, it would occur in PFI contract for the National Physical Laboratory. As described above, because of highly complex 
technique challenging requirements, the project contractor seriously continued to jeopardize the successful delivery of the project, 
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V39.  Higher levels of inflation rate 
 
The ‘higher levels of inflation rate’ refers to the possibility that actual inflation rate will exceed the projected inflation rate, which 
will especially result in the price escalation associated with the delivery, operate and maintenance of the provision of services. 
 
39.Higher levels of


























Figure V39 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Higher Levels of Inflation Rate’ Risk Event 
 
 
As shown in Figure V39, the ‘higher levels of inflation rate’ would be likely to directly cause ‘price escalation’  that increases the 
costs for construction and operation (EC, 2002; Lu, 2004). This would cause ‘construction cost overrun’ (PAC, 2006a) at 
construction stage, and ‘revenue loss’ at operation stage as well. As previously stated, both would result in ‘finance unavailable’. 
This would consequently create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to make more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which would 
make more risk in ‘construction delay’ which would lead to more risk in ‘construction cost overrun’ at construction stage; this 
would also create another vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to make more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which would lead to 
more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ which would result in more risk in ‘revenue loss.’ In general, the ‘higher levels of 
inflation rate’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ 
respectively through these two feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phases.  
 
The ‘higher levels of inflation rate’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘downside economic events’ that the inflation rate 
increases due to the impact of specific downside economic events (The Work Bank, 1999). 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases, it may happen in 
Channel Tunnel Rail Link. The UK Public Account Committee (PAC) reported that the high levels of inflation rate on 
construction projects will drive up the cost overrun of the Section 2 of the Link (PAC, 2006a). In addition, as Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont (2004)’ case study in the Thailand Underground Rail Project, the financial risk due to the higher expected 
inflation is one of the most important impact on project delivery.  
 
V40.  Higher levels of exchange rate 
 
The ‘higher levels of exchange rate’ refers to the possibility that actual exchange rate will exceed the projected exchange rate, 
which will lead to the increase of costs required for the construction or operations phase of the project. 
 
40.Higher levels of


























Figure V40 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Higher Levels of Exchange Rate’ Risk Event 
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As shown in Figure V40, the ‘higher levels of exchange rate’ would be likely to directly cause ‘price escalation’ that increases 
the costs for construction and operation (EC, 2002; Lu, 2004). This would cause ‘construction cost overrun’ at construction stage, 
and ‘revenue loss’ at operation stage as well. As previously stated, both would result in ‘finance unavailable’. This would 
consequently create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to make more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which would make more 
risk in ‘construction delay’ which would lead to more risk in ‘construction cost overrun’ at construction stage; this would also 
create another vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to make more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which would lead to more risk in 
‘performance unavailable’ which would result in more risk in ‘revenue loss.’ In general, the ‘higher levels of exchange rate’ risk 
event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these 
two feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phases.  
 
The ‘higher levels of exchange rate’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘downside economic events’ that the exchange rate 
increases due to the impact of specific downside economic events (The Work Bank, 1999). 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases, the Work Bank’s case 
study report (The Work Bank, 1999) indicated that the Malaysian Government provided guarantee with an agreement “External 
Risks Supplements Agreement” for the North-South Expressway (NSE) and the Kuala Lumpur-Karak Highway to compensate 
for any shortfall in toll revenue arising from the fluctuation of exchange rate or interest rate. In addition, Lu (2004)’s case study 
on the Water Conservancy and Hydropower Project in Southern China reflected that the loss due to devaluation of Renminbi 
(China currency) was about RMB$724 million. In addition, as Ghosh & Jintanapakanont (2004)’ case study in the Thailand 
Underground Rail Project, the financial risk due to the exchange-rate fluctuation is one of the most important impact on project 
delivery.  
 
V41.  Higher levels of interest rate 
 
The “higher levels of interest rate” refers to the possibility that actual interest rate will exceed the projected interest rate, which 
would lead to the increase of costs required for the construction or operations phase of the project, and would affect the 
availability and cost of funds. 
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Figure V41 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Higher Levels of Interest Rate’ Risk Event 
 
As shown in Figure V41, the ‘higher levels of interest rate’ would be likely to directly cause ‘price escalation’ that increases the 
costs for construction and operation (Lu, 2004). This would cause ‘construction cost overrun’ at construction stage, and ‘revenue 
loss’ at operation stage as well (Smith, 2006; The Work Bank, 1999). As previously stated, both would result in ‘finance 
unavailable’. This would consequently create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to make more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ 
which would make more risk in ‘construction delay’ which would lead to more risk in ‘construction cost overrun’ at construction 
stage; this would also create another vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to make more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which 
would lead to more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ which would result in more risk in ‘revenue loss.’ In general, the ‘higher 
levels of interest rate’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ 
respectively through these two feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phases.  
 
The ‘higher levels of interest rate’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘downside economic events’ that the exchange rate 
increases due to the impact of specific downside economic events (EC, 2002; Lu, 2004). 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As described above, the Work Bank’s 
case study report (The Work Bank, 1999) indicated that the Malaysian Government provided guarantee with an agreement 
“External Risks Supplements Agreement” for the North-South Expressway (NSE) and the Kuala Lumpur-Karak Highway to 
compensate for any shortfall in toll revenue arising from the fluctuation of exchange rate or interest rate. In addition, the Smith 
(2006)’s case study on the Harnaschpolder Wastewater Treatment Project (the Netherlands) reflected that subsequent rise in 
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V42.  Less demand 
 
The ‘less demand’ refers to the possibility that the demand for the services generated by a project may be less than projected, 
which results in less revenue. As for a revenue PPP project, the future income from the users is expected to provide a major 
element of the revenue needed to repay the cost of constructing infrastructure. It means the less demand will lead to the 
insolvency of the project contractor to repay the debt of infrastructure construction to the financiers, and poor services against the 
interests of infrastructure users. In the worst circumstance, it causes the project contractor going bankrupt and then the 
government needs to buy the project ownership back (ownership change) before the end of concession period at the costs of 
taxpayer. 
 























Figure V42 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Less Demand’ Risk Event 
 
As shown in Figure V42, the ‘less demand’ would be likely to directly cause ‘revenue loss’ (PAC, 2003c; PAC, 2006a) when the 
demand for the services generated by a project is less than projected, which would further cause ‘finance unavailable.’ As 
previously stated, this would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to cause more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which 
would lead to more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ which would result in more risk in ‘revenue loss.’ On the other hand, the 
‘finance unavailable’ would also cause ‘insolvency of contractor’ which lead to ‘performance unavailable’ since the operating 
party is completely not able to deliver services any longer due to financial difficulty. As previously stated, this would create a 
vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to cause more ‘revenue loss’ which would result in ‘finance unavailable’ yet again. In general, 
the ‘less demand’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘revenue loss’ through these two feedback dynamics 
over the operation phase. 
 
The ‘less demand’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘higher competition’ (Hodge, 2004; Lu, 2004; PAC, 2002b; PAC, 2006a) 
and ‘downside economic events’(PAC, 2006a) that the demand for the services generated by the project might be less than 
projected due to these impacts. 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. It has ever happened in Channel Tunnel 
Rail Link. The UK Public Account Committee (PAC) reported that in 1996 the Department for Transport (DfT) awarded a 
contract to London & Continental Railways Limited (LCR), a private sector consortium, to build the Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
(the Link.) In bidding for the project in 1996, LCR forecast that passenger numbers using Eurostar would reach 21.4 million in 
2004 in bidding the project in 1996, but actual passenger numbers for 2004 were only 7.3 million. The under performing against 
forecast passenger volume leads to the government authority (DfT) lent more the currently estimated ￡260 million to LCR to 
cover future cash shortfalls at the continuing exposure of the taxpayer to the risks inherent in this project. In addition, especially 
it will produce a compound effect to reduce a lower demand than originally envisaged for the CTRL if this risk event combines 
another independent event, the Channel Tunnel fire (PAC, 2006a). 
 
In addition to the Link project, the PAC’s report (PAC, 2003c) revealed that the PPP project contractor, the National Air Traffic 
Services (NATS), had ever faced financial crisis on downturn in income due to less demand than expected in the air traffic 
volume. 
 
V43.  Higher competition 
 
The ‘higher competition’ refers to the possibility that the demand for the services generated by a project may be less than 
projected due to higher competition, which leads to less demand or reducing price and accordingly revenue below projections. 
 
As shown in Figure V43, the ‘higher competition’ would be likely to directly cause ‘less demand’ that the demand for the 
services is impacted by market competition (Hodge, 2004; Lu, 2004; PAC, 2002b; PAC, 2006a). As previously stated in “(42) 
Less demand”, this would create two vicious circles (the positive loop 1 and 2) to cause more risk in ‘revenue loss.’ In general, 
the ‘higher competition’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘revenue loss’ through these two feedback 
dynamics over the operation phase.  
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FigureV43 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Higher Competition’ Risk Event 
 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for case, this risk is likely to occur 
in a PFI project, the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL). The UK PAC’s report (PAC, 2002b)  indicated the demand for the Link 
has been less than the originally forecasts due to the extraordinary success of European low cost airlines.  
 
In addition, Hodge (2004)’s case study in the Melbourne City Link indicated that demand to use the Link tunnel reduced by 30% 
due to competition of an alternative route through Eurundjeri Way. Lu (2004)’s case study on the Zhuhai International Airport 
indicated that the actual utilization rate was less than 10% of the capacity due to the potential competition from other alternatives 
like Huangtian International Airport, the Hong Kong New Airport at Chi Lap Kok and Macao International Airport. 
 
V44.  Downside economic events 
 
The ‘downside economic events’ refers to the possibility that the demand for the services generated by a project may be less than 
projected due to the impact of specific downside economic events, which results in revenue below projections. 
 
As shown in Figure V44, the ‘Downside Economic Events’ would be likely to directly cause ‘higher levels of inflation rate’(The 
Work Bank, 1999), ‘higher levels of exchange rate’(The Work Bank, 1999) and ‘higher levels of interest rate’(EC, 2002; Lu, 
2004), which would cause ‘price escalation’ so that the costs for construction and operation would be increased. As previously 
stated in “(19) Price escalation,” the ‘price escalation’ would lead to ‘construction cost overrun’ at construction stage and 
‘revenue loss’ at operation stage respectively. Bothe would lead to ‘finance unavailable’ due to running out of capital needed for 
construction and pay for the debt. Consequentially it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to cause more risk in 
‘resources unavailable’ which would cause more risk in ‘construction delay’ which would cause more risk in ‘construction cost 
overrun’ at construction stage. At operation stage, it would create another vicious circle (the positive loop 2) to make more risk in 
‘performance unavailable’ which make more risk in ‘revenue loss’ which make more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ yet again. On 
the other hand, as previously stated in “(42) Less demand,” the ‘downside economic events’ would also cause ‘less demand’ 
(PAC, 2006a) so that the revenue is reduced, which would cause ‘revenue loss.’ This would create a vicious circle (the positive 
loop 3) to result in more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ which would result in more risk in ‘insolvency of contractor’ that the 
contractor cannot deliver project services due to financial difficulties, which would make more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ 
which would make more risk in ‘revenue loss’ yet again. In general, the ‘downside economic events’ risk event would result in 
compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these two feedback dynamics 
over the construction and operation phases. 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases, the Work Bank’s case 
study report (The Work Bank, 1999) indicated that the effects of the Asian Economic Crisis during 1997-98 had great impact on 
the PPP toll road projects. As a result, the interest rates increased from 19 percent to over 60 percent per annum and then the 
project debts suddenly increased. 
 
V45.  Political interference 
 
The ‘political interference’ refers to the possibility of unforeseeable conduct by the political parties that materially and adversely 
affect the public decision-making process or project implementation. 























































































Figure V45 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Political Interference’ Risk Event 
 
 
As shown in Figure V45, the ‘political interference’ would be likely to directly cause ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ (EC, 2004b) 
since the politics is easy to adversely affect the public decision-making for regulatory policy under an uncertain political and 
legal environment. This would be likely to cause ‘mis-pricing’ because the government authority doesn’t allow the project 
pricing cap to vary according to the actual market demand variants in the long-term, which would further lead to ‘revenue loss’ 
which would result in ‘finance unavailable’ (Lu, 2004; PAC, 2003c) since the operate contractor has no enough capital to pay for 
debt. The ‘political interference’ and ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ would also be likely to directly cause ‘finance unavailable’ 
since the financial difficulties arising from that the government authorities allow a low equity-debt ratio of project financing but   329
the political imperatives make an inflexible pricing cap for service delivery conflicting with the principles of market regulation. 
As previously stated, this would consequentially create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) at construction stage to cause more 
risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which would make more risk in ‘construction delay’ which would cause ‘construction cost 
overrun’ which would cause ‘finance unavailable’. The ‘finance unavailable’ would also create another vicious circle (the 
positive loop 2) at operation stage to result in more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which would result in more risk in 
‘performance unavailable’ which would result in more risk in ‘revenue loss’ which would lead to ‘finance unavailable’ yet again. 
Moreover, the ‘political interference’ would also be likely to directly cause ‘approval delays’ (Lu, 2004) since the government 
authorities may delay the project contractor from obtaining the required consents or permits for project performance, which 
would cause ‘construction delay’ which would cause ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘performance unavailable’ so that it would 
join feedback loop 1 and 2 to reinforce ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss.’ Furthermore, the ‘political interference’ 
would also be likely to directly cause ‘scope changes’ (EC, 2004d) since the output specification originally set up in the PPP 
contract is against the political benefits so that it would possibly be forced to change by the uncertain political and legal 
environment. The ‘scope changes’ would be likely to cause ‘design changes’ which would cause ‘construction changes’ which 
would cause ‘construction delay’ which would join feedback loop 1 and 2 to reinforce ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue 
loss’ yet again. In general, the ‘political interference’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost 
overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these two feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phases. 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As shown in European Committee’s 
case studies (EC, 2004b) on the Constanta Water and Wastewater project (Romania), there is no complete regulatory framework 
and the concession is regulated by contract, so there is an inherent risk that political imperatives, for instance price pressures, 
conflict with the principles of good regulation founded on proper process. Moreover, another Romania PPP project for solid 
waste management, the Prescom in Targoviste (Romania), also indicated that the uncertain political and legal environment 
leading to litigation and uneven competition from public enterprise (EC, 2004b). The Work Bank’s case study report (The Work 
Bank, 1999) also indicated frequent threats by Thai officials to terminate the PPP project for the Bangkok Elevated Road and 
Track System, which eventually discouraged the project contractor to secure full project financing. 
 
 
V46.  Unsuitable regulatory policy 
 
The ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ refers to the possibility that the public regulatory policies do not reflect project investment 
expectations or do not reflect the public interests. 
 
As shown in Figure V46, the ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ would be likely to directly cause ‘mis-pricing’  since the government 
authority doesn’t allow the project pricing cap to vary according to the actual market demand variants in the long-term (NAO, 
2004b; PAC, 2003c), which would further cause ‘revenue loss’ which would cause ‘finance unavailable.’ The ‘unsuitable 
regulatory policy’ would also be likely to directly cause ‘finance unavailable’ since the financial difficulties arising from that the 
government authorities allow a low equity-debt ratio of project financing but the political imperatives make an inflexible pricing 
cap for service delivery conflicting with the principles of market regulation (PAC, 2006a). As previously stated, this would 
consequentially create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) at construction stage to cause more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ 
which would make more risk in ‘construction delay’ which would cause ‘construction cost overrun’ which would cause ‘finance 
unavailable’. The ‘finance unavailable’ would also create another vicious circle (the positive loop 2) at operation stage to result 
in more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which would result in more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ which would result in more 
risk in ‘revenue loss’ which would lead to ‘finance unavailable’ yet again. In general, the ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ risk 
event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these 



































Figure V46 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Unsuitable Regulatory Policy’ Risk Event 
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The ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ would be likely to be triggered by ‘political interference’(EC, 2004b) since the politics is easy 
to adversely affect the public decision-making for regulatory policy under an uncertain political and legal environment. 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases, it has happened in 
PPP project for National Airport Traffic Services (NATS). As described above, the UK Public Account Committee (PAC) 
reported that the unsuitable regulatory policy of government authority didn’t require a strong financial structure for the PPP 
project bidders, which led to the financial risks that the project contractor, NAT, has no insufficient equity capital to deal with 
adverse event like less revenue due to less demand on international air traffic volume. Moreover, the government authority didn’t 
allow the price cap to vary according to the amount of traffic and inflation rate, which led NATS to financial difficulties so that 
the services would be sacrificed against the public interests (PAC, 2003c).  
 
In addition, Hodge (2004)’s case study in the Melbourne City Link indicated that the government authority has accepted the risk 
of paying compensation to project contractor, Transurban, in certain circumstances where either State or Commonwealth laws or 
requirements ultimately prevent the completion or operation of the City Link. Lu (2004)’s case study in Liaoning Wastewater 
Treatment Plant (China) indicated that invested capital could not be recovered on the tariffs to be collected from domestic and 
industrial users due to the absence of a well-designed regulatory policy. 
 
V47.  Approval delays 
 
The ‘approve delays’ refers to the delays to obtain the consents from each the government authorities. If obtained, the additional 



























Figure V47 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Approval Delays’ Risk Event 
 
 
As shown in Figure V47, the ‘approve delays’ arising from ‘political interference’ (Lu, 2004) would be likely to directly cause 
‘construction delay’ (Lu, 2004) since it needs extra time to obtain the required consents or permits for project performance from 
the government authorities, which would cause ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘performance unavailable’ so that it would create 
two feedbacks (the positive loop 1 and 2) to reinforce ‘construction cost overrun’ at construction stage and ‘revenue loss’ at 
operation stage respectively, as previously described in “(45) Political interference.”  
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. One of the cases is the PPP project for 
National Airport Traffic Services (NATS) described above. Lu (2004)’s case study on the Water and Wastewater Infrastructure 
in Southern China indicated that it is not easy for the project contractor to obtain the permits or licenses necessary for the project 
to proceed as scheduled from eight government agencies who have regulatory authority over the project. 
 
V48.  Law/policy changes 
 
The ‘low/policy changes’ refers to the risk of a change in law/policy will lead to the additional cost and time to comply with the 
change. 
 
As shown in Figure V48, the ‘low/policy changes’ would be likely to directly cause ‘contract breach’(EC, 2002) that the contract 
performance cannot adapt to the updated law/policy, which would further cause ‘ownership changes’ ‘termination liabilities’ and 
‘contract remedies/penalties’. As previously stated in “(31) Contract breach”, this would result in compounding consequences on 
‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through six feedback dynamics (the positive loops 1-6) over the 
construction and operation phases. Moreover, the ‘low/policy changes’ would be likely to directly cause ‘tax increases’ (Lu, 
2004) because the government authorities increase tax rates more than expected, which would cause ‘revenues loss.’ This would 
join positive loop 2 and then reinforce more risk in ‘revenue loss.’ In general, the ‘low/policy changes’ risk event would result in 
compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ respectively through these two feedback dynamics 
over the construction and operation phases. 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases, the European 
Commission’s report (EC, 2002) indicated that the infrastructure contractors, infras, for the London Underground would have the 
risk that it cannot comply its contract obligation due to change in law. Hodge (2004)’s case study in the Melbourne City Link 
indicated that the government authority has assumed responsibility for any outstanding project debt in the event that the 
arrangements are terminated as a result of changes in State or Commonwealth legislation, which would prevents the project 
contractor, Transurban, from delivering or operating the City Link.  




























































Figure V48 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Law/Policy Changes’ Risk Event 
 
 
V49.  Unforeseen site conditions 
 
The ‘unforeseen site conditions’ refers to the unanticipated adverse site conditions such as unusual surface condition of geology 
and ground water are discovered, which will lead to additional construction time and cost. 
 
As shown in Figure V49, the ‘unforeseen site conditions’ would be likely to directly cause ‘construction delays’ (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont, 2004) because construction delay problems would be arisen from the unanticipated adverse site conditions, 
which would cause ‘construction cost overrun’ since the extra costs were incurred in maintaining the purchased materials and 
equipments and paying for the wages of recruited manpower during the construction time delay. Furthermore, the ‘construction 
cost overrun’ risk would possibly lead to ‘finance unavailable’ which would lead to ‘resources unavailable’ because the 
construction party has no enough money to employ the skilled manpower and the required material and equipment for 
construction work. Consequentially it would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to cause more risk in ‘construction 
delay’ which would cause more risk in ‘construction cost overrun.’  Moreover, the ‘construction delay’ would also lead to the 
‘performance unavailable’ that the infrastructure will not be available to be operated for services, which would result in the 
‘revenue loss.’ In general, the ‘unforeseen site conditions’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on 





















Figure V49 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Unforeseen Site Conditions’ Risk Event 
 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. In addition, the Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont (2004)’ case study in the Thailand Underground Rail Project indicated that unforeseen site conditions will cause 
difficulties in tunneling with costly process and time delay. 
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V50.  Environmental pollutions 
 
The ‘environmental pollutions’ refers to the possibility of liability for losses or delay to remedy the problems arising from that 
the infrastructure produces environmental pollutions such as air, water and noise at the level which cannot meet environmental 




































Figure V50 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Environmental Pollutions’ Risk Event 
 
As shown in Figure V50, the ‘environmental pollutions’ would be likely to directly cause ‘industrial disputes’ and ‘contract 
breach’ (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004) since the infrastructure produces environmental pollutions such as air, water and noise 
at the level which cannot meet environmental regulations and contract requirements. Both would cause ‘contract 
remedies/penalties’ which would further result in ‘construction delay’ and ‘construction cost overrun’ at construction stage and 
‘performance unavailable’ and ‘revenue loss’ at operation stage as well since it needs to take additional time and extra costs to 
settle disputes and solve pollution issues. As previously stated, this would create two vicious circles (the positive loops 1 and 2) 
to make more risk in ‘finance unavailable’ which would make more risk in ‘resources unavailable’ which would result in 
‘construction delay’ at construction stage (loop 1) and ‘performance unavailable’ at operation stage (loop 2). In general, the 
‘environmental pollutions’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ and ‘revenue 
loss’ through these two feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phases. 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the case, the experience from the 
Great Belt and Oresund Links/Demark showed the costs for environmental protection will lead to the substantial financial risk, 
especially the construction cost overrun (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). In addition, the Ghosh & Jintanapakanont (2004)’ case study in 
the Thailand Underground Rail Project indicated that this risk will be against environment protection and regulation policy. 
 
V51.  Industrial disputes 
 
The ‘industrial disputes’ refers to the risk of strikes, industrial action, civil commotion, or public protests causing delay and cost 
to the project. 
 
As shown in Figure V51, the ‘industrial disputes’ would be likely to directly cause ‘construction delay’ at construction stage and 
‘performance unavailable’ at operation stage since the project performance would be stopped due to the events such as public 
protests and strikes. As previously stated, the ‘construction delay’ would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) to cause 
‘construction cost overrun’ which would cause ‘finance unavailable’ which would lead to ‘resources unavailable’ which would 
result in ‘construction delay’ yet again. On the other hand, the ‘performance unavailable’ would create another vicious circle (the 
positive loop 2) to cause ‘revenue loss’ which would cause ‘finance unavailable’ which lead to ‘resources unavailable’ which 
would result in ‘performance unavailable.’ In addition, the ‘industrial disputes’ would directly cause ‘contract 
remedies/penalties’(EC, 2003), which would result in more risk in ‘construction delay’ and ‘construction cost overrun’ at 
construction stage, and more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ and ‘revenue loss’ at operation stage as well since it needs to take 
additional time and extra costs to settle disputes. Furthermore, the ‘industrial disputes’ would be likely to result in ‘resources 
unavailable’ since the strikes, industrial action, civil commotion, or public protests would cause that materials, equipment, and 
manpower cannot be supplied. This would make more risk in ‘construction delay’ and more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ as 
well. In general, the ‘industrial disputes’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost overrun’ 
and ‘revenue loss’ through these two feedback dynamics over the construction and operation phases. 
 
 The ‘industrial disputes’ would be likely to be triggered by the ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’(EC, 2003) risk event since the 
industrial action or public protests are arisen from that the public regulatory policies do not reflect project investment 
expectations or do not reflect the public interests; or by the ‘environmental pollutions’(Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004) risk 
event since the industrial action or public protests are arisen from that infrastructure produces pollutions.  
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases In addition, the 
European Commission’s report (EC, 2003) indicated that there were public protests to toll increases for the Vasco da Gama 
Bridge concession project. In addition, the Ghosh & Jintanapakanont (2004)’ case study on the Thailand Underground Rail 
Project reflected that people must be given an opportunity to object and to comment on whether the environment safeguard and 
regulation policy is acceptable. 













































Figure V51 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Industrial Disputes’ Risk Event 
 
 
V52.  Force Majeure 
 
The ‘Force Majeure’ refers to the possibility of occurrence of naturally unexpected events like earthquake, storm, flood, etc. or 
man-made events like war, and fire that are beyond the control of both public and private parties which may affect the 
construction or operation of the project. 
 
As shown in Figure V52, the ‘Force Majeure’ would be likely to directly cause ‘resources unavailable’ (EC, 2002; Grey, 2004) 
since the events like earthquake, storm, flood, war, and fire, etc. that would make the supply of materials, equipment or 
manpower unavailable. As previously described, this would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) at the construction stage 
to cause more risk in ‘construction delay’ which would cause ‘construction overrun’ which would lead to ‘finance unavailable’ 
which would result in ‘resources unavailable.’ On the other hand, this would also create a vicious circle (the positive loop 1) at 
the operation stage to cause more risk in ‘performance unavailable’ which would cause ‘revenue loss’ which would lead to 
‘finance unavailable’ which would result in ‘resources unavailable’ yet again. In addition, the ‘Force Majeure’ would be likely to 
directly cause ‘accidents and safety issues’ since the naturally unexpected events or man-made events that are beyond the control 
of both public and private parties would be likely to affect the safety of infrastructure, which would lead to ‘performance 
unavailable’ and reinforce the loop 2. Moreover, the ‘Force Majeure’ would be likely to directly cause ‘scope changes’(Lu, 2004) 
as well since the uncontrolled events such as naturally unexpected events and man-made events would make the scope of output 
specification changed. As previously stated in “(4) Scope changes”, the ‘scope changes’ would further cause ‘design changes’ 
which would cause ‘construction changes’ which would cause ‘construction delay’ which would join the loops 1 and 2 so that it 
would create a vicious circle (the positive loop 3) to make more risk in ‘construction cost overrun’ and more risk in ‘revenue 
loss’ respectively. In general, the ‘Force Majeure’ risk event would result in compounding consequences on ‘construction cost 









































Figure V52 Cause Loop Diagram for ‘Force Majeure’ Risk Event 
 
This risk has been described in the secondary data sources listed in Table 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. As for the cases, the European 
Commission’s report (EC, 2002) on the London Underground indicated that the Specific Line Upgrade was delayed due to 
certain Force Majeure. Hodge (2004)’s case study on the Melbourne City Link indicated that the government authority has 
assumed control of the project in a damaged condition, under certain catastrophic and uninsurable events. Lu (2004)’s case study 
on the Labin B Power Plant (China) indicated that the government authority took risk to guarantee any circumstance outside the 
control of both parties due to Force Majeure. The Ghosh & Jintanapakanont (2004)’ case study on the Thailand Underground 
Rail Project reflected that the risk due to natural disaster may low probability to happen but very high impact on project 
performance.   334
Appendix VI Analysis of THSR Risks 
 
 
VI1.  ‘Land Unavailable’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in the Section V1 and the CLD illustrated in Figure V1, failure to acquire the lands on schedule would 
be possibly be a result of industrial disputes risk events, and would likely cause construction delay risks. Relative to the THSR 
project, the interview statements were: 
 
“The overall length of lands for the whole route of THSR runs through the west corridor of Taiwan is about 345 
kilometers. Among of them, the private lands occupy about 789 hectares, which were acquired by expropriation, 
whereas the public lands occupy about 101 hectares, which were acquired by appropriation. These include lands for 
routes and five station zones that include Taoyuan Station, Hsinchu Station, Taichung Station, Chaiyi Station and 
Tainan Station. In addition, the lands for constructing and operating six maintenance depots and bases from north 
Taiwan to south Taiwan are required, which includes Hsichih Depot, Liuchia Depot, Wujhi Depot, Taibao Base, Main 
Workshop and Tsoying Depot. The private and public lands occupy about 221 hectares. Most of the scheduled land 
acquisition can be completed to support the start of other work packages, but a delay in land acquisition on 
schedule would seriously delay the completion of other work packages including track work, civic work, station 
construction, depot construction and signal & communication systems of the M/E core system.”  
 
“All of land acquisition requires a negotiation with the land owners, a setup of property rights of superficies and an 
approval request from the related government authority for lands. However, you know there are 1,607 houses, 225 
factories, 1,095 graves, and 70 stables on the lands. Thus negotiation for acquiring these lands is very complicated. 
The major delay was still caused by several disputes and strikes from the land owners from Taipei to Kaohsiung due 
to various reasons like that the land owners were usually unhappy with the acquisition prices, or they cannot find 
another places for settle, or the Green groups wanted to stop this project because they thought it would have a great 
impact on the environment. In addition, the minor delay was caused by obtaining an approval from the government 
authorities to change property right for industrial purpose. This project has been approved by central government, 
but property right change is still under control of local governments. Some of local governments did not completely 
support land acquisition, so most of the approval delays for land acquisition are caused by local government.”  
“According to the past experiences, there were about 5% -11% of land owners would argue against land acquisition, 
and about 3%-13% of processing time for land acquisition would be delayed for the public transport projects; the 
larger projects, the more delay.”  
 
“The land acquisition is a preliminary job before starting other work packages. Our job is to remove obstacles and 
ensure land acquisition can be completion as requested by the Fourth Division (which is responsible for Engineering 
Management and Contract Performance Supervision). The Fourth Division estimated that one year behind 
construction would incur additional construction administration cost about NT$5.5 b, which includes manpower 
costs, material and equipment maintenance costs and interests for purchasing material and equipment, etc.” 
 
From the above interview statements, the general risk causal loop diagram for land unavailable shown in Figure V1 
fits the likely scenarios for the THSR project. But, from the statements such as, “The major delay was still caused by several 
disputes and strikes from the land owners…”, and “the minor delay was caused by obtaining an approval from the government 
authorities to change property right for industrial purpose,” the direct causes of land unavailable were industrial disputes and 
approval delays. Therefore, the direct cause and consequences of land unavailable risk events shown in Figure V1 are modified 














Figure VI1 The Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Land Unavailable’  
 
 
VI2.  ‘Resources Unavailable’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in the Section V2 and the CLD shown in Figure V2, resources including manpower, material, and 
energy could not meet the contract requirements for construction and operation which had possibly been triggered by financial 
unavailable issues of default by subcontractors, industrial disputes and Force Majeure, and would likely cause construction delay. 
As for the THSR project, the interview statements were: 
 
“No doubt the subcontractors are the most important resource for supplies. There are 12 subcontracts for civic 
works: C210 and C215 were carried by joint venture of subcontractors, Obayashi Corp. of Japan and Fu Tsu 
Construction Co. Ltd of ROC; C220 was carried by joint venture of Daiho Corp. of Japan and Chiu Tai General 
Contractor Co. Ltd of ROC and Kou Kai Construction Co. Ltd of ROC; C230 by joint venture of Hyundai 
Engineering & Corp. of Korea, Chung Lin General Contractor Co. Ltd of ROC and Zen Pacific Civil Contractor Co. 
Ltd of Hong Kong; C240 by joint venture of Hyundai Engineering & Corp. of Korea and Chung Lin General 
Contractor Co. Ltd of ROC; C250 by joint venture of Hochtief AG of German, Pan Asia Corp. of ROC and Ballast 
Nedam international of Holland; C260 and C270 by joint venture of Bilfinger and Berger Bauaktiengesellachaft of   335
German, and Continental Engineering Corp. of ROC; C280 by joint venture of Samsung Corp. of Korea, Korea 
Heavy Industries & Construction Co. Ltd. of Korea and International Engineering & Construction Corp. of ROC; 
C291 and C296 by joint venture of Shimizu Corp. of Japan and Evergreen Construction Corp. of ROC; C295 by joint 
venture of Italian Thai Development Public Company Limited of Thailand, Evergreen Construction Corp. of ROC, 
and Pacific Electric Wire & Cable Company of ROC. As for station construction, there are 6 subcontracts: S215 was 
carried by subcontractor Futsu/Obayashi JV; S220 by Daiho; S250 by Taisei/CEC/CTCI/Taian JV; S280 by 
Teco/Takenaka JV; S290 by Evergreen/Shimizu JV; S395 by SECI. The Core System for Electrical and Mechanical 
Equipment is supplied by joint venture of TSC which includes Japan Shinkansen System and other 6 Japanese 
companies for train units, signaling system, electric power and electric train system, telecommunication system, 
general electrical and mechanical equipment along the rail, training simulator and personnel training, etc. Tract work 
contract was carried by subcontractors TSC and TSIEC. As for maintenance depot construction, the detailed design 
contract D370 was carried by subcontractor, Po-Chen International (USA); D220 was carried by Shi-Ya Construction; 
D290 and D250 by joint venture of Chung-Ding Construction, Do-Yuan Engineering, and Chung-Lu Construction; 
D295 by joint venture of Do-Yuan Engineering and TVBJ (Australia); D502 by Safop (Italy); D503 by Vector 
Systems Pte. Ltd (Australia), etc.”  
 
“Apparently, a subcontractor’s skill and coordination capability are the most important factors to ensure 
subcontractors resources can be used to properly build, integrate, and perform heterogeneous systems to meet the 
contract requirements. The Taiwan high speed rail is a high-technology project. All of the civic work, track work, 
mechanical systems and electrical systems were types of innovative technologies. Of special importance was the fact 
that Taiwan has complicated geographical features and natural conditions such as soil condition, underground water, 
mountain tunneling, typhoon, flood, and earthquakes, and the like which need high-technology solutions to overcome. 
The subcontractor selection should ensure it has enough skilled technicians and equipment to implement high-
technology. Moreover, there are about 50 major engineering items for all work packages including civic engineering, 
track work, power system, telecommunication system, and signaling system, etc., which need to be properly 
integrated to ensure the whole system can work well. If any subcontractor for an item failed, the whole THSR project 
would risk failure. Most of these outsourcing contracts (subcontracts) were contracted by international tendering and 
carried out by joint venture of local and international companies. The differences on language, culture, technique 
between subcontractors would challenge whether the subcontractors and concessionaire can coordinate well to 
ensure the whole system can be built and performed to conform contract requirements.” 
 
“Natural calamity is another threat to disrupt resource supplies. Like Taipei Mass Transit, the service was stopped 
before due to flooding caused by a typhoon. The THSR has suffered from the 921 (September 21, 1999) earthquake 
that led to serious equipment and facility damage. We required the concessionaire and their subcontractors who have 
the Standard of Procedure to deal with the risk from the typhoon and earthquake often happens in Taiwan, which 
would likely to cause equipment breakdown and power unavailable so that the construction or operation is forced to 
disrupt.” 
 
“The residents along the THSR line who suffered from the noise of THSR often protested against the THSR project 
construction and operation. Some of the project performance would therefore be stopped. The acceptable level is less 
than 75 decibels to continue for 8 minutes. The point test indicated that it often reaches 76 to 94 decibels which 
would often cause the arguments and protects from the residents to stop project services.” 
 
“Another problem is the financial capability of contractor which is a potential risk to delay resource supplies and 
would lead to serious construction and service delay. The concessionaire would be easy to suffer financial difficulties 
before complete construction, especially when there was a great delay. That is because the project is only expanding 
with no revenue at construction phase. At operation phase, especially at the beginning of services, like Taipei Mass 
Transit, the demand is usually less than expected. This would lead to financial difficulties, too. I would say that the 
financial difficulties for concessionaire would cause significant impact on resource supplies that are required for 
THSR construction and operation.” 
 
“According to the past experience of the similar transport projects like Taipei Mass Transit, the minimum average 
delay for construction due to the lack of resource supplies is about 45 days. According to the contract mechanism, the 
Fourth Division of BHSR, which is responsible for Engineering Management and Contract Performance Supervision 
will step in when the lack of resources would delay each work package behind the schedule until 120 days.” 
 
From the above interview statements, the researcher determined that the direct cause and consequence for land 
unavailable events shown in Figure V2 fit the likely scenarios for the THSR project. 
 
 
VI3.  ‘Performance Unavailable’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in the Section V3 and based on the CLD shown in Figure V3, the project performance were delayed or 
disrupted in delivery of services which lead to revenue losses, which were possibly triggered by construction delays, resource 
unavailable, failed commissioning tests, inspection and testing delay, low operating productivity, system breakdown, high 
maintenance frequency, accidents and safety issues, insolvency of contractors, shorter asset life, and industrial disputes. Relative 
to the THSR project, the interview statements were below: 
 
“There would be lots of challenges to start running this state-of-the-art project. The preliminary condition is that all of 
work package should be completed and passed the inspection & commissioning tests on schedule for operation. 
Annual delay to start operation would be likely to cost about NT$19.3 billion including NT$13.8 billion for interest 
and NT$5.5 billion for operating cost. Moreover, the basic requirement is that we need high quality engineering 
work to build and operate this high-technology system which should dynamically integrate trains, signaling and 
communication systems, and power systems to meet the commissioning test requirement that the THSR is able to 
efficiently and safely operate under high-speed running in 350 km/hr. The train and track are Japanese specifications,   336
but the signaling and communication systems are Germany specifications. They need to be integrated very well to 
ensure the whole THSR system can be operated without any defect during its expected service life.”  
“For example, if the Turn Out system that is used to guide the trains on the right track is out of order, then the regular 
trains would be canceled or delayed for services, which would cause that the whole system broke down or even lead 
to the rail crash. The unreliable integration between train, track signaling and communication system will then need 
frequent modification and maintenance. All of these would reduce operation efficiency.” 
 
“Another major challenge is the skilled manpower and communication issue. For example, a central control room 
has been built to monitor and operate THSR for the entire 345km line. It is similar to the brain controlling the body to 
work properly. It needs to control access to and from depots. It controls the in-cab APT and interlocking that allow 
route-setting and locking functions to be performed at the stations and depots along the route. Any problem on the 
controlling system would cause improper operation and even accident and safety issues. However, we require the 
skilled and practical manpower with good communication and coordination to use this state-of-the-art artificial 
intelligence. Originating from different countries, the current staff in the central control room may be skilled to use 
the central control system but speak different languages. There would be potential risk to reduce the operation quality 
and efficiency due to communication and coordination problems between the train drivers, maintenance staff and the 
staff in the central control room.” 
 
“When the THSR stops or there is a delay in service, the direct consequence is revenue loss. Being unable to meet 
service requirements will be penalized. We estimate that the maximum number of trains that would delay service on 
time for more than 30 minutes in a month is about 45 trains, and there would be no train delay if the operation 
company can monitor and control whole system well. According to the contract terms and conditions, the half of 
ticket fare should be refunded to every rider if the train behind the schedule more than 30 minutes; the whole ticket 
fare should be refunded if delay more than one hour. Furthermore, the cumulative delay service on time would likely 
to cause 20% of trains that are unable to provide service as scheduled. We estimate that the break-even daily capacity 
is about 60 trains. If the number of daily in-service train is less than the break-even daily capacity, then it would lead 
to revenue losses.” 
 
From statement that “all of work package should be completed and passed the inspection and commissioning tests on 
schedule for operation,” the inspection and testing delay and failed commissioning tests risk events are included in construction 
delay. Therefore, they are removed from CLD shown in Figure V3. From the above statements, the researcher indicated that 
resources unavailable (the required for skilled and practical manpower), system breakdown, accidents and safety issues, high 
maintenance frequency, and poor cooperation/coordination (communication and coordination problem) would cause low 
operating productivity (reduce operation efficiency) and then lead to performance unavailable events which cannot meet contract 

























Figure VI3 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Performance Unavailable’  
 
 
VI4.  ‘Scope Changes’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in the Section V4 and the CLD shown in Figure V4, the project scope changed after contracting which 
lead to time delay and extra costs, possibly triggered by law/policy changes political interference and Force Majeure. Relative to 
the THSR project, the interview statements were below: 
 
“The scope change would be a major source to cause construction cost overrun. The politics were one of the typical 
reasons to make the output specifications radically changed. Initially, there were 3 stops sited in the cities of Taoyuan, 
Taichung and Kaohsiung along the whole 345 km route from the north to south of Taiwan planned for THSR project. 
The purpose is to make the THSR a real high-speed train with minimum stops. However, the citizens of cities that had 
no stops worried that it would be bad news to their metropolitan development in the future. These cities officials 
strongly expected that if they were on the route of THSR that it would help to boost economic development. Later on, 
these cities started to lobby the central government to influence policy and plan with the assistant of legislators. 
Eventually the stops were changed from three to six.” 
 
“During construction the 9/21 earthquake happen in 1999 which caused the most serious damage in the late 20th 
century’ this changed lots of rules for the THSR. The policy-maker therefore changed rule that requires 
earthquake-proof technology.” 
 
“Furthermore, the THSR route passes the South Taiwan Science Park, one of the major manufacturer pools of 
electronics and semiconductor in the world. When the trains pass, it will cause unendurable vibration that would   337
significantly influence the products that are manufactured on the delicate instruments. The semiconductor industry 
officials strongly argued that the public and private sector should sort it out together. Similarly, the residents who 
live near the whole THSR route often protested the enormous noise produced by the THSR. Thus, the rules were 
changed to request the system design for the higher level of earthquake-proof, vibration-proof and noise-proof 
technology for THSR project.” 
 
From these statements, it is apparent that scope changes are usually caused by law/policy changes that arise from 
political interference (political reasons), Force Majeure (the earthquake), industrial disputes (the industrial argument and protest), 
and thus lead to design changes. Thus, the direct causes and consequences for scope change shown in Figure V4 were modified 
as Figure VI4 to fit the THSR project. 
 
4.Scope changes 6.Design changes
48.Law/policy
changes + +  
Figure VI4 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Scope Changes’  
 
VI5.  ‘Defective Design’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in the Section V5 and the CLD shown in Figure V5, the defective design would lead to a defective 
system that would potentially cause defective construction and performance unavailable events, possibly catalyzed by defaults of 
subcontractors and resources unavailable events. Relative to the THSR project, the interview statements were below: 
 
“It would be very awful that the THSR is the state-of-art in high-speed rail system, but employs an old ticketing 
system. The ticketing system is one of cases on defective design that would make a defective facility. For example, 
the online booking system is very unfriendly. Numerous customers have complained that it takes at least 40 minutes 
to finish processing a transaction because the system must simultaneously handle the seat arrangements and confirm 
that the banks can successfully collect the money. Overbooking also continues to occur. Moreover, the malfunction 
rate for ticket-checking at the gate is still higher than 5%. Frankly speaking, it seems that the THSR was doing flight 
business. Why do the customers need to go to the platform 20 minutes before train starts? It seems like boarding time 
to take a flight. That is a train, rather than a plane! This case told us that the subcontractors are very important and 
that they need to be familiar with the THSR operations, and have skilled design staff to design and build the ticketing 
system for the THSR, rather than copying the current flight ticketing system. Obviously their performance cannot 
meet contract requirements, so our supervising team has asked them to change design and modify ticketing system to 
meet THSR output service requirements.” 
 
“Another serious issue is that the defective design would cause problem on defective construction about system 
interface and integration. The core power system, train vehicle, electrical and mechanical system, and signaling 
system are a mix of European and Japanese systems. The Japanese train vehicle only fits a one-way and one direction 
signaling system, but the European signaling system is one-way & two directions system. Apparently, they are not 
compatible. The benefit for one-way and one direction is that two trains will not crash into each other. The drawback 
is that once the accident happens, the whole line should be closed. On the contrary, the benefit for the one-way and 
two directions system is that the route will not need to be closed. However, its drawback is the whole signaling 
system becomes very complex so that its difficult to integrate with other systems. Any problem about unskilled 
technicians, human ignorance, poor communication, and even system disorder would lead to serious rail crash. 
Our supervising team has also asked them to modify information control systems for signaling and communication 
systems to meet the THSR output service requirements.” 
 
Based on these statements, the defective design would normally be caused by default of subcontractors, and resource 
unavailable (unskilled design staff), and could easily lead to defective construction (defective facilities) and complex system 
interface/integration. Thus, the direct causes and consequences for defective design shown in Figure V5 were modified as Figure 

















Figure VI5 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Defective Design’  
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VI6.   ‘Design Changes’ on THSR 
 
As described in the Section VI5 and Section VI28,  obviously the ‘design changes’ is one of remedy actions in construction stage 
that is usually caused by ‘scope changes’ and ‘contractual disputes’ and easy to lead to ‘construction delay. Thus the direct 
causes and consequence of ‘design changes’ illustrated in Figure V6 can basically fit the THSR project well. 
 
VI7.  ‘Construction Cost Overrun’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section VI8, VI9, VI22, VI27, VI40 and VI41, obviously all of additional costs arising from risk events such as 
‘construction delay’ ‘variability of interest rate’ ‘price escalation’ and ‘insurance increases’ would likely cause ‘construction cost 
overrun’ at construction stage which would lead to ‘finance unavailable.’ Thus the direct causes and consequences of 



















Figure VI7 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Construction Cost Overrun’ 
 
 
VI8.  ‘Construction Delay’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section VI1, VI2, VI10, VI25, VI30, and VI49, we conclude that the ‘construction delay’ would be directly 
caused by ‘land unavailable’ and ‘resources unavailable’ ‘construction changes’ ‘delay in contract change negotiation’ 
‘ownership change delay’ and ‘unforeseen site conditions.’ It would lead to ‘construction delay’ and ‘performance unavailable’. 





























Figure VI8 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Construction Delay’ 
 
 
VI9.  ‘Defective Construction’ on THSR 
 
As described in the Section VI2, VI3, VI5, and VI33, we conclude that the ‘defective construction’ is usually caused by 
‘defective design’ and ‘resources unavailable’ ‘default of subcontractors’ and ‘poor cooperation/coordination’, and usually leads 
to ‘failed commission tests’ ‘system breakdown’ ‘high maintenance frequency’ ‘accidents and safety issues’ and ‘shorter asset 
life’. Thus, the direct causes and consequences of ‘defective construction’ illustrated in Figure V9 are modified as Figure VI9 to 






















Figure VI9 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Defective Construction’   339
 
VI10. 5.2.10 ‘Construction Changes’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section VI5, Section VI6 and Section VI28, apparently the ‘construction changes’ would be caused by ‘design 
changes’ and easy to lead to ‘construction delay’ and ‘low operating productivity’. Thus the direct causes and consequences of 












Figure VI10 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Construction Changes’ 
 
 
VI11.  ‘Complex System Interface/Integration’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section VI2, VI3, VI5, VI20 and VI21, the THSR project employs Japanese technology for rail power systems, 
but European technology for signalling systems. This mix (‘complex technologies’) makes complex interface issue that it 
difficult to integrate the whole system well. Moreover, from the above statements, the ‘defective design’ of any subsystems such 
as ticketing system and signalling control system would make it be incompatible with other subsystems so that the whole system 
cannot integrated to meet contract requirements. We can therefore conclude that the ‘complex system interface/integration’ is 
usually caused by ‘complex technologies’ and ‘defective design’, and would lead to ‘poor cooperation/coordination’ ‘system 
breakdown’ ‘high maintenance frequency’ ‘accidents and safety issues’ and ‘shorter asset life’ Thus, the direct causes and 





















Figure VI11 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Complex System Interface/Integration’ 
 
 
VI12. ‘Failed Commissioning Tests’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in Section V12 and the CLD shown in Figure V12, that the operational commissioning tests cannot meet output 
specification on the schedule would lead to remedy actions (‘contract remedies/penalties’) to correct the defective systems so that 
the whole infrastructure system cannot start to deliver service (‘performance unavailable’) As for THSR project, the interview 
statement was below: 
 
“During commissioning tests, the whole THSR system failed to meet the operation requirements because of series of 
problem on defective facilities: signalling system and ticketing system. For example, the track sensor that is used to 
sense if the trains pass and measure the speed couldn’t feed back information to the Control Center. The Turn Out 
system and its detector EDP that is used to arrange the trains on the right track were often out of order. Moreover, the 
ticketing system had malfunction rate more than the contract requirements. All of these problems would delay 
operation and even probably cause safety and accident issues during operation. We strongly asked the contractor and 
its subcontractors to fix problems. The government authority rejected to start operating the THSR without remedying 
these defects according to the contract requirements.” 
 
As described in Section VI3 and VI9, and the above interview statement, the ‘defective construction’ would absolutely fail 
commissioning tests to meet contract requirements (‘contract breach’), and would lead to further action on fix defective 
construction. Thus, the direct cause and consequence of ‘failed commissioning test’ illustrated in Figure V12 are modified as 











Figure VI12 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Failed Commissioning tests’ 
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VI13. ‘Low Operating Productivity’ on THSR 
 
As described in the Section VI2, VI3, VI10 and VI11, we conclude that the ‘resources unavailable’ ‘default of subcontractors’ 
‘construction changes’ ‘system breakdown’ ‘high maintenance frequency’ ‘accidents and safety issues’ and ‘poor 
cooperation/coordination’ would lead to ‘low operating productivity’ that performance capability is lower than the contract 
requirements. Thus, the direct cause and consequence of ‘low operating productivity’ illustrated in Figure V13 are modified as 





















Figure VI13 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Low Operating Productivity’ 
 
 
VI14. ‘Mis-pricing’ on THSR 
 
As described in the Section VI29, we can conclude that the ‘mis-pricing’ is caused by ‘inflexible contract arrangement’, and 
would lead to ‘revenue losses.’  
 
“To protect the end users, the government in authority holds the right to change train fare. The current policy allows 
the base fare to be increased by inflation rate approved by government. Then it can be further increased less than 20% 
of the base fare according to the factors such as distance, peak time, and business class. However, how much train 
fare can be increased depends on how flexible of the government’s policy. Therefore, from the perspective of a 
private sector, it would need to take the risk that if the demand is largely less than the expected.” 
 












VI15. ‘Revenue Loss’ on THSR 
 
As described in the Section VI3, VI32, VI14, VI41, VI19, VI26, VI27, VI37, VI42, and VI38, obviously all of additional costs or 
losses arising from risk events at operation stage such as ‘performance unavailable’ ‘contract remedies/penalties’ ‘mis-pricing’ 
‘variability of interest rate’ ‘price escalation’ ‘tax increases’ ‘insurance increases’ ‘less residual value’ ‘variability of less 
demand’ and ‘termination liability’ would likely cause ‘revenue losses’ which would lead to ‘finance unavailable.’ Thus the 
Figure V15 for direct causes and consequences of ‘revenue losses’ were modified as Figure VI15 to fit the THSR project. All of 



































Figure VI15 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Revenue Losses’ 
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VI16.  ‘System Breakdown’ on THSR 
 
As described in the Section VI9, VI11 and VI13, we conclude that the ‘defective construction’ and ‘complex system 
interface/integration’ would cause ‘system breakdown’ that would further lead to ‘low operating productivity’ that performance 
capability is lower than the contract requirements. Thus, the direct causes and consequence of ‘system breakdown’ illustrated in 











Figure VI16 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘System Breakdown’ 
 
 
VI17.  ‘High Maintenance Frequency’ on THSR 
 
As described in the Section VI9, VI11 and VI13, we conclude that the ‘defective construction’ and ‘complex system 
interface/integration’ would cause ‘high maintenance frequency’ that would further lead to ‘low operating productivity’ that 
performance capability is lower than the contract requirements. Thus, the direct causes and consequence of ‘system breakdown’ 


















VI18. ‘Accidents and Safety Issues’ on THSR 
 
As described in the Section VI2, VI9, VI11 and VI52,, we conclude that the ‘resources unavailable’ ‘defective construction’ and 
‘complex system interface/integration’ and ‘Force Majeure’ would cause ‘accidents and safety Issues’ that would further lead to 
‘low operating productivity’ that performance capability is lower than the contract requirements and the accident damage . As for 
THSR project, the interview statement emphasize this issue below: 
 
“As we stated before, the THSR system consists of different sub-systems made by different countries, which is 
operated by the staff who come from different countries with different native languages. Especially for the operators 
work in the Central Control Room, they should be skilled with good command of communication and coordination. 
Any of problems on communication and coordination between operators would lead to accidents and safety issues 
such as derail and rail crash. Moreover, defective facilities and system interface and integration would also be easy 
to cause rail accidents. In addition to the above human factors, the powerful national disaster such as typhoon and 
earthquake that would happen in Taiwan every year would have a most serious impact on accident and safety issues. 
We assume under the worst circumstance there would be an accident due to human factor and national disaster 
every year in Taiwan. According to the current rail accident regulation, the death damage is NT$2.5 million per head, 
the accidental injury is NT$1.4 million per head, and the minor wound is NT$0.4 million per head. Therefore, the 
average maximum accidental damage is about NT$1.3 million per head a year. 
 
According to the above statements, the direct causes and consequences of ‘accidents and safety Issues’ illustrated in Figure V18 





















Figure VI18 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Accidents and Safety Issues’   342
VI19.  ‘Price Escalation’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in Section V19 and Figure V19, the ‘variability of inflation rate’ and ‘variability of exchange rate’ would be likely 
to cause ‘price escalation’ which would lead to higher construction costs and operation costs which would lead to ‘cost overrun’ 
and ‘revenue loss.’ As for THSR project, the interview statement was below: 
 
“Undoubtedly the inflation rate would influence money for time which would cause higher construction costs than 
we budgeted. On the other hand, it would influence operation costs as well. The inflation is greatly influenced by 
global price and our own economy. Of course, it would influence THSR performance. Unfortunately, we cannot 
control it. It’s responsibility of central government.” 
 
According to the above statement, obviously the direct cause and consequences of ‘price escalation’ illustrated in Figure V19 can 
basically fit the THSR project well. 
 
VI20.  ‘Complex Technologies’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section VI11, the THSR project employs complex sub-systems that are incompatible each other would make 
complex interface issue that needs to take additional time and cost to integrate the whole THSR system. As for THSR project, the 
interview statement was below: 
 
“This is a sensitive question. Initially the THSR project focused the core system on German and French high-speed 
technology (German ICE power cars and French TGV Duplex intermediate trailers), but eventually the THSRC 
changed mind to chose Japanese technology (Kawasaki’s 700 series Shinkansen trains). Now the THSR system 
employs Germany signalling and communication system, but employs Japanese power system. Because they cannot 
be compatible each other, the Japanese supplier should modify or re-design the system programs to integrate these 
systems. It’s a great risk to take time and cost to maintain these sub-systems to ensure the whole THSR can be 
operated, since it may reduce reliability and reduce the whole life of THSR system. “This unreasonable decision 
made it’s suspicious of political influence. There is no evidence for this suspiciousness. However, the political power 
represented from different project suppliers always tries to interfere and influence the decision on system design and 
choice.” 
 
According to the above statements, the direct cause and direct consequence of ‘complex technologies’ are ‘political interference’ 
and ‘complex system interface/integration’ respectively. Thus the CLD for ‘complex technologies’ illustrated in Figure V20 can 
basically fit the THSR project well. 
 
 
VI21.  ‘Poor Cooperation/Coordination’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section VI2, VI3, VI5, and VI11, the THSR project employs Japanese technology for rail power systems, but 
European technology for signalling and communication systems. This combination makes complex interface issue that it difficult 
to integrate the whole system well. As for THSR project, the interviewee made the following supplementary statement: 
 
“The ‘skill’ and ‘coordination’ capability would be the most important factors for the concessionaire, and both 
construction and operation subcontractors to ensure these heterogeneous systems can be build, integrate, and operate 
well to meet the contract requirements. The more complex interface and integration the system has, the more 
coordination is needed. At construction stage, it would cause construction defects; at operation stage, the serious 
coordination issue it would often lead system broke down or service delay.” 
 
From the above statements, obviously the ‘poor cooperation/coordination’ is usually caused by ‘complex system 
interface/integration’ and easy to lead to ‘defective construction’ and ‘low operating productivity’. Thus, the direct cause and 















Figure VI21 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Poor Cooperation/Coordination’ 
 
VI22.  ‘Finance Unavailable’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in the Section V22 and the CLD shown in Figure V22 , the ‘finance unavailable’ would cause that project are not 
available on the money amounts and on the conditions anticipated to perform project, which would be possibly caused by 
‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ ‘political interference’ ‘construction cost overrun’ ‘revenue loss’ and ‘ownership changes’. It 
would be likely to lead to ‘resource unavailable’ and ‘insolvency of contractor.’ As for THSR project, the interview statement 
was below: 
   343
“The THSR is a significant contribution for the current governed party. From the perspective of politics benefit, even 
though the THSR project is a private-financing project, the government has helped the contractor to sign a low-
interest project-financing agreement with the banks under the guarantee of government. The government’s policy 
even allows THSR project to have a financing agreement with a low equity-debt ratio at 1/9 (greater than 3/7 would 
prefer). In another word, most of the money used for THSR construction came from the banks rather than the 
contractor’s own capital. Since the large delay in core system work package, the concessionaire has spent large money 
greater than it borrowed from the bank due to construction administration cost and interest payment. A day delay for 
operation means a day loss for revenue. The construction cost overrun due to construction delay and revenue loss 
due to operation delay has made the financing institutes lost their confidence to continue lending money to the 
contractor THSRC. It means it is difficult for the concessionaire to borrow more capital from the banks if they cannot 
start operation to earn money to repay money that they have spent for construction. Even THSR has been started to 
operate, the contractor still will face the risks in financial difficulties when the demand is much less than the 
forecasted. Once the concessionaire has financial difficulties, they won’t be able to pay their subcontractors for 
subcontracts implementation, which would delay project performance. Under the worst circumstance, the 
concessionaire would be consequently incapable of repayment for project debt so that it may go bankrupt and not 
be able to implement contract any more. As a result, the contract will be terminated, and ownership will be switched 
to the government in authority but it would have the obligation to bear liability as well.” 
 
“From our point of view (the lender’s perspective), we focus on the loan repayment capacity to preview and review 
the contractor’s ‘financial capacity to borrow.’ There are two criteria to judge project contractor’s financial capacity: 
‘percentage of construction cost overrun’ for construction stage and ‘Debt Service Coverage (DSC)’ for operation 
stage. The basic requirement of financial capacity for construction is no cost overrun. If there is cost overrun, we will 
feel uncomfortable. The more percentage of construction cost overrun, the more confidence loss on the project 
contractor’s financial capability during construction stage. Our acceptable DSC level is 1.5 for the general PPP case. 
If the project performance is guaranteed under government, then we can reduce this level from 1.5 to 1.2. If the 
average DSC at operation stage is lower than 1.2, we would have no confidence in project contractor’s financial 
capacity.” 
 
From the above statements, obviously the ‘finance unavailable’ is usually caused by ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ ‘construction 
cost overrun’ and ‘revenue loss’ and easy to lead to ‘resources unavailable’ and ‘insolvency of contractor’. Thus, the direct cause 


















Figure VI22 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Finance Unavailable’ 
 
 
VI23.  ‘Refinancing Liabilities’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in Section V23 and Figure V23, the ‘finance unavailable’ would be likely to cause ‘refinancing liabilities’ that the 
materially reduces the private sector’s finance costs but increase the public sector’s liabilities. As for THSR project, Mr A1, the 
1st Division of BHSR, Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) made the following statement: 
 
“When the concessionaire has financial difficulties during project life so that it cannot keep implementing the contract, 
it may ask to argue and change project financing structure to replace the original contract arrangement. In general, the 
refinancing may only benefit the concessionaire but may be helpless to the THSR project. Moreover, it would make 
the government to bear the concessionaire’s debt repayment risk. We need to assess if the refinancing can meet 
taxpayer’s interests based on the real refinancing structure. However, the refinancing needs to be approved by the 
government authority. Moreover, the public sector may need to share the refinancing gains with the concessionaire.” 
 
From the above statement, basically the direct cause and consequence illustrated in Figure V23 can fit the THSR project well. 
However, it’s a post contracting issue that there is no information on refinancing structure on the pre-contracting stage.  
 
 
VI24. ‘Insolvency of Contractor’ on THSR 
 
As the interview statement described in the Section VI22, “under the worst circumstance in financial difficulties (‘finance 
unavailable’), the concessionaire would be consequently incapable of repayment for project debt (‘insolvency of contractor’) so 
that it may go bankrupt and not be able to implement contract any more (‘contract breach’). As a result, the contract will be 
terminated, and ownership will be switched to the government in authority (‘ownership change’) but it would have the obligation 
to bear liability (‘termination liability’) as well.” the ‘finance unavailable’ would likely to lead to ‘insolvency of contractor’. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the ‘finance unavailable’ would cause ‘insolvency of contractor’ which would lead to ‘contract 
breach’ which would lead to ‘ownership change delay’ and ‘termination liabilities.’ Thus, the direct cause and consequence of 
‘insolvency of contractor’ illustrated in Figure V24 are modified as Figure VI24 to fit the THSR project.   344









Figure VI24 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Insolvency of Contractor’ 
 
 
VI25. ‘Ownership Change Delay’ on THSR 
 
As the interview statement described in the Section VI47, we can conclude that the ‘ownership change delay’ is arising from 
‘approval delay’, which would lead to ‘construction delay.’ The statement also indicated that there is no maximum limitation on 
approval review, but the ownership change delay would even take one year. Thus, the direct cause and consequence of 
‘ownership change delay’ illustrated in Figure V25 are modified as Figure VI25 to fit the THSR project. 









Figure VI25 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Ownership Change Delay’ 
 
 
VI26.  ‘Tax Increases’ on THSR 
 
As described in the Section V26 and the CLD shown in Figure V26, the increased tax by government would affect the project 
finance. As for THSR project, the interview statement was below:: 
 
“The average income tax for the general business is about 25%. But THSR project adapts to the government’s 
regulations on ‘Promotion of Private Participation’, which can apply to preferential tax ranged from 15%-25%. After 
taking some exempted taxes into account, the possible tax for THSR would be about average 18%.” 
 
From the above statements, obviously the ‘tax increase’ is controlled under the government’s policy on tax. Therefore, it is an 
external factor to THSR project. Thus, the direct cause and consequence illustrated in Figure V26 are modified as Figure VI26 to 










VI27.  ‘Insurance Increases’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section V27 and Figure V27, the ‘insurance increases’ would contribute to ‘construction cost overrun’ or 
‘revenue loss’. A As for THSR project, the interview statement was below: 
 
“The required insurance for THSR is contracted with the reputable insurers approved by government and on 
conditions required by government. The insurance cost is based on the fixed terms & conditions with cost increase 
that is only subject to inflation. The contingency plan is about NT$54.2 billion for the risk premium over concession 
period.” 
 
From the above statements, the direct consequence illustrated in Figure V27 can fit the THSR project well. 
 
 
VI28. ‘Contractual Disputes’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in Section V28 and the CLD shown in Figure V28, the ‘contractual disputes’ would be likely to lead to additional 
time and costs to solve them. As for THSR project, the interview statement was below: 
  
“Contract breach is the major arguments between contract parties, which are for who need to take responsibility for 
contract defects. For example, the signalling systems had ever been a nightmare for the commission of THSR. Due to 
far behind schedule on the signalling system, the whole THSR seriously delayed to start services. The Japanese joint 
venture TSC the designer and manufacturer of THSR signalling system. The concessionaire THSRC would like to 
claim the loss of signalling system construction delay from TSC, but TSC complain it’s due to unreasonable design 
requirements on the interface integration between European and Japanese systems requested by THSRC. Obviously it 
has been a great contract dispute between THSRC and its subcontractor TSC.”   
 
From the above statements and that in Section VI35, obviously the ‘contractual disputes’ is usually caused by ‘contract breach’ 
and ‘latent defects’, and easy to lead to any actions for dispute solution. Thus, the direct causes of ‘contractual disputes’ 
illustrated in Figure V28 are modified as Figure VI28 to fit the THSR project. 











Figure VI28 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Defective Design’ 
 
 
VI29.  ‘Inflexible Contract Arrangement’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in Section V29 and the CLD as shown in Figure V29, the ‘inflexible contract changes’ would be likely to lead to 
additional time and costs to change contract contents. As for THSR project, the interview statement was below: 
  
“THSR contract is one of the most important infrastructure projects in the recent 10 years, which will have huge 
positive economic effects to reduce the metropolitan development difference between the south Taiwan and south 
Taiwan. Even though the concessionaire has the ownership of THSR during concession period, for public interests, 
the government’ policy is that the public sector in authority still have to hold the right to approve major contract 
changes such as scope change and ticket price change, which also includes the right to approve major contract 
changes between the concessionaire and its subcontracts. Of course, the contractors may not happy with this contract 
change mechanism, which would delay contract changes, and the contractor may not be able to make ticket pricing as 
they would expect. However, from the point of view of the government, the public interests are our first priority.”   
 
According to the above statements, the direct cause of ‘inflexible contract changes’ is ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ and direct 
consequences are ‘delay in contract change negotiation’ and ‘mis-pricing’ respectively. Thus the CLD for ‘inflexible contract 
changes’ illustrated in Figure 4.2.29 can basically fit the THSR project well. 
 
 
VI30. ‘Delay in Contract Change Negotiation’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section VI29 and VI47, we can conclude that the ‘delay in contract negotiation’ is caused by ‘inflexible contract 
arrangement (for example, major contract changes between concessionaire and subcontractors need to obtain approval from the 
government)’ and ‘approval delay (for example, the scope changes and ticket price changes should obtain approval from the 
government)’, and would lead to ‘construction delay’.  
 
Thus, the direct causes and consequence of ‘delay in contract negotiation’ illustrated in Figure V30 are modified as Figure VI30 


















VI31. ‘Contract Breach’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section VI3 and VI12, VI24, VI38, VI48, there are four major scenarios that would cause ‘contract breach’, 
which are ‘performance unavailable’ that the contractor is unable to deliver service according to the contract requirements, 
‘failed commission tests’ that the built systems cannot pass the commission tests according to the contract specification 
requirements, ‘insolvency of contractor’ that the contractor cannot implement contract requirements any longer due to financial 
difficulty, and ‘law/policy changes’ that the contract requirements become more stricter than the original expectation so that the 
contractor cannot make it, for example, the stricter economical protection rules. In addition, the interviewees made a 
supplementary statement below: 
 
“When there is ‘contract breach’ in TSHR project, there are two things would happen: first, it would cause 
‘contractual disputes’ that the government authority, the concessionaire, and the subcontractors would argue who 
will need to take responsibility for the defects; second, it would cause ‘contract termination’ that the issue is very 
serious to sort out. From the stand of government, we prefer sorting out disputes to terminating contract. We hope 
contact can be smoothly implemented to deliver services.” 
 
From the above statements, we can conclude that the ‘contract breach’ would be caused by ‘performance unavailable’ ‘failed 
commission tests’ ‘insolvency of contractor’ and ‘law/policy changes’, and would be likely to lead to ‘contractual disputes’ and 
‘termination liabilities.’ Thus, the direct causes and consequences of ‘contract breach’ illustrated in Figure V31 are modified as 




















Figure VI31 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Contract Breach’ 
 
 
VI32.  ‘Contract Remedies/Penalties’ on THSR 
 
As described from Section VI3 to VI18, the ‘performance unavailable (failure in services’ and ‘accidents and safety issues 
(accident damage)’ will lead to ‘contract remedies/penalties’ that will lead to ‘revenue losses.’ Thus, the direct cause and 












Figure VI32 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Contract Remedies/Penalties’ 
 
 
VI33.  ‘Default of Subcontractors’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in Section V33 and the CLD as shown in Figure V33, the ‘default of subcontractors’ would likely lead to ‘defective 
design’ and ‘defective construction’ that need additional time and costs to remedy. As for THSR project, the interview statement 
was below: 
 
“The subcontractors are the core of PPP project supply chain, which take responsible to design, build, and operate 
THSR project. There have ever been some defective design and facilities happened in THSR project, which would 
make the whole system down and serious safety issues. For example, the ‘Turn Out’ system and its signal detector 
EDP are often out of order that the train cannot be guided into the right track, which would often lead to derail and 
possibly the rail crash accident. The ‘Bogie’ is often out of order, too. It is used to drive the carriage to move along 
the track. Once it damages seriously, not only it would lead the carriage to be derailed but also cause the train engine 
damaged. All of these defective facilities are subcontractors’ responsibilities.”  
 
From the above statements and that in Section VI2 and Section VI3, apparently the ‘default of subcontractors’ would usually lead 
to ‘defective design’, ‘defective construction’, and ‘resources unavailable.’ Thus the direct consequences of ‘design changes’ 
illustrated in Figure V33 can basically fit the THSR project well. 
 
 
VI34. ‘Inspection and Testing Delay’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section VI3, the variable ‘inspection and testing delay’ has been included in ‘construction delay.’ So, this risk 
variable is removed from the research. 
 
 
VI35.  ‘Latent Defects’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in Section V35 and Figure V35, the ‘latent defects’ that the employed technologies infringe the patents held by the 
third parties would likely cause the ‘contractual disputes’ which would likely lead to additional time and costs to solve them. As 
for THSR project, the interview statement was below: 
 
“Because of including many heterogeneous systems, the solution for latent defects is almost one of the terms and 
conditions of large-scale construction engineering contract. The purpose is to prevent contract disputes from the 
contractor, customer, and the third parties in case that there is any patent infringement about technologies employed 
in these heterogeneous systems. Fortunately, the THSR technology is the most updated and innovative, I believe it 
would not have problem about ‘latent defects’ but we still need to reduce this risk by including the related terms and 
conditions about it in the PPP contract.” 
 
From the above interview statements, the direct causes and consequence of ‘latent defects’ illustrated in Figure V35 can basically 
fit the THSR project well.   347
 
VI36.  ‘Shorter Asset Life’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in the Section VI9 and VI11, the ‘shorter asset life’ that the facility life would be shorter than planned would likely 
be caused by ‘defective construction’ and ‘complex system interface/integration’; it would lead to ‘less residual value’ and 
‘performance unavailable’. The interviewees made a supplementary statement below: 
 
“The THSR employs Japanese power system, but European signalling and communication system. We worry that 
upgrading THSR would be difficult, since there is an interface and integration problem between different systems. If 
any of subsystems is not compatible with others, the whole THSR system cannot be operated well. For example, the 
current Trainset is Japanese Shinkansen 700 series with max operation speed 350km/hr. If we would like to upgrade 
500km/hr after 25 years, we suspect the current signalling and communication system and other sub-systems can 
support the new train system. Even though the current whole system can be upgraded, we may need to expense much 
more than we expected.” 
 

















Figure VI36 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Shorter Asset Life’ Risk Event 
 
 
VI37. ‘Less Residual Values’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in Section VI26 and VI36, the ‘less residual value’ would be caused by ‘shorter asset life’; it would lead to ‘revenue 
losses.’ Thus, the direct cause and consequence of ‘shorter asset life’ illustrated in Figure V37 is modified as Figure VI37 to fit 
the THSR project. 
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Figure VI37 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for for ‘Less Residule Value’  
 
 
VI38.  ‘Termination Liabilities’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section VI31,  under the worst circumstance the ‘contract breach’ would cause ‘termination liabilities’ that 
would cause ‘construction delay’ arising from ownership change delay at construction stage and ‘revenue losses’ at operation 
stage. Thus, the direct cause and consequences of ‘termination liabilities’ illustrated in Figure V38 is modified as Figure VI38 to 










Figure VI38 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Termination Liabilities’ 
 
 
VI39.  ‘Variability of Inflation Rate’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in the Section V39 and the CLD shown in Figure V39, the ‘variability of inflation rate’ would be likely to cause 
‘price escalation’. As for THSR project, the interview statement was below: 
 
“The economical policies are always fluctuated by compounding lots of complex factors such as global economy, 
internal economy, politics, and environment protection. The microeconomic factors, such as inflation rate, interest 
rate, foreign exchange rate are demand, are dependent each other. It’s difficult for us to make a specific pattern to 
predict their influence on THSR performance. However, to stable economic growth for our country, all of these 
microeconomic factors are controlled by the central government of Taiwan. In addition, these microeconomic factors 
are external risk to THSR project, so   we always employ the policies and data announced by the Directorate-
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DBAS), Executive Yuan.” 
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“Construction Price Index (CPI) is usually used for construction projects to measure the escalation of materials and 
labour costs. According to the DBAS   (2000; 2007)’s data, the average annual inflation rate was about 4.98% for 
construction material from year 1986 to 1997 in Taiwan; 1.35% for construction wage. The average annual increase 
rate for CPI is about 3.69%, ranged from about 2% to 6% from year 1986 to 1997 in Taiwan. In the future, the CPI 
is predicted that it would likely to continuously increase due to higher global oil prices and higher construction 
material demand due to economic boost in China, but the government’s policy is to keep it stable and being less 
than 7%.” 
 
From the above statements, we can conclude that ‘variability of inflation rate’ is an external risk to THSR project but would lead 
to ‘price escalation’ in common sense for THSR project. Thus, the direct consequence of ‘variability of inflation rate’ illustrated 
in Figure V39 is modified as Figure VI39 to fit the THSR project. 
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Figure VI39 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Variability of Inflation Rate’ 
 
 
VI40.  ‘Variability of Exchange Rate’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in the Section V40 and the CLD shown in Figure V40, the ‘variability of exchange rate’ would be likely to cause 
‘price escalation’. As for THSR project, the interview statement was below: 
 
“The depreciated exchange rate against US dollar would increase the costs of importing materials for project 
construction and operation. Basically its change is up to the currency market. However, it’s easy to be influenced by 
the fluctuation of local stock market and the manipulation of international investors. For a healthy investment 
environment, the Central Bank would keep interfering currency market to stabilize the exchange rate. According to 
the CEPD’s data, the past twenty years indicated that exchange rates for New Taiwan dollar were changed between 
about 25 and 35 against US dollar. The long-term policy, the exchange rate would be held about 33 by the Central 
Bank.” 
 
From the above statements, we can conclude that ‘variability of exchange rate’ is an external risk to THSR project but would 
lead to ‘price escalation’ for THSR project. Thus, the direct cause and consequence of ‘variability of exchange rate’ illustrated in 
Figure V40 are modified as Figure VI40 to fit the THSR project. 
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Figure VI40 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Variability of Exchange Rate’ 
 
 
VI41.  ‘Variability of Interest Rate’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in Section V41 and CLD shown in Figure V41, increasing interest rate rather expected would be possibly triggered 
by ‘downside economic events’ and would be likely to cause ‘price escalation.’ As for THSR project, the interview statement 
was below: 
 
“The increased interest rate would increase the repayment arising from borrowing money for construction. Generally 
speaking in Taiwan the interest rate will drop off to about 2% from 6% after 1999. The interest rate is also easy to be 
influenced by global economy and politics. For example, some countries such as China, Russia, India, and oil export 
countries have large foreign exchange reserves. Their behaviour of how to use these reserves for foreign investment 
would have great impact on interest rate. However, like inflation rate and exchange rate, the Central Bank would keep 
interfering to stabilize the interest rate for a healthy investment environment. For long-term policy, the interest rate 
would be held around 2% to 4%, and the highest impact is around 9%.” 
 
From the above interview statements, the ‘variability of interest rate’ is manipulated by the Central Bank in Taiwan. Therefore, 
we can conclude that ‘variability of exchange rate’ is an external risk to THSR project but would lead to increase expense for 
THSR project. Thus, the direct cause and consequence of ‘variability of interest rate’ illustrated in Figure V41 is modified as 
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VI42.  ‘Variability of Less Demand’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in the SectionV42 and the CLD shown in Figure V42, the ‘variability of less demand’ than expected would be 
possibly triggered by ‘higher competition’ and would be likely to cause ‘revenue loss.’ As for THSR project, the interview 
statement was below: 
 
“There are many research reports indicated that the demand for ridership will be grew up from yearly average 2% to 
6%. There are lots of factors would influence ridership demand. Among of them, travel time and travel cost are two 
most important factors. High way road systems, flights, railway, and high-speed railway are four major transport 
systems from North to South Taiwan. Flight has shorter travel time, higher operation cost, but lower infrastructure 
cost than high speed railway. High way road system has longer travel time, higher operation cost, but much lower 
infrastructure cost. Take accidents and time delay and pollution cost into account, the high speed railway is the lowest 
among these systems. If we take the whole life costing into account and convert it into NT$/Person*Km, which 
includes ‘infrastructure cost’ ‘operation cost’ ‘travel time cost’ ‘noise costs’ ‘air pollutions and CO2  cost’ ‘discards 
cost’ ‘land impact cost’ ‘delay and congestion cost’ and ‘accident cost’, then the high speed railway system costs 
4.4918 NT$/PKm. This is the lowest cost among all transport systems.  As for mid and long distance travellers, the 
high speed railway system is the most attractive. Moreover, all of these systems use petroleum as fuel. People have 
no choice when the international petroleum is increasing. Therefore, there are almost no other transport systems 
that are able to compete the high speed railway system for the mid and long distance travellers in the future. On the 
contrary, the high speed railway system would have great impact on flight system in Taiwan.” 
 
“We have our own (BHSR’s) ridership demand forecast for THSR. But I know there are lots of different demand 
research reports from different points of view with different evaluation methodologies. I suggest they would be taken 
into account to minimise the evaluation bias.” 
 
From the above interview statements, it indicates that the ‘variability of less demand’ would not be influenced by ‘higher 
competition’ and ‘downside economic events’ in Taiwan for THSR case, since THSR has the lowest whole life cost and the users 
doesn’t change their transport using behaviour due to specific economic event like higher petroleum price. Therefore, the direct 
cause and consequence of ‘variability of less demand’ are illustrated in Figure V42 is modified as Figure VI42 to fit THSR case. 
42.Variability of




Figure VI42 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Variability of Less Demand’ Risk Event 
 
 
VI43. ‘Higher Competition’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section VI43, there is no ‘higher competition’ risk for THSR project. Therefore, we remove causal loop diagram 
shown in Figure VI43 for ‘higher competition’ risk. 
 
 
VI44.  ‘Downside Economic Events’ on THSR 
 
As described from Section VI39 to VI42, the ‘downside economic events’ would likely influence the government’s economic 
policies on inflation, exchange rate, interest rate, etc. However, the ‘downside economic event’ is uncontrollable so that it’s an 
external factor to THSR project. Thus, the direct cause and consequence for ‘downside economic events’ illustrated in Figure 









Figure VI44 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Downside Economic Events’ 
 
 
VI45.  ‘Political Interference’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section VI4 and VI20, for example, the ‘political interference’ from different parties would influence 
government’s policy to change THSR service scope (‘law/policy changes’), and would be likely to influence decision on choose 
complex and inefficient systems (‘complex technologies’) for THSR project. The interviewees a supplementary statement about 
‘political interference’ below: 
 
“Unfortunately, the influence of politics is extensive on a large-scale construction project like THSR. For example, 
the current government considered THSR is one of its great contributions. To gain benefits from annual election, the 
authority in supervising THSR project allows the contractor THSRC to start test runs before THSRC can complete 
the rectification of all the more than 20 defects and problems listed in the latest inspection report concerning the 
independent verification and validation facility (IV&V) issued by the Lloyd's. This led to great public arguments.” 
“Most of reasonable regulations on large-scale infrastructure projects are influenced by politics, which may be from 
the standpoint of the business benefits rather than that of taxpayers.” 
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From the above statements, we can conclude that the ‘political interference’ would lead to ‘law/policy changes’ ‘complex 
technologies’ and ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ for THSR project. Thus, the direct consequences of ‘political interference’ 













Figure VI45 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Political Interference’ Risk Event 
 
 
VI46.  ‘Unsuitable Regulatory Policy’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section VI22, VI29, VI47, and VI51, we can conclude that the ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ is caused by 
‘political interference’ and would lead to ‘financial unavailable (for example, allow a low equity-debt ratio of project financing 
from the standpoint of short-term business benefits)’ ‘inflexible contract arrangement (for example, major contract changes 
between concessionaire and subcontractors need to obtain approval from the government)’ ‘industrial disputes (the negotiation 
argument on land acquisition price)’ and ‘approval delay (for example, the scope changes and ticket price changes should obtain 
approval from the government)’.  
 
Thus, the direct causes and consequences of ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ illustrated in Figure V46 are modified as Figure VI46 


















Figure VI46 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Unsuitable Regulatory Policy’ Risk Event 
 
 
VI47.  ‘Approval Delays’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in the Section V27 and as CLD shown in Figure V47, the ‘approval delay’ that the possible time delay arising from 
obtaining consents from the government authority, which is possibly directly triggered by ‘political interference’ and directly 
lead to ‘construction delay.’ The interviewee summarised three types of approval delays by government’s regulations as the 
following statements: 
 
“In addition to changing property right for land acquisition, changing major contract contents and changing project 
ownership are two major things that need to obtain approval from the government authority. From the point of view 
of project management, the current regulation for the procedure to get an approval from the government is too 
complex to efficiently perform THSR project. There is no maximum limitation on approval review, so the approval 
delay can be very unstable. From our past experience on Transit projects, the greatest argument is the ownership 
change delay, which would even take government authority one year; contract change would also lead to great 
argument that would may need to take from 0.5 months to 6 months.” 
  
From the above statements, we can conclude that ‘approval delay’ would be caused by ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ and lead to 
‘land unavailable’ ‘ownership change delay’ and ‘delay in contract change negotiation’ for THSR project. Thus, the direct cause 
















Figure VI47 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Approval Delay’   351
 
VI48.  ‘Law/Policy Changes’ on THSR 
 
As described in the Section VI2, VI4, VI31, VI44, VI45, VI51, and VI52, we conclude that the ‘downside economic events’ 
‘political interference’ ‘industrial disputes’ and ‘Force Majeure’ would cause ‘law/policy changes’ that would further lead to 
‘scope changes’ and ‘contract break.’ For example, the ‘downside economic events’ would lead to policy changes on interest rate, 
inflation rate, exchange rate, etc; the ‘political interference’ would influence government’s policy on THSR service scope, and 
then lead to ‘scope change’; the ‘industrial disputes’ on environmental pollutions and ‘Force Majeure’ on national disaster would 
cause stricter policies on noise-proof and earthquake-proof standard than the contractors can follow so that it would lead to 
‘contract breach.’ 
 




















Figure VI48 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Law/Policy Changes’ Risk Event 
 
 
VI49.  ‘Unforeseen Site Conditions’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in the Section V49 and Figure V49, the ‘unforeseen site conditions’ that the unanticipated adverse site conditions 
would directly lead to ‘construction delay.’  As for THSR project, the interview statement was below:: 
 
“There are ten new stations, along with a large number of new bridges, tunnels and viaducts on the line's total 345km 
length. The route includes steep gradients to cross the terrain. It’s a great challenge for construction under the 
complicated geographical features and natural calamity such as soil condition, underground water, mountain 
tunnelling, typhoon, flood, and earthquake, etc. Any unforeseen site conditions more than we expected would cause 
construction delay, especially for tunnelling that would be very difficult and costly process. We have conducted prior 
survey on site conditions, but it’s difficult to predict the delay under this risk. However, based on our past experience, 
the unforeseen site conditions would always delay about 5%-15% of the tunnelling schedule.” 
  
From the above interview statements, the direct cause and consequence of ‘unforeseen site conditions’ illustrated in Figure V49 
can basically fit the THSR project well. 
 
 
VI50. ‘Greater Environmental Expectation’ on THSR 
 
As discussed in the Section V50 and Figure V50, the ‘greater environmental expectation’ that the people have more expectation 
than the regular environmental protection regulation. As for THSR project, the interview statement was below: 
 
“The contractor has been suffered serious protests from the electronic industry and residents along the route of THSR. 
They complained that the contractor didn’t deal with the noise, underground water, and vibration issues well. They 
would take further actions to prevent THSR from operating if the public sector is unable to step in to sort out these 
problems. However, this would force the government change some environmental protection regulations to meet the 
public expectation.” 
 
From the above statements, we can conclude that ‘greater environmental expectation’ would lead to ‘industrial disputes’ for 
THSR project. Thus, the direct cause and consequence of ‘greater environmental expectation’ illustrated in Figure V50 are 
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VI51. ‘Industrial Disputes’ on THSR 
 
As described in the Section VI1, VI2, VI4, VI46, VI48, and VI50, we conclude that the ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ and 
‘higher environmental protection expectation’ would cause ‘industrial disputes’ that would further lead to ‘land unavailable (for 
example, the negotiation argument on land acquisition price)’ ‘resources unavailable (for example, the environmental protests 
due to noise pollution would cause that the residents would try to stop contractors from THSR operations)’ and ‘law/policy 
changes (for example, the environmental protection regulations on noise-proof would change and become stricter)’. Thus, the 




















Figure VI51 The Modified Direct Cause and Consequence for ‘Industrial Disputes’ 
 
 
VI52.  ‘Force Majeure’ on THSR 
 
As described in the Section VI2, VI5, VI18, and VI48, we conclude that the ‘Force Majeure’ would lead to ‘accidents and safety 
issues (for example, the powerful typhoon and earthquake would cause death or injure damage)’ ‘resources unavailable (for 
example, powerful typhoon and earthquake would lead to equipment breakdown and power unavailable so that the construction 
or operation is forced to disrupt.)’ and ‘law/policy changes (For example, the damage due to earthquake would likely to change 
rule and policy that requires earthquake-proof technology)’. Thus, the direct consequences of ‘Force Majeure’ illustrated in 
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Appendix VII Analysis of The Risk Network Models 
 
VII1. RCN for ‘Land Unavailable’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI1 and the Figure VI1, the direct causes for land 
unavailable events were approval delays and industrial disputes, and the direct consequence was construction 
delays. Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model was applied to address the relationship between land 
unavailable, approval delays and industrial disputes for the SD model as shown in Figure VII1: 
 
RDk(lu) = β0k + β1k* RDk(id) + β2k* RDk(ad)+εk, k = c 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
lu: risk event for ‘land unavailable’; 
id: risk event for ‘industrial disputes’; 
ad: risk event for ‘approval delay’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 














Figure VII1 The SD Model for ‘Land Unavailable’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII2. RCN for ‘Resource Unavailable’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI2 and the Figure VI2, the direct causes for resources 
unavailable events were default of subcontractors, Force Majeure, industrial disputes, and financial unavailable, 
and the direct consequence was construction delay. Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model was applied to 
address the relationship between resources unavailable events, default of subcontractor, Force Majeure, industrial 
disputes, and finance unavailable events for the SD model as illustrated in Figure VII2.  
 
RDk (ru) = β0k +β1k*RDk(ds)+β2k*RDk(fm)+β3k*RDk(id)+β4k*RDk(fu)+εk, k = c, o 
 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
ru: risk event for ‘resource unavailable’; 
ds: risk event for ‘default of subcontractors’; 
fm: risk event for ‘Force Majeure’; 
id: risk event for ‘industrial disputes’; 
fu: risk event for ‘financial unavailable’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k, β3k, β4k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 
εk: the random error for the multiple regression model; 
 
















Figure VII2 The SD Model for ‘Resources Unavailable’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII3. RCN for ‘Performance Unavailable’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI3 and the Figure VI3, the direct cause for performance 
unavailable event were low operating productivity, and the direct consequences were revenue losses, contract 
remedies/penalties, and contract breaks. Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model was applied to address the 
relationship between performance unavailable and low operating productivity for the SD model illustrated in 
Figure VII3: 
 
RDk (pu) = β0k +β1k*RDk(lop)+εk, k =o 
 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
pu: risk event for ‘performance unavailable’; 
lop: risk event for ‘low operating productivity’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 
εk: the random error for the multiple regression model; 
 
 
As for the direct consequence of contract remedies/penalties, according to the interview statements 
described in Section V13, the researcher assumed that the number of trains that would likely delay on-time service 
was in linear proportion to the expected risk effect caused by risk event performance unavailable between the 
maximum consequence (the maximum number of delayed trains) and minimum consequence (the minimum 
number of delayed trains). Therefore, by using interpolation, the likely number of delayed trains was: 
 
DeT = Int[(RD(pu) - RDmin)/(RDmax - RDmin)*(DeTmax - DeTmin) + DeTmin] 
 
Where 
DeT: the number of trains that would likely delay on-time service; 
Int[x]: integer function; 
RD: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
pu: risk event ‘performance unavailable’; 
RDmax: 25;  
RDmin: 1; 
DeTmax: 45 trains; 
DeTmin: 0 train; 
 
Thus, the penalty (refund) for on-time delay that is the average of delay for more than 30 minutes and 
one hour was:  
   
 
   Afr= (1+0.5)/2*AAF 
ODR = DeT*Afr*Apt*AM 
where 
Afr: the average fare refund; 
ODR: on-time delay refund; 
DeT: the number of trains that would likely delay on-time service; 
AAF: the annual average fare, as shown in Section 6.1.3; 
Apt: the average person per train = 350 person/train; 
AM: average mileage = 160 km; 
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According to the interview statement in Section VI3, another consequence for capacity loss arising from less 
capacity than break-even daily capacity was: 
 
CLE =Int(DeT*0.2) 
CL = CLE*12/(BEDC*2*365)*TOC 
 
Where 
CLE: capacity loss effect; 
Int[x]: Integer function; 
DeT: the number of trains that would likely delay on-time service; 
CL: capacity loss; 
BEDC: break-even daily capacity for a single way =60; 









































Figure VII3 The SD Model for ‘Performance Unavailable’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII4. RCN for ‘Scope Changes’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI4 and the Figure VI4, the direct cause for ‘scope changes’ 
is ‘law/policy changes’, and the direct consequence is ‘design changes.’ Therefore, the linear multiple-regression 
model used to address the direct cause relationship between ‘scope changes’ and ‘law/policy changes’ in the SD 
risk model illustrated in Figure VII4 was: 
 
RDk (sc) = β0k +β1k*RDk(lpc)+εk, k = c, o  
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
sc: risk event ‘scope changes’; 
lpc: risk event ‘law/policy changes’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 











Figure VII4 The SD Model for ‘Scope Changes’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII5. RCN for ‘Defective Design’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI5 and the Figure VI5, the direct causes for ‘defective 
design’ are ‘default of subcontractors’ and ‘resource unavailable’, and the direct consequences are ‘defective 
construction’ and ‘complex system interface/integration.’ Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model used to 
address the direct cause relationship between ‘land unavailable’, ‘approval delays’ and ’industrial disputes’ in the 
SD model illustrated in Figure VII5 was:    356
 
RDk (dd) = β0k +β1k*RDk(ds)+β2k*RDk(ru)+εk, k = c, o 
 
where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
dd: risk event ‘defective design’; 
ds: risk event ‘default of subcontractors’; 
ru: risk event ‘resources unavailable’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 














Figure VII5 The SD Model for ‘Defective Design’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII6. RCN for ‘Design Changes’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI6 and the Figure V6, the direct causes for ‘design 
changes’ are ‘scope changes’ and ‘contractual disputes’, and the direct consequence is ‘construction changes.’ 
Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model used to address the direct cause relationship between ‘design 
changes’, ‘scope changes’ and ‘contractual disputes’ in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII6 was:  
 
RDk (dch) = β0k +β1k*RDk(sc)+β2k*RDk(cd)+εk, k = c, o 
where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
dch: risk event ‘design changes’; 
sc: risk event ‘scope changes’; 
cd: risk event ‘contractual disputes’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 














Figure VII6 The SD Model for ‘Design Changes’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII7. RCN for ‘Construction Cost Overrun’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI7 and the Figure VI7, the direct causes for construction 
cost overrun were construction delay, variability of interest rate, price escalation and insurance increases, and the 
direct consequence was finance unavailable. Therefore, the risk variable construction cost overrun for the SD 
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E = Cradj+Cins+Cint  








CCO = CE-CPC 
where 
E: annual expense; 
Cradj: risk adjusted annual construction cost; 
Cins: annual insurance cost; 
Cint: annual interest; 
CE: cumulative expensive; 
CPC: cumulative project capital; 
AC: annual raising capital 
RCCT: risk adjusted construction completion time; 
RCST: risk adjusted construction start time; 





















Figure VII7 The SD Model for ‘Construction Cost Overrun’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII8. RCN for ‘Construction Delay’ on THSR 
 
Based on statements made in Section VI8 and the FigureVI8, the direct causes for construction delay were land 
unavailable and resources unavailable, construction changes, delay in contracts, change negotiation, ownership 
changes, delays, and unforeseen site conditions. The direct consequences were construction delay and performance 
unavailable. As shown in Figure VII8, the variable time delay effect on construction delay was assumed to be in 
linear proportion to the expected effect between the maximum time consequence (maximum time delay in each 
work package) and minimum consequence (maximum time delay in each work package). Therefore, the variable 
time delay effect in every work package was modeled below: 
 
TDij = (RDi-RDmin)/(RDmax-RDmin)*(TCMAXij-TCMINij)+TCMINij 
where 
TDij: time delay effect for the risk event on a work package (in percentage); 
RDi: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
TCMAXij: maximum time delay effect for a risk event on a work package (in percentage); 
TCMINij: minimum time delay effect for a risk event on a work package (in percentage); 
RDmax: 25;  
RDmin: 1; 
i: risk event index; 
j: work package index 
 
The variable increased completion time for work package was: 
 
∆TDik = ∑TDik·( SCTk- SSTk)+ ∑TDim·( SCTm- SSTm) 
   ∆TDim = ∑TDim·( SCTm- SSTm) 
where 
∆TDik: increased completion time for a work package caused by a risk event; 
TDik: time delay effect for a risk event in a work package (in percentage); 
SCTk: scheduled completion time for a work package;   358
SSTk: scheduled start time for a work package;  
i: risk event index; 
m: work package index for ‘land acquisition’; 
k: work package index j≠ m (because when execution of workpackage k depends on execution 
of ‘land acquisition’ workpackage m) 
 
Thus, the risk-adjusted construction completion time for a work package was: 
 
RCCTj = SCTj+∆TDij 
Where 
RCCTj: the risk-adjusted construction completion time for a work package; 
SCTj: scheduled completion time for a work package; 
i: risk event index; 
j: work package index 
 
As the result, the risk variable ‘construction delay’ was: 
 
CD = Max(RCCTj)-Max(SCTj) 
where 
CD: construction time delay; 
Max(xj): the maximum value of the elements of an array xj; 
RCCTj: the risk-adjusted construction completion time for a work package; 
SCTj: scheduled completion time for a work package; 
i: risk event index; 
j: work package index 
 
As shown in Figure VII8, the variable ‘construction delay cost’ was: 
 
CDC = CD*ACDC 
where 
 CD: construction time delay; 
ACDC: average administration cost due to construction time delay 
 
The ‘construction delay cost’ is then added into the variable ‘risk-adjusted annual total construction cost’ 
illustrated in Figure VII8 which is linked with the Project Cash Flow model. 
 






































































Figure VII8 The SD Model for ‘Construction Delay’and Construction Delay Cost 
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VII9. RCN for ‘Defective Construction’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI9 and the Figure VI9, the direct causes for ‘defective 
construction’ are ‘defective design’ ‘default of subcontractors’ ‘resources unavailable’ and ‘poor 
cooperation/coordination’, and the direct consequences are ‘failed commission tests’ ‘system breakdown’ ‘high 
maintenance frequency’ ‘accidents and safety issues’ and ‘shorter asset life’ Therefore, the linear multiple-
regression model used to address the direct cause relationship function in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII9 
was:  
 
RDk (dc) = β0k +β1k*RDk(dd)+β2k*RDk(ds)+β3k*RDk(ru)+β4k*RDk(pcc)+εk,k = c, o 
 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
dc: risk event ‘defective construction’; 
dd: risk event ‘defective design’; 
ds: risk event ‘default of subcontractors’; 
ru: risk event ‘resources unavailable’; 
pcc: risk event ‘poor cooperation/coordination’ 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k, β3k, β4k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 

















Figure VII9 The SD Model for ‘Defective Construction’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII10.  RCN for ‘Construction Changes’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI10 and the Figure VI10, the direct cause for ‘construction 
changes’ is ‘design changes’, and the direct consequences are ‘construction delay’ and ‘low operating 
productivity.’ Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model used to address the direct cause relationship function 
in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII10 was:  
 
RDk (cc) = β0k +β1k*RDk(dch)+εk, k = c, o 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
cc: risk event ‘construction changes’; 
dch: risk event ‘design changes’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 
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VII11.  RCN for ‘Complex System Interface/Integration’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI11 and the Figure VI11, the direct causes for ‘complex 
system interface/integration’ are ‘complex technologies’ and ‘defective design’, and the direct consequences are 
‘poor cooperation/coordination’ ‘system breakdown’ ‘high maintenance frequency’ and ‘accidents and safety 
issues.’ Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model used to address the direct cause rrelationship in the SD 
model illustrated in Figure VII11 was: 
 
RDk (csi) = β0k +β1k*RDk(ct)+β2k*RDk(dd)+εk, k = c, o 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
csi: risk event ‘complex system interface/integration’; 
ct: risk event ‘complex technology’; 
dd: risk event ‘defective design’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 
εk: the random error for the multiple regression model; 
 
Complex system





Figure VII11 The SD Model for ‘Complex System Interface/Integration’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII12.  RCN for ‘Failed Commissioning Tests’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI12 and the Figure VI12, the direct cause for ‘failed 
commissioning test’ is ‘defective construction’, and the direct consequence is ‘contract breach’. Therefore, the 
linear multiple-regression model used to address the direct cause relationships in the SD model illustrated in 
Figure VII12 was:  
 
RDk (fct) = β0k +β1k*RDk(dc)+εk, k = c 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
fct: risk event ‘failed commissioning test’; 
dc: risk event ‘defective construction’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 















VII13.  RCN for ‘Low Operating Productivity’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI13 and the Figure VI13, the direct causes for ‘low 
operating productivity’ are ‘resources unavailable’ ‘default of subcontractors’ ‘construction changes’ ‘system 
breakdown’ ‘high maintenance frequency’ ‘accidents and safety issues’ and ‘poor cooperation/coordination’, and 
the direct consequence is ‘performance unavailable.’ Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model used to 
address the direct cause relationships in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII13 was:  
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RDk (lop) = β0k β1k*RDk(ru)+β2k*RDk(cc)+β3k*RDk(hmf)+β4k*RDk(sb)+β5k*RDk(asi)+ β6k*RDk(pcc)+εk, k = o 
 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
lop: risk event ‘low operating productivity’; 
ru: risk event ‘resources unavailable’; 
cc: risk event ‘construction changes’; 
hmf: risk event ‘high maintenance frequency’; 
sb: risk event ‘system breakdown’; 
asi: risk event ‘accidents and safety issues’; 
pcc: risk event ‘poor cooperation/coordination’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k, β3k, β4k, β5k, β6k,: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 


















safety issues> <Poor cooperation
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VII14.  RCN for ‘Mis-pricing’ on THSR 
 
The direct causes of mis-pricing and the inflexible contract arrangement influence policy on the fare 
adjustment rate for train ticket which would influence operating revenue are illustrated in the operating 
revenue sub-model. As shown in Figure VII14, the expected fare adjustment rate is in linear reverse 
relationship with the expected risk effect caused by the risk event inflexible contract arrangement 
between the maximum consequence and minimum consequence. Therefore, by using interpolation, the 
expected fare adjustment rate was: 
 
EFA = (RD(ica) – RDmax)*(FAmax-FAmin)/( RDmin - RDmax)*+FAmin 
where 
EFA: the ‘expected fare adjustment rate’ 
FAmax: maximum fare adjustment allowance = 0.2; 
FAmin : minimum fare adjustment allowance = 0; 
RD: random variable for the expected effect; 
Ica: risk event ‘inflexible contract arrangement’; 




VII15.  RCN for ‘Revenue Losses’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI15 and the Figure VI15, the direct causes for ‘revenue 
losses’ are ‘performance unavailable’ ‘contract remedies/penalties’ ‘mis-pricing’ ‘variability of interest rate’ ‘price 
escalation’ ‘tax increases’ ‘insurance increases’ ‘less residual value’ ‘variability of less demand’ and ‘termination 
liability.’ 
 
All of the additional costs or less revenue arising from the above risk events have been modeled and directly or 
indirectly linked to NPV Project Cash Flow model, which are described in the related Sections. 



























































VII16.  RCN for ‘System Breakdown’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI16 and the Figure VI16, the direct causes for ‘system 
breakdown’ are ‘defective construction’ and ‘complex system interface/integration’, and the direct consequence is 
‘low operating productivity.’ Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model used to address the direct cause 
relationship in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII16 was: 
 
RDk (sb) = β0k +β1k*RDk(dc)+β2k*RDk(csi)+εk, k = o 
 
where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
sb: risk event ‘system breakdown’; 
dc: risk event ‘defective construction’; 
csi: risk event ‘complex system interface/integration’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 
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VII17.  RCN for ‘High Maintenance Frequency’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI17 and the Figure VI17, the direct causes for ‘high 
maintenance frequency’ are ‘defective construction’ and ‘complex system interface/integration’, and the direct 
consequence is ‘low operating productivity.’ Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model used to address the 
direct cause relationship in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII17 was: 
 
RDk (hmf) = β0k +β1k*RDk(dc)+β2k*RDk(csi)+εk, k =o 
 
where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
hmf: risk event ‘high maintenance frequency’; 
dc: risk event ‘defective construction’; 
csi: risk event ‘complex system interface/integration’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 

















VII18.  RCN for ‘Accidents and Safety Issues’ on THSR 
 
Based statements in Section VI18 and the Figure VI18, the direct causes of accidents and safety issues were 
resources unavailable, defective construction and complex system interface/integration, and Force Majeure, The 
direct consequences were low operating productivity, and contract remedies/penalties (the expected accident and 
safety loss). Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model was applied to address the direct cause relationships 
for the SD model as illustrated in Figure VII18:  
 
RDk (asi) = β0k +β1k*RDk(ru)+β2k*RDk(dc)+β3k*RDk(csi)+β4k*RDc(fm)+εk, k =o 
where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
asi: risk event ‘accidents and safety issues’; 
ru: risk event ‘resources unavailable’; 
dc: risk event ‘defective construction’; 
csi: risk event ‘complex system interface/integration’; 
fm: risk event ‘Force Majeure’ 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k, β3k, β4k: the relational coefficients for theindependent risk variables; 
εk: the random error for the multiple regression model; 
 
As for the direct consequence of contract remedies/penalties, according to the interview statements, the 
maximum accident and safety loss for death penalty and system damage due to human factor and national 
disaster is NT$0.174 billion. The researcher assumes the expected accident and safety loss is in linear 
proportion to the expected risk effect caused by ‘accidents and safety issues’ risk event between the 
maximum consequence (maximum accident and safety loss) and minimum consequence (minimum accident 
and safety loss). Therefore, by using interpolation, the expected accident and safety loss at operation stage 
was: 
 
EASL = [RD(asi) - RDmin]/(RDmax - RDmin)*(ASDmax - ASDmin) + ASDmin 
ASDmax = Apt*Acdh 
Where 
EASL: expected accident and safety loss; 
RD: random variable for the expected risk effect;   364
asi: risk event ‘accidents and safety issues’; 
RDmax: 25;  
RDmin: 1; 
ASDmax: maximum accident damage, NT$1.3 millions; 
ASDmin: minimum accident damage, NT$ 0.00 billions; 
Apt: average person per train; 




































VII19.  RCN for ‘Price Escalation’ on THSR 
 
From the scenario statements described in Section VI19, Section VI39, Figure VI19, and Figure VII39, the 
variability of inflation rate would influence money for time, which is linked with the discount rate sub-model 
shown in Figure 6.1.6 to replace the inflation rate. Then, the new value for inflation adjusted discount rate would 
be linked with project cash flow model shown in Figure 6.1 to change NPV value. The new value for inflation 
adjusted discount rate illustrated in Figure VII19 (a) was:  
 
r’wacc= rwacc+ rinf+ rwacc rinf  
 
              Where  
r’wacc: inflation adjusted discount rate; 
rwacc: Weight Average Cost of Capital; 
rinf: variability of inflation rate 
 
In addition, the ‘variability of inflation rate’ would be linked with Operation Revenue sub-model to replace the 
‘inflation rate’ to change ‘fare increase rate’ below: 
 
AFIR’ = Fb rinf 
where 
AFIR’ = risk adjusted annual fare increase rate; 
Fb: base fare; 
rinf: variability of inflation rate 
 
Furthermore, based on the scenario statements described in Section VI19, Section VII40, Figure VI19, 
and Figure VII40, the variability of exchange rate would influence construction cost and operation cost 
which is linked with the construction cost sub-model shown in Figure 6.1.1 and operation cost sub-
model shown in Figure 6.1.1. The new values for construction cost and operation cost illustrated in 
Figure VII19 (b) were: 
 
CCadj =(PATCC+CDC)* r’ex / rrex 
Where 
CCadj: risk adjusted construction cost; 
PATCC: planned annual total construction cost; 
CDC: construction delay cost 
r’ex: risk adjusted exchange rate = MAX(rrex, rex) 
rrex: reference exchange rate = 33; 
MAX(A,B): maximum function of two alternatives A, B;  
rex= ‘variability of exchange rat’ addressed in Appendix VII40 
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Figure VII19 (a) Risk Variables ‘Variability of Inflation Rate’ and ‘Inflation Adjusted Discount Rate’ Are 














































































Figure VII19 (b) Risk Variable ‘Risk Adjusted Exchange Rate’ and ‘Reference Exchange Rate’ Are Linked 




VII20.  RCN for ‘Complex Technologies’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in the Section VI20 and Figure VI20, the direct cause for ‘complex 
technologies’ is ‘political interference’ and the direct consequence is ‘complex system interface/integration’. 
Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model used to address the direct cause relationship in the SD model 
illustrated in Figure VII20 was:  
 
RDk (ct) = β0k +β1k*RDk(pi)+εk, k = c, o 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
ct: risk event ‘complex technologies’; 
pi: risk event ‘political interference’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 
εk: the random error for the multiple regression model; 
 
 










Figure VII20 The SD Model for ‘Complex Technologies’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII21.  RCN for ‘Poor Cooperation/Coordination’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in the Section VI21 and Figure VI21, the direct cause for ‘poor 
cooperation/coordination’ is ‘complex system interface/integration’ and the direct consequences are ‘defective 
construction’ and ‘low operating productivity’. Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model used to address the 
direct cause relationship in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII21 was:  
 
RDk (pcc) = β0k +β1k*RDk(csi)+εk, k = c, o 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
pcc: risk event ‘poor cooperation/coordination’; 
csi: risk event ‘complex system interface/integration’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 











Figure VII21 The SD Model for ‘Poor Cooperation/Coordination’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII22.  RCN for ‘Finance Unavailable’ on THSR 
 
Per statements in Section VI22 and the Figure VI22, the direct causes for finance unavailable were unsuitable 
regulatory policy, construction cost overruns, and revenue losses. The direct consequences were resources 
unavailable and insolvency of contractor.  
 
As in Section VI22, the finance unavailable was expressed by two independent variables: percentage of 
construction cost overrun during construction stage, and debt service coverage (Dsc) during operation stage, which 
was: 
 
RDk(fu) = π +εk, k=c; 
= 
sc D +εk, k=o; 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
fu: risk event ‘finance unavailable’; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
π : average percentage of construction cost overrun; 
sc D :average Debt Service Coverage 
 
The percentage of construction cost overrun and the exponential smooth for average percentage of construction 
cost overrun were: 
 









EXP: annual total expense; 
APC: annual project raising capital;   368
t: time at construction stage 
tcs: construction start time 
 
According to the interview statement, the RDk(fu) during construction stage was assumed to be a linear reverse 
relationship with π  when -100% < π  < 0% :  
 
RDk(fu) =1+εk, π  ≤ -100%; 
              =(π +1)( RDmax - RDmin)+ 1+εk, -100% < π  < 0%; 
             =25+εk, π  ≥ 0% 
Where  
RDmax: 25;  
RDmin: 1; 
k: time period  c (construction stage) 
 
 
The ‘Debt Service Coverage(Chang & Chen, 2001)’ and the exponential smooth for ‘average Debt Service 
Coverage’ were:  
 











Eb: Earnings before Interest, Tax and Depreciation 
I: Interest 
Pr: Principal Repayment 
Tm: Tax Rate 
 
According to the interview statement, the RDk(fu) during operation stage was assumed to be a linear relationship 
with  sc D  when 0 <  sc D < D
*
sc (desired DSC level) :  
 RDk(fu) =1+εk,  sc D  ≥ D
*
sc; 
              = RDmax -  sc D ( RDmax - RDmin) / D
*







RDmax: 25;  
RDmin: 1; 
k: time period  o (operation stage) 
 
 
VII23.  RCN for ‘Refinancing liabilities’ on THSR 
 
As stated in the Section VII23, the ‘refinancing liabilities’ is a post-contracting issue that we cannot model and 
assess if it would become ‘liability’ risk of the public sector when there is no information on real refinancing 

















































Figure VII22 The SD Model for ‘Finance Unavailable’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII24.  RCN for ‘Insolvency of Contractor’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI24 and the Figure VI24, the direct cause for ‘insolvency 
of contractor’ is ‘finance unavailable’ and the direct consequence is ‘contract breach’. Therefore, the linear 
multiple-regression model used to address the direct cause relationship in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII24 
was:  
RDk (ioc) = β0k +β1k*RDk(fu)+εk, k = c, o 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
ioc: risk event ‘insolvency of contractor’; 
fu: risk event ‘finance unavailable’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 











Figure VII24 The SD Model for ‘Insolvency of Contractor’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII25.  RCN for ‘Ownership Changes Delay’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI25 and the Figure VI25, the direct cause for ‘ownership 
change delay’ is ‘approval delay’ and the direct consequence is ‘construction delay’. Therefore, the linear 
multiple-regression model used to address the direct cause relationship in the SD model illustrated in Figure 6.2.25 
was:  
RDk (ocd) = β0k +β1k*RDk(ad)+εk, k = c, o 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
ocd: risk event ‘ownership change delay’; 
ad: risk event ‘approval delay’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables;   370











Figure VII25 The SD Model for ‘Ownership Change Delay’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII26.  RCN for ‘Variability of Tax Rate’on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI26 and the Figure VI26, the ‘variability of tax rate’ shown 
in Figure VII26 (a) is an independent risk variable that has no the direct causes. According to the interview 
statement, the random variable for ‘variability of tax rate’ was assumed to come from a triangular distribution that 
had a minimum value of 15%, a maximum value of 25% and the mean value of 18%. It was: 
 
t’m = RANDOM TRIANGULAR(a, m, b) 
 
where 
t’m: the random variable for ‘variability of tax rate’; 
a: minimum value= 0.15; 
b: maximum value=0.25; 





Figure VII26 (a) The SD Model for ‘Variability of Tax Rate’ Risk Effect 
 
 
From Figure VI26, the consequence of ‘tax increases is ‘revenue loss.’ Thus, the variable ‘variability of tax rate’ 
(t’m) is linked with Discount Rate Sub-model (Figure 6.1.6) and Project Cash Flow model to replace variable ‘tax 
rate’ (tm), as illustrated in Figure VII26(b).  
 
















VII27.  RCN for ‘Insurance Increases’ on THSR 
 
According to the interview statements described in Section VI27, the variable ‘annual insurance cost’ shown in 
Figure VII27 was below: 
 
AIC = CPB/CP 
where 
AIC: annual insurance cost; 
CPB: contingency plan budget; 
CP: concession period 
 
 
Then, as illustrated in Figure 6.2.27, the ‘annual insurance cost’ contributes to project expenses and its cost is 
adjusted by the ‘inflation adjusted discount rate’. It is linked with the NPV Project Cash Flow model (Figure 6.1.7).  
 






















































































Figure VII27 The SD Model for ‘Insurance Increases’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII28.  RCN for ‘Contractual Disputes’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI28, Section VI6 and the Figure VI28, the direct causes for 
‘contract breach’ and ‘latent defect’, and the direct consequence is ‘design changes (remedy to solve contractual 
disputes).’ Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model used to address the direct cause relationship in the SD 
model illustrated in Figure VII28 was:  
 
RDk (cd) = β0k +β1k*RDk(cb)+β2k*RDk(ld)+εk, k = c, o 
where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
cd: risk event ‘contractual disputes’; 
cb: risk event ‘contractual breach’; 
ld: risk event ‘latent defect’. 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables;   372













Figure VII28 The SD Model for ‘Contractual Disputes’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII29.  RCN for ‘Inflexible Contract Arrangements’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI29 and the Figure VI29, the direct cause for ‘inflexible 
contract changes’ is ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’, and the direct consequences are ‘‘delay in contract change 
negotiation’ and ‘mis-pricing’. Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model used to address the direct cause 
relationship in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII29 was:  
 
RDk (ica) = β0k +β1k*RDk(urp)+εk, k = c, o 
where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
ica: risk event ‘inflexible contract changes’; 
urp: risk event ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 











Figure 6.2.29 The SD Model for ‘Inflexible Contract Arrangement’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII30.  RCN for ‘Delay in Contract Change Negotiation’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI30 and the Figure VI31, the direct causes for ‘delay in 
contract negotiation’ are ‘inflexible contract arrangement’ and ‘approval delay’, and the direct consequence is 
‘construction delay’. Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model used to address the direct cause irelationship 
in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII30 was: 
 
RDk (dccn) = β0k +β1k*RDk(ica)+β2k*RDk(ad)+εk, k = c, o 
where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect;; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
dccn: risk event ‘delay in contract negotiation’; 
ica: risk event ‘inflexible contract arrangement’; 
ad: risk event ‘approval delay’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 
εk: the random error for the multiple regression model; 












Figure VII30 The SD Model for ‘Delay in Contract Change Negotiation’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII31.  6.2.31 RCN for ‘Contract Breach’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI31 and the Figure VI31, the direct causes for ‘contract 
breach’ are ‘performance unavailable’ ‘failed commission tests’ ‘insolvency of contractor’ and ‘law/policy 
changes’; the direct consequences are ‘contractual disputes’ and ‘termination liabilities.’ Therefore, the linear 
multiple-regression model used to address the direct cause relationship in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII31 
was:  
 
RDk (cb) = β0k +β1k*RDk(fct)+β2k*RDk(ioc)+β3k*RDk(lpc)+εk, k=c; 
RDk (cb) = β0k +β1k*RDk(pu)+β2k*RDk(ioc)+β3k*RDk(lpc)+εk, k=o 
 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
cb: risk event ‘contractual breach’; 
fct: risk event ‘failed commission tests’; 
ioc: risk event ‘insolvency of contractor’; 
lpc: risk event ‘law/policy changes’; 
pu: risk event ‘performance unavailable’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k, β3k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 
















Figure VII31 The SD Model for ‘Contract Breach’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII32.  RCN for ‘Contract Remedies/Penalties’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI32, and Figure VI32, the ‘performance unavailable’ and 
‘accidents and safety issues’ would lead to ‘contract remedies/penalties’ which would lead to ‘revenue losses.’ As 
described in Section VII3 and VII18, these remedies and penalties include ‘capacity losses’, ‘on-time delay refund’ 
and ‘expected accident damage.’ Therefore, the variable ‘contract performance remedy/penalty’ illustrated in 
Figure VII32 was: 
 
CPP = CL + ODR +EASL 
where 
CPP: contract performance remedy/penalty; 
CL: capacity loss; 
ODR: on-time delay refund; 
EASL: expected accident and safety loss 
 
Then, as illustrated in Figure VII32, the variable ‘contract performance remedy/penalty’ will be one of the 
‘revenue loss’ that it is linked with the Project Cash Flow model and added into the variable ‘expense.’ 
















































VII33.  RCN for ‘Default of Subcontractors’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI33 and the Figure V33, the ‘default of subcontractor’ is 
an independent risk variable that has no the direct causes. It was: 
 
RDk(ds), k=c, o 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect;; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 













Figure VII33 The SD Model for ‘Default of Subcontractor’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII34.  RCN for ‘Inspection and Testing Delay’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section VI34, the variable ‘inspection and testing delay’ has been included in ‘construction delay.’ 
So, this risk variable is removed from modelling. 
 
VII35.  RCN for ‘Latent Defect’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI35 and the Figure VII35, the ‘latent defect’ is an 
independent risk variable that has no the direct causes. It was: 
 
RDk(ld), k=c, o 
where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
ld: risk event ‘latent defect’ 
t: time; 
RACST: risk-adjusted construction start time; 
RACCT: risk-adjusted construction completion time 






Latent defect C Latent defect O
 




VII36.  RCN for ‘Shorter Asset Life’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI36 and the Figure VI36, the direct causes for ‘shorter 
asset life’ are ‘defective construction’ and ‘complex system interface/integration’; the direct consequences are ‘less 
residual value’ and ‘performance unavailable’ Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model used to address the 
direct cause relationship in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII36(a) was: 
 
RDk (sal) = β0k +β1k*RDk(dc)+β2k*RDk(cii)+εk, k=o 
where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
sal: risk event ‘shorter asset life’; 
dc: risk event ‘defective construction’; 
cii: risk event ‘complex system interface/integration’; 
β0k: the constant term of for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 




























Figure VII36 The SD Model for ‘Shorter Asset Life’ Risk Effect 
 
Assume the variable ‘expected reduced life’ is in linear proportion to the expected risk effect produced by 
‘shorter asset life’ between the maximum consequence (maximum reduced life) and minimum consequence 
(minimum reduced life). Therefore, by using interpolation, the ‘expected reduced life’ was: 
 
ERL = (RDk (sal) - RDmin)/(RDmax - RDmin)*(RLmax - RLmin) + RLmin 
where 
ERL: the expected reduce life; 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
sal: risk event ‘shorter asset life’; 
RDmax: 25;  
RDmin: 1; 
RLmax: 10 years; 




VII37.  RCN for ‘Less Residual Values’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI36, VI37, the Figure VI36 and VI37, the direct causes for 
‘less residual value’ is ‘shorter asset life’; the direct consequence is ‘revenue losses.’ As shown in Figure VII37, 
the ‘expected reduce life’ is linked with ‘Depreciation’ sub-model (Figure 6.1.5) to make higher depreciation rate 
so that the residual value during ‘expected reduced life’ drop to 0. As described in Section 6.1.5, the fraction of the 
book balance α would be changed to α':  
 
   376
α'=λ(100%/(L-ERL) 
D’n =  1 − n BB α =
1 ) 1 (
− −
n
asset C α α  
n
asset n C BB ) 1 (
' α − = , n=1,...L-ERL 
Where  
α': the new fraction of the book balance; 
λ: multiplier =1.5 
D’n: the new depreciation value at nth year;  
Casset: estimated cost of asset; 
BB’n: book balance or accounting value of asset after period n;  
L: asset life time = 30 years 





























































Figure VII37 The SD Model for ‘Less Residual Value’ Risk Effect 
 
 
In addition, as shown in Figure VII37, the ‘expected reduce life’ is linked with ‘Operation Revenue’ sub-model 
(Figure 6.1.3) to make average fare =0 so that the revenue is 0 during the ‘expected reduce life’ was below: 
     
 AAF = 0, RACCT< t < RACCT+L-ERL 
where 
AAF: Annual average fare; 
t: time; 
RACCT: risk-adjusted construction completion time; 
L: asset life time = 30 years; 




VII38.  RCN for ‘Termination Liabilities’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI38 and the Figure V38, the ‘termination liabilities’ is 
caused under the worst circumstance of ‘contract breach’ and would lead to ‘construction delay’ at construction 
stage and ‘revenue losses’ at operation stage. Therefore, the risk variable ‘contract has terminated?’ is a binary 
variable that ‘1’ means the contract has been terminated; ‘0’ means the contract has not been terminated yet. It is 
modelled as below: 
 
Cht =1,  RD(cb)=25; 
                                                                                 = 0, RD(cb)<25   377
Where 
Cht: risk variable ‘contract has terminated?’; 
RD: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
cb: risk event ‘contract breach’ 
 
As for direct consequence on ‘construction delay’, it is described in Section VII8. As for consequence on ‘revenue 
losses’, the risk variable ‘contract has terminated?’ is linked with the ‘Operation Revenue sub-model (Figure 
6.1.3)’ as shown in Figure VII38. The variable ‘operating revenue’ would turn to be 0 when binary variable 
‘contract has terminated?’= 1 that means contract has been terminated so that the operation is stop. Therefore, the 
annual operating revenue is modified as:  
 
AOR’ = (1-Cht)*AOR 
Where 
AOR: new annual operating revenue; 












































adjustment rate>  
Figure VII38 The SD Model for ‘Termination Liabilities’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII39.  RCN for ‘Variability of Inflation Rate’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI39 and the Figure VI39, the ‘variability of inflation rate’ 
shown in Figure VII39 is an independent risk variable that has no the direct causes. According to DBAS(2000, 
2007)’s data and the interview statement, the random variable for ‘variability of inflation rate’ was assumed to 
come from a triangular distribution that had a minimum value of 2%, a maximum value of 7% and the mean value 
of 3.69%. 
 
rinf = RANDOM TRIANGULAR(a, m, b) 
 
where 
rinf: random variable for ‘variability of inflation rate’; 
a: minimum value= 0.02; 
b: maximum value=0.07; 





Figure VII39 The SD Model for ‘Variability of Inflation Rate’ Risk Effect 
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VII40.  RCN for ‘Variability of Exchange Rate’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI40 and the Figure VI40, the ‘variability of exchange rate’ 
shown in Figure VII40 is an independent risk variable that has no the direct causes, but has direct effects on 
construction costs and operation costs. According to CEPD (2005)’s data, the random variable for ‘variability of 
exchange rate’ during the past twenty years was assumed to come from a normal distribution that had a mean value 






rex= RANDOM NORMAL(μ, σ) 
    where 
rex: random variable for ‘variability of exchange rate’; 
μ: mean=30.73; 
σ: standard deviation = 3.34 
 
Then, as illustrated in Figure VII40, the ‘variability of exchange rate’ is linked with the ‘Construction Cost’ and 
‘Operation Cost’ sub-models to replace ‘exchange rate (the risk-free exchange rate)’ so that we can evaluate the 











































































Figure VII40 The SD Model for ‘Variability of Exchange Rate’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII41.  RCN for ‘Variability of Interest Rate’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI41 and the Figure VI41, the ‘variability of interest rate’ 
shown in Figure VII41 is an independent risk variable that has no the direct causes, but has direct effects on 
construction expense and operation expense. According to Central Bank (2005)’s data and the interviewing 
statement, the random variable for interest rates during the past 10 years was assumed to come from a triangular 
distribution that had a minimum value of 1.75%, a maximum value of 9% and a mean value of 4.2%, which was:   379
 
rint= RANDOM TRIANGULAR(a, m, b) 
      
Where 
rint: random variable for ‘variability of interest rate’; 
a: minimum value= 0.0175; 
b: maximum value=0.09; 
m: mode=3*mean-a-b=3*0.042-0.0175-0.09= 0.0185 
 
 
Then, as illustrated in Figure VII41, the ‘variability of interest rate’ is linked with the Project Finance sub-model to 
replace ‘interest rate (the risk-free interest)’ so that we can evaluate the additional interest payment due to higher 
interest than the reference interest rate. 
 
 

























































VII42.  RCN for ‘Variability of Less Demand’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI42 and the Figure VI42, the ‘variability of less demand’ 
shown in Figure VII42 is an independent risk variable that has no the direct causes but has direct effects on 
‘revenue loss’ which has impact on cash flow. As mentioned by interviewees, for THSR case, there is no a 
triggered event for ‘variability of demand’. Therefore, the research evaluates the probability distribution for the 
‘variability of less demand’ risk event based on the current research reports on ridership demand for THSR. The 
risk-free ridership demand described in Section 6.1.3 is based on BHSR’s report (Hsu, 2000). To minimise the 
evaluation bias for ridership demand, the research take both the differences among different reports and optimal 
bias into account. There are seven research reports (THSR, 2002) for ridership demand forecasting, which include 
Sofrerail (1991), Transmark (1993), MVA(1993), Chen-Da(1995), NSA(1997), TRI(1998), and THSR(2000). The 
average difference of percentage of ridership demand between these reports and Hus(2000) was assumed to come 
from a normal distribution that had that had a mean value of 0.166, a standard deviation of 0.32, a minimum value 
of -0.13 and maximum value of 0.71. According to a statistics report conducted by Flyvbjerb et al.(2003) for the   380
optimism bias for 27 rail projects around the world, it indicated that the average inaccuracy of rail passenger 
forecasts was assumed to come form a normal distribution that had that had a mean value of -0.39, a standard 
deviation of 0.52,  a minimum value of -0.80 and maximum value of 0.20. As illustrated in Figure VII42, the ‘less 
demand adjustment’ is the sum of ‘variability of less demand’ variable and ‘optimism bias’ variable, which was: 
 
LDA= VarLd+OptBias; 
VarLd= RANDOM NORMAL(a1, b1 , μ1 , σ1); 
OptBias = RANDOM NORMAL(a2, b2 , μ2 , σ2) 
Where 
LDA: random variable for ‘less demand adjustment’; 
VarLd: random variable for ‘variability of less demand’; 
OptBias: random variable for ‘optimism bias’; 
a1: minimum value of ‘variability of less demand’= -0.13; 
b1: maximum value of ‘variability of less demand’= 0.71; 
μ1: mean value of ‘variability of less demand’=0.166; 
σ1: standard deviation of ‘variability of less demand’= 0.32; 
a2: minimum value of ‘optimism bias’= -0.8; 
b2: maximum value of ‘optimism bias’= 0.2; 
μ2: mean value of ‘optimism bias’=-0.39; 
σ2: standard deviation of ‘optimism bias’= 0.52 
           
Then ‘less demand adjustment’ is linked with Operation Revenue sub-model so that the daily ridership demand 




DRD’: adjusted daily ridership demand; 
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VII43.  RCN for ‘Higher Competition’ on THSR 
 
As described in Section VI42, there is no ‘higher competition’ risk for THSR project. 
 
 
VII44.  RCN for ‘Downside Economic Events’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI44 and the Figure VI44, the ‘downside economic events’ 
is an independent risk variable that has no the direct causes. It was: 
 
RDk(dee), k=c, o 
Where 
            RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 

















VII45.  RCN for ‘Political Interference’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI45 and the Figure VI45, the ‘political interference’ is an 
independent risk variable that has no the direct causes. It was: 
 
RDk(pi), k=c, o 
Where 
            RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 

















VII46.  RCN for ‘Unsuitable Regulatory Policy’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI46 and the Figure VI46, the direct cause for ‘unsuitable 
regulatory policy’ is ‘political interference’, and the direct consequences are ‘financial unavailable’ ‘inflexible 
contract arrangement’ ‘approval delay’ and ‘industrial disputes’. Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model 
used to address the direct cause relationship in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII46 was:  
 
RDk (urp) = β0k +β1k*RDk(pi)+εk, k=c, o 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
urp: risk event ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’; 
pi: risk event ‘political interference’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 
εk: the random error for the multiple regression model; 










Figure VII46 The SD Model for ‘Unsuitable Regulatory policy’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII47.  RCN for ‘Approval Delay’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI47 and the Figure VI47, the direct cause for ‘approval 
delay’ is ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’, and the direct consequences are ‘land unavailable’ ‘ownership change 
delay’ and ‘delay in contract change negotiation’. Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model used to address 
the direct cause relationship in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII47 was:  
 
RDk (ad) = β0k +β1k*RDk(urp)+εk, k=c, o 
where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
ad: risk event ‘approval delay’; 
urp: risk event ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 












Figure VII47 The SD Model for ‘Approval Delay’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII48.  RCN for ‘Law/Policy’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI48 and the Figure VI48, the direct causes for ‘law/policy 
changes’ are ‘downside economic events’ ‘political interference’ ‘industrial disputes’ and ‘Force Majeure’, and the 
direct consequences are ‘scope change’ and ‘contract breach’ Therefore, the linear multiple-regression model used 
to address the direct cause relationship in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII9 was: 
 
RDk (lpc) = β0k +β1k*RDk(dee)+β2k*RDk(pi)+β3k*RDk(id)+β4k*RDk(fm)+εk, k=c, o 
 
where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
lpc: risk event ‘law/policy changes’; 
dee: risk event ‘downside economic events’; 
pi: risk event ‘political interference’; 
id: risk event ‘industrial disputes’; 
fm: risk event ‘Force Majeure’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k, β3k, β4k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 
εk: the random error for the multiple regression model; 
















Figure VII48 The SD Model for ‘Approval Delay’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII49.  RCN for ‘Unforeseen Site Conditions’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI49 and the Figure VI49, the ‘unforeseen site conditions’ 




            RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 












Figure VII49 The SD Model for ‘Unforeseen Site Conditions’ Risk Effect 
 
VII50.  RCN for ‘Greater Environmental Expectation’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI50 and the Figure VI50, the ‘greater environmental 
expectation’ is an independent risk variable that has no the direct causes. It was: 
 
RDk(gee), k=c, o 
where 
            RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
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VII51.  RCN for ‘Industrial Disputes’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI51 and the Figure VI51, the direct causes for ‘industrial 
disputes’ are ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’ and ‘higher environmental protection expectation’, and the direct 
consequences are ‘land unavailable’ ‘resources unavailable’ and ‘law/policy changes’. Therefore, the linear 
multiple-regression model used to address the direct cause relationship in the SD model illustrated in Figure VII51 
was: 
 
RDk (id) = β0k +β1k*RDk(urp)+β2k*RDk(gee), k=c, o 
  
where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
id: risk event ‘industrial disputes’; 
urp: risk event ‘unsuitable regulatory policy’; 
gee: risk event ‘greater environmental expectation’; 
β0k: the constant term for the multiple regression model; 
β1k, β2k: the relational coefficients for the independent risk variables; 














Figure VII51 The SD Model for ‘Industrial Disputes’ Risk Effect 
 
 
VII52.  RCN for ‘Force Majeure’ on THSR 
 
Based on the scenario statements described in Section VI52 and the Figure VI52, the ‘Force Majeure’ is an 
independent risk variable that has no the direct causes. It was: 
 
RDk(fm), k=c, o 
Where 
RDk: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
k: time period, c (construction stage); o (operation stage); 
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Estimated Regression Coefficients for land unavailable 
Term                   Coef  SE Coef       T      P 
Constant             4.3862  0.15511  28.278  0.000 
industrial disputes  0.5250  0.01288  40.751  0.000 
approval delay       0.1819  0.01251  14.537  0.000 
S = 0.0338242  PRESS = 0.0477128 
R-Sq = 98.84%  R-Sq(pred) = 98.58%  R-Sq(adj) = 98.77% 
 
Analysis of Variance for land unavailable 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS        F      P 
Regression       2  3.31806  3.31806  1.65903  1450.11  0.000 
  Linear         2  3.31806  3.31806  1.65903  1450.11  0.000 
Residual Error  34  0.03890  0.03890  0.00114 
Total           36  3.35696 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for resource unavailable 
Term                         Coef   SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                  10.9449  0.594646  18.406  0.000 
default of subcontractor   0.1548  0.007249  21.357  0.000 
Force Majeure              0.1027  0.005392  19.054  0.000 
industrial disputes        0.1427  0.057126   2.498  0.018 
finance unavailable        0.0990  0.006691  14.791  0.000 
S = 0.159302   PRESS = 1.21205 
R-Sq = 96.80%  R-Sq(pred) = 95.22%  R-Sq(adj) = 96.40% 
 
Analysis of Variance for resource unavailable 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS       F      P 
Regression       4  24.5624  24.5624  6.14060  241.98  0.000 
  Linear         4  24.5624  24.5624  6.14060  241.98  0.000 
Residual Error  32   0.8121   0.8121  0.02538 
Total           36  25.3745 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for scope change 
Term                  Coef  SE Coef       T      P 
Constant           11.5664  0.22542  51.311  0.000 
law/policy change   0.4979  0.01470  33.870  0.000 
S = 0.151106   PRESS = 0.905771 
R-Sq = 97.04%  R-Sq(pred) = 96.64%  R-Sq(adj) = 96.95% 
 
Analysis of Variance for scope change 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS        F      P 
Regression       1  26.1941  26.1941  26.1941  1147.21  0.000 
  Linear         1  26.1941  26.1941  26.1941  1147.21  0.000 
Residual Error  35   0.7992   0.7992   0.0228 
Total           36  26.9933 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for defective design 
Term                         Coef   SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                  3.61059  0.376221   9.597  0.000 
default of subcontractor  0.09693  0.004830  20.069  0.000 
resource unavailable      0.16386  0.021758   7.531  0.000 
S = 0.0948642  PRESS = 0.376288 
R-Sq = 96.00%  R-Sq(pred) = 95.08%  R-Sq(adj) = 95.76% 
 
Analysis of Variance for defective design 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS       F      P 
Regression       2  7.33797  7.33797  3.66899  407.70  0.000 
  Linear         2  7.33797  7.33797  3.66899  407.70  0.000 
Residual Error  34  0.30597  0.30597  0.00900 
Total           36  7.64395 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for design changes 
Term                     Coef  SE Coef       T      P 
Constant              -0.3466  0.48629  -0.713  0.481 
scope change           0.4972  0.02326  21.380  0.000 
contractual disputes   0.2742  0.01353  20.260  0.000 
S = 0.120655   PRESS = 0.599094 
R-Sq = 96.43%  R-Sq(pred) = 95.67%  R-Sq(adj) = 96.22% 
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Analysis of Variance for design changes 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS       F      P 
Regression       2  13.3519  13.3519  6.67596  458.59  0.000 
  Linear         2  13.3519  13.3519  6.67596  458.59  0.000 
Residual Error  34   0.4950   0.4950  0.01456 
Total           36  13.8469 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for defective construction 
Term                             Coef   SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                       6.5782  0.815954   8.062  0.000 
default of subcontractor       0.1186  0.005293  22.411  0.000 
resource unavailable           0.1475  0.023740   6.211  0.000 
poor cooperation/coordination  0.3137  0.083858   3.741  0.001 
S = 0.103307   PRESS = 0.431655 
R-Sq = 96.52%  R-Sq(pred) = 95.73%  R-Sq(adj) = 96.20% 
 
Analysis of Variance for defective construction 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS       F      P 
Regression       3   9.7585  9.75855  3.25285  304.79  0.000 
  Linear         3   9.7585  9.75855  3.25285  304.79  0.000 
Residual Error  33   0.3522  0.35219  0.01067 
Total           36  10.1107 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for construction changes 
Term               Coef  SE Coef       T      P 
Constant        10.6535  0.53604  19.875  0.000 
design changes   0.3646  0.03930   9.278  0.000 
S = 0.146228   PRESS = 0.840976 
R-Sq = 71.09%  R-Sq(pred) = 67.52%  R-Sq(adj) = 70.27% 
 
Analysis of Variance for construction changes 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS      F      P 
Regression       1  1.84055  1.84055  1.84055  86.08  0.000 
  Linear         1  1.84055  1.84055  1.84055  86.08  0.000 
Residual Error  35  0.74840  0.74840  0.02138 
Total           36  2.58894 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for complex system interface/integr 
Term                    Coef  SE Coef       T      P 
Constant              8.8222  0.60390  14.609  0.000 
complex technologies  0.3765  0.01565  24.062  0.000 
defective design      0.1377  0.06462   2.132  0.040 
S = 0.178124   PRESS = 1.29224 
R-Sq = 94.45%  R-Sq(pred) = 93.36%  R-Sq(adj) = 94.13% 
 
Analysis of Variance for complex system interface/integr 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS       F      P 
Regression       2  18.3731  18.3731  9.18656  289.54  0.000 
  Linear         2  18.3731  18.3731  9.18656  289.54  0.000 
Residual Error  34   1.0788   1.0788  0.03173 
Total           36  19.4519 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for low operating productivity 
Term                              Coef  SE Coef      T      P 
Constant                       0.98599  0.77428  1.273  0.212 
resource unavailable           0.09524  0.01877  5.075  0.000 
construction changes           0.19599  0.05017  3.907  0.000 
system breakdown               0.14498  0.02494  5.813  0.000 
accidents and safety issues    0.09239  0.01482  6.235  0.000 
poor cooperation/coordination  0.15299  0.03312  4.619  0.000 
S = 0.0619201  PRESS = 0.163599 
R-Sq = 96.77%  R-Sq(pred) = 95.55%  R-Sq(adj) = 96.24% 
 
Analysis of Variance for low operating productivity 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS    Adj MS       F      P 
Regression       5  3.55689  3.55689  0.711379  185.54  0.000 
  Linear         5  3.55689  3.55689  0.711379  185.54  0.000 
Residual Error  31  0.11886  0.11886  0.003834 
Total           36  3.67575 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for system breakdown 
Term                      Coef  SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                9.3599  0.32184  29.083  0.000 
defective construction  0.5831  0.02330  25.024  0.000 
S = 0.149170   PRESS = 0.876975 
R-Sq = 94.71%  R-Sq(pred) = 94.04%  R-Sq(adj) = 94.56% 
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Analysis of Variance for system breakdown 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS       F      P 
Regression       1  13.9337  13.9337  13.9337  626.18  0.000 
  Linear         1  13.9337  13.9337  13.9337  626.18  0.000 
Residual Error  35   0.7788   0.7788   0.0223 
Total           36  14.7125 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for high maintenance frequency 
Term                               Coef  SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                         2.5632  1.05995   2.418  0.021 
defective construction           0.3822  0.02636  14.498  0.000 
complex system interface/integr  0.2932  0.05930   4.944  0.000 
S = 0.167267   PRESS = 1.07790 
R-Sq = 88.37%  R-Sq(pred) = 86.82%  R-Sq(adj) = 87.68% 
 
Analysis of Variance for high maintenance frequency 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS       F      P 
Regression       2  7.22643  7.22643  3.61321  129.14  0.000 
  Linear         2  7.22643  7.22643  3.61321  129.14  0.000 
Residual Error  34  0.95126  0.95126  0.02798 
Total           36  8.17769 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for accidents and safety issues 
Term                                Coef   SE Coef        T      P 
Constant                         5.92910  0.067784   87.471  0.000 
resource unavailable             0.09712  0.003007   32.300  0.000 
defective construction           0.25295  0.002887   87.610  0.000 
complex system interface/integr  0.10434  0.003760   27.754  0.000 
Force Majeure                    0.20018  0.000518  386.300  0.000 
S = 0.0104998  PRESS = 0.00460871 
R-Sq = 99.99%  R-Sq(pred) = 99.99%  R-Sq(adj) = 99.99% 
 
Analysis of Variance for accidents and safety issues 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS          F      P 
Regression       4  46.7531  46.7531  11.6883  106019.16  0.000 
  Linear         4  46.7531  46.7531  11.6883  106019.16  0.000 
Residual Error  32   0.0035   0.0035   0.0001 
Total           36  46.7566 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for complex technologies 
Term                      Coef   SE Coef        T      P 
Constant                6.8154  0.056344  120.961  0.000 
political interference  0.3412  0.003510   97.234  0.000 
S = 0.117190   PRESS = 0.541080 
R-Sq = 99.63%  R-Sq(pred) = 99.58%  R-Sq(adj) = 99.62% 
 
Analysis of Variance for complex technologies 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS        F      P 
Regression       1  129.845  129.845  129.845  9454.52  0.000 
  Linear         1  129.845  129.845  129.845  9454.52  0.000 
Residual Error  35    0.481    0.481    0.014 
Total           36  130.325 
 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for poor cooperation/coordination 
Term                               Coef  SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                         4.7294  0.21579  21.917  0.000 
complex system interface/integr  0.2670  0.01484  17.990  0.000 
S = 0.0654666  PRESS = 0.166271 
R-Sq = 90.24%  R-Sq(pred) = 89.18%  R-Sq(adj) = 89.96% 
 
Analysis of Variance for poor cooperation/coordination 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS       F      P 
Regression       1  1.38715  1.38715  1.38715  323.66  0.000 
  Linear         1  1.38715  1.38715  1.38715  323.66  0.000 
Residual Error  35  0.15001  0.15001  0.00429 
Total           36  1.53715 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for insolvency of contractor 
Term                   Coef   SE Coef        T      P 
Constant             1.7040  0.100109   17.022  0.000 
finance unavailable  0.8422  0.005442  154.775  0.000 
S = 0.136496   PRESS = 0.732217 
R-Sq = 99.85%  R-Sq(pred) = 99.84%  R-Sq(adj) = 99.85% 
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Analysis of Variance for insolvency of contractor 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS         F      P 
Regression       1  446.312  446.312  446.312  23955.18  0.000 
  Linear         1  446.312  446.312  446.312  23955.18  0.000 
Residual Error  35    0.652    0.652    0.019 
Total           36  446.964 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for ownership change delay 
Term              Coef  SE Coef       T      P 
Constant        5.4909  0.21988  24.972  0.000 
approval delay  0.7397  0.01733  42.683  0.000 
S = 0.0517507  PRESS = 0.105321 
R-Sq = 98.12%  R-Sq(pred) = 97.88%  R-Sq(adj) = 98.06% 
 
Analysis of Variance for ownership change delay 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS        F      P 
Regression       1  4.87912  4.87912  4.87912  1821.84  0.000 
  Linear         1  4.87912  4.87912  4.87912  1821.84  0.000 
Residual Error  35  0.09373  0.09373  0.00268 
Total           36  4.97286 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for contractual disputes 
Term               Coef   SE Coef        T      P 
Constant         5.9944  0.167275   35.836  0.000 
latent defect    0.3820  0.002383  160.311  0.000 
contract breach  0.3197  0.012288   26.014  0.000 
S = 0.0554044  PRESS = 0.128020 
R-Sq = 99.87%  R-Sq(pred) = 99.84%  R-Sq(adj) = 99.86% 
 
Analysis of Variance for contractual disputes 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS         F      P 
Regression       2  79.6256  79.6256  39.8128  12969.81  0.000 
  Linear         2  79.6256  79.6256  39.8128  12969.81  0.000 
Residual Error  34   0.1044   0.1044   0.0031 
Total           36  79.7300 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for contract change negotiation 
Term                               Coef  SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                         3.9919  0.15358  25.992  0.000 
inflexible contract arrangement  0.4145  0.02042  20.294  0.000 
S = 0.151346   PRESS = 0.878953 
R-Sq = 92.17%  R-Sq(pred) = 91.41%  R-Sq(adj) = 91.94% 
 
Analysis of Variance for delay in contract change negoti 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS       F      P 
Regression       1   9.4336  9.43363  9.43363  411.85  0.000 
  Linear         1   9.4336  9.43363  9.43363  411.85  0.000 
Residual Error  35   0.8017  0.80170  0.02291 
Total           36  10.2353 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for contract breach 
Term                        Coef   SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                  7.0160  0.307568  22.811  0.000 
performance unavailable   0.1684  0.029040   5.800  0.000 
insolvency of contractor  0.2910  0.005001  58.183  0.000 
law/policy change         0.1905  0.010637  17.911  0.000 
S = 0.0484001  PRESS = 0.0991878 
R-Sq = 99.35%  R-Sq(pred) = 99.17%  R-Sq(adj) = 99.29% 
 
Analysis of Variance for contract breach 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS        F      P 
Regression       3  11.8732  11.8732  3.95774  1689.49  0.000 
  Linear         3  11.8732  11.8732  3.95774  1689.49  0.000 
Residual Error  33   0.0773   0.0773  0.00234 
Total           36  11.9505 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for contract breach 
Term                           Coef  SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                    2.39314  2.30459   1.038  0.307 
insolvency of contractor    0.62804  0.12382   5.072  0.000 
law/policy change           0.58273  0.13932   4.183  0.000 
insolvency of contractor*  -0.01985  0.00747  -2.656  0.012 
  law/policy change 
 
S = 0.0624275  PRESS = 0.159171 
R-Sq = 98.92%  R-Sq(pred) = 98.67%  R-Sq(adj) = 98.83% 
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Analysis of Variance for contract breach 
 
Source          DF   Seq SS     Adj SS    Adj MS        F      P 
Regression       3  11.8219  11.821925  3.940642  1011.15  0.000 
  Linear         2  11.7944   0.333986  0.166993    42.85  0.000 
  Interaction    1   0.0275   0.027496  0.027496     7.06  0.012 
Residual Error  33   0.1286   0.128607  0.003897 




Estimated Regression Coefficients for law/policy change 
Term                        Coef   SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                  2.5020  0.296874   8.428  0.000 
downside economic events  0.2011  0.003446  58.348  0.000 
political interference    0.1949  0.002754  70.754  0.000 
industrial disputes       0.2445  0.031820   7.684  0.000 
Force Majeure             0.2068  0.002704  76.485  0.000 
S = 0.0815858  PRESS = 0.287675 
R-Sq = 99.80%  R-Sq(pred) = 99.73%  R-Sq(adj) = 99.77% 
 
Analysis of Variance for law/policy change 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS        F      P 
Regression       4  105.459  105.459  26.3647  3960.89  0.000 
  Linear         4  105.459  105.459  26.3647  3960.89  0.000 
Residual Error  32    0.213    0.213   0.0067 
Total           36  105.672 
 
Estimated Regression Coefficients for industrial disputes 
Term                                Coef   SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                         6.15515  0.225146  27.338  0.000 
unsuitable regulatory policy     0.14523  0.013871  10.470  0.000 
greater environmental expectati  0.07903  0.002640  29.934  0.000 
S = 0.0819708  PRESS = 0.265238 
R-Sq = 96.98%  R-Sq(pred) = 96.49%  R-Sq(adj) = 96.80% 
 
Analysis of Variance for industrial disputes 
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS       F      P 
Regression       2  7.32457  7.32457  3.66229  545.05  0.000 
  Linear         2  7.32457  7.32457  3.66229  545.05  0.000 
Residual Error  34  0.22845  0.22845  0.00672 
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Appendix IX A Statistical Analysis on “Univariate”and 
“Multivariate” Approaches 
 
1. The problems 
 
The “univariate” approach was originally proposed in the submitted PhD thesis that it used a risk matrix 
for the conversion of the 2 dimensional measures of likelihood and impact into a single measure of risk. This 
approach has the following technical limitations: 
 
1. Using a risk matrix for conversion is arbitrary and arguable. 
 
Since the expert judgment regarding risk effect measurement is very subjective, the observation and 
interpretation of the same risk factors may be inconsistent among different project experts. In addition, the risks 
involved in PPP projects are unique (Li & Zou, 2008). There may be the same type of risk factors among 
different projects, but different likelihood and impact exist. A clear definition of risk likelihood-impact scales are 
designed and tailored to reflect the specific risk characteristics of a particular project that may be helpful to reduce 
risk measurement bias. Therefore, the risk matrix used in this thesis research originally intended to provide the 
consistent definition of categorized scales with the corresponding numerical scales for risk likelihood-impact 
measures to reduce potential subjective bias when the project experts measured risk effects (see Appendix IV). 
However, using a risk matrix for converting two-dimension categorical data to one-dimension ordinal 
numerical data for risk effect rating seems arbitrary and arguable. For example, there will be a question about why 
is LOW PROBABILITY MEDIUM IMPACT (numerical rating: 10) in the risk matrix worse than VERY HIGH 
LIKELIHOOD LOW IMPACT (numerical rating: 11)? Even though the numerical ranking depends on “RF 
values” calculation which depends on the “numerical weights” which are tailored to suit a particular project (see 
Appendix IV), the settings of “numerical weights” are arbitrary and also difficult to be justified according to the 
project characteristics. 
 
2. Using a risk matrix to produce ordinal data for regression analysis is unreliable. 
 
There are fundamental issues in using ordinal data for regression analysis. First, in general it implies the data 
must be interval in nature if regression analysis is used. There has been a continuing debate about whether it is 
legitimate to use ordinal data in parametric statistical procedures in the literature (see Appendix IXG). Second, the 
“rankings” of the ordinal values in the risk matrix are sensitive to the numerical scales. The different sets of 
numerical scales produce different weights which produce different rankings in the risk matrix (see Section 2.1, 
Appendix IX). Since the ordinal values produced by the risk matrix are critical input to the regression analysis, 
there will be a fundamental error in the analytical process for the use of regression. 
Most of the literature simply used the two-dimensional risk matrix for prioritising or categorising the 
importance of risk factors only. It seems to be unsupported by any extensive literature or research that using a risk 
matrix for the conversion of the 2 dimensional measures of likelihood and impact into a single measure of risk, 
especially the issue that impact and probability are not commensurate dimensions. Thus, a “multivariate 
(bivariate)” approach using a two-dimensional independent set of values for probability and impact is undertaken 
to examine if it can resolve some of the concerns about the use of ordinal nature of data for regression. 
 
2. Introduction to the statistical analysis 
 
A statistical analysis is performed to examine the reliability and appropriateness of “univariate” and 
“multivariate (bivariate)” approaches in the use of regression by testing the sensitivity of risk relationships 
(including both ordinal and ratio relationships) to the numerical scales. It was performed from two different 
perspectives: “single-observed data” and “multiple-observed data”, because this provided us with an insight to 
clarify and justify reliability and appropriateness in using both approaches for regression analysis. “Single-
observed data” means that the risk factors are measured by a project expert only (sample size / number of project 
experts = 1), and “multiple-observed data” means that the risk factors are measured by a group of experts (sample 
size / number of project experts = 37 in this PhD thesis research). The data characteristics in terms of mean and 
standard deviation were calculated for comparison. The hypothesis tests using “Two-Sample T-Test” were also 
performed to examine the consistency of expected risk effect values (mean values), ordinal and ratio relationships 
among different sets of numerical scales. An interpretation was presented to explain the results of statistical 
analysis. 
 
2. The statistical analysis for “univariate” approach 
 
2.1 Single-observed data (sample size / number of project experts = 1) 
 
Four different sets of numerical scales including Original scale, Scale 1, Scale 2 and Scale 3 are used as 
examples to test the reliability of “univariate approach”. They are: 
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Original scale: (Originally proposed in this PhD thesis) 
Impact: 5, 20, 100, 700, 1000 
Likelihood: 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 
Scale 1: (Adopting a simple linear scale for likelihood) 
Impact: 5, 20, 100, 700, 1000 
Likelihood: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
Scale 2: (Retaining the likelihood scale but adopting a different scale for impact) 
Impact: 5, 20, 100, 300, 500 
Likelihood: 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 
Scale 3: (Exchanging the impact and likelihood numerical scales) 
Impact: 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 
Likelihood: 5, 20, 100, 300, 500 
 
This test is based on “single-observed data (sample size / number of project experts = 1)”. Assume after 
an individual judgment, the impact and probability for Risk A and Risk B are given as: 
 
Risk A: Impact (I) = High (H) and Likelihood (L) = Low (L); 
Risk B: Impact (I) = Low (L) and Likelihood (L) = High (H) 
 
Then we can obtain a rating value as the risk effect from risk matrix for Risk A and Risk B by Original 
scale, Scale 1, Scale 2 and Scale respectively (The data are illustrated in Appendix IXA). We compare “ordinal 
relationship” and “ratio relationship” between Risk A and Risk B among different numerical scales (Table IX1). 
        Obviously, Table IX1 illustrates that the both the “ordinal relationship” and “ratio relationship” between 
Risk A and Risk B change among different sets of numerical scales. Especially there is a radical change in 
numerical scales between Scale 3 and others. For example, changing numerical scale from Original scale to Scale 
3, then ordinal relationship changes from “Risk A > Risk B” to “Risk A < Risk B” and ratio relationship changes 
from “Risk A = 1.8 Risk B” to “Risk A = 0.63 Risk B”. Using different numerical scale values will change the 
ordinal and ratio relationships which are the critical inputs to the regression analysis. Since the rankings of the 
ordinal values in the risk matrix are very sensitive to the numerical scales, the “UNIVARIATE” approach is 
UNRELIABLE in the use of regression if the data are based on “SINGLE-OBSERVED DATA (sample size 
/number of project experts = 1)”.  
  
Table IX1 Reliability of “univariate” approach (single-observed data, sample size = 1) 
Testing scales  Numerical scales  Rating values  
(Expected risk effect values) Ordinal relationships  Ratio relationships 
Risk A(I, L)=(H, L)=18 
Original  Impact: 5, 20, 100, 700, 1000 
Likelihood:1, 2, 5, 7, 9  Risk B(I, L)=(H, L)=10 
Risk A > Risk B  Risk A = 1.8 Risk B
Risk A(I, L)=(H, L)=18 
Scale 1  Impact: 5, 20, 100, 700, 1000 
Likelihood:1, 2, 3, 4, 5  Risk B(I, L)=(H, L)=9 
Risk A > Risk B  Risk A = 2 Risk B 
Risk A(I, L)=(H, L)=16 
Scale 2  Impact: 5, 20, 100, 300, 500 
Likelihood:1, 2, 5, 7, 9  Risk B(I, L)=(H, L)=10 
Risk A > Risk B  Risk A = 1.6 Risk B
Risk A(I, L)=(H, L)=10 
Scale 3  Impact: 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 
Likelihood:5, 20, 100, 300, 500  Risk B(I, L)=(H, L)=16 
Risk A < Risk B  Risk A = 0.63 Risk B
 
 
2.2 Multiple-observed data (sample size /number of project experts = 37) 
 
This PhD thesis research used a “univariate” approach with a risk matrix for the conversion of the 2 
dimensional measures of likelihood and impact into a single measure of risk. A group of experts were asked to 
make their judgments to rate the risk effect values by the use of the risk matrix which specified impact and 
likelihood scales separately. We originally obtained “multiple-observed data” that the sample size was equal to 37. 
The original data produced by Original scale are converted to other 3 sets of data by Scale 1, Scale 2, and Scale 3 
respectively (The data are illustrated in Appendix IXB). Three risk factors including “Force Majeure (FM)”, 
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Table IX2 Statistics of “univariate” approach (multiple-observed data, sample size = 37) 
Numerical 
Scales 
Original  Scale 1  Scale 2  Scale 3  Original  Scale 1  Scale 2  Scale 3  Original  Scale 1  Scale 2  Scale 3 
Risk  factors  FM FM FM FM  USC  USC  USC  USC PI  PI  PI  PI 
Mean (μ)  18.23 18.27 18.19 16.81 11.97 11.97 12.22 12.68 15.09 15.03 15.03 14.22 
SD  5.04 4.83 5.07 6.23 3.13 3.35 3.58 5.56 5.57 5.47 5.50 6.43 
Change of 
Mean % 
0.00% 0.22% -0.22% -7.79% 0.00% 0.00% 2.09% 5.93% 0.00%  -0.40%  -0.40%  -5.77% 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Original) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 2)- μ (Original) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 3)- μ (Original) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ ( Scale 1)- μ (Scale 2) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ ( Scale 1)- μ (Scale 3) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ ( Scale 2)- μ (Scale3) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Original) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 2)- μ (Original) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 3)- μ (Original) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ ( Scale 1)- μ (Scale 2) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ ( Scale 1)- μ (Scale 3) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ ( Scale 2)- μ (Scale3) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Original) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 2)- μ (Original) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 3)- μ (Original) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ ( Scale 1)- μ (Scale 2) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ ( Scale 1)- μ (Scale 3) = 0 (don't reject) 




Expected risk effect value μ(FM) at α = 0.05 
μ(FM)Original =μ(FM)Scale1=μ(FM)Scale2 =μ(FM)Scale3 
Expected risk effect value μ(USC) at α = 0.05 
μ(USC)Original =μ(USC)Scale1=μ(USC)Scale2 =μ(USC)Scale3
Expected risk effect value μ(PI) at α = 0.05 
μ(PI)Original =μ(PI)Scale1=μ(PI)Scale2 =μ(PI)Scale3 
Note: FM: risk factor “Force Majeure”; USC: risk factor “unforeseen site conditions; PI: risk factor “political interference.” 
     
Table IX3 Reliability of “univariate” approach (multiple-observed data, sample size = 37) 
Testing scales  Numerical scales  Expected risk effect values, μ Ordinal relationships  Ratio relationships 
μ(FM) = 18.23  μ(FM) = 1.52 μ(USC) 
μ(USC) = 11.97  μ(USC) = 0.79 μ(PI )  Original 
Impact: 5, 20, 100, 
700, 1000  
Likelihood: 1, 2, 5, 7, 
9  μ(PI ) = 15.09 
μ(FM) > μ(PI ) > μ(USC) 
μ(PI ) = 0.83 μ(FM) 
μ(FM) = 18.27  μ(FM) = 1.53 μ(USC) 
μ(USC) = 11.97  μ(USC) = 0.80 μ(PI )  Scale 1 
Impact: 5, 20, 100, 
700, 1000  
Likelihood: 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5  μ(PI ) = 15.03 
μ(FM) > μ(PI ) > μ(USC) 
μ(PI ) = 0.82 μ(FM) 
μ(FM) = 18.19  μ(FM) = 1.49 μ(USC) 
μ(USC) = 12.22  μ(USC) = 0.81 μ(PI )  Scale 2 
Impact: 5, 20, 100, 
300, 500  
Likelihood: 1, 2, 5, 7, 
9  μ(PI ) = 15.03 
μ(FM) > μ(PI ) > μ(USC) 
μ(PI ) = 0.83 μ(FM) 
μ(FM) = 16.81  μ(FM) = 1.33 μ(USC) 
μ(USC) = 12.68  μ(USC) = 0.89 μ(PI )  Scale 3 
Impact: 1, 2, 5, 7, 9  
Likelihood: 5, 20, 
100, 300, 500 
μ(PI ) = 14.22 
μ(FM) > μ(PI ) > μ(USC) 
μ(PI ) = 0.85 μ(FM) 
Reliability 
There is no statistically significant difference in the expected risk effect values (mean values) among different sets 
of numerical scales at α = 0.05, i.e. μ(Scale 1) = μ(Scale 2) = μ(Scale 3) = μ(Original). Thus, there is no 
statistically significant difference in both ordinal and ratio relationships between different sets of numerical scales 
at 95% confidence level. We can draw a conclusion that the “UNIVARIATE” APPROACH with adequate 
MULTIPLE-OBSERVED DAT is RELIABLE in the use of regression, since both ordinal and ratio relationships 
remain CONSISTENT among different sets of numerical scales. 
     
Table IX2 indicates that the data characteristics in terms of the mean (μ) and “standard deviation (SD)” 
values only slightly change between different sets of numerical scales. For example, the expected risk effect values 
(mean values) for risk factor “Force Majeure (FM)” produced by Scale 1, Scale 2 and Scale 3 are 18.27, 18.19, and 
16.81 respectively, which change between ±0.00% and ±7.79% only from the values produced by Original scale. 
Moreover, a stricter statistics in “Two-Sample T-Test” (Appendix IXC) is applied to test the difference of mean 
values between two independent samples produced by different sets of numerical scales. Table IX2 indicates that 
there are no statistically significant differences in the expected risk effect values among four different sets of 
numerical scales at 95% confidence level. Especially, there are no statistically significant differences in the sample 
means between Scale 3 and others even if there is a radical change in numerical scales between Scale 3 and others. 
For example, the “Two-Sample T-Test” on “Scale 3 vs. Original scale” for risk factor “Force Majeure (FM)” is: 
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Two-sample T for Original vs Scale 3 
 
Ho: μ (Scale 3)- μ (Original) = 0 
Ha: μ (Scale 3)- μ (Original) ≠ 0 
 
           N   Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Original    37   18.23   5.04   0.83 
Scale 3     37   16.81   6.23   1.0 
 
Difference = mu (Original) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  1.42 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.21, 4.04) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.07  P-Value = 0.286  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 5.6678 
 
It indicates that a 95% confidence interval is (-1.21, 4.04), which includes zero. Thus, it suggests that 
there is no statistically significant difference in mean values between Scale 3 and Original scale. In addition, the 
hypothesis test statistic is 1.07 with p-value of 0.286. Since the p-value is greater than α-level (0.05), there is no 
evidence for a difference in the expected risk effect values between Scale 3 and Original scale.  
Table IX3 illustrates the expected risk effect values, ordinal relationship and ratio relationship among four 
different sets of numerical scales. It appears that there is no difference in ordinal relationship and a slight 
difference only in ratio relationship among different sets of numerical scales. However, the “Two-Sample T-Test” 
indicates there is no evidence for a difference in the expected risk effect values among different sets of numerical 
scales at α-level (0.05), i.e. μ(Scale 1) = μ(Scale 2) = μ(Scale 3) = μ(Original). Thus, there is no statistically 
significant difference in both ordinal and ratio relationships between different sets of numerical scales at 95% 
confidence level. We can draw a conclusion that the proposed “UNIVARIATE” approach with adequate 
“MULTIPLE-OBSERVED DATA (sample size /number of project experts = 37)” is RELIABLE in the use of 
regression since both ordinal and ratio relationships remain consistent among different sets of numerical scales. 
 
3. The statistical analysis for “multivariate (bivariate)” approach 
 
3.1 Single-observed data (sample size /number of project experts = 1) 
 
The different sets of numerical scales including “Scale 1 (linear scale)”, “Scale 2 (linear scale)”, “Scale 3 
(nonlinear scale)”, “Scale 4 (nonlinear scale)”, “Scale 5 (nonlinear and normalised scale)” and “Scale 6 (nonlinear 
and normalised scale)” are used as examples to test the reliability of “multivariate (bivariate)” approach. They are:  
 
Scale 1: (linear) 
Impact: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
Likelihood: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 
Scale 2: (linear) 
Impact: 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 
Likelihood: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 
Scale 3: (non-linear) 
Impact: 1, 5, 9, 15, 25 
Likelihood: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 
Scale 4: (non-linear) 
Impact: 1, 5, 9, 15, 25 
Likelihood: 0.01, 0.1, 0.4, 0.6, 1 
Scale 5: (non-linear and normalised) 
Impact: 5, 20, 100, 700, 1000 (normalised: 0.0027, 0.0109, 0.0547, 0.3835, 0.5479) 
Likelihood: 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 (normalised: 0.0416, 0.0833, 0.2083, 0.2916, 0.3750) 
Scale 6: (non-linear and normalised) 
Impact: 5, 20, 100, 300, 500 (normalised: 0.0054, 0.022, 0.1081, 0.3243, 0.5405) 
Likelihood: 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 (normalised: 0.0416, 0.0833, 0.2083, 0.2916, 0.3750) 
 
This test is based on “single-observed data (sample size / number of project experts = 1)”. Assume after 
an individual judgment, the impact and probability for Risk A and Risk B are given as: 
 
Risk A: Impact (I) = High (H) and Likelihood (L) = Low (L); 
Risk B: Impact (I) = Low (L) and Likelihood (L) = High (H) 
 
Then we can respectively calculate the expected risk effect values for Risk A and Risk B: 
 
Expected risk effect value = impact (I) × Likelihood (L) 
 
The data are illustrated in Appendix IXD. Table IX4 illustrates the ordinal and ratio relationships between 
Risk A and Risk B among different numerical scales. Obviously, it appears that the both ordinal relationship and 
ratio relationship between Risk A and Risk B change very much among different sets of numerical scales if the   394
“multivariate (bivariate)” approach is used. Since ordinal and ration relationships are very sensitive to the 
numerical scales, the “MULTIVARIATE (BIVARIATE)” approach is UNRELIABLE in the use of regression if 
the data are based on “SINGLE-OBSERVED DATA (sample size /number of project experts = 1)”. 
 
3.2 Multiple-observed data (sample size / number of project experts = 37) 
 
We use the same two-dimensional scales (Scale 1-6) as illustrated in Section 3.1/ Appendix IX to test the 
reliability of “multivariate (bivariate) approach” based on “multiple-observed data ” that the risk factors are 
measured by a group of experts (group judgment). Three risk factors including “Force Majeure (FM)”, “unforeseen 
site conditions (USC)” and “political interference (PI)” are randomly chosen to demonstrate the tests. Based on the 
originally collected data (sample size /number of project experts = 37) in this PhD thesis research, the two-
dimensional independent set of values for probability and impact set in the Scale 1-6 are used to calculate the 
expected risk effect value for each observed data (The data are illustrated in Appendix IXE): 
 
Expected risk effect value = impact (I) × Likelihood (L) 
 




Numerical scales  Expected risk effect values  Ordinal relationships  Ratio relationships
Risk A(I, L)= 4×0.3= 1.2 
Scale 1 
Impact: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
Likelihood: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9  Risk B(I, L)= 2×0.7= 1.4 
Risk A < Risk B  Risk A = 0.86 Risk B
Risk A(I, L)= 7×0.3= 2.1 
Scale 2 
Impact: 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 
Likelihood: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9  Risk B(I, L)= 3×0.7= 2.1 
Risk A = Risk B  Risk A = 1.0 Risk B
Risk A(I, L)= 15×0.3= 4.5 
Scale 3 
Impact: 1, 5, 9, 15, 25 
Likelihood: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9  Risk B(I, L)= 5×0.7= 3.5 
Risk A > Risk B  Risk A = 1.29 Risk B
Risk A(I, L)= 15×0.1= 1.5 
Scale 4 
Impact: 1, 5, 9, 15, 25 
Likelihood: 0.01, 0.1, 0.4, 0.6, 1  Risk B(I, L)= 5×0.6= 3.0 
Risk A < Risk B  Risk A = 0.50 Risk B
Risk A(I, L)= 0.38×0.08= 0.031
Scale 5 
Impact: 0.0027, 0.0109, 0.0547, 0.3835, 
0.5479 
Likelihood: 0.0416, 0.0833, 0.2083, 
0.2916, 0.3750 
Risk B(I, L)= 0.01×0.29= 0.003
Risk A > Risk B  Risk A = 10.0 Risk B
Risk A(I, L)= 0.33×0.08= 0.027
Scale 6 
Impact: 0.0054, 0.022, 0.1081, 0.3243, 
0.5405 
Likelihood: 0.0416, 0.0833, 0.2083, 
0.2916, 0.3750 
Risk B(I, L)= 0.02×0.3= 0.006 
Risk A > Risk B  Risk A = 4.5 Risk B
 
Table IX5 indicates that the expected risk effect values (mean values) largely change between different 
sets of numerical scales, which range between ±32% and ±296% from the values produced by Scale 1. Moreover, 
Table IX5 appears almost all of the “Two-Sample T-Tests” (Appendix IXF) have statistically significant 
differences in mean values among different sets of numerical scales at 95% confidence level. Especially, there are 
statistically significant differences in mean values between Scale 5 and Scale 6 even if these two numerical scales 
have been normalised to reduce data variation as a result of numerical scales. For example, the “Two-Sample T-
Test” for “Scale 5 vs. Scale 6” for risk factor “unforeseen site conditions (USC)” is: 
 
Two-sample T for Scale 5 vs Scale 6 
 
Ho: μ (Scale 5)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 
Ha: μ (Scale 5)- μ (Scale 6) ≠ 0 
           
        N    Mean    StDev    SE Mean 
Scale 5   37   0.00974  0.00977   0.0016 
Scale 6   37   0.0246   0.0350    0.0057 
 
Difference = mu (Scale 5) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.01491 
95% CI for difference:  (-0.02681, -0.00301) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.50  P-Value = 0.015  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 0.0257 
 
It indicates that a 95% confidence interval is (-0.02681, -0.00301), which excludes zero. Thus, it suggests 
that there is statistically significant difference in mean values. In addition, the hypothesis test statistic is -2.50 with   395
p-value of 0.015. Since the p-value is less than α-level (0.05), there is strong evidence for a difference in mean 
values between Scale 5 and Scale 6. 
   
Table IX5 Statistics of multivariate (bivariate) approach (multiple-observed data, sample size = 
37) 
Numerical Scales  Scale 1 Scale 2  Scale 3  Scale 4  Scale 5 Scale 6 Scale 1 Scale 2 Scale 3 Scale 4 Scale 5 Scale 6 Scale 1 Scale 2  Scale 3  Scale 4  Scale 5 Scale 6
Observation 
No(Sample Size = 
37) 
FM FM FM FM FM FM USC USC USC USC USC USC PI  PI  PI  PI  PI  PI 
Mean  2.20 3.86 8.71 7.81 0.07 0.07 1.51 2.00 3.54 2.51 0.01 0.03 1.56 2.64 5.86 4.54 0.04 0.04
SD  1.04 1.90 5.53 5.62 0.06 0.05 1.72 1.00 1.95 2.08 0.01 0.04 1.04 1.87 4.65 5.35 0.05 0.05
Change of Mean %  0%  75%  296%  255%  -97% -97% 0% 32% 134% 66% -99% -98% 0% 69% 276%  191% -97% -97%
Two-Sample T-
Test for Sample 
Means 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Scale 2) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Scale 3) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Scale 4) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Scale 5) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 2)- μ (Scale 3) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 2)- μ (Scale 4) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 2)- μ (Scale 5) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 2)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 3)- μ (Scale 4) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 3)- μ (Scale 5) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 3)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 4)- μ (Scale 5) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 4)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 5)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Scale 2) = 0 (don’t reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Scale 3) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Scale 4) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Scale 5) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 2)- μ (Scale 3) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 2)- μ (Scale 4) = 0 (don’t reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 2)- μ (Scale 5) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 2)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 3)- μ (Scale 4) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 3)- μ (Scale 5) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 3)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 4)- μ (Scale 5) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 4)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 5)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Scale 2) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Scale 3) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Scale 4) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Scale 5) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 1)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 2)- μ (Scale 3) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 2)- μ (Scale 4) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 2)- μ (Scale 5) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 2)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 3)- μ (Scale 4) = 0 (don't reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 3)- μ (Scale 5) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 3)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 4)- μ (Scale 5) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 4)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 (reject) 
Ho: μ (Scale 5)- μ (Scale 6) = 0 (don't reject) 
 
Table IX6 illustrates the expected risk effect value (mean), ordinal relationship and ratio relationship 
among six different sets of numerical scales. Since there is strong evidence for a difference in the expected risk 
effect values among different sets of numerical scales at α-level (0.05) and hence the ordinal and ratio relationships 
among different sets of numerical scales are very inconsistent. We further use “Two-Sample T-Test” to test if the 
expected risk effect values are the same between different factors within the same scales. We find out that the 
expected risk effect values are not significantly different between risk factors “unforeseen site conditions (USC)” 
and “political interference (PI)” at α-level (0.05) as Scale 1, Scale 2 and Scale 6 are applied, but they are 
significantly different as the rest of scales are used (Table IX6). These tests further confirm that the expected risk 
effect values, ordinal and ratio relationships among different sets of numerical scales are very inconsistent at α-
level (0.05) as the “multivariate (bivariate)” approach with “multiple-observed data” are applied to measure risk. 
Since ordinal and ration relationships are sensitive to the numerical scales, the “MULTIVARIATE 
(BIVARIATE)” approach is UNRELIABLE in the use of regression if the data are based on “MULTIPLE-
OBSERVED DATA (sample size /number of project experts = 37)”. 
 
4. Interpretation of results 
 
We summarise the results of statistical analysis for “univariate vs. multivariate(bivariate)” approaches in 
Table IX7. When data are based on “single-observed data (sample size = 1)”, the statistical analysis appears that 
the expected risk effect values, ordinal and ratio relationships are very sensitive to the numerical scales regardless 
of which approaches are used to measure risks. That is because the individual outcomes are easily subject to the 
numerical scales. Using different sets of numerical scales will change both ordinal and ratio relationships of risk 
factors. From the perspective of “single-observed data (sample size/number of project experts = 1)”, both 
“univariate” and “multivariate (bivariate)” approaches are inappropriate in the use of regression. 
 
When data are based on “multiple-observed data (sample size/number of project experts = 37)”, the 
statistical analysis appears the data characteristics in terms of expected risk effect values (mean values), ordinal 
and ratio relationships among different sets of numerical scales remain consistent at α=0.05 significance (95% 
confidence level) if the “univariate” approach is used. On the other hand, when data (sample size /number of 
project experts = 37)”, the statistical analysis appears the data characteristics in terms of expected risk effect values 
(mean values), ordinal and ratio relationships among different sets of numerical scales are inconsistent at α=0.05 
significance (95% confidence level) if “multivariate (bivariate)” approach is used. Therefore, the “univariate” 
approach based on “multiple-observed data (sample size /number of project experts = 37)” is reliable and 
appropriate in the use of regression. On the contrast, “multivariate (bivariate)” approach based on “multiple-
observed data” is unreliable in the use of regression.  
Why can “univariate” approach with “multiple-observed data (sample size /number of project experts = 
37)” remain consistency of risk relationships among different sets of numerical scales, but “multivariate   396
(bivariate)” approach can not? There are two contributors to reduce the sensitivity of risk relationships to the 
numerical scale values: 
 
Table IX6 Reliability of multivariate (bivariate) approach (multiple-observed data, sample size = 
37) 
Testing scales  Numerical scales  Expected risk effect values  Ordinal relationships  Ratio relationships 
μ(FM) = 2.20  μ(FM) = 1.46 μ(USC)
μ(USC) = 1.51  μ(USC) = 0.96 μ(PI) Scale 1 
Impact: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
Likelihood: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 
0.7, 0.9 
μ(PI) = 1.56 
μ(FM) > μ(USC) = μ(PI) 
Ho: μ (USC)- μ (PI) = 0 (don't reject) 
μ(PI) = 0.71 μ(FM) 
μ(FM) = 3.86  μ(FM) = 1.93 μ(USC)
μ(USC) = 2.00  μ(USC) = 0.76 μ(PI) Scale 2 
Impact: 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 
Likelihood: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 
0.7, 0.9 
μ(PI) = 2.64 
μ(FM) > μ(USC) = μ(PI) 
Ho: μ (USC)- μ (PI) = 0 (don't reject) 
μ(PI) = 0.68 μ(FM) 
μ(FM) = 8.71  μ(FM) = 2.46 μ(USC)
μ(USC) = 3.54  μ(USC) = 0.60 μ(PI) Scale 3 
Impact: 1, 5, 9, 15, 25 
Likelihood: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 
0.7, 0.9 
μ(PI) = 5.86 
μ(FM) > μ(PI) > μ(USC) 
μ(PI) = 0.67 μ(FM) 
μ(FM) = 7.81  μ(FM) = 3.11 μ(USC)
μ(USC) = 2.51  μ(USC) = 0.55 μ(PI) Scale 4 
Impact: 1, 5, 9, 15, 25 
Likelihood: 0.01, 0.1, 0.4, 
0.6, 1 
μ(PI) = 4.54 
μ(FM) > μ(PI) > μ(USC) 
μ(PI) = 0.58 μ(FM) 
μ(FM) = 0.07  μ(FM) = 7.40 μ(USC)
μ(USC) = 0.01  μ(USC) = 0.25 μ(PI) Scale 5 
Impact: 0.0027, 0.0109, 
0.0547, 0.3835, 0.5479 
Likelihood: 0.0416, 
0.0833, 0.2083, 0.2916, 
0.3750 
μ(PI) = 0.04 
μ(FM) > μ(PI) > μ(USC) 
μ(PI) = 0.55 μ(FM) 
μ(FM) = 0.07  μ(FM) = 2.87 μ(USC)
μ(USC) = 0.03  μ(USC) = 0.75 μ(PI) Scale 6 
Impact: 0.0027, 0.0109, 
0.0547, 0.3835, 0.5479 
Likelihood: 0.0054, 
0.0216, 0.1081, 0.3243, 
0.5405 
μ(PI) = 0.04 
μ(FM) > μ(USC) = μ(PI) 
Ho: μ (USC)- μ (PI) = 0 (don't reject) 
μ(PI) = 0.57 μ(FM) 
Reliability 
There is almost statistically significant difference in the expected risk effect values (mean values), ordinal 
and ratio relationships between different sets of numerical scales at 95% confidence level. We can draw a 
conclusion that the “MULTIVARIATE” APPROACH with adequate MULTIPLE-OBSERVED DAT is 
UNRELIABLE in the use of regression, since both ordinal and ratio relationships remain 
INCONSISTENT among different sets of numerical scales. 
 






Sample size, N  N=1  N=37  N=1  N=37 
Are the ordinal and ratio relationships of risk factors 
consistent among different sets of numerical scales? 
No Yes  No  No 
Is it reliable and appropriate in the use of regression?  No  Yes  No  No 
   
First, the “multiple-observed data (sample size /number of project experts = 37)” will greatly contribute to 
reduction of the sensitivity of risk ordinal and ratio relationships to the numerical scales. A whole of “multiple-
observed data” may consist of individual outcomes that can take on a wide range of values from extremely small 
(the minimum is 1 in 1-25 point scale values) to extremely large (the maximum is 25 in 1-25 point scale values) 
which will have an effect on the mean value (expected risk effect value). However, this effect is reduced because 
the value is averaged with other values in the “multiple-observed data.” The standard error of the mean σm is equal 
to the standard deviation in the population σ divided by the square root of the sample size n (σm = σ/n
1/2). As the 
sample size increases, the standard error of the mean decreases. Therefore, the mean values in the “multiple-
observed data” are less variable than the individual values in the “single-observed data.” The greater sample size 
(number of project experts) for “multiple-observed data” is used to measure risk effect, the less standard error of 
mean (the expected risk effect value) is produced to provide more possibility of remaining ordinal and ratio   397
relationships of risk factors unchanged among different sets of numerical scales. The sample size used to measure 
risk effect in this PhD thesis research is 37. Apparently it is adequate to the use of regression in risk relationship 
modelling, because this statistical analysis illustrates that it helps to reduce sensitivity of risk relationships to the 
numerical scales when using whatever the “univariate” or “multivariate (bivariate)” approach. 
Second, “single and normalised numerical scale values” will greatly contribute to reduction of the 
sensitivity of risk ordinal and ratio relationships to numerical scales. That is because “single and normalised 
numerical scale values” will produce less data variation arisen from numerical scale values. This implies that there 
is less amount of dispersion of risk effect rating values away from a central point in a data set and hence mean 
values (expected risk effect values) are less variable to reduce sensitivity of risk relationships to the numerical 
scales. The “univariate” approach proposed in this PhD thesis employs a risk matrix for the conversion of two 
scale values (impact and likelihood values) into “single and normalised numerical scale values.” They are 
standardised to 1-25 point scale values which continuously and symmetrically spread from the minimum extreme 
category (VL, VL; level 1) through the middle category (M, M; level 13) to the maximum extreme category (VH, 
VH; level 25) (p. 222 in the submitted thesis). This format of numerical scale makes consistency of the expected 
risk effect values among different sets of numerical scales by reducing amount of dispersion of risk effect rating 
values away from mean values. It ensures there is less data variation to make risk relationships insensitive to the 
measurement scales. Thus, this statistical analysis has illustrated that the data based on “single and normalised 
numerical scale values” is reliable in the use of regression. On the other hand, this statistical analysis has 
illustrated that the mean values in the data sets based on “a two-dimensional independent set of values for 
probability and impact” are more variable than “single and normalised numerical scale values.”  That is the result 
of compounding data variation respectively arisen from each of the two dimensional scales (“Impact” and 
“Likelihood” scale values) to become a greater amount of dispersion of risk effect values away from mean in a 
data set. The more dimensional scales are used to represent risk effect, the more data variations will cause more 
variable in the expected risk effect values. This explain why both ordinal and ratio relationships among different 
sets of numerical scales are still inconsistent in “multivariate (bivariate) approach” even if the numerical scales 
(Scale 5 and Scale 6) have been normalised to reduce data variation. Thus, the data based on “a two-dimensional 
independent set of values for probability and impact” is not reliable in the use of regression. 
The “multiple-observed data” collected by the proposed “univariate” approach has proved to be valid in 
the use of regression in this PhD research. A set of residual plots including a histogram of residuals, a normality 
plot of residuals, residuals versus fits, and residuals versus order were conducted to test whether the data can meet 
the assumptions of regression procedure. All of these plots showed that the data well meet the assumptions on 
residuals are normally distributed, residuals have constant variance, and residuals are independent. Moreover, the 
analysis of variance indicates the p-value for regression was close to 0. It appeared that both coefficients and 
regression relationship between predictors and response are statistically significant at α = 0.05. That is the model 
can fit the data extremely well. The small p-value ensures that there is a strong evidence to support using 
“univariate” approach with “multiple-observation data in the use of regression. This has been addressed in Section 
8.4 and Appendix IXG. 
In addition to regression modelling, the proposed “univariat”e approach based on “multiple-observation 
data” has also proved to be valid in System Dynamics modelling in this PhD research. Eight variant validation 
tests with 23 measures of performance from variant views were implemented to examine the SD model in Chapter 
8. These tests include boundary adequacy tests, structure assessment tests, dimensional consistency tests, 
parameter assessment tests, extreme condition analysis, integration error tests, behaviour reproduction tests, and 
sensitivity analysis. All of the test results indicated that the developed SD model using “univariate” approach 
based on “multiple-observed data (sample size /number of project experts = 37)” is capable of reproducing real-




From the results of this statistical analysis, we can draw the following conclusions:  
1.  Both the “univariate” and “multivariate (bivariate)” approaches are inappropriate in the use of regression in 
the circumstance of “single-observed data (sample size/number of project experts = 1)”. That is because the 
individual outcomes are easily subject to the numerical scales. Using different sets of numerical scales will 
change both ordinal and ratio relationships of risk factors. 
2.  The “univariate” approach is not supported by any extensive literature and has potential technical 
limitations on converting two conceptually distinct dimensions (Impact and Probability) into one single 
measure, but the results of this statistical analysis support the data are reliable in the use of regression in 
some circumstances. First, the data from conversion and expert judgment are arbitrary and arguable, but 
they have face validity. Second, using ordinal data in parametric statistical procedures has drawn much 
debate in the literature. However, this has received wide range of acceptance. It is used not only in 
psychology and marketing researches but also in other areas. Many researches have noted that the ordinal 
data can be treated as interval data in parametric statistical procedures under certain conditions. The 
“univariate” approach can generally meet these conditions for the use of regression (Appendix IXG). Third, 
the rankings of the ordinal values in the risk matrix are sensitive to the numerical scales, but the results of 
this statistical analysis appear that this effect will be reduced as sample size (number of project expects) 
increases. As the sample size increases, the standard error of the mean decreases and hence the data 
characteristics in terms of expected risk effect values (mean values), ordinal and ratio relationships among 
different sets of numerical scales remain consistent. Therefore, the “univariate” approach is reliable in the   398
use of regression in the circumstance of “multiple-observed data (sample size / number of project expert = 
37 in this PhD thesis research)”. 
3.  The results of this statistical analysis have shown that the data characteristics in terms of expected risk effect 
values (mean values), ordinal and ratio relationships among different sets of numerical scales don’t come up 
with consistent results at α=0.05 significance (95% confidence level) in the circumstance of “multiple-
observed data (sample size / number of project expert = 37).”  Because of the technical problem that impact 
and probability are not commensurate dimensions, the compounding data variation respectively arisen from 
each of the “Impact” and “Likelihood” scale values will become a greater data variation which have a great 
effect on mean values. As the sample size (number of project experts) increases, this doesn’t greatly 
contribute to reduction of the sensitivity of risk ordinal and ratio relationships to numerical scales. In 
addition, most of the literature simply used the two-dimensional scales (impact and probability) for 
prioritising or categorising the importance of risk factors, rather than for the use of regression. Therefore, 
the “multivariate (bivariate)” approach is not reliable and not recommended in the use of regression. 
4.  Due to some potential technical limitations in the proposed “univariate” approach, the System Dynamics 
(SD) model itself may well be based on some slightly suspect data, and so the conclusions this thesis 
research has drawn may not be 100% reliable. Since the SD model testing results (Chapter 8) are generally 
acceptable, the problems of the proposed “univariate” approach do not detract from the basic structural 
validity of the SD model or affect the fundaments of the methodology that are proposing in the rest of the 
thesis. This thesis research suggests that future researchers look into the numerical-scale problems 
concerning risk measurement and may attempt to solve problems for the legitimate use of ordinal data in 
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Appendix IXA Outcomes of “univariate” approach with “single-observed data (sample 
size = 1)” 
 
Original scale: (Originally proposed in this PhD thesis, p.230) 
Numerical scales  Impact  ranking 
1000  VH  17 19 22 24 25 
700  H  15  18 20 21 23 
100  M  9  12 13 14 16 
20  L  3 6 9  10 11 
5  VL  1 2 4 5 7 
 
VL L  M H VH  Likelihood 
 
1 2 5 7 9  Numerical  scales 
 
Scale 1: (Adopting a simple linear scale for likelihood) 
Numerical scales  Impact  ranking 
1000  VH  17 19 22 24 25 
700  H  16  18 20 21 23 
100  M  11 12 13 14 15 
20  L  5 7 8 9 11 
5  VL  1 2 3 5 6 
 
VL L  M H VH  Likelihood 
 
1 2 3 4 5  Numerical  scales 
 
Scale 2: (Retaining the likelihood scale but adopting a different scale for impact) 
Numerical scales  Impact  ranking 
500  VH  14 19 22 24 25 
300  H  13  16 20 21 23 
100  M  8  12 15 17 18 
20  L  3 6 9  10 11 
5  VL  1 2 4 5 7 
 
VL L  M H VH  Likelihood 
 
1 2 5 7 9  Numerical  scales 
 
Scale 3: (Exchanging the impact and likelihood numerical scales) 
Numerical scales  Impact  ranking 
9  VH  7  11 18 23 25 
7  H  5  10 17 21 24 
5  M  4 9  15  20  22 
2  L  2 6  12  16 19 
1  VL  1 3 8  13  14 
 
VL L  M H VH  Likelihood 
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Appendix IXB Outcomes of “univariate” approach with “multiple-observed data 
(sample size = 37)” 
 
Numerical Scales Original Scale 1 Scale 2 Scale 3 Original Scale 1 Scale 2 Scale 3 Original  Scale 1  Scale 2 Scale 3
Observation No   






























1  21  21 21 21  6  7  6  6  5  5  5  13 
2  14  14 17 20  12  12  12  9  20  20  20  17 
3  19  19 19 11  7  6  7  14  12  12  12  9 
4  20 20  20  17  14 14 17 20  17  15  18  22 
5  21  21 21 21  12  12  12  9  21  21  21  21 
6  22 22  22  18  13 13 15 15  15  16  13  5 
7  19 19  19  11  18 18 16 10  22  22  22  18 
8  22 22  22  18  11 11 11 19  19  19  19  11 
9  24  24 24 23  12  12  12  9  13  13  15  15 
10  17 15  18  22  17 15 18 22  16  17  14  7 
11  18 18  16  10  14 14 17 20  8  8  9  12 
12  21 21  21  21  14 14 17 20  11  11  11  19 
13  17 15  18  22  14 14 17 20  18  18  16  10 
14  19  19 19 11  12  12  12  9  22  22  22  18 
15  23 23  23  24  11 11 11 19  23  23  23  24 
16  16 17  14 7  15 16 13  5  20  20  20  17 
17  24 24  24  23  13 13 15 15  10  9  10  16 
18  16 17  14 7  13 13 15 15  10  9  10  16 
19  23  23 23 24  8  8  9  12  18  18  16  10 
20  11  11 11 19  15  16  13  5  20  20  20  17 
21  13  13 15 15  16  17  14  7  6  7  6  6 
22  20  20 20 20  15  16  13  5  9  11  8  4 
23  25 25  25  25  11 11 11 19  8  8  9  12 
24  20 20  20  17  19 19 19 11  19  19  19  11 
25  23  23 23 24  12  12  12  9  15  16  13  5 
26  13  13 15 15  4  3  4  8  14  14  17  20 
27  20 20  20  17  13 13 15 15  17  15  18  22 
28  16 15  13 7  11 11 11 19  14  14  17  20 
29  14  14 17 20  10  9  10  16  2  2  2  3 
30  22  22 22 18  8  8  9  12  12  12  12  9 
31  11 11 8 19  10  9  10 16  23  23  23  24 
32  24  24 24 23  10  9  10  16  13  13  15  15 
33  3  5 3 2  9  11 8  4  11 11 11 19 
34  18  18 16 10  10  9  10  16  25  25  25  25 
35  24  24 24 23  9  11  8  4  15  16  13  5 
36  15 16  13 5  13 13 15 15  16  17  14  7 
37  8  8 9  12  9 11 8  4  17 15 18 22 
Mean 18.23  18.27  18.19 16.81 11.97 11.97 12.22 12.68 15.09 15.03 15.03 14.22
SD 5.04  4.83  5.07 6.23 3.13 3.35 3.58 5.56 5.57 5.47 5.50 6.43 
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Appendix IXC “Two-Sample T-Test” for “univariate” approach with “multiple-observed 
data (sample size = 37)” 
 
“Two-Sample T-Test” for risk factor “Force Majeure (FM)” between Original, Scale 1, Scale 2 and Scale 3 
Two-sample T for Original vs Scale 1 
         N  Mean   StDev    SE Mean 
Original  37  18.23   5.04     0.83 
Scale 1   37  18.27   4.83     0.79 
Difference = mu (Original) - mu (Scale 1) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.04 
95% CI for difference:  (-2.33, 2.25) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.04   
P-Value = 0.970  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 4.9393 
Two-sample T for Original vs Scale 2 
         N  Mean   StDev    SE Mean 
Original  37  18.23   5.04     0.83 
Scale 2   37  18.27   4.83     0.79 
Difference = mu (Original) - mu (Scale 2) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.04 
95% CI for difference:  (-2.33, 2.25) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.04   
P-Value = 0.970  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 4.9393 
Two-sample T for Original vs Scale 3 
         N  Mean   StDev    SE Mean 
Original  37  18.23   5.04     0.83 
Scale 3   37  16.81   6.23      1.0 
Difference = mu (Original) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  1.42 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.21, 4.04) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.07   
P-Value = 0.286  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 5.6678 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 2 
        N   Mean  StDev    SE Mean 
Scale 1  37  18.27   4.83     0.79 
Scale 2  37  18.27   4.83     0.79 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 2) 
Estimate for difference:  0.00 
95% CI for difference:  (-2.24, 2.24) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.00   
P-Value = 1.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 4.8342 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 3 
        N   Mean  StDev    SE Mean 
Scale 1  37  18.27   4.83     0.79 
Scale 3  37  16.81   6.23      1.0 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  1.46 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.13, 4.04) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.13   
P-Value = 0.264  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 5.5765 
Two-sample T for Scale 2 vs Scale 3 
        N   Mean  StDev    SE Mean 
Scale 2  37  18.27   4.83     0.79 
Scale 3  37  16.81   6.23      1.0 
Difference = mu (Scale 2) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  1.46 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.13, 4.04) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.13   
P-Value = 0.264  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 5.5765 
   
“Two-Sample T-Test” for risk factor “unforeseen site conditions (USC)” between Original, Scale 1, Scale 2 and Scale 3 
Two-sample T for Original vs Scale 1 
         N   Mean  StDev    SE Mean 
Original  37  11.97   3.13     0.51 
Scale 1   37  11.97   3.35     0.55 
Difference = mu (Original) - mu (Scale 1) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.002 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.506, 1.502) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.00   
P-Value = 0.998  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.2444 
Two-sample T for Original vs Scale 2 
         N   Mean  StDev    SE Mean 
Original  37  11.97   3.13     0.51 
Scale 2   37  12.22   3.58     0.59 
Difference = mu (Original) - mu (Scale 2) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.245 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.805, 1.314) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.31   
P-Value = 0.755  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.3648 
Two-sample T for Original vs Scale 3 
         N   Mean  StDev    SE Mean 
Original  37  11.97   3.13     0.51 
Scale 3   37  12.68   5.56     0.91 
Difference = mu (Original) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.70 
95% CI for difference:  (-2.80, 1.39) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.67   
P-Value = 0.504  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 4.5139 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 2 
        N   Mean  StDev    SE Mean 
Scale 1  37  11.97   3.35     0.55 
Scale 2  37  12.22   3.58     0.59 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 2) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.243 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.852, 1.365) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.30   
P-Value = 0.764  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.4706 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 3 
        N   Mean  StDev    SE Mean 
Scale 1  37  11.97   3.35     0.55 
Scale 3  37  12.68   5.56     0.91 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.70 
95% CI for difference:  (-2.83, 1.43) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.66   
P-Value = 0.513  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 4.5933 
Two-sample T for Scale 2 vs Scale 3 
        N   Mean  StDev    SE Mean 
Scale 2  37  12.22   3.58     0.59 
Scale 3  37  12.68   5.56     0.91 
Difference = mu (Scale 2) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.46 
95% CI for difference:  (-2.63, 1.71) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.42   
P-Value = 0.674  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 4.6791 
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“Two-Sample T-Test” for risk factor “political interference (PI)” between Original, Scale 1, Scale 2 and Scale 3 
Two-sample T for Original vs Scale 1 
         N   Mean  StDev    SE Mean 
Original  37  15.09   5.57     0.91 
Scale 1   37  15.03   5.47     0.90 
Difference = mu (Original) - mu (Scale 1) 
Estimate for difference:  0.06 
95% CI for difference:  (-2.50, 2.62) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.05   
P-Value = 0.963  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 5.5177 
Two-sample T for Original vs Scale 2 
         N   Mean  StDev    SE Mean 
Original  37  15.09   5.57     0.91 
Scale 2   37  15.03   5.50     0.91 
Difference = mu (Original) - mu (Scale 2) 
Estimate for difference:  0.06 
95% CI for difference:  (-2.51, 2.63) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.05   
P-Value = 0.963  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 5.5353 
Two-sample T for Original vs Scale 3 
         N   Mean  StDev    SE Mean 
Original  37  15.09   5.57     0.91 
Scale 3   37  14.22   6.43      1.1 
Difference = mu (Original) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  0.87 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.92, 3.66) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.62   
P-Value = 0.535  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 6.0108 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 2 
        N   Mean  StDev    SE Mean 
Scale 1  37  15.03   5.47     0.90 
Scale 2  37  15.03   5.50     0.91 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 2) 
Estimate for difference:  0.00 
95% CI for difference:  (-2.54, 2.54) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.00   
P-Value = 1.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 5.4873 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 3 
         N   Mean  StDev   SE Mean 
Scale 1  37  15.03   5.47     0.90 
Scale 3  37  14.22   6.43      1.1 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  0.81 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.95, 3.58) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.58   
P-Value = 0.561  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 5.9666 
Two-sample T for Scale 2 vs Scale 3 
         N   Mean  StDev   SE Mean 
Scale 2  37  15.03   5.50     0.91 
Scale 3  37  14.22   6.43      1.1 
Difference = mu (Scale 2) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  0.81 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.96, 3.58) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.58   
P-Value = 0.562  DF = 72 
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Appendix IXD Outcomes of “multivariate (bivariate)” approach with “multiple-observed 
data (sample size = 37)” 
 
Scale 1: (linear) 
Numerical scales  Impact  ranking 
5  VH  0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 
4  H  0.4  1.2 2 2.8  3.6 
3  M  0.3 0.9 1.5 2.1 2.7 
2  L  0.2 0.6  1  1.4 1.8 
1  VL  0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
 
VL L  M H VH  Likelihood 
 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5  Numerical  scales 
 
Scale 2: (linear) 
Numerical scales  Impact  ranking 
9  VH  0.9 2.7 4.5 6.3 8.1 
7  H  0.7  2.1 3.5 4.9 6.3 
5  M  0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 
3  L  0.3 0.9 1.5 2.1 2.7 
1  VL  0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
 
VL L  M H VH  Likelihood 
 
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9  Numerical  scales 
 
Scale 3: (non-linear) 
Numerical scales  Impact  ranking 
25  VH  2.5 7.5  12.5  17.5  22.5 
15  H  1.5  4.5 7.5  10.5  13.5 
9  M  0.9 2.7 4.5 6.3 8.1 
5  L  0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 
1  VL  0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
 
VL L  M H VH  Likelihood 
 
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9  Numerical  scales 
 
Scale 4: (non-linear) 
Numerical scales  Impact  ranking 
25  VH  0.25 2.5  10  15  25 
15  H  0.15  1.5 6  9 15 
9  M  0.09 0.9  3.6  5.4  9 
5  L  0.05 0.5  2  3 5 
1  VL  0.01 0.1  0.4  0.6  1 
 
VL L  M H VH  Likelihood 
 
0.01 0.1  0.4  0.6  1  Numerical  scales 
 
Scale 5: (non-linear & normalised) 
Normalised scales  Numerical scales  Impact  ranking 
0.547945 1000  VH  0.022831 0.045662 0.114155 0.159817 0.205479 
0.383562 700  H  0.015982  0.031963 0.079909 0.111872 0.143836 
0.054795 100  M  0.002283 0.004566 0.011416 0.015982 0.020548 
0.010959 20  L  0.000457 0.000913 0.002283 0.003196 0.00411 
0.00274 5  VL  0.000114 0.000228 0.000571 0.000799 0.001027 
 
VL L  M H VH  Likelihood 
1 2 5 7 9  Numerical  scales  
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Scale 6: (non-linear & normalised) 
Normalised scales  Numerical scales  Impact  ranking 
0.540541 500  VH  0.022523 0.045045 0.112613 0.157658 0.202703 
0.324324 300  H  0.013514  0.027027 0.067568 0.094595 0.121622 
0.108108 100  M  0.004505 0.009009 0.022523 0.031532 0.040541 
0.021622 20  L  0.000901 0.001802 0.004505 0.006306 0.008108 
0.005405 5  VL  0.000225 0.00045 0.001126  0.001577  0.002027 
 
VL L  M H VH  Likelihood 
1 2 5 7 9  Numerical  scales  
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Appendix IXE Outcomes of “multivariate” approach with “multiple-observed data 
(sample size = 37)” 
 
Numerical Scales  Scale 1  Scale 2  Scale 3  Scale 4  Scale 5  Scale 6 
Observation No 
(Sample Size = 37) 
Force Majeure  Force Majeure  Force Majeure  Force Majeure  Force Majeure  Force Majeure 
1  2.80  4.90 10.50 9.00 0.112  0.095 
2  2.10 3.50 6.30 5.40  0.016  0.032 
3  1.50 2.70 7.50 2.50  0.046  0.045 
4  2.00 3.50 7.50 6.00  0.080  0.095 
5  2.80  4.90 10.50 9.00 0.112  0.095 
6  2.50  4.50  12.50 10.00 0.114 0.113 
7  1.50 2.70 7.50 2.50  0.046  0.045 
8  2.50  4.50  12.50 10.00 0.114 0.113 
9  3.50  6.30  17.50 15.00 0.160 0.158 
10  2.70 4.50 8.10 9.00  0.021  0.041 
11  1.20 2.10 4.50 1.50  0.032  0.027 
12  2.50  4.50  10.50 10.00 0.112 0.095 
13  2.70 4.50 8.10 9.00  0.021  0.041 
14  1.50 2.70 7.50 2.50  0.046  0.045 
15  3.60  6.30  13.50 15.00 0.144 0.122 
16  0.50 0.90 2.50 9.00  0.023  0.023 
17  3.50  6.30  17.50 15.00 0.160 0.158 
18  2.70 4.50 2.50 9.00  0.023  0.023 
19  3.60  6.30  13.50 15.00 0.144 0.122 
20  1.80 2.70 4.50 5.00  0.004  0.008 
21  1.50 2.50 4.50 3.60  0.011  0.023 
22  2.00 3.50 7.50 6.00  0.080  0.068 
23  4.50  8.10  22.50 25.00 0.205 0.203 
24  2.00 3.50 7.50 6.00  0.080  0.068 
25  3.60  6.30  13.50 15.00 0.144 0.122 
26  1.50 2.50 4.50 3.60  0.011  0.023 
27  2.00 4.90 7.50 6.00  0.080  0.068 
28  0.50 0.70 2.50 0.25  0.023  0.023 
29  2.10 3.50 6.30 5.40  0.016  0.032 
30  2.50  4.50  12.50 10.00 0.114 0.113 
31  1.80 2.70 4.50 5.00  0.004  0.008 
32  3.50  6.30  17.50 15.00 0.160 0.158 
33  0.20 0.30 0.50 0.05  0.000  0.009 
34  1.20 2.10 4.50 1.50  0.032  0.027 
35  3.50  6.30  17.50 15.00 0.160 0.158 
36  0.40 0.70 1.50 0.15  0.016  0.014 
37  1.00 1.50 2.50 2.00  0.002  0.005 
Mean  2.20 3.86 8.71 7.81  0.072  0.071 
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Numerical Scales  Scale 1  Scale 2  Scale 3  Scale 4  Scale 5  Scale 6 
Observation No 













1  0.6 0.9 1.5 0.5  0.001  0.002 
2  0.9 1.5 2.7 0.9  0.005  0.009 
3  0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0  0.001  0.002 
4  2.1 3.5 6.3 5.4  0.016  0.032 
5  0.9 1.5 2.7 0.9  0.005  0.009 
6  1.5 2.5 4.5 3.6  0.011  0.023 
7  1.2 2.1 4.5 1.5  0.032  0.027 
8  1.8 2.7 4.5 5.0  0.004  0.008 
9  0.9 1.5 2.7 0.9  0.005  0.009 
10  2.7 4.5 8.1 9.0  0.021  0.041 
11  2.1 3.5 6.3 5.4  0.016  0.032 
12  2.1 3.5 6.3 5.4  0.016  0.032 
13  2.1 3.5 6.3 5.4  0.016  0.032 
14  0.9 1.5 2.7 0.9  0.005  0.009 
15  1.8 2.7 4.5 0.9  0.005  0.008 
16  0.4 0.7 1.5 0.1  0.021  0.134 
17  1.5 2.5 4.5 3.6  0.011  0.023 
18  1.5 2.5 4.5 3.6  0.011  0.023 
19  1.0 1.5 2.5 2.0  0.002  0.005 
20  0.4 0.7 1.5 0.1  0.016  0.134 
21  0.5 0.9 2.5 0.3  0.023  0.023 
22  0.4 0.7 1.5 0.1  0.016  0.134 
23  11.0  2.7 4.5 5.0  0.004  0.008 
24  1.5 2.7 7.5 2.5  0.046  0.045 
25  0.9 1.5 2.7 0.9  0.005  0.009 
26  0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6  0.001  0.001 
27  1.5 2.5 4.5 3.6  0.011  0.023 
28  1.8 2.7 4.5 3.0  0.004  0.008 
29  1.4 2.1 3.5 3.0  0.003  0.006 
30  1.0 1.5 2.5 2.0  0.002  0.005 
31  1.4 2.1 3.5 3.0  0.003  0.006 
32  1.4 2.1 3.5 3.0  0.003  0.006 
33  1.4 2.1 0.9 3.0  0.002  0.005 
34  1.4 2.1 3.5 3.0  0.003  0.006 
35  0.3 0.5 0.9 0.1  0.002  0.005 
36  1.5 2.5 4.5 3.6  0.011  0.023 
37  0.3 0.5 0.9 0.1  0.002  0.005 
Mean  1.51 2.00 3.54 2.51  0.010  0.025 
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Numerical Scales  Scale 1  Scale 2  Scale 3  Scale 4  Scale 5  Scale 6 
Observation No 













1  0.70 0.70 0.70 0.60  0.001  0.002 
2  2.00 3.50 7.50 6.00  0.080  0.068 
3  0.90 1.50 2.70 0.90  0.004  0.009 
4  1.20 2.10 8.10 1.50  0.020  0.041 
5  2.80  4.90 10.50 9.00 0.111  0.095 
6  0.40 0.70 1.50 0.15  0.016  0.014 
7  2.50  4.50  12.50 10.00 0.114 0.113 
8  1.50 2.70 7.50 2.50  0.050  0.045 
9  1.50 2.50 4.50 3.60  0.011  0.023 
10  0.50 0.90 2.50 0.25  0.022  0.023 
11  1.00 1.50 2.50 2.00  0.002  0.005 
12  1.80 2.70 4.50 5.00  0.004  0.008 
13  1.20 2.10 4.50 1.50  0.032  0.027 
14  2.50  4.50  12.50 10.00 0.114 0.113 
15  3.60  6.30  13.50 15.00 0.144 0.122 
16  2.00 3.50 7.50 6.00  0.080  0.068 
17  1.40 2.10 3.50 3.00  0.003  0.006 
18  1.40 2.10 3.50 3.00  0.003  0.006 
19  1.20 2.10 4.50 1.50  0.040  0.027 
20  2.00 3.50 7.50 6.00  0.080  0.068 
21  0.60 0.90 1.50 0.50  0.001  0.002 
22  0.30 0.50 0.90 0.09  0.002  0.005 
23  1.00 1.50 2.50 2.00  0.002  0.005 
24  1.50 2.70 7.50 2.50  0.046  0.045 
25  0.40 0.70 1.50 0.15  0.016  0.014 
26  2.10 3.50 6.30 5.40  0.016  0.032 
27  2.70 4.50 8.10 9.00  0.021  0.041 
28  0.30 0.30 6.30 0.10  0.016  0.032 
29  0.30 0.30 0.30 0.10  0.000  0.000 
30  0.90 1.50 2.70 0.90  0.005  0.009 
31  3.60  6.30  13.50 15.00 0.144 0.122 
32  2.10 3.50 4.50 5.40  0.011  0.023 
33  1.80 2.70 4.50 5.00  0.004  0.008 
34  4.50  8.10  22.50 25.00 0.205 0.203 
35  0.40 0.70 1.50 0.15  0.016  0.014 
36  0.50 0.90 2.50 0.25  0.023  0.023 
37  2.70 4.50 8.10 9.00  0.021  0.041 
Mean  1.56 2.64 5.86 4.54  0.040  0.041 
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Appendix IXF “Two-Sample T-Test” for “multivariate” approach with “multiple-
observed data (sample size = 37)” 
 
“Two-Sample T-Test” for risk factor “Force Majeure (FM)” between Scale 1-6 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 2 
        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 1  37  2.20   1.04     0.17 
Scale 2  37  3.86   1.90     0.31 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 2) 
Estimate for difference:  -1.659 
95% CI for difference:  (-2.370, -0.949) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -4.66   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.5329 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 3 
        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 1  37  2.20   1.04     0.17 
Scale 3  37  8.71   5.33     0.88 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  -6.514 
95% CI for difference:  (-8.294, -4.733) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -7.29   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.8415 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 4 
        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 1  37  2.20   1.04     0.17 
Scale 4  37  7.81   5.62     0.92 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 4) 
Estimate for difference:  -5.612 
95% CI for difference:  (-7.484, -3.740) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -5.98   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 4.0384 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 5 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 1  37    2.20    1.04     0.17 
Scale 5  37  0.0721  0.0597   0.0098 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 5) 
Estimate for difference:  2.125 
95% CI for difference:  (1.783, 2.468) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 12.37   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 0.7388 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 6 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 1  37    2.20    1.04     0.17 
Scale 6  37  0.0708  0.0539   0.0089 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  2.127 
95% CI for difference:  (1.784, 2.469) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 12.38   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 0.7386 
Two-sample T for Scale 2 vs Scale 3 
        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 2  37  3.86   1.90     0.31 
Scale 3  37  8.71   5.33     0.88 
Difference = mu (Scale 2) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  -4.854 
95% CI for difference:  (-6.709, -2.999) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -5.22   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 4.0024 
Two-sample T for Scale 2 vs Scale 4 
        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 2  37  3.86   1.90     0.31 
Scale 4  37  7.81   5.62     0.92 
Difference = mu (Scale 2) - mu (Scale 4) 
Estimate for difference:  -3.953 
95% CI for difference:  (-5.895, -2.010) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -4.06   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 4.1917 
Two-sample T for Scale 2 vs Scale 5 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 2  37    3.86    1.90     0.31 
Scale 5  37  0.0721  0.0597   0.0098 
Difference = mu (Scale 2) - mu (Scale 5) 
Estimate for difference:  3.785 
95% CI for difference:  (3.162, 4.408) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 12.11   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.3444 
Two-sample T for Scale 2 vs Scale 6 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 2  37    3.86    1.90     0.31 
Scale 6  37  0.0708  0.0539   0.0089 
Difference = mu (Scale 2) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  3.786 
95% CI for difference:  (3.163, 4.409) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 12.11   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.3443 
Two-sample T for Scale 3 vs Scale 4 
        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 3  37  8.71   5.33     0.88 
Scale 4  37  7.81   5.62     0.92 
Difference = mu (Scale 3) - mu (Scale 4) 
Estimate for difference:  0.90 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.64, 3.44) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.71   
P-Value = 0.481  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 5.4752 
Two-sample T for Scale 3 vs Scale 5 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 3  37    8.71    5.33     0.88 
Scale 5  37  0.0721  0.0597   0.0098 
Difference = mu (Scale 3) - mu (Scale 5) 
Estimate for difference:  8.639 
95% CI for difference:  (6.891, 10.386) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 9.86   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.7703 
Two-sample T for Scale 3 vs Scale 6 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 3  37    8.71    5.33     0.88 
Scale 6  37  0.0708  0.0539   0.0089 
Difference = mu (Scale 3) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  8.640 
95% CI for difference:  (6.893, 10.387) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 9.86   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.7702 
Two-sample T for Scale 4 vs Scale 5 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 4  37    7.81    5.62     0.92 
Scale 5  37  0.0721  0.0597   0.0098 
Difference = mu (Scale 4) - mu (Scale 5) 
Estimate for difference:  7.737 
95% CI for difference:  (5.897, 9.578) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 8.38   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.9707 
Two-sample T for Scale 4 vs Scale 6 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 4  37    7.81    5.62     0.92 
Scale 6  37  0.0708  0.0539   0.0089 
Difference = mu (Scale 4) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  7.739 
95% CI for difference:  (5.898, 9.579) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 8.38   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.9706 
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Two-sample T for Scale 5 vs Scale 6 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 5  37  0.0721  0.0597   0.0098 
Scale 6  37  0.0708  0.0539   0.0089 
Difference = mu (Scale 5) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  0.0014 
95% CI for difference:  (-0.0250, 0.0277) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 0.10   
P-Value = 0.918  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 0.0569 
 
 
“Two-Sample T-Test” for risk factor “unforeseen site conditions (USC)” between Scale 1-6 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 2 
        N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 1  37   1.51   1.72     0.28 
Scale 2  37  2.003  0.995     0.16 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 2) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.496 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.146, 0.154) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.52   
P-Value = 0.133  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.4027 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 3 
        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 1  37  1.51   1.72     0.28 
Scale 3  37  3.54   1.95     0.32 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  -2.031 
95% CI for difference:  (-2.882, -1.180) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -4.76   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.8360 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 4 
        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 1  37  1.51   1.72     0.28 
Scale 4  37  2.51   2.08     0.34 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 4) 
Estimate for difference:  -1.006 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.890, -0.122) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.27   
P-Value = 0.026  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.9073 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 5 
        N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 1  37     1.51     1.72     0.28 
Scale 5  37  0.00974  0.00977   0.0016 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 5) 
Estimate for difference:  1.497 
95% CI for difference:  (0.934, 2.059) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 5.31   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.2134 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 6 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 1  37    1.51    1.72     0.28 
Scale 6  37  0.0246  0.0350   0.0057 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  1.482 
95% CI for difference:  (0.919, 2.044) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 5.25   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.2137 
Two-sample T for Scale 2 vs Scale 3 
        N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 2  37  2.003  0.995     0.16 
Scale 3  37   3.54   1.95     0.32 
Difference = mu (Scale 2) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  -1.535 
95% CI for difference:  (-2.252, -0.818) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -4.27   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.5472 
Two-sample T for Scale 2 vs Scale 4 
        N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 2  37  2.003  0.995     0.16 
Scale 4  37   2.51   2.08     0.34 
Difference = mu (Scale 2) - mu (Scale 4) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.510 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.266, 0.246) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.35   
P-Value = 0.183  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.6311 
Two-sample T for Scale 2 vs Scale 5 
        N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 2  37    2.003    0.995     0.16 
Scale 5  37  0.00974  0.00977   0.0016 
Difference = mu (Scale 2) - mu (Scale 5) 
Estimate for difference:  1.993 
95% CI for difference:  (1.667, 2.319) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 12.18   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 0.7037 
Two-sample T for Scale 2 vs Scale 6 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 2  37   2.003   0.995     0.16 
Scale 6  37  0.0246  0.0350   0.0057 
Difference = mu (Scale 2) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  1.978 
95% CI for difference:  (1.652, 2.304) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 12.08   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 0.7041 
Two-sample T for Scale 3 vs Scale 4 
        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 3  37  3.54   1.95     0.32 
Scale 4  37  2.51   2.08     0.34 
Difference = mu (Scale 3) - mu (Scale 4) 
Estimate for difference:  1.025 
95% CI for difference:  (0.091, 1.959) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.19   
P-Value = 0.032  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 2.0159 
Two-sample T for Scale 3 vs Scale 5 
        N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 3  37     3.54     1.95     0.32 
Scale 5  37  0.00974  0.00977   0.0016 
Difference = mu (Scale 3) - mu (Scale 5) 
Estimate for difference:  3.528 
95% CI for difference:  (2.889, 4.167) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 11.01   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.3780 
Two-sample T for Scale 3 vs Scale 6 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 3  37    3.54    1.95     0.32 
Scale 6  37  0.0246  0.0350   0.0057 
Difference = mu (Scale 3) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  3.513 
95% CI for difference:  (2.874, 4.152) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 10.96   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.3782 
 
   410
 
Two-sample T for Scale 4 vs Scale 5 
        N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 4  37     2.51     2.08     0.34 
Scale 5  37  0.00974  0.00977   0.0016 
Difference = mu (Scale 4) - mu (Scale 5) 
Estimate for difference:  2.503 
95% CI for difference:  (1.821, 3.185) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 7.32   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.4715 
Two-sample T for Scale 4 vs Scale 6 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 4  37    2.51    2.08     0.34 
Scale 6  37  0.0246  0.0350   0.0057 
Difference = mu (Scale 4) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  2.488 
95% CI for difference:  (1.806, 3.170) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 7.27   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.4717 
Two-sample T for Scale 5 vs Scale 6 
        N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 5  37  0.00974  0.00977   0.0016 
Scale 6  37   0.0246   0.0350   0.0057 
Difference = mu (Scale 5) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.01491 
95% CI for difference:  (-0.02681, -0.00301) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.50   
P-Value = 0.015  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 0.0257 
 
 
“Two-Sample T-Test” for risk factor “political interference (PI)” between Scale 1-6 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 2 
        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 1  37  1.56   1.04     0.17 
Scale 2  37  2.64   1.87     0.31 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 2) 
Estimate for difference:  -1.073 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.773, -0.373) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.05   
P-Value = 0.003  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.5111 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 3 
        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 1  37  1.56   1.04     0.17 
Scale 3  37  5.86   4.65     0.76 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  -4.295 
95% CI for difference:  (-5.855, -2.734) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -5.48   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.3677 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 4 
        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 1  37  1.56   1.04     0.17 
Scale 4  37  4.54   5.35     0.88 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 4) 
Estimate for difference:  -2.979 
95% CI for difference:  (-4.767, -1.192) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.32   
P-Value = 0.001  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.8561 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 5 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 1  37    1.56    1.04     0.17 
Scale 5  37  0.0400  0.0508   0.0084 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 5) 
Estimate for difference:  1.522 
95% CI for difference:  (1.181, 1.863) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 8.91   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 0.7350 
Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 6 
        Two-sample T for Scale 1 vs Scale 6 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 1  37    1.56    1.04     0.17 
Scale 6  37  0.0406  0.0454   0.0075 
Difference = mu (Scale 1) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  1.522 
95% CI for difference:  (1.181, 1.862) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 8.91   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 0.7349 
Two-sample T for Scale 2 vs Scale 3 
        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 2  37  2.64   1.87     0.31 
Scale 3  37  5.86   4.65     0.76 
Difference = mu (Scale 2) - mu (Scale 3) 
Estimate for difference:  -3.222 
95% CI for difference:  (-4.863, -1.580) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.91   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.5422 
Two-sample T for Scale 2 vs Scale 4 
        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 2  37  2.64   1.87     0.31 
Scale 4  37  4.54   5.35     0.88 
Difference = mu (Scale 2) - mu (Scale 4) 
Estimate for difference:  -1.906 
95% CI for difference:  (-3.765, -0.048) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.05   
P-Value = 0.044  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 4.0094 
Two-sample T for Scale 2 vs Scale 5 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 2  37    2.64    1.87     0.31 
Scale 5  37  0.0400  0.0508   0.0084 
Difference = mu (Scale 2) - mu (Scale 5) 
Estimate for difference:  2.595 
95% CI for difference:  (1.983, 3.208) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 8.45   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.3213 
Two-sample T for Scale 2 vs Scale 6 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 2  37    2.64    1.87     0.31 
Scale 6  37  0.0406  0.0454   0.0075 
Difference = mu (Scale 2) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  2.595 
95% CI for difference:  (1.982, 3.207) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 8.45   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.3212 
Two-sample T for Scale 3 vs Scale 4 
        N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 3  37  5.86   4.65     0.76 
Scale 4  37  4.54   5.35     0.88 
Difference = mu (Scale 3) - mu (Scale 4) 
Estimate for difference:  1.32 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.01, 3.64) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 1.13   
P-Value = 0.263  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 5.0133 
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Two-sample T for Scale 3 vs Scale 5 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 3  37    5.86    4.65     0.76 
Scale 5  37  0.0400  0.0508   0.0084 
Difference = mu (Scale 3) - mu (Scale 5) 
Estimate for difference:  5.817 
95% CI for difference:  (4.293, 7.340) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 7.61   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.2869 
Two-sample T for Scale 3 vs Scale 6 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 3  37    5.86    4.65     0.76 
Scale 6  37  0.0406  0.0454   0.0075 
Difference = mu (Scale 3) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  5.816 
95% CI for difference:  (4.293, 7.340) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 7.61   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.2869 
Two-sample T for Scale 4 vs Scale 5 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 4  37    4.54    5.35     0.88 
Scale 5  37  0.0400  0.0508   0.0084 
Difference = mu (Scale 4) - mu (Scale 5) 
Estimate for difference:  4.502 
95% CI for difference:  (2.747, 6.256) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 5.11   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.7858 
Two-sample T for Scale 4 vs Scale 6 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 4  37    4.54    5.35     0.88 
Scale 6  37  0.0406  0.0454   0.0075 
Difference = mu (Scale 4) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  4.501 
95% CI for difference:  (2.746, 6.256) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 5.11   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.7857 
Two-sample T for Scale 5 vs Scale 6 
        N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
Scale 5  37  0.0400  0.0508   0.0084 
Scale 6  37  0.0406  0.0454   0.0075 
Difference = mu (Scale 5) - mu (Scale 6) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.0006 
95% CI for difference:  (-0.0229, 0.0217) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.05   
P-Value = 0.957  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 0.0482 
 
 
“Two-Sample T-Test” for Scale 1 
Two-sample T for FM vs USC 
      N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
FM   37  2.20   1.04     0.17 
USC  37  1.51   1.72     0.28 
Difference = mu (FM) - mu (USC) 
Estimate for difference:  0.691 
95% CI for difference:  (0.033, 1.349) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.09   
P-Value = 0.040  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.4200 
Two-sample T for FM vs PI 
     N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
FM  37  2.20   1.04     0.17 
PI  37  1.56   1.04     0.17 
Difference = mu (FM) - mu (PI) 
Estimate for difference:  0.635 
95% CI for difference:  (0.153, 1.117) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.63   
P-Value = 0.011  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.0407 
Two-sample T for USC vs PI 
      N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
USC  37  1.51   1.72     0.28 
PI   37  1.56   1.04     0.17 
Difference = mu (USC) - mu (PI) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.056 
95% CI for difference:  (-0.713, 0.602) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.17   
P-Value = 0.867  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.4182 
 
 
“Two-Sample T-Test” for Scale 2 
Two-sample T for FM vs USC 
      N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
FM   37   3.86   1.90     0.31 
USC  37  2.003  0.995     0.16 
Difference = mu (FM) - mu (USC) 
Estimate for difference:  1.854 
95% CI for difference:  (1.151, 2.557) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 5.26   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.5169 
Two-sample T for FM vs PI 
     N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
FM  37  3.86   1.90     0.31 
PI  37  2.64   1.87     0.31 
Difference = mu (FM) - mu (PI) 
Estimate for difference:  1.222 
95% CI for difference:  (0.348, 2.095) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.79   
P-Value = 0.007  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.8842 
Two-sample T for USC vs PI 
      N   Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
USC  37  2.003  0.995     0.16 
PI   37   2.64   1.87     0.31 
Difference = mu (USC) - mu (PI) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.632 
95% CI for difference:  (-1.326, 0.061) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.82   
P-Value = 0.073  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 1.4965 
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“Two-Sample T-Test” for Scale 3 
Two-sample T for FM vs USC 
      N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
FM   37  8.71   5.33     0.88 
USC  37  3.54   1.95     0.32 
Difference = mu (FM) - mu (USC) 
Estimate for difference:  5.173 
95% CI for difference:  (3.313, 7.033) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 5.54   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 4.0140 
Two-sample T for FM vs PI 
     N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
FM  37  8.71   5.33     0.88 
PI  37  5.86   4.65     0.76 
Difference = mu (FM) - mu (PI) 
Estimate for difference:  2.85 
95% CI for difference:  (0.54, 5.17) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.45   
P-Value = 0.017  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 5.0016 
Two-sample T for USC vs PI 
      N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
USC  37  3.54   1.95     0.32 
PI   37  5.86   4.65     0.76 
Difference = mu (USC) - mu (PI) 
Estimate for difference:  -2.319 
95% CI for difference:  (-3.971, -0.667) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.80   
P-Value = 0.007  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 3.5639 
 
 
“Two-Sample T-Test” for Scale 4 
Two-sample T for FM vs USC 
      N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
FM   37  7.81   5.62     0.92 
USC  37  2.51   2.08     0.34 
Difference = mu (FM) - mu (USC) 
Estimate for difference:  5.296 
95% CI for difference:  (3.334, 7.259) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 5.38   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 4.2343 
Two-sample T for FM vs PI 
     N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
FM  37  7.81   5.62     0.92 
PI  37  4.54   5.35     0.88 
Difference = mu (FM) - mu (PI) 
Estimate for difference:  3.27 
95% CI for difference:  (0.73, 5.81) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.56   
P-Value = 0.012  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 5.4859 
Two-sample T for USC vs PI 
      N  Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
USC  37  2.51   2.08     0.34 
PI   37  4.54   5.35     0.88 
Difference = mu (USC) - mu (PI) 
Estimate for difference:  -2.029 
95% CI for difference:  (-3.911, -0.146) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -2.15   
P-Value = 0.035  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 4.0615 
 
 
“Two-Sample T-Test” for Scale 5 
Two-sample T for FM vs USC 
      N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
FM   37   0.0721   0.0597   0.0098 
USC  37  0.00974  0.00977   0.0016 
Difference = mu (FM) - mu (USC) 
Estimate for difference:  0.06238 
95% CI for difference:  (0.04255, 0.08220) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 6.27   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 0.0428 
Two-sample T for FM vs PI 
     N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
FM  37  0.0721  0.0597   0.0098 
PI  37  0.0400  0.0508   0.0084 
Difference = mu (FM) - mu (PI) 
Estimate for difference:  0.0321 
95% CI for difference:  (0.0064, 0.0578) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.49   
P-Value = 0.015  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 0.0554 
Two-sample T for USC vs PI 
      N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
USC  37  0.00974  0.00977   0.0016 
PI   37   0.0400   0.0508   0.0084 
Difference = mu (USC) - mu (PI) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.03025 
95% CI for difference:  (-0.04722, -0.01329) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -3.56   
P-Value = 0.001  DF = 72 
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“Two-Sample T-Test” for Scale 6 
Two-sample T for FM vs USC 
      N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
FM   37  0.0708  0.0539   0.0089 
USC  37  0.0246  0.0350   0.0057 
Difference = mu (FM) - mu (USC) 
Estimate for difference:  0.0461 
95% CI for difference:  (0.0250, 0.0672) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 4.36   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 0.0455 
Two-sample T for FM vs PI 
     N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
FM  37  0.0708  0.0539   0.0089 
PI  37  0.0406  0.0454   0.0075 
Difference = mu (FM) - mu (PI) 
Estimate for difference:  0.0302 
95% CI for difference:  (0.0070, 0.0533) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.60   
P-Value = 0.011  DF = 72 
Both use Pooled StDev = 0.0499 
Two-sample T for USC vs PI 
      N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
USC  37  0.0246  0.0350   0.0057 
PI   37  0.0406  0.0454   0.0075 
Difference = mu (USC) - mu (PI) 
Estimate for difference:  -0.01596 
95% CI for difference:  (-0.03473, 0.00282) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -1.69   
P-Value = 0.095  DF = 72 
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Appendix IXG The Conditions of using ordinal data for parametric statistical analysis 
 
The popularity of Likert-type ordinal rating scale is not without controversy. Whether the ordinal rating 
data merely are ordered-categorical or relative to intervals has been a continuing and fierce debate (Wu & Tsai, 
2007). A very common question is whether it is legitimate to use ordinal data in parametric statistical procedures 
that require interval data, such as linear regression, ANOVA, and factor analysis (Carifio & Perla, 2007; Jamieson, 
2004).  
Relative to the issue of the usage of ordinal rating scales, two opposing positions have been held by 
researchers. Some researchers maintain ordinal rating scales as ordered categories, the intervals between the scale 
values are not equal. Treating it as interval, or even ratio, is doubtful and unclear (Hodge & Gillespie, 2003). Any 
mean, correlation, or other numerical operation applied is invalid. Only non-parametric statistics such as 
frequencies, tabulation, chi-squared statistics, and Kruskall-Wallis can be used on ordinal data (Elene & Seaman, 
2007; Hair et al., 2009). The other group of researchers maintains that while technically the ordinal rating scales 
are ordered, using them in parametric statistics is valid in some situations.  
For example, Dawes (2008) found that the data obtained from the ordinal rating scales which have more 
than five points are approximately comparable in terms of mean score and various measures of variation and data 
shape. Dawes concluded that when using five response levels it clearly implies symmetry of response levels about 
a middle category; at the very least, such an item would fall between ordinal and interval-level measurement, and 
to treat it as merely ordinal would lose information. Lubke and Muthen (2004) found that it is possible to find true 
parameter values in factor analysis with ordinal data if assumptions about skewness, number of categories, and the 
like are met. Likewise, Glass et al. (1972) found that F tests in ANOVA could return accurate p-values on ordinal 
data under certain conditions. 
However, the leading researchers in the social science area such as marketing and organizational and 
strategic management use ordinal data in parametric statistical analysis. Leading textbook authors also follow this 
approach (Carifio & Perla, 2007). A definitive answer is absent therefore the debate continues. Many researchers 
have noted that some conditions must be met when treating ordinal data as interval data in parametric statistical 
procedures (Dawes, 2008; Kerlinger & Lee, 2000; Lubke & Muthen, 2004): 
 
1.  The ordinal rating scales should be more than five points with symmetry of response levels about a 
middle category. The underlying concept is that the data are continuous, and that there is an 
indication that the intervals between points are approximately equal.  
 
This is the preliminary condition to use ordinal data in parametric statistics like multiple-
regression. 
 
2.  Regardless of equal intervals, assuring the data meets assumptions in parametric statistics.  
 
In parametric statistics, assuring the data meets the assumptions is very important. For example, 
constant variance of error terms, independence of error terms and normality of the error term 
distribution are the assumptions in multiple regression analysis. To ensure that the resulting regression 
equations for expressing the functional relations of the dependent risk variable and independent risk 
variables are appropriately formulated, the ordinal numerical data must meet the assumptions underling 
multiple regression analysis.  
 
3.  Make sure a strong result is delivered before making claims.  
 
This ensures that there is strong evidence to support the appropriateness of the resulting 
regression equations when using ordinal data. For example, the p-values of 0.001 are much stronger 
than that of 0.45, even if parameter estimates are slightly biased. It is when p-values are close to .05 
that the effect of bending assumptions is unclear. 
 
In the questionnaire survey, the 1 to 25 ordinal numerical scales were accompanied with the categorical 
scales for the survey questionnaire so that project experts could rate risk effects. As shown in Table IXG1, with 
more than five balance rating scales, 25 response levels symmetrically spread from the minimum extreme category 
(VL, VL; level 1) through the middle category (M, M; level 13) to the maximum extreme category (VH, VH; level 
25). This meets the first condition addressed in point 1 that the ordinal numerical data are valid in parametric 
statistics. 
The ordinal numerical data obtained from the questionnaire survey were used in two types of parametric 
statistical analysis. By fitting a set of theoretical distribution to the sample data collected from questionnaire 
survey, a fitted continuous probability distribution for the expected risk effect can be easily identified in risk 
network modelling and simulation to estimate the range values of project NPV. By the use of multiple-regression 
analysis, the functional relationships of the risk variables can be easily identified as well in risk network modelling. 
A set of plots were conducted to test whether the fitted probability distributions and multiple-regression models 
were adequate and the data assumptions were met. All of the results showed that all of the fitted probability 
distributions and regression models were adequate and the data assumptions were met. The ANOVA analysis had 
small p-values close to 0. (See point 3). They meet the second and third conditions addressed in point 2 and 3 that 
applying ordinal numerical data in the use of parametric statistical analysis.  
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Appendix X The analysis of the remarkable low 
standard deviation in construction delay 
 
Concerning construction delay, the actual construction delay percentage was approximately 18.59% 
(Bureau of High Speed Rail, 2007). The SD model outcome (Figure X1) reported the simulation result for 
construction delay percentage with 18.63% for mean, 0.08% for standard deviation, and (18.47%, 18.78%) for a 
95% confidence interval. The forecast error was approximately 0.22% for construction delay, which represented a 
small discrepancy between the simulated and real data. This remarkable result on low estimation error casts doubt 
on the credibility of the SD modelling and this needs justification. In this section, this result was checked and 
analysed to find out why SD model reported a low standard deviation and low forecast error for the percentage of 
construction delay. 
As stated in Section 6.2.5, the risk variable “construction delay” is calculated and depends on another 
variable “time delay effect” which is assumed to be in linear proportion to the expected risk effect between the 
maximum time delay effect TCMAXij and minimum time delay effect TCMINij of a risk event on a work package: 
 
TDij = (RDi-RDmin)/(RDmax-RDmin)*(TCMAXij-TCMINij)+TCMINij 
where 
TDij: time delay effect for a risk event on a work package (in percentage); 
RDi: random variable for the expected risk effect; 
TCMAXij: maximum time delay effect for a risk event in a work package (in percentage); 
TCMINij: minimum time delay effect for a risk event in a work package (in percentage); 
RDmax: 25;  
RDmin: 1; 
i: risk event index; 
j: work package index 
 
Table X1 shows the minimum and maximum values for the time delay effect of a risk variable on a work 
package. The original data from interview surveys for time delay units are day or month. All of time units used in 
the SD model are converted to year. The work packages for THSR project are civic work, track work, station 
construction, depot construction, core system, Taipei underground, and design and supervision. From interview 
survey, six risk variables including land unavailable, resource unavailable, contract change negotiation, 
construction change, site conditions, and ownership change would directly lead to construction delay (see 
Appendix VI8, VI1, VI2, VI10, VI25, VI30, VI49). In Table X1, the total time delay effect of all risk variables 
that would lead to construction delays on a work package of the THSR project are calculated. Table X2 shows a 
rough estimation for SD model outcome ‘% construction delay’. There are 7 major parallel paths for THSR project, 
including ‘land+civic’ (work package ‘land acquisition’ + work package ‘civic work’. ‘+’ means that the civic 
work depends on land acquisition.), ‘land+track’, ‘land+station’, ‘land+depot’, ‘land+core system’, ‘Taipei 
undeground’, and ‘design+supervision’. The minimum and maximum time delay, minimum and maximum 
percentage of construction delay, and range of percentage of construction delay (the range between minimum and 
maximum percentage of construction) are calculated for each path. Since the path ‘land+core’ is the critical path, 
the time delay on this path is equal to the construction delay of the THSR project. As shown in Table X2, the 
minimum percentage construction delay is about 0.0311, the maximum percentage construction delay is about 
0.2079, and the range of percentage construction delay is about 0.1768 for THSR project. Since the range is the 
simplest measure of variation (Mendenball et al., 1993), the variance σ
2 is 0.1768. Thus, the rough estimating for 
standard deviation s is about: s = 0884 . 0 1768 . 0
2 = = σ . This is very close to the SD model outcome that the 
standard deviation is 0.0805 for percentage of construction delay. The maximum time delay effect TCMAXij and 
the minimum time delay effect TCMINij are two of the key parameters that affect output values of risk variable 
“construction delay”. The smaller range values between TCMAXij and TCMINij, the smaller variation in the output 
values of “construction delay”. This interprets that the low standard deviation and low forecast error in the output 
values of “construction delay” are the result of tight range values between “the maximum time delay effect 
TCMAXij” and “the minimum time delay effect TCMINij” obtained from interview survey. 
In addition to using an Excel spreadsheet to calculate the approximate construction delay to find out why 
SD model reports a low standard deviation for the percentage of construction delay, a sensitivity analysis in the SD 
model will be performed to interpret the result in a low standard deviation for the percentage of construction delay. 
Figure X2 and Figure X3 show the spider plot and the tornado plot for sensitivity analysis, respectively, that 
measure the variability of “the percentage of construction delay” when the parameter values of an exogenous risk 
variable change. The SD model has 7 qualitative exogenous variables that affect output variable “construction 
delays”, including “default of subcontractors”, “Force Majeure”, “unforeseen site conditions”, “greater 
environment expectation”, “latent defect”, “political interference”, and “downside economic events”. Figure X2 
and Figure X3 shows that the exogenous variables except for “political interference” are almost not sensitive to the 
variability of “the percentage of construction delay”. Even for “political interference”, it only leads to a small slope 
of relation line which is about 0.0008 in Figure X2 and a narrow range of “the percentage of construction delays”   417
between 0.18 and 0.19 in Figure X3. These results are consistent with those of SD output shown in Figure X1 that 
the standard deviation is 0.08% and the range of “the percentage of construction delay” is between 18% and 19%. 
This means that the SD outcome “the percentage of construction delay” is not sensitive to all of the exogenous 
variables so that there is only a small standard deviation.  
There are six risk variables that directly cause variable “time delay effect” which directly lead to output 
variable “construction delay”, including “land unavailable”, “resource unavailable”, “contract change negotiation”, 
“construction change”, “site conditions”, and “ownership change”. From the causal loop diagrams we discovered 
that all of the exogenous variables but “political interference” lead to only one or two of six risk variables which 
would directly lead to “construction delay”. The exogenous risk variable “political interference” can lead to five of 
the six risk variables which would directly lead to “construction delay”. This explains why “the percentage of 
construction delay” is more sensitive to “political interference” than other exogenous variables shown in spider 
and tornado plots. It indicates that risk variable “political interference” is the major driver of “construction delay” 
in THSR project. 
 
 






















Figure X1 Discrepancy between Simulated and Real Data of Percentage of Construction Delay 
 
 
Table X1 The Min. and Max. Time Delay Effect of the Risk Variables on the Work Packages 
 
   Work packages 
 
Risk variables 










Land unavailable  (0,0)  (0,0) (0,0)  (0,0)  (0,0) (0.03,  0.13) (0,0)  (0,0) 
Resource unavailable  (0.026,0.007)  (0.037,0.1)  (0.037,0.1) (0.028, 0.076) (0.06,0.165)  (0,0)  (0,0)  (0,0) 
Contract change 
negotiation  (0.0089,0.107) (0.0125,0.15) (0.125,0.15) (0.0096,0.115) (0.0209,0.25) (0.0122,0.146)  (0.0062,0.074) (0.0058,0.07)
Construction change  (0.01,0.15)  (0,0.03)  (0.01,0.15) (0,0.01)  (0.1,0.3)  (0,0)  (0,0.01)  (0.05,0.25) 
Site conditions  (0.1,0.3)  (0.05,0.15)  (0,0) (0,0)  (0,0)  (0,0) (0,0)  (0,0) 
Ownership change  (0,0.214)  (0,0.3) (0,0.3) (0,0.23) (0,0.5)  (0,0) (0,0.148)  (0,0) 
Total time effects  (0.0949,0.619)  (0.0995,0.73) (0.0525,0.7) (0.0376,0.431) (0.1809,1.215) (0.0422,0.276)  (0.0062,0.232) (0.0558,0.32)
Note: (min, max), unit: year   418
 
Table X2 A Rough Estimation for the percentage of Construction Delay 
 
Rough estimating for time 
delay on a project path 
Min. delay effect  Max. delay effect 
Min. % construction 
delay 
Max. % construction 
delay 
Range %  
construction delay
land+civic 0.1371  0.895  0.019121339  0.124825662  0.105704 
land+track 0.1417  1.006  0.019762901  0.140306834  0.120544 
land+station 0.0947  0.976  0.01320781  0.136122734  0.122915 
land+depot 0.0798  0.707  0.011129707  0.0986053  0.087476 
land+core system  0.2231  1.491  0.03111576  0.207949791  0.176834 
Taipei underground  0.0062  0.232  0.000864714  0.032357043  0.031492 
design & supervision  0.0558  0.32  0.007782427  0.044630404  0.036848 
 
As shown in Table X2, the interviewees’ statement led to the inference that the minimum percentage of 
construction delay was approximately 0.0311, the maximum percentage of construction delay was approximately 
0.2079, and the range of the percentage of construction delay was about 0.1768 (0.08 for standard deviation) for 
THSR project. Since “political interference” causes five of the six risk variables that would directly lead to 
“construction delay”, so the time delay effect caused by “political interference” would be close to the upper bound 
of approximately 0.2079. On the contrary, the other exogenous variables cause only one or two of six risk 
variables would directly lead to construction delay, so the time delay effect caused by other exogenous variables 
would be close to the lower bound around 0.03. As a result, a tight range between the maximum time delay effect 
TCMAXij and the minimum time delay effect TCMINij set up by interviewees, the SD model produced a narrow 
range in percentage of “construction delay” between 0.18 and 0.19, which was close to 0.2079. All of above 
analyses can consistently interpret why the SD model outcome for “the percentage of construction delay” is so 
accurately with low standard deviation. 
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Downside economic event 
 
Figure X2 The Spider Plot for Sensitivity Analysis   419
Tornado Diagram for Sensitivity Analysis
















Figure X3 The Tornado Diagram for Sensitivity Analysis 
 
A question may be raised, “Why could the interviewees set up a tight range between minimum and 
maximum values for construction delay?” The interviewees have wide experiences in project management of mass 
transit projects that are similar to THSR project. This might be the reason why the interviewees were confident in 
using their experiences or historic data from other similar projects to support their information on tight range 
values between TCMAXij and TCMINij. For example, one of the interviewees, answered to this question as the 
following statement:  
 
“We have wide experiences and good record of achievement to manage 
mass transit projects that are similar to THSR project, like Taipei Metro 
system. The Nova and CoMET rail public transport benchmarking 
consortiums facilitated by the Railway and Transport Strategy Centre at 
Imperial College London have placed the Taipei Metro system first for 
reliability among the 26 other consortium members since year 2004. We 
believe that we are able to provide you with useful information for case 
study on public transit projects.”  
 
 Since there were no real data in terms of qualitative risk effects, many parameter values in the SD model 
were heavily relied on the interviewees (the project experts). Thus the accuracy and error of SD model might be 
greatly subject to the interviewees. The remarkable low estimation error in “construction delay” reported in the SD 
model outcome is exactly the case. Because the maximum time delay effect TCMAXij and the minimum time delay 
effect TCMINij of a qualitative risk factor on a work package are unknown, they need to be estimated by the 
interviewees. Due to the tight range values between the maximum time delay effect and the minimum time delay 
effect, the SD model produced a low estimation error in “construction delay”. This case reflects that the effects of 
qualitative risk factors such as “resource unavailable” and “ownership change” have to depend on the 
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Appendix XI Acronyms 
 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
PPP: Public-private Partnership 
VFM: Value for Money 
NPV: Net Present Value 
BOT: Build-operate-transfer 
P3: Public-private Partnerships 
PWF: Public Works Financing Projects 
O&M: Operations and Maintenance 
DB: Design, Build 
LDO: Lease, Develop, Operate 
DBOM: Design, Build, Operate, Maintain 
DBFO: Design, Build, Finance, Operate 
BOO: Build, Own, Operate 
RS: Risk Sharing 
LC: Long-term Contract 
SPV: Special Purpose Vehicle 
PF: Private Financing 
OS: Output Specifications 
PBP: Performance-based Payment 
PSC: Public-sector Comparator 
CBA: Cost Benefit Analysis 
CEA: Cost-effectiveness Analysis 
MCDA: Multi-criteria Decision Making 
IRR: Internal Rate of Return 
BC: Benefit-cost 
WBS: Work Breakdown Structure 
SD: System Dynamics 
STPR: Social Time Preference Rate 
CAPM: Capital Asset Pricing Model 
MRP: Market Risk Premium 
NPC: Net Present Cost   421
WSDOT: Washington Department of Transportation 
MoD: Ministry of Defense 
NAO: National Audit Office 
ENPV: Expected Net Present Value 
VNPV: Variance of Net Present Value 
ELR: Expected-loss Ratio 
DSS: Decision Support System 
EEA: European Environmental Agency 
SPARCS: Supply-chain Parameter Classification System 
CLD: Causal Loop Diagram 
PAC: Public Account Committee 
THSR: Taiwan High Speed Rail 
BHSR: Bureau of High Speed Rail 
MOTC: Ministry of Transportation and Communications 
CEVP: Cost Estimate Validation Process 
 
 